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 This dissertation is a political history of the Creek Indians spanning the years 
between the conclusion of the Creek-Cherokee War in 1753 and the Creek Redstick 
migration to Florida.  That migration came to a conclusion in 1821, when the United 
States took possession of Florida from Spain.  By examining British, Spanish, American, 
and Creek documents with the methodology of ethnohistory, it seeks to understand how 
community interests directly and indirectly shaped political leadership in Creek society.  
It argues that Creek towns (italwa), clans, and provinces inspired a contradictory pattern 
of politics among Creek peoples.  On one hand, town headmen forged coalitions with 
other Creek towns to secure trade with Euro-Americans, pursue peace with Euro-
Americans and other indigenous people, and protect Creek hunting grounds.  At times, 
clans stabilized the cross-town coalitions, especially when town leaders forged kinship 
ties with one another or with a potential Euro-American or indigenous ally.  On the other 
hand, clans undermined political agreements and policies when clansmen carried out the 
law of retaliation (lex talionis) against Euro-Americans and other indigenous people. 
 By uncovering the ways in which community fostered and impeded coalition-
building in Creek society, this project revises debates in Creek ethnohistory, Native 
American history, and the history of the “Red”/Native Atlantic.  Countless examples of 
coalition-building demonstrate that the Creeks were not politically decentralized, as some 
Creek ethnohistorians have argued, but nor did they create a centralized “nation” with 
coercive authority, as others in the same body of scholarship have contended.  Secondly, 
 
 
the rise, shift, and demise of coalitions pieced together by this dissertation suggest that 
Creeks conceptualized politics in terms of coalition units.  As a result, Native 
Americanists should no longer use terms like faction, pro-American, or pro-British to 
explain Native political agency.  Rather, Creek politics developed, operated, shifted, and 
fractured along lines of community interests, choices, and affiliations.  Finally, this 
project asserts that the Creeks shaped the contours of empire in the Atlantic basin by 
giving them a decidedly political cast.  European overseas empire-building in the Native 
South was tied to the logic of Creek politics.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Community Politics 
 
 This dissertation examines the Creek Indians in the colonial, revolutionary, and 
early national eras.  This time frame marked a turning point in the history of the Native 
South, where Euro-American colonization steadily reduced the size of Native lands and 
the power of Native sovereignty.  That reduction was not, however, a foregone 
conclusion, and a careful study of Indian politics offers new insight into the arc of 
colonization in this region.  By tracing Creek politics between the conclusion of the 
Creek-Cherokee War in 1753 and of the Redstick exodus to Spanish Florida in 1821, it 
provides a new study of North American colonization from the perspective of an 
indigenous society and its political culture during an era of drastic change.  To 
understand how Native people adapted to, resisted, and perceived colonization, it centers 
on extended family units known as clans (symbolized by totems like Bear and Deer); on 
towns (italwa), the fundamental political node of Creek society; and on socio-political 
“provinces,” which grouped sets of neighboring towns into shared webs of kinship and 
alliance (Figure 1).  My project investigates the contributions of clanspeople and 
townspeople to the creation of Creek policy, the practice of diplomacy, the signing of 
Indian-European treaties, the eruption of Indian-European and inter-tribal warfare, and 
the Creek Civil War of 1813-1814.  While the nature of the evidence compels this project
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 to focus on political leaders so as to elucidate Native history, as ethnohistorians and 
historical anthropologists have done before me, I depart from these scholars by mining 
the archives for the ways in which clans and towns shaped, inspired, and thwarted 
headmen’s political and diplomatic aims.  It also pays unique attention to the political 
language harnessed and deployed by headmen in order to glean how community 
affiliations shaped their beliefs, actions, and goals  
 This dissertation argues that the Creeks actively responded to Euro-American 
colonization by generating a political strategy driven by community interests and 
allegiances, or what is referred to hereafter as the “community politics.”  I refer to clans, 
towns, and provinces collectively as “community,” and employ those terms separately 
when a clan, town, or province is under discussion.  The Creeks’ community politics 
captured both the dizzying possibilities and frustrating limits of communities’ influence 
in Creek politics, and it consisted of two parts.  First, Creek headmen forged an array of 
cross-town coalitions that united clans, towns, and/or provinces around shared goals, such 
as the pusuit of Euro-American trade, the promotion of international peace, and the 
defense of hunting grounds.  Many coalitions were interregional in scope, linking several 
towns across the provinces of Creek society, and some even incorporated Euro-American 
and other indigenous peoples, primarily by means of kinship.  Secondly, precisely 
because coalitions bore the weight of numerous peoples, affiliations, and interests, they 
were shaky political enterprises.  Towns’ interests fluctuated according to perceived 
needs, and clans did not always cooperate with coalition leaders.  Although headmen 
leveraged kinship customs to stabilize a coalition, in many cases kinship smashed 
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coalitions and uprooted societal order.  Coalitions buckled when the warriors of a clan 
fulfilled the law of retaliation (lex talionis).  When an outside group murdered a relative 
(or several relatives), this ritual custom obligated the male warriors of a clan to seek 
revenge and release the spirits of a slain relative to the afterlife.  As a result, clans 
triggered small-scale conflict and full-fledged wars, which subsequently undermined 
coalition unity and policy.  Although Creek clans were primarily institutions of kinship 
that organized individuals into family groupings, clans doubled as legal bodies charged 
with meting out punishment on offenders.  As such, clan warriors and town headmen’s 
commitment to their clans thwarted cross-town unity and unleashed chaos across the 
Native South.  Community politics was double-edged, then.  Town headmen fueled 
domestic unity by linking multiple towns in alliance and by occasionally leveraging 
kinship networks to ease coalition-building and form larger diplomatic alliances.  Yet 
kinship-based clan networks triggered internal disunity and international conflict, 
especially when clans retaliated against an outside group, such as the British, Choctaws, 
or Chickasaws.
1
 
 Creek community politics centered on the political principle of consensus.  
Consensus encouraged town leaders to rule according to the majority opinion in any 
given clan, town, or province, though we know the most about consensual rule within 
                                                             
 
1
 On Creek politics, see Charles Hudson’s The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, TN: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 202-222; Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek 
Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 102-103; 
Joshua A. Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 7-10; and George E. Lankford, Looking for Lost Lore: Studies in 
Folklore, Ethnology, and Iconography (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 73-
96. 
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towns.  Creeks lacked an electoral process, but it is certain that the town council (mikalgi) 
elected a chief town leader (mico) and headmen who served in other ranked capacities on 
behalf of the town.  Only men who excelled in hunting, warfare, oratory, spiritual affairs, 
and other areas of leadership were considered fit to rule.  Leadership based on merit 
meant that headmen served and continued to serve the town only if they voiced town 
interests.  There were clear limts imposed by the town on a headman.  Most archival 
evidence does not clarify whether the men and women in a town explicitly empowered 
headmen to pursue a course of action.  But headmen’s daily meetings in the town square 
ground (tcoko-thlako, “big house”), where they debated domestic and foreign affairs, 
presumably reflected the majority interests of a town, though divisions could easily 
surface.  Women, too, shaped the recurring council meetings.  Though barred from the 
proceedings, women influenced the daily gatherings by swaying their kinsmen to pursue 
a course of action and by cultivating public influence through participation in square 
ground ceremonialism.  Whether Creek policy and diplomacy reflected a previously 
agreed-upon course of action in a town or whether the town left it up to the headmen’s 
discretion to improvise in the moment is uncertain, although it was probably some 
combination of the two.  This is bolstered by the fact that Southern Indian custom held 
that headmen generally should rule for as many people in their particular town as 
possible.  But clans and especially women, who led clans, complicated town politics 
since custom required women, as necessary, to call upon their male family members to 
get revenge.  Women, as leaders of clans, maintained the principle of retaliation as well 
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as their own authority in politics, thereby occasionally inhibiting intra-town unity and 
inter-town coalitions.
2
 
 The evidence examined in this dissertation suggests that when spearheading 
domestic and international policies, most Creek headmen believed that they were 
representing their clan, town, and/or provincial interests in the pursuit of common goals.  
The available evidence also indicates that the longer a particular leader served in a 
political and/or diplomatic capacity, the more able to maintain his power and popularity 
he was and, therefore, the more confident we can be that his people supported his 
decisions over time.  In this way, headmen frequently attempted to pass and implement 
policies, sign treaties, pursue peace, and wage war because a majority in his town, clan, 
or province tasked him with doing so or, at least, he perceived as much.  Community, 
then, was a major building block of Creek politics.  When, for instance, the headmen of 
Cussita told a U.S. official in 1793 that “The three rivers have talked, and wished for 
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 Consensus, according to anthropologist Robbie Ethridge, was “a valued social trait” 
among Creek headmen who brokered agreements and crafted policy following vigorous and 
tiresome discussions, and despite the outcome, “everyone was under intense pressure to comply 
with [the] majority.”  According to ethnohistorian Joshua Piker, Creeks “resolved debates . . . via 
consensus and compromise, not with the warfare they sometimes used to settle disputes” with 
outsiders.  All townsmen were required to participate in daily discussion, and although women 
may have been barred from the brush cabins, they could look on and indirectly sway the goings-
on.  At times, town headmen took a decision reached in their towns and brought it to the 
Council’s attention, thereby laying the basis of cross-town coalitions, goals, and policies.  All 
Cherokee men, too, participated in Cherokee town councils, where according to ethnohistorian 
Theda Perdue, the headmen proposed “a course of action and then waited for a consensus to 
emerge from prolonged discussion.”  For quotes, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 108 (“valued,” 
“everyone”); Joshua A. Piker, The Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler: Telling Stories in Colonial 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 98 (“resolved”); Theda Perdue, 
Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1998), 56 (“course”).  For women’s role in their clan, see Kathryn E. Holland 
Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; 
repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 23. 
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peace,” they were saying that the towns along three major rivers of Creek society had 
earlier assembled in one town (i.e., Cussita) to develop a peace policy designed to 
appease the aggressively expanding United States.  That headmen drawn from several 
towns agreed to such a policy suggests that they spoke for a general sentiment—a 
consensus—among all Creeks, who believed that they needed to do something to address 
the crises of U.S. expansion.
3
  In numerous cases, moreover, headmen invoked their clan, 
town, and provinicial affiliations in cross-town assemblies, in diplomacy with other 
Indians, and at the European-Indian treaty table.  By doing so, headmen publicly 
established their legitimacy as community leaders, represented a majority agenda, and 
signaled the partipation of communities in the political and diplomatic process.  Leaders, 
coalitions, and communities therefore constituted a symbiotic whole.  In many cases, 
Creeks strove to unite for common purposes and to do so for the benefit of a vast 
majority. 
 Unfortunately, headmen struggled to voice majority interests since doing so 
meant juggling their affiliations with and allegiances to their clan, town, and province as 
well as to a cross-town coalition and in some cases an international alliance with, say, the 
British or Choctaws.  That was quite a difficult endeavor, skilled though many headmen 
were.  Colonization exposed the inability of individual Creek leaders to balance local 
                                                             
 3 For “three rivers,” see Bird Tail King (“BIRD KING”) and Cussita Mico (“CUSSETAH 
KING”) to Major Henry Gaither, 4/13/1793, Cussita, in American State Papers. Documents, 
Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, from the First Session of the First 
to the Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1789, and 
Ending March 3, 1815, ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, DC: Gales 
and Seaton, 1832), 1:420 (hereafter cited as ASPIA, volume number, page number), enclosed in 
Henry Gaither to Henry Knox, 4/19/1793, Fort Fidius, ASPIA, 1:419. 
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affiliations, especially their clan and town affiliations, with the needs and interests of 
coalitions, which encompassed multiple clans and towns.  The problem was that the local 
clashed with the national, frustrating Creek unity.  Since a headman’s legitimacy 
depended in part on representing his clan and town in larger political groupings, he had to 
obey his people when they required him to do so.  As leaders of coalitions, headmen 
faced enough problems trying to unite numerous towns behind a policy, but clans posed 
more serious—and violent—problems for headmen.  When a Native or non-Native 
person murdered his relative (or relatives), a leader’s clan affiliation and obligation to his 
grieving family took precedence.  He helped mete out punishment or, at least, consented 
to such punishment to satisfy his clan’s demands.  As a result, he placed the clan’s needs 
ahead of his town, his province, and/or the coalition he might be participating in.  
Consequently, retaliation ignited cycles of attack and counter-attack.  In fact, during the 
Creek-Choctaw War (1766-1776) and Creek-Chickasaw War (1792-1797), some Creek 
headmen pursued diplomacy with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, but then later exacted 
vengeance on them.  Although Creek headmen excelled in forging coalitions across 
towns and provinces, they often struggled to suppress their own clan identities and the 
obligation of retaliation that accompanied being a Bear or Deer. 
 
Historiographical Discussion and Significance 
 A dissertation tracing the community shape of Creek politics draws from, and 
reinforces, a “local” turn in the Native South scholarship, whose practitioners are 
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ethnohistorians and historical anthropologists.
4
  Both kinds of scholars study the Native 
past by examining ethnographic reports, oral traditions, and documentary evidence.
5
  
Although no Native South scholar ignores the impact of global/Atlantic history on Native 
history and the ways in which the Southern Indians participated in the global capitalist 
market system, scholars have begun to more explicitly probe the changes and continuities 
of community, place, and identity in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Native South.  
Recent analyses of Native Southerners begin at the ground level and work their way up 
categorically and historically: from the local world within which the Creeks lived and 
from which they became clanspeople and townspeople to the interregional and global 
linkages that they helped forge and that carried them into the modern world. 
 The local turn is indebted to earlier historians, such as Verner W. Crane, who 
engineered a more inclusive history of the colonial South than what had come before.  
Writing in 1929, Crane argued that the Southern “frontier” was a shifting “zone” of 
peoples and goods that resulted from the three-way competition among Spanish La 
Florida, English Carolina (f. 1670), and French Louisiana (f. 1699).  The Southern 
Indians participated in the nexus of imperial conflict, he asserted, by trading Indian slaves 
and animal skins for coveted trade goods.  Crane was the first modern scholar of the 
                                                             
 
4
 As opposed to the Native “Southeast,” an older term that referred rather limitedly to the 
Southern Indians, “Native South” captures the expansive triracial components of Southern 
history, which envelops Indians as well as people of European and African descent.  See James 
Taylor Carson, Robbie Ethridge, and Greg O’Brien, “Editors’ Introduction: A Line in the Sand,” 
in Native South, 1 (2008): ix-xvi, here xii-xiii.  Collectively, I refer to the indigenous people of 
the South as “Southern Indians,” “Native Southerners,” and “indigenous Southerners.” 
 
5
 I consider myself to be an “ethnohistorian,” although trained in the methods of history 
and the historiography of United States history.  I have published, for example, in Ethnohistory, 
the journal of the international American Society for Ethnohistory; see Steven J. Peach, “Creek 
Indian Globetrotter: Tomochichi’s Trans-Atlantic Quest for Traditional Power in the Colonial 
Southeast,” Ethnohistory 60:4 (Fall 2013): 605-635. 
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colonial South to demonstrate that Indians possessed their own agendas and interests on 
the frontier.  In that vein, he contended that the powerful Creek confederacy developed 
the “play-off system,” a unique approach to balance-of-power politics by which the 
Creeks pitted the European powers against one another to secure better prices on trade 
goods, to keep the Europeans guessing, and, above all, to remain autonomous.  Since 
1929, the concept of the play-off system courses through recent books on the Creeks.
6
  
                                                             
 
6
 Crane briefly studied under Harvard University’s Frederick Jackson Turner, a famous 
American historian of American frontier history.  Crane was unsatisfied with Turner’s 1893 
“Frontier Thesis,” which interpreted the American frontier as a sharp line of civilization that 
divided savage Indians from civilized Americans (usually white males).  As Americans pushed 
west in the 1800s, Turner believed, Indians receded from view and diminished in historical 
importance.  Crane also challenged anthropologist John R. Swanton, his contemporary.  Whereas 
Swanton examined Creek history from the “ethnographic present,” which assumes cultural 
continuity in an indigenous culture, Crane historicized Southern Indian actions and motives.  
Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, with an introduction by Steven C. Hahn 
(1929; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004), xviii-xxiii, 71-107, 153-154, 
185.  “The Indian frontier in the South,” he argued, “was a zone of intercolonial as well as 
international contacts and rivalries” (153-154).  In a study of the Creeks from de Soto’s entrada 
to the U.S. victory over Britain in the American Revolution, David H. Corkran developed Crane’s 
notion of the play-off system; see Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783 (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1967). 
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Figure 1.  Eighteenth-Century Creek Society.  For the Creek provinces, see Table 1.  In the 
riverine world of the Native South, Creeks divided into the “Lower” and “Upper” Creeks.  The 
Lower Creek provincial division inhabited the middle Chattahoochee River.  The Tallapoosa, 
Abeika, Okfuskee, and Alabama towns, known collectively as the Upper Creeks, lived on the 
Tallapoosa, Coosa, and upper Alabama Rivers.  Beginning in the early eighteenth century, many 
Lower Creeks migrated to the Florida peninsula and established Alachua and other towns in the 
north Florida plains.  These breakaway Creeks later became known as the “Seminoles.”  Source: 
Map from Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with 
Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 10.  
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 In the 1970s and 1980s, after the field of ethnohistory emerged, historical 
anthropologist Charles Hudson and ethnohistorian Michael D. Green pushed Southern 
Indian history and culture in new directions.  Hudson’s influential Southeastern Indians 
(1976) tackled extant but underused Creek and Cherokee sources to argue that the 
Southern Indian “belief system” promoted societal and cosmic “order.”  Anything pure 
was good, and anything polluted was bad.  Purity fostered harmony, while pollution 
precipitated discord.
7
  If Hudson searched for a unifying cultural paradigm for the Native 
South, in 1982 Green interrogated the divisiveness of Creek society, which struggled to 
unite against U.S. expansion in the 1810s and 1820s.  Creek history “pointed . . . to local 
autonomy and the independence of towns,” he wrote, arguing that decentralization and 
particularly the growing wedge between the Lower and Upper Creek towns weakened 
Creek autonomy and hastened Creeks’ forced removal in 1836 and 1837 to Indian 
Territory (which became Oklahoma in 1907).
8
 
 The 1990s witnessed two economic approaches to the so-called decentralized 
Creek town world.  In 1993, Kathryn E. Holland Braund argued that decentralized towns 
                                                             
 
7
 Hudson, Southeastern Indians, especially 120-183, 120 (“belief”), 121 (“order”).  Mary 
C. Churchill, “The Oppositional Paradigm of Purity Versus Pollution in Charles Hudson’s The 
Southeastern Indians,” in “To Hear the Eagles Cry: Contemporary Themes in Native American 
Spirituality,” ed. Lee Irwin, special issue, American Indian Quarterly 20, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 563-
593, critiques Hudson’s argument for its reliance on a Western-centric paradigm that privileged 
an oppositional schematic over indigenous thought and scholarly nuance.  I agree with his retort, 
which is that the Indians’ actions often reflected an almost obsessive concern with maintaining 
purity in a world undergoing cataclysmic change. 
 
8
 Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in 
Crisis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), especially 12 (“pointed”), 69-97, 141-173.  
Like Green, who also examined the relationship between U.S. Indian policy and Creek 
factionalism, Kevin Kokomoor considers the impact of Federalist Indian policy on U.S.-Creek 
relations in “Creeks, Federalists, and the Idea of Coexistence in the Early Republic,” Journal of 
Southern History 81:4 (November 2015): 803-842. 
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participated in the deerskin trade by supplying European traders with finished and 
unfinished deerskins in exchange for a myriad of trade goods, including weapons, 
clothing, and brass and iron utensils.  Like Green, she argued that “the loosely structured, 
ill-defined collection of independent towns” pushed against political cohesion.  
Decentralization spelled disaster in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
Creek dependence on U.S. trade goods and Creek debts to U.S. trading “factories” caused 
American authorities to exploit societal divisions and secure land cession treaties.
9
  In 
1999, Claudio Saunt presented an innovative economic analysis of Creeks.  He argued 
that Creeks’ linkage to the global market created both political and economic divisions.  
A minority of métis (bicultural) Creeks, children of Euro-American fathers and Creek 
mothers, adopted the profit motive from their trader fathers.  Intermarried white male 
traders were popularly known as “Indian countrymen.”  Ushering in a “new order” of 
society, métis headmen amassed wealth in the form of livestock and African American 
slaves.  These changes prompted métis leaders to accept the concept of private property 
and “theft,” having kept personal possession under lock and key.
10
 
 Scholars continue to examine Creek towns in the twenty-first century.  Steven C. 
Hahn’s Invention of the Creek Nation (2004) follows Crane by arguing that different 
                                                             
 
9
 The Americans followed the British, who pioneered goods-for-land deals.  Braund, 
Deerskins, especially 6-7, 121-138, 139 (“loosely”), 164-188. 
 
10
 Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of 
the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1 (“new”), 1-7, 
90-110, 164-185, 175 (“theft”).  I use “métis” to convey the bicultural ancestry of Indian people.  
Although métis is a problematic term, others like “mixed-blood” or “half-blood” are blatantly 
racist, and Euro-American settlers used the latter terms to denigrate people of mixed ancestry.  
For presumptions of race and culture that underlay language, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 249-
250n1; Joel W. Martin, Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees’ Struggle for a New World (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1991), 79. 
 
13 
 
“factions” of Creek towns excelled in the play-off system.  But he expands on Crane by 
arguing that the Creek “nation” was born in the three-way contest for empire.  Moreover, 
whereas Green and Braund suggested that Creek factionalism naturally emerged in a 
decentralized society, Hahn asserts that Creeks framed a policy of “neutrality” that 
deliberately encouraged factionalism and the play-off system on which factions were 
based.  Neutrality policy bolstered Creek autonomy, at least until 1763, when Britain’s 
victory in the Seven Years’ War ejected the Spanish and French from the South.
11
  
Debuting in the same year, Joshua A. Piker’s Okfuskee (2004) traces the “town history” 
of Okfuskee from the early colonial period to the Revolutionary era.  His central 
contention is that Creek history was town-based.  When “we examine the logic and 
practice of Creek life,” he argues, “the clan’s importance diminishes, although it does not 
disappear, and towns [take] center stage” diplomatically.  By focusing on Creek towns, 
he follows in the footsteps of Green and Braund who viewed Creek society as a 
decentralized town world, but he diverges from them by underscoring the agency of 
individual towns whose inhabitants probably did not see themselves as decentralized.  
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 Hahn, Invention, 110-119, 225-228, 231-244, 276-277; Green, Politics, 12; Braund, 
Deerskins, 22.  According to Hahn, two “ideas” of Creek nationhood existed side-by-side and 
converged by midcentury.  The first was the “aboriginal Creek nation,” which enveloped “the 
Creek people and the kinship relationships that bound them together into clans and towns.”  The 
second idea of a Creek nation was influenced by European conceptions of borders and space; this 
was the “Creek Nation, . . . a legal entity empowered to cede or protect the land claimed by the 
nation as a whole.”  An outgrowth of “frontier diplomacy,” the Creek Nation took shape “only 
intermittently, most obviously when Creeks and Europeans met to discuss land transactions” 
(262). 
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Rather, each town had its own worldview, motives, and traditions that shaped Anglo-
Creek diplomacy.
12
 
 In 2003, anthropologist Robbie Ethridge presented an original economic and 
ecological analysis of Creeks at the turn of the nineteenth century.  In Creek Country, 
Ethridge analyzes the impact of environmental change on seventy-three Creek towns, 
which she carefully maps.  Some of these changes included the growing frequency of 
mixed-crop farming and the widespread adoption of animal husbandry.  She develops 
Saunt’s focus on Creek economic divisions but offers the important argument that most 
Creeks owned private property, particularly hogs, cattle, and horses, and not just the 
minority class of wealthy métis headmen.  By participating in the global profit-motivated 
Southern economy or Saunt’s “new order,” Creek women especially showed, according 
to Ethridge, an unprecedented “commercial aggressiveness.”  Women transported their 
cattle to market and sold it in exchange for trade goods and African American slaves.  
Although it is unclear whether non-wealthy Creeks conceptualized property as a form of 
capital that spawned class divisions, Ethridge like Saunt raises the possibility that the 
“wealth generated from” property certainly fostered a line between rich and poor by the 
early 1800s.
13
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 Piker, Okfuskee, 10 (“examine”) and especially 15-74.  Piker, “‘Meet at My Town’: 
Localism in the Native American Southeast from the Mississippian Era to Removal,” 
(unpublished manuscript), pp. 1-56, traces the local history of much of the Native South from the 
Mississippian to Removal periods.  He argues that towns were central components of diplomacy 
and politics in the Mississippian, colonial, and modern Native South.  I thank Professor Piker for 
sharing his manuscript with me.  Many of the arguments in “‘Meet at My Town’” can be found in 
Piker, Four Deaths, especially 100-103, 136-141, 251-253. 
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 Ethridge, Creek Country, 158-174, 167 (“commercial”), 299n23, 300n29 (“wealth” 
[my emphasis]). 
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 Angela Pulley Hudson and Michelle LeMaster interrogate other local concepts, 
such as space, gender, and kinship, providing a more nuanced understanding of Creek 
history.  Hudson examines the impact of “territoriality” and geographical “access” in 
early-nineteenth-century Creek society.  The Creeks’ notion of a “white path” denoted 
the literal trade paths that led to and from Creek society and a symbolic path (a Spirits’ 
Road) that maintained Creeks’ linkages to the Master of Breath and the Spirit World.  
When Creeks spoke of a white path in diplomacy, she argues, they were promoting Creek 
culture and sovereignty.  The controversial Treaty of Washington of 1805, however, 
undermined the white path.  Pursuant to that treaty, between 1806 and 1811 U.S. 
engineers constructed the Federal Road, an intrusive horse path that cut through Creek 
country.  The Road facilitated the passage of thousands of white and black people 
through Creek territory, constricted clan and town mobility, and subsequently triggered 
the Creek civil war known as the Redstick War of 1813-1814.  For her part, Michelle 
LeMaster dissects European and Native gender norms in seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century British-Indian relations.  By crafting a framework of gendered power 
and culture, she contends that the “rhetorics” and realities of Native and European 
families shaped intermarriage.  Native women, according to LeMaster, influenced cross-
cultural diplomacy by casting male leaders’ diplomatic messages in a more peaceful 
light.
14
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 Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves 
and the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2010), 1-9, 37-65, 67-89, 91-120; LeMaster, Brothers, 15-50.  For the idea that women’s 
presence in Native embassies signaled the peaceful intentions of those embassies, see Greg 
O’Brien, “The Conqueror Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-
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 Scholars of the Native South, then, examine Indians through the categories of 
community, particularly towns, place, and kinship.  Beginning with Crane and 
accelerating under Hudson, Green, Braund, and Saunt, the newest generation of 
scholarship probes the cultural, gendered, political, and environmental changes in 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Creek society.  Whereas Piker examines the 
nuances of town life, Hahn’s study of Creek nation-building demonstrates that towns 
came together especially at the treaty table to defend land and articulate a sense of Creek 
“‘nationhood’” by 1750.
15
  Ethridge tracks the environmental changes of Creek talwas by 
examining the ways in which the incorporation of mixed-crop farming and animal 
husbandry contributed to the growth of talofas (daughter towns) and the demographic 
dispersal of Creeks at the turn of the nineteenth century.
16
  Furthermore, Angela Pulley 
Hudson identifies the origins of the Redstick War in a contest over local territorial access.  
The Federal Road threw up roadblocks on the Spirits’ Road.
17
 
 Scholars since Charles Hudson agree that towns were the lifeblood of Creek 
politics, but they disagree on the extent to which towns collaborated to adapt to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Revolutionary Southern Frontier,” Journal of Southern History 67:1 (February 2001): 39-72, here 
51, 55, and especially p. 59; and Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and 
Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-
15, 55, 283-287. 
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 Piker, Okfuskee, 15-74 (for the political and diplomatic history of Okfuskee) and 75-
195 (for the economic, demographic, and gendered contours of Okfuskee town life); Hahn, 
Invention, 8 (“‘nationhood’”), 186-228.  According to Hahn, Coweta’s Malatchi articulated a 
“legal” definition of Creek nationhood that was rooted in a clearly defined territory (189).  Like 
Hahn, Tyler Boulware investigates the relationship between town and nation in Cherokee 
country.  See Boulware, Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among 
Eighteenth-Century Cherokees (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2011), 2-5, 10-31. 
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 Ethridge, Creek Country, 29 (for map of all Creek towns; Figure 2), 95-96, 158-174.  
For Ethridge’s dazzling ecological maps, see pp. 59, 61, 65, 69-70, 72-73, 83, 86, 89, 171-172. 
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 Hudson, Creek Paths, 12-20, 67-89.  Actually, both roads and rivers were points of 
cross-cultural tension (see 81-84, 104). 
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colonization.  Green, followed by Braund, contends that Creek society was composed of 
decentralized towns that struggled to unite against an expanding America after 1783.  
American authorities exploited Creek disunity by wrestling several land cessions from 
the Creeks in the early nineteenth century.  To some extent, Piker accepts the 
decentralization thesis by arguing that Creeks viewed their world with a town lens.  
While Saunt accepts the decentralization argument, he argues that by 1800 the adoption 
of a profit-oriented economy by métis headmen generated a centralized and coercive 
Creek nation.  Drawing on untapped Spanish sources, Saunt argues that wealthy headmen 
hijacked the National Council, a national institution composed ideally of all Creek towns’ 
interests, by passing laws that suppressed local town initiative and especially the clan law 
of retaliation.  Hahn, however, examines the concept of a territorial Creek nationhood.  
He asserts that towns and clans formed the backbone of Creek history, but that they 
intermittently united to articulate a territorial “nation.”  By uniting as “miniature . . . 
confederacies,” those communities at least partially defended Creek land from the 
British.
18
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 Green, Politics, 12, 21-23, 33-34; Braund, Deerskins, 139-141; Piker, Okfuskee, 7-10 
and Piker, “‘Meet at My Town,’” especially pp. 4-5, 20, 22, 26; Saunt, New Order, 180; Hahn, 
Invention, 110-119, 231-244, 241 (“miniature”).  Duane Champagne, Social Order and Political 
Change: Constitutional Governments among the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the 
Creek (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 113-117, argues for a pre-1815 
decentralized model as well.  Joseph M. Hall, Jr., Zamumo’s Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in 
the Colonial Southeast (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 1-11, 12-32, 
95-116, 168-171, follows in the footsteps of Hahn and Piker by tracing the history of the gift 
across Mississippian chiefdoms and early colonial towns.  He contends that chiefdoms exchanged 
gifts that established bonds of kinship and cemented alliances.  The ritual power of gifts gave way 
to alienable commodity trade between Europeans and Indians.  As a result, the informal exchange 
of goods as opposed to the intimate exchange of gifts failed to stop intertribal conflict, which was 
fueled by the Indian slave trade and by Indians’ relentless quest to acquire guns, metal utensils, 
clothing, and other prized goods. 
 
18 
 
 My project, however, disputes the interpretive models of decentralization and of 
nation.  Although the decentralization argument recognizes that the Creeks favored local 
forms of action over unity, it fails to account for the numerous cross-town coalitions, 
some of which engaged in confederation-building with other Native people, that my 
project identifies.  On the other hand, themes of nation, nation-building, and 
centralization overstate the ideology and reality of a Creek “nation.”  The frequent 
eruption of inter-Indian warfare and Creek-European frontier conflict necessitated the law 
of retaliation, which tended to prevent a Creek nation from developing in this period.  
Defined as a coercive legal structure, nation possessed little meaning for most Creeks, 
who preferred clan law to a national legislative body.
19
  Nor did a Creek nation defined as 
a clearly-marked territorial space emerge.  Evidence suggests that most Creeks believed 
that land could not be surveyed and marked.  Although a few headmen framed a legal and 
territorial understanding of nationhood as early as the 1740s and 1750s, it remains to be 
proven that the majority of Creeks viewed their world territorially.
20
  In 1759, for 
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 Saunt, New Order, 90-110.  For a recent dissertation that traces the attempt by several 
headmen to centralize the National Council, see Kevin Kokomoor, “‘To be of one mind and one 
government:’ The Creation of the Creek Nation in the Early Republic,” unpublished project, 
which charts a shift from Creek “society” to a Creek “nation” 
(http://www.kevinkokomoor.com/#!research/c1pvz). 
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 For Malatchi’s articulation of “legal” nationhood in the 1750s, see Hahn, Invention, 
189.  Hudson, Creek Paths, 48, argues that by the early nineteenth century, as Americans 
encircled and invaded Creek lands, some headmen like Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee thought of 
Creek society as a “bounded territory” that needed to be defended and protected.  Revealingly, 
the contemporary Muscogee (Creek) Nation is defined by the town and not by the Western 
construct of a coercive “nation.”  Its bicameral legislature, known as the “Muskogee National 
Council House,” is rendered in Muskogee as “Este-Maskoke Tvlwv-Vlke Ennvkvftetv-Cuko.”  This 
phrase underscores “Tvlwv” or town, a fundamental community unit both today and in the early 
nineteenth century.  As well, the Muskogee term for “nation” is “etvlwv” or town, indicating that 
the Creek government today is as localized as it was during the period under study.  See Jack B. 
Martin and Margaret McKane Mauldin, A Dictionary of Creek/Muskogee (Lincoln, NE: 
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instance, a British official asked the Creeks, “What River divides the Creek & Chactaw 
Country”?  A Tallassee headman replied, “There is no such thing as a Division [i.e., 
boundary]” (my emphasis).
21
 
 Creek society neither coalesced as a nation nor remained wholly decentralized in 
the period under study; rather, Creeks preferred developing policy and conducting 
diplomacy as coalitions.  A coalition temporarily unites people of varying interests and 
backgrounds to achieve a set of goals.  From the colonial to early national periods, Creek 
headmen frequently transcended lines of kinship, town, and provincial affiliation to forge 
coalitions design to secure trade, defend hunting grounds and other lands, and promote 
ties with Euro-American and other Native peoples.  While the most skilled town headmen 
erected coalitions, the ebb and flow of coalition-building rested on clans, towns, and 
provinces.  In addition to towns and provinces, clans—frequently overlooked in the 
Creek scholarship—provided both the adhesive binding a coalition together and the 
lubricant causing it to shift and crumble.  Put differently, all coalitions sprang from and 
served the participating communities, but they also buckled under the weight of clan, 
town, and regional interests.  In a way, the National Council itself was a kind of cross-
town and interregional coalition.  In fact, the larger a coalition became, the shakier it was, 
simply because so many opinions, desires, hopes, and fears clashed and converged.  The 
obligation of a coalition participant to avenge a loved one’s death tended to undermine 
the coalition in which the aggrieved family was involved, especially if that coalition was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 219 (“Muskogee National Council House”), 276 (“nation”).  
See, too, Piker, Four Deaths, 100-101. 
 
21
  Long Lieutenant was the headman.  See Document No. 1, 7/9/1759, Tuckabatchee 
Square, p. 12, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
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currently pursuing peace with the same offending group that had killed the offended 
family’s loved one.  As well, the interests of specific towns within a specific province 
changed at a moment’s notice, thereby inhibiting political unity.
22
 
 Still, for several decades, Creek coalition-building was a highly adaptable 
political response to colonization.  It empowered Creeks to unite for common purposes, 
sometimes ephemerally and sometimes year after year (see Table 1).  Eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Creek political history evolved in the creative tension between 
coalitions and the individual clans, towns, and provinces that shaped each coalition.  The 
Creek language suggests that Creek society resembled a patchwork of coalitions united 
by marriage.
23
  Several scholars have likened the Creeks to a “confederacy” or a 
confederation of towns.
24
  This terminology makes sense and accurately captures the 
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 My thinking on Native American politics is inspired by several scholars, including 
foremost Piker, Okfuskee, 6, and Piker “‘Meet at My Town,’” especially p. 8 as well as by Hahn, 
Invention, 241-242; Ethridge, Creek Country, 19, 93, 277-279n1; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 8, 160-
167; and Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in 
the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 
39-49.  I thank Professors Ethridge and Hahn for reading earlier chapter drafts and helping me 
think through some of my ideas.  For the “interior world” of a Native region, see Natale A. 
Zappia, Traders and Raiders: The Indigenous World of the Colorado Basin, 1540-1859 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 5-18, 25-51, 5 (quote). 
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 Euro-American missionaries created some of the first Creek grammars during Indian 
Removal, when the Southern Indians faced enormous colonial pressures.  See Martin and 
Mauldin, Dictionary, xvii-xviii. 
24
 Green, Politics, 4; Braund, Deerskins, 4-7.  Gregory A. Waselkov and John W. Cottier, 
“European Perceptions of Eastern Muskogean Ethnicity,” in Proceedings of the Tenth Meeting of 
the French Colonial Historical Society, April 12-14, 1984, ed. Philip Boucher (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1985), 23-45, point out that European intrusion into the sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century South caused “previously distinct, geographically dispersed peoples [to 
seek] mutual protection by concentrating their villages in a few selected river valleys.”  As a 
result, several “confederacies” or “unions of convenience” developed (23).  Waselkov and Cottier 
also argue that by the eighteenth century and in response to British policy and settlement, “the 
Muskogees created a reasonably cohesive tribal ethnic group in which the component parts had 
considerable autonomy” (33).  Hahn, Invention, 8, traces the origins and growth not of the 
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ways in which towns were yoked together by kinship politics.  The Muskogee translation 
of “the Creek Confederacy” is Isti Maskóki im Itihalátka.  Literally, it means “Muskogee 
person his/her wedding” or, more freely, “a Creek’s wedding.”  Consequently, the 
political logistics of the Creek confederacy were glued together by numerous affective 
ties that locked families and towns into shared bonds of kinship.
25
 
 Yet, like marriage ties, coalitions and political agreements blossomed and 
unraveled according to familial interests and towns’ shifting agendas.  The root of 
“confederacy” (iti-) captures the political seesaw that yielded both linkage and division in 
Creek society.  For instance, itihoyanka thlákko means “highway,” a space that connects 
peoples and places.  The verb iticakhitá means “to collide,” however, and the adjective 
itikálki translates to “divided in pieces” (as a noun, itikálki is “political divisions”).
26
  
Other Muskogee words with the root iti- signal agreement and disagreement.
27
  Whereas 
itim apalwicitá means “to reach a consensus,” itimathlahkitá suggests the opposite: “to 
disagree, have differing opinions.”
28
  In short, the Creek language glimpses the way in 
which Creeks conceptualized their politics. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Confederacy” but of Creek “nationhood.”  Conceptually nationhood offers “more precise means 
by which to assess the historical and cultural dimensions of political change,” Hahn writes (8). 
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 Martin and Mauldin, Dictionary, 34 (the Creek Confederacy), 36 (wedding).  The 
respective verb of itihalátka is itihalatipeycitá, meaning “to marry (a couple)” (36).  To ease 
reading proficiency, I include in the main text the phonetic spelling of Muskogee words, a 
standard scholarly practice.  For instance, “wedding” is spelled etehvlvtka; phonetically, it is 
rendered “itihalátka” or “(i)ti-halát-ka” (Martin and Mauldin, Dictionary, 36).  The “v” is 
Muskogee is pronounced “a” as in the English “ago” (Martin and Mauldin, Dictionary, xix). 
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 Martin and Mauldin, Dictionary, 36 (highway), 36 (to collide), 37 (divided in 
pieces/political divisions). 
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 For a list of Muskogee words whose root is “iti- (ete-),” see Martin and Mauldin, 
Dictionary, 36-39. 
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 Martin and Mauldin, Dictionary, 37 (to reach a consensus), 37 (to disagree/have 
differing opinions). 
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 This project relies sparingly on language materials, however, developing instead 
the aforementioned ideas with archival evidence.  Like other ethnohistorians of the 
Native South, I interrogate written documentation to track the history of a non-literate 
people.  Records analyzed include British, American, and (translated) Spanish 
correspondence and ethnographic reports, private journals and letters, travel accounts, 
and transcriptions of Creek headmen’s speeches.  I rarely include oral traditions in the 
analysis, though not because they convey a supposedly inaccurate view of the past.  
When coupled with the archives, oral traditions can shed light on the broad continuities 
and changes that Native people experienced during colonization.  But oral materials 
cannot track the nuances of Native political history or the precise ways in which Native 
communities shaped political change.  Documentation is not, of course, without 
problems.  Elite white men authored most of the documents under analysis and betray the 
perspectives of their race, status, and gender position.  Still, a reasonably accurate 
ethnohistory of Creek politics may be crafted by analyzing multiple records against each 
other.  A crucial source for the study of Native politics is the “talk.”  In oral cultures, the 
spoken word is sacred, it affirms and renews bonds, and it is the major form of 
communication.  In the colonial period, Euro-Americans trained in Native languages 
translated and wrote down a headman’s “talk” and then gave the message to an Indian 
“runner,” who delivered it to another locality.  To transmit a message from the town of 
Tuckabatchee to Pensacola, for instance, required “eight days [of] travel.”  The recipient 
was supposed to read the talk aloud to capture the cadences of the words.  Because 
political leaders typically addressed a talk to a potential ally (or enemy), Native talks 
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reveal headmen’s unique perspectives and help flesh out the community nuances of 
politics.  While ethnohistorians before me rely on Native Talks as a primary source of 
documentation, my approach differs in that I examine the actual words that headmen use 
to describe political and diplomatic situations.  Those words were charged with 
culturally-specific meaning and bring us one step closer to understanding how Creeks 
conceived and deployed politics during an era of colonial stress.
29
 
 This project revises the scholarship on Creek Indian history, Native American 
history, and the early modern Atlantic world by offering new approaches to and 
understandings of indigenous politics.  By showing that Creek community politics 
contained the seeds of both unity and division in Creek history, it asserts that Creeks 
transcended the “decentralized” world of kinship and town affinities but respected the 
established customs of clans and towns, forestalling the emergence of a centralized 
and/or territorial “nation.”
30
  My research proposes a historiographical synthesis that 
treads a middle path in the Creek scholarship by examining how headmen forged 
coalitions that linked Creeks across clan, town, and provincial associations, but that never 
grew into a permanent coercive and territory-based nation.  The major reason for this was 
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 Enrique White to Baron de Carondelet, 9/1/1793, Pensacola, in Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, 1765-1794, Part III: Problems of Frontier Defense, 1792-1794, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), 4:201 (“eight”).  Hereafter cited as SMV, 
volume number, page number(s).  Native thought and speech were grounded in a non-Western 
epistemology that emphasized habits of metaphor, spirituality, and kinship.  See Clara Sue 
Kidwell and Alan Velie, Native American Studies (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2005), 83-92, 94-95. 
30
 For “nation,” see Hahn, Invention, 110-120, 274-275.  Hahn’s caveat that clans and 
towns were intimate support structures of eighteenth-century nationhood meshes with Ethridge, 
who writes in Creek Country, 107-108, that the early-nineteenth century National Council’s 
authority was hamstrung by local customs.  For centralization, see Saunt, New Order, 67-135, 
180; Hudson, Creek Paths, 37-65; and Kokomoor, “‘To be of one mind.’”  For 
“decentralization,” see Green, Politics, 12, and Braund, Deerskins, 139-141, 159-163, 164. 
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that although Creeks banded together to promote peace with the South’s inhabitants, 
communities and especially clans triggered societal instability and regional war.  That 
violence, in turn, made it difficult for headmen to form a national configuration of 
politics and to suppress clan retribution. 
 The corollary is that scholars of Creek history have missed the point that the law 
of retaliation destabilized Creek and other indigenous societies because headmen could 
not always successfully balance the competing loyalities of family.  Although in some 
cases headmen and his clan agreed to exercise restraint, in other cases clans obeyed the 
custom of retaliation, which smashed coalitions and revealed the staying power of 
women in politics.  A complex set of geopolitical factors caused the Creek-Choctaw War 
(1766-1776) and Creek-Chickasaw War (1792-1797), which devastated the Upper Creek 
towns and complicated coalition-building in these years.  But the law of retaliation also 
fueled those wars, because clans possessed the duty and right to exact vengeance, 
creating runaway cycles of violence.  While Creek scholars have pointed out that 
retributive justice helped restore peace between a killer’s clan and an offended one, less 
understood is the reality that clans via retaliation thwarted political coalitions, launched 
wars, prolonged those wars, and undermined international peace.
31
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 Both wars demonstrate that the eighteenth-century Native South was not only 
incredibly violent but that clan allegiances drastically shaped violence and warfare.  The Creek-
Choctaw War has received attention from Braund, Deerskins, 133-137 and from Choctaw scholar 
Greg O’Brien, “Protecting Trade through War: Choctaw Elites and British Occupation of the 
Floridas,” in Pre-Removal Choctaw History: Exploring New Paths, ed. Greg O’Brien (1999; 
repr., Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 103-122; and O’Brien, Choctaws, 
Chapter 3 and 84-85.  No scholar has traced this war in depth at the clan or town level.  For a fine 
analysis of the Creek-Chickasaw War from the Chickasaw perspective, see James R. Atkinson, 
Splendid Land, Splendid People: The Chickasaw Indians to Removal (Tuscaloosa, AL: University 
of Alabama Press, 2004), 139-179.  For the nuts-and-bolts of retaliation, see Reid, Law of Blood, 
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 By arguing that Creeks organized politically into coalitions, my research provides 
new conceptual contours in the debate over Native American factionalism.  Native 
Americanists commonly assert that “pro-Spanish,” “pro-French,” “pro-British,” or “pro-
American” factions emerged in Native societies as a result of Euro-American 
colonization.  As factions competed for power, so the argument runs, they fueled division 
and weakened their society’s response to Euro-American expansion, especially the U.S. 
westward advance in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  The factionalist thesis 
is, however, Euro-centric because it replaces Native goals and perspectives with those of 
Euro-American empires and nation-states.  Fundamentally the Creeks were, say, pro-
Cussita (a Creek town) or pro-Bear (a Creek clan).  When Mortar declared to his British 
allies that he was “A King of the Ancient Bear family,” he revealed his pro-Bear bias in 
intercultural dialogue.
32
  Thus, colonization generated Creek divisions not by spawning 
trade factions but by merely exposing the tensions inherent in headmen’s affiliations with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
153-161; Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 172, 229-32; Braund, Deerskins, 154-56; Urban, “Social 
Organization,” in North American Indian Anthropology, ed. DeMallie and Ortiz, 175-178; Piker, 
Four Deaths, 101-102, 114. 
 
32
 For Mortar, see Pensacola Congress Minutes, 5/30/1765, in GFT, ed. Juricek, 272.  For 
excellent ethnohistorical studies that nonetheless get mired in the factional perspective, see 
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“all these dichotomies wear thin under close inspection” (Creek Paths, 86).  For Okfuskee’s ties 
to Tame King of Tallassee, for instance, see Tame King and Handsome Fellow to American 
Commissioners, 6/18/1777, Ogeechee River, in Revolution and Confederation, ed. Colin G. 
Calloway, in vol. 18 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. 
Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1994), 223-225 
(hereafter, RC). 
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a clan, town, and province.  Depending on the circumstances, clans and, less often, towns 
fueled division and warfare.  My work, then, allows us to see the colonial process from 
the inside out.  Finally, a factionalist intereptation overlooks the numerous examples 
whereby Creeks united against Euro-American encroachment.  
 A political study of indigenous communities reveals how indigenous people of the 
“Red Atlantic” adjusted to colonization through political means.  A spin-off of the early 
modern Atlantic world scholarship, the Red Atlantic traces the role of Indians who 
shaped and reshaped networks of empire and trade by physically traversing the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean.  Indians across the Americas, like the polyglot of Europeans and 
Africans who disembarked in the New World, were continental, Atlantic, and global 
players.
33
  Jace Weaver, Kate Flint, and I have recently made this point.  Still, as my 
dissertation argues, Creek Indian coalition-building gave the Red Atlantic a political edge 
that has remained unexplored in the budding scholarship of Red Atlantic studies.  
Coalitions helped mitigate the colonization of the Atlantic basin by frustrating the 
westward movement of British and American settlers in the eighteenth and early 
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 Native Americanists have begun to track the continental networks of exchange and 
alliance that made Native America a shared, if remarkably diverse, unit.  See, for example, a 
dazzling analysis of the “interior world” of the early Colorado River valley and its connections to 
continental, Atlantic, and global nodes of power and trade in Zappia, Traders, 5-18, 5 (quote), 
and especially 25-51.  Juliana Barr is an advocate of continental over Atlantic histories of Native 
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continental world in “The Indians’ Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 53:3, Indians and Others in Early America (July 
1996): 435-458. 
 
27 
 
nineteenth century.  Creek Indians were Red “Atlanteans,” to borrow a term from Daniel 
K. Richter, even if the majority never set foot in London or Madrid.
34
 
 
Community in Context 
The institution of community politics encompassed three tiers of community: 
clan, town, and province.  Foremost, “matrilineal” clans established a framework of 
kinship for all Creek individuals.  In a matrilineal form of kinship organization, Creeks 
reckoned descent through the mother, inheriting her clan identity at birth and for life.  A 
girl or boy’s relatives included one’s mother, all of her maternal relatives, and one’s own 
brothers and sisters.  He was not related to his father and paternal relatives, who played 
little to no role in his upbringing.  Rather, the authority figures in the child’s life 
encompassed his mother, aunts, uncles, and maternal grandmother (mother’s mother).  
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 The Atlantic world is a heuristic device that encapsulates the interface among the 
peoples, ecologies, cultures, and polities of the early modern Atlantic Rim, including the 
Indigenous Americas, Europe, and Africa.  It was also a shared cultural unit that possessed its 
own history, and that was generated and sustained by the circulation of goods, migrants, slaves, 
foods, diseases, capital, cash crops, and ideas.  For a history of indigenous power and politics 
explored through the lens of a Creek leader named Tomochichi, see Peach, “Creek Indian 
Globetrotter,” 607-609, 617, 627-628.  For cultural and spatial interpretations of Native people in 
the Atlantic basin, see Kate Flint, The Transatlantic Indian, 1776-1930 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Robert Paulett, An Empire of Small Places: Mapping the Southeastern 
Anglo-Indian Trade, 1732-1795 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012); and Jace 
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(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).  For “Atlanteans,” see Daniel K. 
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Among Creeks, a woman shared a particularly close relationship with her brother, who 
helped raise and discipline her sons.  Her sisters assisted in the rearing of her daughter.
35
 
 There were probably dozens of Creek clans in the colonial period, although the 
exact number is unknown.
36
  Each one traced its origins to a mythic ancestor, which was 
symbolized by a totem.  Some totems captured a life force, such as Wind, while many 
others derived from animals, such as Bear, Deer, and Tiger (or Panther).  Not all 
members of a given clan lived together in one town, however.  Rather, kinspeople were 
dispersed throughout society.  Some Bears lived in one town, while other Bears lived in 
another town.  In fact, members of a Creek clan lived in many Creek towns, of which 
there were roughly sixty in the period under study.  For instance, a headman named 
Acorn Whistler shared clan ties with people in possibly six towns (including, of course, 
his own).
37
  The dispersion of fellow kin across society meant that an individual town 
hosted several clans.  For instance, Bears, Tigers, and other clanspeople could be found in 
just one town.
38
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 Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 185-197, 323-324. 
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 In the colonial period, four clans (Wind, Tiger, Bear, and Eagle) appear most 
commonly in the records, but there were many others; see Braund, Deerskins, 11.  For Deer clan, 
see Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida, ed. Kathryn E. 
Holland Braund (1999; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2014 [1775]), 150 
(figure 14, “N2”). 
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 The six towns included Little Okfuskee (Acorn Whistler’s town), Coweta, Cussita, 
Autossee, Okfuskee, and “perhaps” Hitchiti. For Acorn Whistler’s clan connections, see Piker, 
Four Deaths, 102. 
 
38
 Anthropologist John R. Swanton was the first scholar to comprehensively study the 
Creek clan system.  He relied on documentary evidence and interviewed Creek headmen in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to glean the intricacies of clan affiliation and 
residence patterns.  See Swanton, “Social Organization and Social Usages of the Indians of the 
Creek Confederacy,” in Forty-Second Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the 
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1924-1925 (Washington: United States Government 
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 Clans were subdivided into matrilineages or families.  Each family included, 
according to one anthropologist, an “old ancestress,” her husband, daughters, daughters’ 
children, and any unmarried sons.  All lived together in a household (huti) consisting of 
several domestic structures, usually somewhere between one and four houses, which the 
women owned (Figure 3).  Household residence was “matrilocal,” which meant that upon 
marriage, the husband moved from his mother’s household into his wife’s huti.  Of 
course, the husband did not surrender his clan identity upon marriage; his clan 
“allegiance” lay with his own matrilineal relatives.  He lived in his wife’s huti until one 
of the spouses died or when the marriage soured, prompting a divorce.  After a divorce, 
the ex-husband probably returned to living in his mother’s huti until he remarried.  The 
ex-wife was free to remarry, and she retained ownership of the house and control over 
any offspring, although divorce was atypical after the issue of a child.
39
 
 Matrilineal kinship prescribed rules and customs designed to foster social 
harmony and cosmic balance.  A host of relatives instructed the children in the fulfillment 
of proper gender roles that followed a division of labor within each town.  As the life-
givers of society, women provided food to their families by farming during the spring and 
summer.  Each town supported a communal field where the female members of each 
lineage planted, tended, and harvested the staples of Southeastern society, including corn, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Printing Office, 1928), pp. 23-472, here 107-170.  For recent analyses of clans and the role of 
clans in diplomacy, see Piker, Four Deaths, 102, 136-141. 
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 Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 190-191, 196-202, 213 (huti and “allegiance”), 190 
(“old”).  Clans were exogamous, meaning that marriage between two people within the same clan 
was forbidden; a suitable marriage partner was to be found in another clan.  During the courtship 
phase, the man built his soon-to-be wife a house and killed an animal to prove his worth as a man 
and hunter (198). 
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beans, and squash.  As European crops, such as wheat, became more prevalent 
throughout the eighteenth century, women cultivated these as well.  Daughters learned 
the methods of agriculture by hoeing beside their mother and aunts.  During the cold 
season, when men hunted and went to war, women collected nuts, roots, and berries to 
prepare for any possible food shortages, although women and possibly children did 
accompany men on the hunt.  A girl’s rite of passage into womanhood was marked by the 
menses.
40
 
 While women nourished life as farmers and gatherers, men extinguished it by 
killing deer and other animals during the hunt and by waging war on their enemies.  A 
boy’s uncle (pawa), who called him “sister’s son,” trained him in the skills of hunting 
and warfare.  The pawa taught his nephew that a hunter always throws part of the slain 
animal’s meat into the campfire as a ritual thanksgiving to the animal, who had sacrificed 
itself for human nourishment.  After learning to hunt, the young boy was ready for war 
and joined a war party comprised of a small number of male maternal relatives.  When he 
killed his first combatant in war, the boy took a war title and became a man.  Successful 
warriors demonstrated prowess in battle, mastered spiritual power, and earned new war 
titles based on additional success in war.  Three “grades” of adult ranked warriors 
existed: the warriors (tastanagi), the war captains (imathlas), and the head warriors or 
                                                             
 40 Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 120-121, 271, 317-319, 336.  For a discussion of 
Cherokee women’s powers and the role of blood and balance in Cherokee society in the colonial 
era, see Perdue, Cherokee Women, 17-40. 
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war chiefs (tastanagi thlako), who led his town to war.  The young unranked warriors 
were the tasikyalgi.
41
 
 To uphold order in the cosmos, gender roles were linked to concepts of purity and 
pollution.  Like other Southern Indians, the Creeks believed that blood rendered women 
and men impure and therefore harmful to society.  During menstruation, women isolated 
themselves from their town in small menstrual huts.  Removed from normal society, they 
briefly lived with other menstruating women and ate from specially marked food utensils.  
A man could not touch a menstruating woman whose procreative abilities polluted his 
virility and dispossessed him of the strength to take life.  Before departing for the hunt or 
for war, men too removed themselves from the town for several days and purified 
themselves by taking emetic herbs, such as the button snakeroot, and danced to cultivate 
spiritual power and ensure success in the chosen task.  When the men returned, they 
endured a second brief interval of isolation and cleansed themselves by bathing in a river 
and taking additional herbs.  A man or a woman’s failure to practice these customs risked 
triggering disease or other ills among the town community.
42
 
 Aside from prescribing gender roles, clans managed crime and punishment.  
When a Creek killed another Creek, by accident or intentionally, the spirit of the slain 
man haunted his surviving kinspeople if his death was not properly avenged.  Next, the 
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 Euro-Americans usually addressed leaders by their war titles.  I will clarify which 
Indian headman is under question when that is the case.  Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 187 
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clan relations of the deceased and of the killer tried to work out an inter-clan agreement.  
The deceased’s relations sought compensation from the manslayer’s clan in the form of 
deerskins, trade goods, or other items.  If emotion prevailed and they rejected the 
payment, as was often the case, the mourners demanded that a person in the manslayer’s 
lineage be put to death.  What happened next was critical.  Because clans resisted killing 
one of their own, warriors in the aggrieved lineage carried out the execution, which 
anthropologists call “blood revenge.”  The killer’s clan stood idly by as the warriors 
meted out the execution, which restored inter-clan harmony and released the spirit to the 
afterlife.  Native Southerners scrupulously followed the principle of blood revenge.  
Unlike blood revenge, however, the law of retaliation (in Western parlance, lex talionis) 
applied to international disputes.  When a Creek killed a member of another society, the 
offended clan was obligated to retaliate.  If that happened, theoretically the matter was 
settled.  But the reality was much messier.  When the clan that committed the original 
killing refused to recognize the retaliation, its warriors responded with a counter-
retaliation that usually ignited war.  Some wars, such as the Creek-Cherokee War (1717-
1753), Creek-Choctaw War (1766-1776), and Creek-Chickasaw War (1792-1797), began 
in such a way.
43
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 I also refer to the law of retaliation as “clan retribution,” “retributive justice,” “clan 
vengeance” or, simply, “retaliation.”  To murder someone implies intent, but since the Southern 
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 Creek towns helped suppress kinship loyalties by uniting a town’s various 
families around a common township identity.  In the Creek language, itálwa (commonly 
Anglicized as “talwa”) means tribal town or, simply, town.  Like clans, towns were a 
distinct community.  The Muskogee term for community is im italhámki, whose root, 
“ital-,” invokes talwa.  According to two experts on the Creek language, a talwa was (and 
is) “the most important unit of community and political organization.”
44
  Merit-based 
town leaders held a rank and title.  Each town had a council (mikalgi), which elected the 
following headmen to office: a mico (“king”), who was the town chief; his advisors, 
including a heniha, or “second man” who served as his “interpreter” or speaker in council 
meetings; and other political officials, including the elderly Beloved Men (isti atcacagi) 
whose wisdom and experience steered discussion.  The council belonged to the “white” 
political division (or moiety), while the warrior classes were “red.”  In Southern Indian 
color symbolism, white symbolized peace, with “white” officials handling matters of 
diplomacy.  Red, the color of blood, referenced war.  Headmen convened daily to discuss 
alliances, Euro-American trade policy, warfare, and other matters in the square ground 
(Figure 2).  Four brush arbor cabins surrounded the square ground, and each was divided 
into three sections to accommodate the ranked headmen.  The mico’s cabin served the 
mico, the second man, and other close advisors.  It faced east, a sacred cardinal direction 
that, like the white division, augured peace and success in diplomacy.  The town warriors, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Evan Nooe, “Common Justice: Vengeance and Retribution in Creek Country,” Ethnohistory 62:2 
(April 2015): 241-261.  Southern Indians ritually also tortured male captives to appease slain 
spirits and capture sacred powers.  Colonial traveler William Bartram reported as much; see 
Bartram, ed. Waselkov and Braund, 155. 
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Beloved Men, and young unranked boys sat in each remaining cabin.  During winter, 
headmen met adjacent to the square ground in a conical structure known to Europeans as 
the “hot house.”
45
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Figure 2.  “A Publick Square.”  Authored by William Bonar, 1757.  During the daily council 
meetings, headmen sat in one of four brush arbor cabins according to their rank.  Each cabin 
opened towards the square ground and faced the sacred fire, which embodied the Master of 
Breath.  The fire cosmically linked the townspeople in This World to the Above World.  Source: 
Image from Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with 
Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), ii.  
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Figure 3.  A Creek Town, 1770s.  Naturalist and traveler William Bartram sketched this Creek 
town and “habitations.”  “A” designates the winter council house or “hot house,” which served 
the same political functions as a square ground, represented at “B.”  The open plaza or “chunkey 
yard,” where Creeks played this famous game in the early colonial period, is depicted by “C.”  
The dwellings of each matrilineage consisted of one to four oblong houses that were arranged in 
the shape of a square, like the town square.  Each house served a purpose, including cooking and 
winter lodging, summer lodging, a granary for storage of corn and other foodstuffs, and a 
warehouse for hunters to store “Deer Skins, Furs & Merchandize.”  But, as Bartram noted, not 
“every Family [has] four of these Houses - some [have] 3, - some 2, - and some but one, 
according to their circumstances, of largeness of their family, &c.”  Source: William Bartram, 
“Observations on the Creek and Cherokee Indians, 1789,” in William Bartram on the 
Southeastern Indians, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 180, 183 (for image; Figure 33), 279n80. 
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 The square ground was a porous and participatory communal space, and the 
seemingly rigid distinctions between the white and red political divisions overlapped.  As 
folklorist George Lankford argues, the square ground and the mikalgi were considered 
white, but the warriors sat among the council and probably freely participated in 
discussion, indicating that “the red could penetrate the white—the two divisions were not 
mutually exclusive.”  Moreover, warriors implemented diplomacy.  Although the council 
authorized diplomatic embassies, most were actually made up of warriors and usually 
head warriors.
46
  White/peace also represented the gradual and natural result of red/war.  
The calm and wise mico was once a hot-headed and rash warrior, and it was only because 
he excelled in the craft of warfare as a younger man and safely led men into battle that he 
was able to earn his position as a trusted town leader and be elected to it.
47
  Women, too, 
played roles in town affairs.  They served as important leaders in town rituals, such as the 
annual Green Corn Ceremony during which the townspeople gave thanks to the Master of 
Breath, a spiritual force present in both the town fire and the Sun.  Although women and 
children were probably barred from the daily council meetings, women shaped men’s 
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 Lankford, Looking, 82-83, 82 (“the red”).  That warriors served as diplomats 
complicated alliances and occasionally perpetuated warfare, a dynamic that is explored in 
Chapters II and IV of this dissertation.  For an archival example of head warriors, such as 
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thoughts and actions “behind-the-scenes.”
48
  As the tcoko-thlako or “big house,” the 
square ground joined the town’s families into a common union.
49
 
 The Big House united the townspeople around the sacred fire that burned year 
round in the center of the square ground.  The fire’s centered position mirrored the town’s 
cosmic place at the center of the universe.  It connected the town to the Master of Breath, 
vertically, and encompassed the nexus of town relations, horizontally.  All people who 
belonged to a town were thought to be of “one fire,” a concept that had political and 
diplomatic ramifications.  Throughout the eighteenth century, the Creeks domesticated 
cattle and hogs, forcing town members to establish villages or daughter towns (talofas) 
away from the talwas, which lacked abundant land to support free-range animals.
50
  Some 
talofas resided a few miles from the mother town, others dozens.  But despite the talofa’s 
physically distinct location, it remained as “one fire” with the talwa.
51
  The concept of 
“one fire” was so expansive that it generated alliances between a town and an outside 
group.  In the late 1790s, one headman reported to U.S. Agent Benjamin Hawkins that 
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 Michelle LeMaster, Brothers Born of One Mother: British-Native American Relations 
in the Colonial Southeast (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 15-50.  
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James Seagrove, 4/19/1793, Flint River, ASPIA, 1:386; and Barnard to Seagrove, 5/12/1793, 
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see Piker, Okfuskee, 8-9, 127-130. 
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the Creek town of Cussita and the Chickasaws, an indigenous group that lived in north-
central Mississippi, were of “one fire (totekitcau humgoce) from the earliest account of 
their origin.”
52
 
Communal ritual nurtured intra-town relations.  Anytime between late July and 
early September, each talwa hosted the week-long Green Corn Ceremony, also known as 
the poskitá (“to fast”) or, simply, Busk.  A sacred harvest festival, Busk marked the 
“Creek New Year” by giving thanks to the Master of Breath for the ripening of the corn 
crop.  During Busk, every townsperson was forbidden from eating the new corn until men 
and women fulfilled the proper rituals of purification.  Men swept the square, discarded 
any refuse from the cabins, and danced, fasted, and slept in the square.  At a certain point, 
women put on the Women’s Dance to celebrate their connection with the Corn Mother.  
Busk culminated with the fire ceremony, which was conducted by the town fire maker or 
“high priest,” a square ground official and ritual specialist trained in the mysteries of the 
cosmos.  He purified the town’s connections with their protector, the Master of Breath, 
by ritually extinguishing and rekindling the town fire.  After relighting the fire, he 
presented fresh embers to the huti women, who relit the fire in their home, thereby 
sealing the bond between family and town, men and women, This World and the Above 
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World.  Afterwards, the townspeople packed into the square ground to dance, sing, and 
eat the new corn.
53
 
 The third scale of community was the Creek province, a regional grouping of 
towns.  Most Creek towns belonged to one of five provinces (Table 1).  The first was the 
Apalachicola or “Lower” Creek province, some of whose towns nestled along the 
Chattahoochee River in the seventeenth century.  The Tallapoosa, Abeika, Okfuskee, and 
Alabama provinces clustered along the Tallapoosa, Coosa, and upper Alabama Rivers in 
what is today central Alabama (Map 1).  These four provinces made up the “Upper” 
Creeks, who lived west of the Lower Creek towns.  To some extent, the Lower and Upper 
Creeks handled their affairs independently.  In 1793, Governor of Spanish Louisiana and 
West Florida Baron de Carondelet noted that the Lower Creeks “although they are united 
with the Upper Creeks . . . are governed . . . with quasi independence of the latter.”
54
  At 
the same time, as this dissertation will reveal, political coalitions unified many of the 
Lower and Upper towns. 
 Every single Creek individual, then, possessed a clan, town, and provincial 
identity.  For instance, an eighteenth-century Creek headman named Mortar belonged to 
the Bear clan, lived in Okchai, and affiliated with the Abeika province.  We can say that 
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he came from the “Abeika town of Okchai” or the “Upper Creek town of Okchai.”  He 
was simultaneously a Bear, an Okchai, and an Abeika.
55
  Headmen occasionally invoked 
their provincial identities in diplomacy, as when a Creek war captain named the Okfuskee 
Captain, who lived in Okfuskee town, introduced a British official to Upper Creek 
country, declaring that “I am one of the Abehkas, & I speak for them.”
56
  The Okfuskee 
Captain was saying that he represented the Abeikas’ interests and that several headmen 
from among the Abeika towns appointed him to that capacity.  
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The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter cited as WHLP). 
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Table 1.  Provincial Affiliation of Major Creek Towns and Talofas, Arranged in Alphabetical 
Order. 
 
Major Creek talwas/talofas Lower 
Creek 
Tallapoosa Okfuskee* Abeika Alabama 
Apalachicola, Broken Arrow 
(talofa), Chehaw, Coweta, Cussita, 
Lower Eufaula, Hitchiti Town, 
Oconee, Ouseechee, Padjeeligau 
(talofa), Sauwoogelo, 
Sauwoogelooche (talofa), Upatoi 
(talofa), Yuchi Town 
X     
Autossee, Cooloome, Fusihatchee, 
Hoithlewaulee, Muccolossus, Little 
Tallassee, Sawanogi, Tallassee, 
Tuckabatchee, Upper Eufaula (?), 
White Ground 
 X    
Okfuskee talwa and Okfuskee 
talofas, including Corn House, 
Imookfau, Little Okfuskee, 
Nuyaka, and Sugatspoges 
  X   
Aubecooche, Coosa, 
Eufaulauhatchee, Hillaubee, 
Kialijee, Nauchee, Okchai, 
Pucantallahassee, Wewocau, 
Woccoccoie 
   X  
Coosada, Hickory Ground, 
Tuskegee 
    X 
 
Source: Jerome Courtonne, List of Headmen, October 1758, box 8, WHLP; Benjamin Hawkins, 
“A sketch of the Creek Country in the years 1798 and 1799,” in Letters, Journals and Writings of 
Benjamin Hawkins, ed. C. L. Grant (Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1980), 1:285-327.  Creek 
orthography follows Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 29 (figure 2). 
 
* Although Okfuskee and its talofas had formed their own province by the early eighteenth 
century, I lump them with the Abeikas throughout this dissertation.  For the Okfuskees as Abeika-
affiliated towns, see Courtonne, List of Headmen, October 1758, box 8, WHLP; Joshua A. Piker, 
Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 8.  
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 All five provinces took shape in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, when a culturally and ethno-linguistically diverse Creek confederacy emerged 
from the ashes of the Mississippian peoples.  During the “Mississippian” period (ca. 900-
1700), which takes its name after the towns along that river that supposedly birthed the 
Mississippian way of life, a series chiefdoms dominated the Native South.  In each 
chiefdom, a civil and priestly class ruled from atop sacred mounds, where they mastered 
the powers of the cosmos and demonstrated their connection to the Above World.  The 
commoners, who were removed from the cult of leadership, may have considered their 
leaders to be semi-divine.  Chieftains exacted tribute in the form of food and labor from 
the town’s population, yet many of them distributed that food during droughts and times 
of distress, thereby tying elite and commoner into a mutual relationship.
57
 
 In the sixteenth century, Mississippian rulers experienced stiff challenges from 
European intrusion.  In 1539, the Spanish conquistador Hernán de Soto invaded the 
South with about six hundred men and hundreds of horses and livestock.  In search of 
gold, Soto’s entrada (armed reconnaissance) introduced “virgin soil” epidemics, 
including smallpox and other diseases, which may have precipitated the collapse of the 
chiefdoms.  One historian argues that between 1696 and 1715, disease reduced the Lower 
Creek population by between sixty-eight and seventy-five percent.
58
  Others factors 
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 Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion and the 
Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), 15. 
 
58
 Ethridge, Chicaza, Chapter 3; Ethridge, “Introduction,” in Mapping the Mississippian 
Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South, 
eds. Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Schuck-Hall (Lincoln, NE, 2009), 10-12.  For Lower Creek 
decline, see Paul Kelton, “Shattered and Infected: Epidemics and the Origins of the Yamasee 
War, 1696-1715,” in Mapping, ed. Ethridge and Shuck-Hall, 312-332, here 321. 
 
44 
 
accounted for demographic decline, such as the intensification of the precontact practice 
of slave-raiding and -trading.  After the founding of English Carolina in 1670, English 
traders competed with Spanish Florida for Indian slaves and animal skins.  Slaves and 
peltry commanded a high price on the global market and became forms of currency with 
which Native people could purchase new trade goods.  As a result, rival Indian towns 
raided each other for slaves with alarming regularity as well as hunted animals.  Spanish 
and English traders exchanged guns, blankets, iron implements, and other coveted goods 
with those Indians who supplied slaves and skins in return.  English traders shipped many 
of the slaves to the English West Indies, where they labored on sugar plantations, and to 
New England, where they worked as household slaves.  By 1700, the complex of trading 
and raiding had destabilized the Mississippian chiefdoms.
59
 
Chiefdom collapse fueled the growth of “coalescent” societies, giving rise to 
consensual and community-based power and authority.  Reeling from violence and 
dislocation, peoples of diverse backgrounds, ethnicities, and languages banded together 
in small settlements for safety and mutual support.  The process of coalescence produced 
the modern Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws.  Part and parcel to the development of 
coalescent refugee towns and villages was that after 1650, according to anthropologist 
Robbie Ethridge, a “shift in interpretations” of cultural practice too place, undermining 
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 Ethridge, “Introduction,” in Mapping, ed. Ethridge and Shuck-Hall, 12.  In Chicaza, 4, 
68-69, 194-231, Ethridge identifies four broad changes introduced by European colonialism: 
internal and external pressures on the chiefdoms; disease; the incorporation of polities into global 
capitalist networks via the Indian slave trade; and the permeation of violence stemming from the 
slave trade.  For Indian slavery in New France, see Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: 
Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2012). 
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the power and authority of Mississippian elites.  Leaders’ engagement with “supernatural 
realms” receded as commoners stressed the powers of This World or the “human realm.”  
The exclusivist mound yielded to the “inclusive” town community.  Headmen’s power 
rested to a greater degree on human reciprocity rather than on spiritual power.  Evidence 
for this comes from the growing appearance on commoners’ utensils of the “looped 
square,” a motif typically etched on the wares of Mississippian elites.  Commoners drew 
on this and other symbols of the Mississippian Art and Ceremonial Complex (MACC) for 
their own purposes.  According to new research, the reinterpretation of religion and 
culture was likely caused by a “revitalization movement.”  In this movement, 
seventeenth-century ceramics suggest that an ethos of consensus emerged.  Whole towns 
harnessed the rituals and iconography once associated exclusively with elite authority.  
Non-specialists may have taught themselves the mysteries of the cosmos by offering their 
own interpretations of Mississippian myths and motifs.  In the wake of revitalization, 
coupled with societal instability, headmen consulted the advice of a larger segment of 
their towns.  Consensus was born.
60
 
Tremendous change shaped the formation of the Creek provinces.  The Abeikas 
migrated to the upper Coosa River valley throughout the seventeenth century and were 
probably remnants of a sixteenth-century polity known as the Coosa chiefdom, which 
                                                             
 
60
 Ethridge, Chicaza, 82-84 (for paragraph quotes); Martin, “Rebalancing,” in Native 
Religions, ed. Sullivan, 91-95.  For the revitalization thesis, see Gregory A. Waselkov and Ashley 
A. Dumas, “Archaeological Clues to a Seventeenth-Century Pan-Southeastern Revitalization 
Movement,” paper presented at the Southeastern Archaeological Conference, Mobile, Alabama, 
2009.  For a brief overview of the MACC, see F. Kent Reilly III, “People of Earth, People of Sky: 
Visualizing the Sacred in Native American Art of the Mississippian Period,” in Hero, Hawk, and 
Open Hand: American Indian Art of the Ancient Midwest and South, ed. Richard F. Townsend 
and Robert V. Sharp (Chicago, IL: Art Institute of Chicago, 2004), 125-137. 
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was located in northwestern Georgia.  The migrant Abeikas may have settled among the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Coosa, forged ties with them, and moved downstream in 
successive waves.  After perhaps one final migration downstream around 1700, the 
Coosa-Abeika population came to include the major Creek towns of Coosa and 
Aubecooche.  Other Abeika towns, such as Okchai, planted roots along the upper 
Tallapoosa River, while still others settled along smaller creeks between the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa watersheds.
61
 
The archaeology of the Okfuskee province in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries is slim.  Whether the Okfuskees were “descendants of the Mississippian polities 
on the upper Tallapoosa River or were immigrants into this area in later years” is, 
according to Ethridge, a mystery.  By 1705, however, the Okfuskees comprised “a 
relatively substantial population and province” on the upper reaches of that river.
62
  
Because the Okfuskee province lived among and appeared to be closely affiliated with 
the Abeika towns along the upper Tallapoosa River, I will hereafter refer to the town of 
Okfuskee (from which the Okfuskee province gets its name) and its talofas as “Abeika.”
63
  
In the late colonial period, Mortar of Okchai and Handsome Fellow of Okfuskee, for 
instance, coordinated diplomacy.
64
 
                                                             
61
 For Abeika coalescence, see Gregory A. Waselkov and Marvin T. Smith “Upper Creek 
Archaeology,” in Indians of the Greater Southeast: Historical Archaeology and Ethnohistory, ed. 
Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000): 242-264, here 244, 246-
247; Ethridge, Chicaza, 113-114. 
62
 For work on the Okfuskees, see Waselkov and Smith “Upper Creek,” in Indians, ed. 
McEwan, 255-256; Ethridge, Chicaza,166 (“descendants”), 166-167 (“a relatively”). 
63
 For evidence of Okfuskee’s affiliating with the Abeikas, see British trader Jerome 
Courtonne, List of Headmen, October 1758, box 8, WHLP; and Piker, Okfuskee, 8. 
64
 See, for instance, “A Peace Talk The Creeks to the Chactaws,” enclosed in John Stuart 
to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP. 
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 Most Tallapoosa towns derived from local populations along the river bearing 
their name, although some Abeika “refugees” settled among them in the colonial period.  
Major coalescent Tallapoosa towns featured in the coalitions examined in this 
dissertation include Tuckabatchee, Tallassee, Autossee, Cooloome, Hoithlewaulee, and 
Muccolossus.
65
  The Alabama peoples founded towns at the confluence of the upper 
Alabama, lower Coosa, and lower Tallapoosa Rivers in the late 1600s and early 1700s.  
The Alabamas were actually composed of two migrant communities who spoke closely 
related dialects of the Western Muskogean language division.  The Alabamas proper 
spoke Alabama, while the Koasati Alabamas spoke Koasati.
66
  The Alabamas proper 
arrived from eastern Mississippi followed by the Koasatis, who moved to Upper Creek 
country from the eastern Tennessee River valley in the late 1600s.  The Koasati-speaking 
town of Coosada (a corruption of Koasati) was an influential Alabama town.
67
 
The Lower Creek province coalesced around a group of immigrant towns.  Except 
for the Hitchiti-speaking towns, such as Apalachicola and Hitchiti Town, which may 
have been indigenous to the Chattahoochee River valley, most Lower Creek towns seem 
to have migrated to the area by the 1660s and 1670s.  By 1662, for example, Cussita had 
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 For evidence identifying these as Tallapoosa towns, see Courtonne, List of Headmen, 
October 1758, box 8, WHLP.  For Tallapoosa coalescence, see Waselkov and Smith “Upper 
Creek,” in Indians, ed. McEwan, 250 (“refugees”), 252-253. 
 
66
 Unless specified otherwise, the Alabamas proper and Koasatis are referred to as “the 
Alabamas” or “the Alabama towns.” 
67
 Waselkov and Smith “Upper Creek,” in Indians, ed. McEwan, 248-249.  Mary R. Haas, 
“The Classification of the Muskogean Languages,” in Language, Culture, and Personality: 
Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir, ed. Leslie Spier, A. Irving Hallowell, and Stanley S. 
Newman (1941; repr., Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1960): 41-56, here 46, 
suggested that “On the phonemic level [Alabama and Koasati] are identical but on the lexical 
level they maintain quite a few differences. In many cases of lexical dissimilarities we find that 
Alabama agrees with Choctaw [a Western Muskogean language] whereas Koasati agrees with 
Creek and sometimes with Hitchiti [Eastern Muskogean languages].” 
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been settled there.  Between 1662 and 1674, Coweta formed perhaps from a “later” post-
Cussita migration.  The ancestors of the two towns, however, probably moved into the 
Chattahoochee from the Tallapoosa watershed as early as the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries.  The Lower Creek province also encompassed the Yuchis (at 
Yuchi Town), who spoke a non-Muskogean language.  The Yuchis likely relocated from 
the Tennessee River delta.
68
 
Apart from the Alabama language, which belongs to the Western Muskogean 
division, most Creeks spoke a derivative of Eastern Muskogean.
69
  Muskogee proper, 
also known as “Muskogee” or “Creek,” was the most widely spoken language among the 
Creek Indians in the period under study.  Among Creeks, it became known as the 
“mother tongue.”  The widespread use of Creek among most Creek towns created a sense 
of linguistic unity in a coalescent world.
70
  Another factor unifying the towns was the 
name “Creek,” a political term that imperial officials invented to distinguish the Creeks 
from other indigenous peoples, such as the Cherokees to the northeast or Choctaws to the 
west.  Between 1691 and 1715, when the Lower Creek towns temporary lived along the 
Okmulgee and Oconee Rivers, British traders began calling the Creeks the “Uchise Creek 
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 For Lower Creek coalescence, see John E. Worth, “The Lower Creeks: Origins and 
Early History,” in Indians, ed. McEwan, 265-298, here 266-291; Ethridge, Chicaza, 73-74 
(Apalachicola), 113-114 (Yuchis).  The Hitchiti-speaking town of Apalachicola anchored the 
province, and its leaders forged ties with the Spanish to the south (Chicaza, 81-82).  Hahn, 
Invention, 28-29 (origins of Coweta and Cussita), 29-46 (Coweta’s early political history). 
 
69
 The Muskogean languages are divided into Western and Eastern Muskogean.  
Chickasaws and Choctaws spoke the Western division, whereas the Eastern division includes 
Alabama, Koasati, Hitchiti, Mikasuki, Muskogee proper (or Creek), and Seminole.  See Haas, 
“Classification,” in Language, ed. Spier, Hallowell, and Newman, 41, 43. 
 
70
 Hahn, Invention, 242 (“mother”), 243.  Hahn notes that by the mid eighteenth century, 
Creeks forged a “Muskogee identity” based in part on the growing use of Creek across the Creek 
provinces. 
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Indians.”  Uchise was the indigenous term for the Okmulgee River.  After 1715, the 
Lower Creeks returned to the Chattahoochee, where they lived until Indian Removal in 
the 1830s.  Incrementally, after 1715, the British shortened the original moniker to the 
“Creek Indians,” and appended “Lower” or “Upper” to that term.  Gradually, the Creeks 
adopted the term “Creek,” especially when it came time to defend “Creek” hunting 
grounds and other lands from Euro-American encroachers.
71
 
To preserve land and the sovereignty on which land rested, Creeks formed the 
National Council perhaps as early as the seventeenth century and certainly by the early 
eighteenth century.  By the 1780s and 1790s, when U.S. colonization exerted tremendous 
pressure on the Creeks to cede land, it met at least once a year, usually in the late spring.  
At that time, dozens of town headmen convened in Tuckabatchee, Coweta, or another 
influential town.  During the meetings, town headmen filled the Council’s various 
positions of leadership, including Speaker (yatika).  National leaders possessed the 
delicate task of balancing one’s own clan, town, and provincial interests with those of the 
remaining Creek clans, towns, and provinces.  The Council featured discussions about 
land cessions, trade debts, and cross-cultural property theft, and occasionally created 
policies to address those issues.  During a given meeting, any and all Creeks could come 
forward to lodge complaints and air grievances regarding some issue.
72
 
 
                                                             
 
71
 Hahn, Invention, 6, 49-52, 91.  The Spanish referred to the Lower Creeks as the 
Uchises and the Upper Creeks as the Tuckabatchees or Tallapoosas (Invention, 91). 
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 For a concise analysis of the Council, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 105-107.  Green, 
Politics, 12, suggests that Europeans in the seventeenth century took vague notice of this 
institution. 
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Organization of Argument 
 This dissertation is organized into three parts.  Chapter II examines coalition-
building during the French and Indian War (1754-1763).  I argue that the Creeks 
addressed the crises of British encroachment by forging several coalitions whose leaders, 
both men and women, largely obeyed the majority interests of clans, towns, and 
provinces.  Coalitions took shape from towns and bonds of kinship that shaped the 
actions and rhetoric of the leadership, which was not “pro-British” but pro-Creek town or 
pro-Creek clan.  In Chapter III, however, the crosshairs are focused on the Creek-
Choctaw War (1766-1776).  This war exposed the ways in which community politics 
simultaneously fueled stability and ratched up violence within and without Creek society.  
In particular, clans and towns facilitated peace and ritual innovation, yet some towns 
promoted the continuation of warfare and several clans prolonged the war by requiring 
warrior-diplomats to seek revenge on Choctaws.  Aside from uncovering the violent edge 
of community membership, Chapter III is significant because it explains why the Creeks 
refrained from participating in the militant Western Indian Confederacy, an intertribal 
confederation of Native peoples in the Ohio valley who resisted British expansion after 
1763. 
 Chapter IV identifies the formation in 1777 of the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee 
town coalition and the Cussita-Tallassee town coalition.  Although the coalitions 
encompassed numerous towns, coalition leadership revolved around headmen from each 
of those four towns.  This chapter dispels the idea that Creek society remained 
decentralized or grew into a coercive/territorial nation by the late eighteenth century.  The 
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Creeks were politically organized but did not embark on nation-building.  Chapter V 
moves into the 1790s, when Creeks fought a two-front war with the Americans and a new 
indigenous enemy, the Chickasaws.  To rein in the chaos, a coalition of Lower and Upper 
Creek towns framed the Three Rivers Resolution, a peace-keeping initiative that 
promoted peace with the U.S. and Chickasaws.  The gnawing persistence of clan 
retaliation, however, engaged the Upper Creeks and Chickasaws in endless cycles of 
violence and disrupted peaceful relations until hostilities ceased in 1797.  The Resolution 
codified community politics by uniting Creek towns around a national policy but also by 
respecting the wishes of individual community aims, especially the law of retaliation. 
 Chapter VI asserts that a contradiction emerged among turn-of-the-century 
Creeks.  On one hand, the advent of profit-oriented headmen created a wedge between 
rich and poor Creeks, many of whom starved during periods of famine when wealthy 
headmen failed to equally distribute among their townspeople the annuity monies 
established by U.S.-Creek treaties.  Although rich leaders were few and far between, they 
did introduce starvation and poverty among some Creeks.  On the other hand, most 
headmen respected and promoted the political traditions of their clans, towns, and 
provinces.  In fact, in 1803, Creek headmen spearheaded the Hickory Ground Resolution 
with fellow Southern Indians.  In this intertribal pact, the Indians pledged solidarity 
against the rapidly expanding U.S.  The Resolution indicates that contrary to several 
scholars, the Creek National Council did not become centralized by the early nineteenth 
century.  Instead, it changed its political colors, chameleon-like, to accommodate the ever 
shifting needs and interests of Creek peoples. 
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 By the second decade of the nineteenth century, the rich tradition of inter-town 
coalition-building that inspired the Hickory Ground Resolution and other forms of 
political action dating back to the Creek-Cherokee War became a liability when Creek 
society erupted into civil war in 1813.  During the Redstick War of 1813-1814, a sub-
conflict of the War of 1812, Creek prophets launched a revitalization movement.  An 
anthropological term, “revitalization” refers to a spiritual movement that seeks to 
overturn the dire conditions of an oppressed people.  Although Creeks were not 
oppressed or wholly powerless against U.S. expansion, the Creek prophets indicted U.S. 
Agent Benjamin Hawkins, who meddled in Creek affairs, and the supposedly 
“accommodationist” National Council which tacitly supported Hawkins.  The prophets 
railed against wealthy Council headmen, such as Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee, who were 
responsible for the economic divisions that had emerged among Creeks since 1800.  
Chapter VII argues that Creek revitalization and the subsequent civil war restructured the 
old coalition system but did not suppress communities’ and especially towns’ 
participation in political affairs.  Town interests so endured that they exacerbated chaos 
and division; the Redstick and National Council leadership each mobilized its supporters 
by forging two competing cross-town coalitions.  Like clans during wartime, towns 
disrupted politics, with each coalition driving a deeper and deeper wedge between the 
Redsticks and non-aligned Creeks.  When the Redstick War came to a close in early 
1814, the Redsticks fled to the Spanish Floridas, where they founded settlements away 
from their Creek and American enemies.  In 1821, when the U.S. inherited Florida from 
Spain, Creek society lay permanently divided.
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CHAPTER II 
 
TOWN-BASED COALITIONS 
 
 
 Scholars argue that in the period between the founding of English Carolina in 
1670 to the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, the Creeks organized their 
loose-knit confederacy of towns into trade factions.  Within those years, a Creek town or 
group of towns traded with the English; or the French, who settled in Louisiana in 1699; 
or the Spanish, who established the first permanent Spanish outpost in North America at 
St. Augustine in 1565.  Some Creek towns or even individual headmen traded with one or 
a combination of the European powers.  The Lower Creek towns and the Upper Creek 
town of Tallassee preferred Spanish traders, while the Alabamas in Upper Creek country 
favored the French.  The Creek policy of factionalism allowed the Creeks to play off the 
European empires by trading with the one that supplied cheaper, more abundant, and 
better trade goods than a competing empire.  Factionalism preserved Creek sovereignty 
by keeping towns from becoming dependent on one empire but also sowed the seeds of 
political division across society.  (See Figure 4 below for the political geography of 
Creek society in the colonial period.)
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Figure 4.  Creek Towns, Colonial Period.  Other notable towns include Chehaw, just north of 
Apalachicola, and Yuchi Town, which was north of Chehaw.  Both Chehaw and Yuchi Town 
inhabited the west bank of the Chattahoochee, whereas the town of Hitchiti lay on the east bank, 
north of Oconee.  Source: Map from Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The 
Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2008), 10.  
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 By arguing that the Creeks engaged the Europeans as divisive factions,
1
 however, 
scholars unwittingly interpret Creek history from Euro-centric perspectives, substituting 
the goals of European empires for those of indigenous leaders.  I argue that Creek policy, 
politics, and diplomacy resulted from town-based coalitions, and not from factions, 
during the Seven Years’ War in the Native South.  As opposed to searching for the 
connection between a town and empire, we ought to probe the ties within, between, and 
across towns.  A study of coalitions exhumes the ways in which Creek towns frequently 
overcame factionalized politics by partnering together to preserve Creek sovereignty 
during a period of unmitigated British expansion.  This is not to imply that coalitions 
unified all Creeks at all times, but copious evidence suggests that colonization shaped the 
Creeks into a formidable political force, revealing their ability to politically collaborate to 
a greater extent than scholars have appreciated.
2
  Whether a Creek town traded with the 
British, French, or Spanish (or all), town headmen, women, and other non-headmen 
                                                             
 
1
 Great Setter of the Tallapoosa town of Tuckabatchee held commissions from all three 
empires; see Document No. 2, 7/24/1759, p. 1, in Edmond Atkin to William Henry Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, box 13, William Henry Lyttelton papers, William L. Clements Library, The 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter WHLP).  Brims of Coweta held commissions 
from the Spanish and British, while numerous Coweta women clamored for British patronage.  
Some Coweta headmen cultivated ties with the Spanish and French, largely avoiding the British.  
See Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004), 93-95, 113.  For factionalism, see Michael D. Green, The Politics of 
Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1982), 21-23; Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with 
Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 148; 
Hahn, 119-120.  Whether Creek factionalism was a deliberate policy of neutrality or a diplomatic 
afterthought is debated.  For neutrality, see Hahn, Invention, 117; for afterthought, see Michael D. 
Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 21-22, and Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 21-22.  For 
Iroquois factionalism, see Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the 
Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992), 6-7. 
 
2
 Green, Politics, 21-23; Braund, Deerskins, 5-7, 139; Hahn, Invention, 81-148. 
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bonded within a town or across towns to service Creek goals, one of the most important 
of which was to maintain peace with the expansionist British.
3
 
 If Creeks wove coalitions from towns, clans tightened the fabric of cross-town 
ties.  Strong circumstantial evidence suggests that clans, by way of retaliation, aided in 
the building and operation of multi-town confederation.  For the most part, scholars 
assume that clans played little to no role in political or diplomatic affairs.
4
  Joshua Piker’s 
Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler asserts, for instance, that towns largely trumped clans in 
the creation of Creek political and diplomatic policy in the colonial era.  “If Creek 
politics was a language,” he writes, clan was its “accent” but town was its “syntax.”
5
  On 
the contrary, both town and clan were the “syntax” of Creek politics.  This chapter 
considers, in part, two examples of that dynamic.  When a Creek clan meted out 
retaliation on the British (or threatened to do so), headmen dealt with the diplomatic 
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 For the influence of women, young warriors, children and other non-headmen in 
diplomatic meetings, see Greg O’Brien, “The Conqueror Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating 
Cultural Boundaries on the Post-Revolutionary Southern Frontier,” Journal of Southern History 
67:1 (February 2001): 39-72, here 51, 55, and especially p. 59; Hahn, Invention, 93-94; and 
Michelle LeMaster, Brothers Born of One Mother: British-Native American Relations in the 
Colonial Southeast (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2012), esp. 3-12, 15-50.  
For the argument that towns grounded diplomacy and politics, see Joshua A. Piker, Okfuskee: A 
Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); and 
Piker, “‘Meet at My Town’: Localism in the Native American Southeast from the Mississippian 
Era to Removal,” (unpublished manuscript): 1-56.  I thank Joshua Piker for sharing his 
unpublished work with me. 
 
4
 In Okfuskee, 10, Piker argues that in everyday life, the Creek township trumped clan 
affiliation; and Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 93, also argues that “one of the deepest and 
most abiding affiliations and loyalties” of a Creek resided in their town.  I suggest that Creek 
politics and diplomacy, however, was bound up with both clan and town identities. 
 
5
 Joshua A. Piker, The Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler: Telling Stories in Colonial 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 137, argues that “family [clan] was 
an issue in Creek politics, but not the central one. Relations between communities [towns] and 
nations were family inflected, not family based” (my emphasis).  See same page for “If Creek 
politics...” 
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fallout by forging town-based coalitions that repaired the breach in Anglo-Creek relations 
occasioned by retaliation.  Furthermore, when vengeance obligated headmen to attack the 
British, most foreswore revenge and, instead, chose to maintain peace and trade with the 
British.  Regardless of the obligation, threat, or act of clan retaliation, clans provided the 
glue holding a cross-town coalition together. 
 The cessation of the Creek-Cherokee War in 1753 launched the Creek Indians 
into a sustained period of coalition-building across Creek society.  In that year, headmen 
from the Lower and Upper Creek provinces negotiated with the Cherokees, while South 
Carolina Governor James Glen served as an intermediary.
6
  The Creek coalition featured 
leadership from the Upper Creek towns of Okchai, Okfuskee, and Muccolossus as well as 
from the Lower Creek towns of Coweta and Cussita.  In late May and early June of 1753, 
leading Upper and Lower Creek headmen met Governor Glen in Charles Town, where 
among other things they limned the outlines of a Creek-Cherokee peace.  Malatchi of 
Coweta led the discussions with Glen, but other headmen including Wolf of Muccolossus 
and Okfuskee’s Red Coat King and Handsome Fellow participated in the talks between 
Glen and Malatchi.  The influential Gun Merchant of Okchai did not attend because he 
needed “to be present at confirming a Peace with the Cherokees,” which may have taken 
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 This war originated from a complex set of factors related to British expansion and 
Indian dependence on trade.  In 1716, a recently formed Anglo-Cherokee alliance prompted some 
Cherokee warriors to kill a thirteen-man peace delegation sent from the Lower Creek town of 
Coweta.  The incident happened in the Cherokee town of Tugaloo and became known as the 
“Tugaloo Massacre.”  Throughout the 1720s, 1730s, and 1740s, the Lower Creeks raided Lower 
Cherokee towns and British settlements as punishment for the massacre.  See William Ramsey, 
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place as Creek headmen parleyed with Glen.
7
  By July 15, a British trader reported that 
Gun Merchant had dissuaded several “Head Warriours” from going out against the 
Cherokees.
8
 
 The Creek coalition blossomed in the remaining year.  In late July, Red Coat King 
of Okfuskee sent a talk to Governor Glen showing his support for Gun Merchant’s efforts 
to deescalate the war.  Red Coat King indicated that the Creeks “will shake Hands” with 
the Cherokees “and make every Thing firm and strong” so long as the Cherokees gave 
proof of their desire for Creek-Cherokee peace.  He recommended that the Cherokees 
bring “two Northern India[n] Slaves,” who may have been recently captured by Cherokee 
warriors, to Creek country within “three Moons” (months).  One slave was supposed to 
go to Coweta, the other to Okfuskee.  The Okfuskee headman hoped that this ritual would 
“make a good Peace between us and the Cherokees.”
9
  Although it is unknown whether 
the Cherokees forwarded the luckless captives to the Creeks, the Creeks and Cherokees 
had indeed made peace by fall of 1753.  Perhaps in late October, Malatchi of Coweta 
                                                             
 
7
 “Proceedings of the Council Concerning Indian Affairs,” 5/30/1753-6/4/1753, Charles 
Town, in Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents relating to Indian Affairs, May 21, 
1750-August 7, 1754, ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (1958; repr., Columbia, SC: South Carolina 
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Creek Nation” as well as “About 69 more of the Upper Creeks had come being all the Head Men 
of the Upper and Lower Creek Nation excepting the Gun Merchant [of Okfuskee] and Chiggilli 
[of Coweta]” convened with Glen (387).  For a list of specific headmen, see p. 410 of the 
“Proceedings.” 
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 James Germany to Lachlan McGillivray, 7/15/1753, Okchai (“Oackioys”), in CRSCIA, 
1750-1754, 379.  Germany noted that Mortar had “gon to war” just before Glen’s letter arrived in 
Okchai (380).  Apparently, Mortar was stopped (380). 
 
9
 Red Coat King to Governor Glen, 7/26/1753, Okfuskee, in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 380.  
Creeks referred to the Cherokees as the “Mountenings” or “Mountings,” who lived in the 
Appalachian corridor; see, for example, Lachlan McIntosh to James Glen, 7/24/1753, Kialijee 
(“Carliges”), in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 381. 
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informed Gun Merchant of Okchai that “a firm Peace was agreed on between the Creeks” 
and Cherokees.  Red Coat King of Okfuskee revealed, too, that “the Peace is strong 
between them now.”
10
 
 Creek headmen cultivated peace with the Cherokees as a unified political unit in 
1754.  In early February, the Upper and Lower Creeks coordinated a peace effort by 
traveling to Cherokee country.  While “some Upper Creeks” went to the Cherokee town 
of Great Tellico, accompanied by Shawnee Indian intermediaries, the “Lower Creeks” 
were “expected” to arrive among the Cherokees in the same month.
11
  Mortar of Okchai 
traveled to Cherokee country a month later “to confirm a Peace” with headmen there.
12
  
Mortar probably set out for the Cherokee Beloved Town of Chota, where he shared 
kinship ties with many of the townspeople there.
13
  Aside from Mortar’s probable 
embassy to that town, evidence confirms that “a Warrior” from Coweta had been 
“receaved as a Brother” in Chota sometime before mid-April, suggesting that Okchai and 
Coweta worked together to fasten fictive kin ties with the Cherokees via the Chota 
townspeople.  As a result, Cherokee warriors confidently reported to Glen that the Creeks 
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 For Malatchi, Gun Merchant, and Red Coat King, see Lachlan McIntosh to Glen, 
11/2/1753, Okfuskee, in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 465.  The Cherokees are referred to as “the 
Muntins” (465). 
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 Lodvic Grant to Glen, 2/10/1754, Timothy, in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 476.  In March, 
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and Cherokees “now might come and go as Friends.”
14
  Cherokee leaders also voyaged to 
Creek country to confirm the peace, and in early May, Malatchi of Coweta hosted eight 
Cherokees, as he put it, in “my Town.”
15
  Malatchi later thanked Governor Glen for his 
assistance in ending the war, apprising him that “we are at Peace with the Chickesaws, 
Cherokees, and Catawbas.”
16
  (The latter lived in the Carolina interior.)  In the first half 
of 1754, Upper and Lower Creeks leaders established a workable relationship as they 
greased the axles of the newfound Creek-Cherokee alliance. 
 As the Creeks and Cherokees achieved a rapprochement, tensions simmered 
between the French and British.  In 1754, Anglo-French rivalries boiled over into the 
French and Indian War, with Spain allying with France.  Since the early eighteenth 
century, the British and French had competed for dominion over the Northeast, the Ohio 
valley, and the Southeast, although the lucrative sugar-producing Caribbean islands were 
the most coveted lands.  On the American mainland, each European power courted 
Native allies with gifts and trade goods at reduced prices.  Indeed, the balance of power 
rested on powerful Native people, such as the Iroquois League, Shawnees, Delawares, 
and the South’s Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws.  After war broke out 
between Britain and France in the Ohio in 1754, Europeans again relied on Indians 
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 “Warriors of Highwassee and Tommothy” to Glen, 4/15/1754, “in the House of 
Ludvick Grant,” in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 504-506, 506 (“a Warrior of the Cowataks” and “now 
might”). 
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 Malatchi to Glen, 5/7/1754, Coweta, in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 507. 
 
16
 Malatchi, “King [Mico] of the Cawettas,” to Glen, 5/12/1754, Coweta, in CRSCIA, 
1750-1754, 500 (“we are”).  Evidence suggests that the Cussitas had Malatchi thank Glen on their 
behalf; see George Galphin to Glen, 5/12/1754, Coweta, in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 499. 
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allies.
17
  Throughout the war, the Creeks received overtures from Britain, France, and 
Spain (allied to France).  In Upper Creek country, the Alabama towns stuck with the 
French, having courted the French since the construction of Fort Toulouse (“Fort des 
Alibamones”) in 1717.
18
  The Abeika town of Okfuskee was committed to British 
patronage,
19
 while Tuckabatchee and Coweta traded with all European powers.
20
 
 During the French and Indian War, British expansion undermined Creek 
sovereignty and engulfed Creeks in intermittent conflict with British settlers.  
Emboldened by the Empire’s wartime supremacy, British settlers established a string of 
settlements in the Ogeechee and Oconee valleys in the mid-1750s.
21
  There they 
competed with Creek and Cherokee hunters for white-tailed deer and other animals that 
those Indians sold to European traders in exchange for trade items.
22
  Conflict inevitably 
surfaced.  When Creeks died in skirmishes with Europeans, two principles of justice 
collided.  On one hand, the British required murder to be adjudicated through the 
apprehension of the killer whose judgment was rendered in a court trial.  On the other 
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 Piker, Okfuskee, 15-63. 
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 For Tuckabatchee, see Document No. 2, 7/24/1759, p. 1, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. For Coweta headmen visiting Fort Toulouse during the war, see 
Bossu, Travels, ed. Feiler, 151-152. For Coweta’s ties, see Hahn, Invention, 225-228. 
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 According to one report, British “Idlers” (hunters) captured and skinned deer and 
beaver in the “Hunting grounds which they [i.e, the Creeks] call their Property.”  See Daniel 
Pepper to Lyttelton, November (?) 1756, box 3, WHLP. 
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 Braund, Deerskins, 149; Ethridge, Creek Country, 134-137. 
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hand, clan justice demanded that the offended clan mete out punishment on the British 
offender or on the British settlement where he lived.
23
  The problem was that when the 
warriors of the deceased’s clan attacked a backcountry settlement, colonists interpreted 
the specific raid as a general declaration of war.  Thus, the failure of both Europeans and 
Creeks to respect the other’s understandings of crime and punishment threatened to 
trigger an Anglo-Creek war along the Oconee and Ogeechee.
24
 
 To prevent that possibility, Creek headmen drew upon and reshaped the 
interregional coalition first forged during the Creek-Cherokee War.  In the following 
years, Lower and Upper Creek headmen collaborated to preserve peace and, therefore, 
trade with the British, while attempting to keep British settlers at bay.  In September 
1756, for example, seven Creeks from an unknown Tallapoosa town stole property, 
including blankets and horses, from British colonists near the Ogeechee River.  When the 
affronted colonists caught up with the “Indian Camp,” they fired on the Tallapoosas, 
killing at least two of them.
25
  In the wake, Okfuskee’s Handsome Fellow and the 
Okfuskee Captain transmitted to Coweta a peace talk from South Carolina Governor 
William Lyttelton.
26
  In his message, Lyttelton counseled all “hot headed Young 
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 For retaliation, see Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, TN: 
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 Braund, Deerskins, 156-163. 
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 For details of the Ogeechee Incident, including mention of seven Creeks, see Georgia 
Governor John Reynolds to South Carolina Governor William H. Lyttelton, Georgia, 9/15/1756; 
for Tallapoosas, see Lower Creek headmen to Reynolds, 9/17/1756, in Reynolds to Lyttelton, 
10/6/1756; for “Indian Camp,” see Douglass to Lower Creeks, 9/13/1756, in White Outerbridge 
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Warriors” to allow the “proper Head Men” to seek justice from the British.
27
  On 
September 17, the Lower Creeks assembled in Coweta to discuss Lyttelton’s talk.  
Because Malatchi had died months earlier, the Coweta leadership now included Coweta 
Mico, Coweta’s “half Breed” Abraham, and Coweta’s “red King.”  The new Coweta 
leadership spearheaded peace with the British at the September conference.  Other Lower 
Creek leaders participated in this task: Cussita Mico (“Ischeigea”), Cussita’s head 
warrior, and the Hitchiti-speaking micos of Chehaw, Ocmulgee, Hitchiti Town, and 
Apalachicola.
28
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Table 2.  Five Creek Coalitions, 1753-1765.  For clarity’s sake, only the major provinces, towns, 
and headmen are listed. 
 
Five Coalitions Major participating provinces, towns, and headmen 
 
- Peace coalition that 
negotiated with Cherokees in 
1753 and 1754 
 
 
- Lower Creek: Malatchi of Coweta, Cussita 
- Abeika: Red Coat King of Okfuskee, Mortar and Gun 
Merchant of Okchai 
 
 
- Coalition that signed the 
Treaty of 1757, arising from 
Ogeechee incident and 
Bosomworth Affair 
 
- Lower Creek: Coweta, Cussita, and Chehaw 
- Tallapoosa: Wolf of Muccolossus, Tallassee, Tuckabatchee  
- Abeika: Pucantallahassee, Hillabee, Okfuskee 
- Alabama: Tuskegee 
 
 
- Coalition of 1758, arising 
from Yuchi crisis 
 
 
- Lower Creek: Chehaw, Coweta, Captain Aleck of Cussita 
 
- Upper Creek trade coalition 
of 1759 (inclusive of twenty-
seven towns/talofas in 
September) 
 
 
- Tallapoosa: Wolf Warrior of Fusihatchee, Tuckabatchee, 
Tallassee 
- Abeika: Okfuskee Captain of Okfuskee, Kialijee, 
Woccoccoie, Hillabee, Pucantallahassee 
 
 
- Upper Creek peace 
coalition of 1764 and 1765 
 
 
- Abeika: Mortar of Okchai 
- Tallapoosa: Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee 
- Alabama: Topalga (Molton) of Coosada 
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 At the end of the meeting, Lower Creek headmen dispatched to Georgia Governor 
John Reynolds a peace talk trying to assure him that the Tallapoosas would not attack 
Georgia’s Ogeechee settlements.  They claimed that two colonists and two Tallapoosas 
perished in the Ogeechee confrontation, meaning that the parity of deaths would prevent 
the Tallapoosas’ need to carry out retaliation.  Reynolds and the Georgia settlements, 
Lower Creek headmen implied, had nothing to fear.
29
  Yet, no evidence corroborates the 
Lower Creeks’ report that two British settlers had died on the Ogeechee.
30
  Although the 
headmen knew that the law of retaliation obligated the Tallapoosas to kill two British 
settlers, the Lower Creeks likely fudged the numbers in order to maintain ties with the 
British.  Evidence supporting this possibility comes from British official Daniel Pepper, 
who believed in late September that he “shall meet with the greatest Difficulty in 
prevailing on the Relations of the kill’d, to be satisfy’d with Presents alone, but shall do 
the utmost in my Power.”
31
  In Pepper’s estimation, the Tallapoosas planned to secure 
compensation by raiding the Ogeechee settlements. 
 For the rest of 1756 and in 1757, the Tallapoosas built on the Lower Creeks’ 
efforts to allay British fears of a Creek revenge raid.  To that end, a prominent Tallapoosa 
headman named Wolf of Muccolossus simultanelously and deftly handled relations with 
his Tallapoosa kin and with the British.
32
  Although Wolf was a “Relation to one” of the 
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 Lower Creeks to Reynolds, 9/17/1756, in Reynolds to Lyttelton, 10/6/1756, box 2, 
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 By early October, most of the fugitives had been apprehended; see Reynolds to 
Lyttelton, 9/22/1756, Savannah, and Outerbridge to Lyttelton, Fort Augusta, 10/10/1756—both 
box 2, WHLP. 
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 Daniel Pepper to Lyttleton, 9/22/1756, James Island, box 2, WHLP. 
 
32
 Wolf mediated in the Creek-Cherokee peace of 1753 by supporting one of Governor 
Glen’s major goals as a governor: to realize a sweeping Anglo-Indian alliance.  For “Wolf King,” 
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slain Tallapoosas, he “thought the White People were not to be blamed,” betraying his 
choice to forego retaliation.  Evidence suggests that Wolf and his “Brother” convinced 
their relatives to forgive the British, likely in order to maintain trade ties with the 
British.
33
 
 After he and his relations averted the threat of retaliation, Wolf sent a message to 
South Carolina Governor Lyttelton in October of 1757, more than a year after the 
Ogeechee incident.  Wolf’s political acquaintance, Wolf Warrior of the nearby 
Tallapoosa town of Fusihatchee, carried the message to Charles Town.  Wolf reported 
that “neither I nor the division of the Tallapooses (consisting of eight Towns)” favored 
their British trader, who traded to the Creeks at higher prices than the French.  Although 
intimating that he and the Tallapoosa towns considered trading with the French, Wolf 
seems to have put Lyttelton on the defensive simply to reinforce Anglo-Creek ties.  He 
apprised the Governor, for instance, that when Creek headmen “in the French interest” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
see “Proceedings,” Thursday, A.M., 5/31/1753, in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 397.  For Glen’s 
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had recently planned to attack the British, three Tallapoosa towns (led by his own, 
Muccolossus) stopped them.
34
 
 By strengthening the Anglo-Creek alliance, Tallapoosa leaders bolstered inter-
Tallapoosa relations, but they also tightened Lower-Upper Creek ties.  This is 
demonstrated by the Treaty of Savannah.  In late October 1757, more than one hundred 
headmen representing twenty-one Lower and Upper Creek towns parleyed with Georgia 
Governor Henry Ellis in Savannah to discuss land issues.  On October 29, the Creeks 
convened with Ellis in the Council Chamber.  After Ellis and the Creeks shook hands, he 
informed them that the British did not covet their hunting grounds, but that British 
settlements would generously supply corn and rice to the Creeks.  Serving as speaker for 
the delegation was none other than Wolf, who replied that he was glad to see the 
governor “Face to Face.”  Similarly, Togulky of Coweta flattered Ellis by saying that the 
governor received the Creeks with “stronger Tokens of Love” than other British 
governors.  On November 3, Ellis presented the headmen with the Treaty of Savannah, 
and they “declared their Approbation aloud” when the five treaty articles were translated 
for the assembled leaders.
35
 
 One of the most important was Article Four, which resolved the “Bosomworth 
Affair,” a twenty-year land dispute between colonial Georgia and a powerful married 
couple—Mary Bosomworth (a Creek originally named Coosaponakeesa) and her 
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husband, Thomas.  Because of Mary’s political connections with Creeks, the 
Bosomworth’s claimed a small acreage of land along the Savannah River and three 
islands along the Georgia coast for her service to the colony as a translator since the 
1730s.  Although she had a legitimate claim to at least the Savannah tract, headmen 
ceded all her claims to Georgia in the treaty.
36
  Article Two acknowledged and resolved 
the Ogeechee Incident, stating that prior “Grievances & dissatisfactions of every kind 
shall be forgiven & forgot as thoroughly as if they never had happened.”
37
  Lastly, Article 
Three stipulated that “the irregularities & misdeameanours committed by the Stragglers 
or Vagrants of either Nation shall not” be considered as the “Act of the Nation to which 
they belong.”  This article was designed to prevent additional Ogeechee Incident-like 
flare-ups from morphing into general wars.
38
 
 The Treaty of Savannah represented the apex of Lower and Upper Creek 
coordination.  The flurry of Creek political activity following the Ogeechee Incident gave 
rise to a twenty-one town coalition that signed the treaty with Governor Ellis on 
November 3, 1757.
39
  Most Tallapoosa towns attended, including Wolf’s Muccolossus, 
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Fusihatchee (and Wolf’s ally, Wolf Warrior
40
), Tallassee, White Ground, Little Tallassee, 
Autossee, and Tuckabatchee.  Also present were the Abeika towns of Okfuskee, 
Pucantallahassee, Hillabee, Wewoka, and Upper Eufaula.  Key Lower towns 
encompassing Coweta, Cussita, Chehaw, and Oconee also signed.
41
  Towns like Coweta, 
Okfuskee, and Muccolossus had originally worked together to forge peace with the 
Cherokees years earlier.  That coalition expanded after the Ogeechee Incident and 
showcased the Creeks’ ability to actively collaborate across the Creek provinces. 
 After signing on November 3, Lower and Upper Creek leaders promoted their 
coalition.  Togulky’s uncle, Stumpee of Coweta, declared that although the “old Men” 
respected all of the Anglo-Creek treaties, “it would be well that they were renewed and 
Confirmed in our Days,” so that “the Young Men may be Witnesses to them and transmit 
all Knowledge of them to their Children.”
42
  By invoking such treaties, the first of which 
was signed between the Creeks and English in 1705, Togulky made the point that treaties 
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united Creeks generationally, politically, and geographically.
43
  Likewise, Wolf of 
Muccolossus told the assembled Creeks that “All of you have this Day freely Confirmed 
your antient Treaties with the English by a new one in which some fresh Articles are 
inserted.”  To be sure, he doubted that Creeks towns would adhere to the Savannah treaty, 
saying that “it has been customary for You to deny in your own Towns the Contracts you 
have made in those of the white People.”  But he invited the town headmen to band 
together to carry out the treaty.  As he asked rhetorically, “[W]hich of you then will dare 
to Deny it in our Public Squares hereafter? If there is one of you that can be so base, I am 
the Man that will call him a Liar.”
44
 
 No sooner had the ink dried on the Treaty of Savannah when renewed Anglo-
Creek violence erupted.  In the summer of 1758, British settlers killed five Yuchi Creeks.  
Where this occurred and why are unknown, but the law of retaliation obligated the 
grieving family to take revenge on five British lives.  By July 20, the Yuchis had killed 
three colonists, including one man and two women.
45
  Although two colonists remained 
in the Yuchis’ debt, the death of three Britons triggered a diplomatic crisis between the 
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Creeks and Georgia.  Like the Ogeechee incident, the Creeks resolved the Yuchi 
controversy by forging a multi-town coalition.  The Chehaws took the initiative, having 
been the first to learn of the Yuchi retaliation.  In mid-July, “Oacothla” returned home 
from Savannah with his Chehaw companions and discovered three dead colonists, who 
had been killed perhaps only moments before.  The Chehaws pursued the Yuchis and, as 
they told British interpret Joseph Wright, wished to kill them on sight had it not been for 
the presence of women and children traveling with the Yuchi predatory party.  This was a 
mere excuse, however, since the Chehaws likely respected the Yuchis’ right to enforce 
clan justice, which was lost on Wright.  In fact, on August 3, Wright “demanded the 
Lives of three Euchees [Yuchis],” but the Chehaws stalled him, telling Wright that they 
must first consult with Coweta and Cussita.
46
  The Chehaws’ refusal to execute the 
Yuchis without discussing the matter with other towns indicates that the Chehaws 
acknowledged a need to arrive at some sort of consensus among the Lower Creek towns. 
 The following day Cussita and Coweta headmen met Wright in Chehaw.  After a 
discussion, it was agreed that Chehaw warriors should go into Yuchi Town to “kill three 
Euchees.”  In the evening, a Chehaw head warrior “with near thirty men went according 
to agreement [but] . . . returned without doing any thing.”  Again, the Chehaws hesitated.  
They continued to respect the Yuchis’ right to exact vengeance, but they also knew that 
the principle of retaliation obliged the Yuchis to mete out punishment on the would-be 
executioners.  Wright’s journal indicates that the Cowetas and Cussitas supported the 
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Chehaws’ decision to back down.
47
  During the same evening, Coweta headmen 
Abraham and Togulky came to Chehaw and sent for the headmen of Yuchi Town.  Upon 
arriving in Chehaw, Yuchi Mico and other headmen conferred with the British interpreter 
about the recent killings.  They apprised Wright that because colonists had killed five of 
their people, the offended clan appropriately responded by killing three, but they 
reminded Wright that the “English were still two in their debt.”  To restore peace, 
however, the Yuchis promised not to kill two additional colonists.
48
  But Wright 
stubbornly “demanded” that the Cowetas “go and kill the three Euchees that had 
committed the Murder.”  On August 6, Yuchi headmen caught wind of this, with Wright 
learning that “if any of their people is killed by the Creeks they will kill me [Wright] as 
they are confident it will be thro’ my means.”  Knowing that Wright intruded in clan 
affairs, the Yuchis offered to pardon any of the would-be Coweta executioners.  At last, 
on August 9 the Lower Creeks informed Wright that they had put “one of the Murderers 
to death” (the other two fled).
49
 
 The murder of one Yuchi sanctioned by the Lower Creek leadership is explained 
by the fact that the Yuchis inhabited an ambiguous ethno-linguistic space in that 
province.  Ethnic and linguistic antagonisms between the minority Yuchi speakers and 
majority Muskogee speakers combined with British imperialism to create an especially 
deadly situation for Yuchi Town.  One scholar has likened the Muskogean Lower Creeks 
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to a political “hegemony.”
50
  Too, both Creek and European authorities held the Yuchis 
in low regard.
51
  Yet, despite Lower Creek attitudes towards the Yuchis, the Lower Creek 
coalition exercised restraint against the Yuchis.  Although they acquiesced to one 
execution, they probably worried that Yuchi headmen might follow through on their 
threat to kill Wright and thereby provoke war with the British. 
 To repair Anglo-Creek ties, the Lower Creek coalition drew upon bonds of clan 
and kinship.  During the August 9 meeting, Lower Creek headmen called attention to the 
Ogeechee Incident, reminding Wright that British authorities never executed two 
colonists, as clan vengeance and, for that matter, British law, dictated.  Because the 
Creeks and British each owed each other two executions, headmen believed therefore that 
it was better to drop the matter.  Indeed, although the Upper Creeks had apprehended the 
second Yuchi, no evidence indicates that he was put to death.
52
  Additionally, Lower 
Creek headmen enlisted Captain Aleck to calm the Yuchis and Wright.  Aleck was a 
Cussita headman who served as speaker during the August 9 meeting and who shared 
affinal ties to Yuchi Town.  Back in 1729, Aleck had “married three Uchee wives, and 
brought them to Cussetuh.”  Ethnic antagonisms between the Cussitas and the Yuchis 
forced Aleck and his wives to move downstream, where they founded Yuchi Town.  
Aleck’s “three brothers,” two of whom had “Uchee wives,” soon joined him there.  Later, 
Aleck “collected all the Uchees” who resettled in the new town.  Although Aleck 
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remained a Cussita townsperson and had become its “Mico” by the 1750s, he likely 
shuffled back-and-forth to visit his biological and adoptive kinspeople.
53
  With his 
influence and ties, Aleck was the natural choice for speaker.  Speaking for the Lower and 
Upper towns, Aleck assured Wright that when the two Yuchis were “found . . . they shall 
be killed.”  Aleck’s language suggests, however, that the Creeks took a passive approach 
to the affair.  Aleck himself probably refused to endorse another execution, especially 
since the killers may have been his family members.
54
  By the late 1750s, then, Creeks 
responded to intense colonial pressures by uniting as coalitions and by relying heavily on 
networks of kinship to strengthen those coalitions. 
 Like the Creeks, Cherokees grappled with British colonialism.  Since the early 
1750s, Cherokee hunters chafed at the British presence along the upper Savannah and 
Ogeechee valleys.  Some Creeks joined the Cherokees in a pan-Indian compact to 
eliminate British forts in Cherokee country and resist Britain’s expansion into the Native 
South.  From 1756 to 1759, the head warrior of Okchai named Mortar formed an alliance 
with the Overhill Cherokees and portions of the Lower and Upper Creeks.
55
  This pan-
Indian alliance enlisted the French, who looked to gain the upper hand on their wartime 
enemy.  Creeks and Cherokees constructed a new town, Etoahatchee, on the Coosa River, 
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serving as a launching pad for attacks on Fort Loudon in Cherokee country.  When the 
Anglo-Cherokee War erupted in 1759, most Creeks urged cool-headedness.  Okfuskee’s 
Handsome Fellow advised Mortar, “Don’t be rash, or in a hurry. . . . This may be a 
Scheme of the French, [while] we men are all out to War against the English, to come 
into our Towns, & carry away all our Women and Children.”
56
  Though Mortar ignored 
his advice, few Creeks assisted Mortar and the Cherokees.
57
 
 Even so, the British were nervous.  So in the summer and fall of 1759, Edmond 
Atkin visited Creek country, hoping to counter Mortar’s plan and keep the Creeks away 
from French influences.  Appointed the British “Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the 
Southern District of North America” in 1756, Atkin was tasked with dissuading Creeks 
from joining the Cherokees and convincing headmen to dismiss any French (and Spanish) 
traders who supplied Creek towns.  Atkin threatened to revoke British trade in any town 
that traded with Britain’s enemies or teamed up with the Cherokees.  In July, for instance, 
he warned Mortar to back down by threatening to pull out British traders from Okchai.
58
  
Despite Atkin’s attempt to secure an exclusive Creek loyalty to the British, Creek towns, 
                                                             
 
56
 For the Okfuskee’s talk, see Document No. 4, Billy Germany to Atkin, 8/20/1759, pp. 
2-3, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  The letter’s chronology is unclear. 
 
57
 By February 1760, Captain Aleck of Cussita told Atkin that the Creeks preferred 
“Neutrality” in the Anglo-Cherokee War, and that “they the Creeks would stand still & look on, 
as at a Ball Play”; see Atkin to Lyttelton, 2/13/1760, Fort Moore, box 14, WHLP.  Perhaps only a 
few Lower Creek warriors planned to join the Cherokees in the revolt; see Atkin to Lyttelton, 
Fort Moore, 2/5/1760, p. 3, box 14, WHLP.  For Mortar’s plot, see Hahn, Invention, 250-253, 252 
(“widespread”); for a thoroughgoing discussion of the Anglo-Cherokee War and its impact on the 
Native South, see Juricek, Colonial Georgia, 264-303. 
 
58
 Mortar, however, still kept in contact with the Cherokees; see Atkin to Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, Okfuskee, pp. 3-5, box 13, WHLP. 
 
76 
 
such as Tuckabatchee, refused to dump their French and Spanish traders.  As a result, one 
scholar characterizes Atkin’s diplomacy as a “resounding failure.”
59
 
 By examining the Superintendent’s mission from the perspective of Creeks, I 
show that at least among the Upper Creeks, Abeika and Tallapoosa townspeople 
preserved British trade by creating a trade coalition that kept Atkin at arm’s length.  
Tuckabatchee became a vibrant center of diplomacy and Abeikas and Tallapoosas 
prominently shaped negotiations with Atkin.  Atkin’s diplomacy, precisely because it 
impinged on Creek autonomy, prompted several town communities to organize within, 
discuss common goals, and grease the axles of inter-town ties. 
 When Atkin arrived among the Lower Creeks in April 1759, headmen greeted 
him with gestures of goodwill and friendship.  He and his small retinue “came within 22 
miles of the Lower Towns,” where they were “met by a great many Beloved men, 
Mico’s, & head Warriours.”  Headmen presented him with a white “wing” on behalf of 
“the Upper & Lower Towns.”  By doing so, the headmen established peaceful relations 
with Atkin and adopted him as a fictive kinsperson.  This status encouraged him to treat 
all the towns as fellow allies.
60
  The Anglo-Lower Creek relationship, however, 
immediately soured.  For weeks, the Superintendent threatened to revoke British trade 
with any town that traded with or held commissions from the French.  By late June, he 
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had alienated many headmen in Coweta and Cussita.  Wearing out his welcome, he 
departed for Upper Creek country to assess Creek wartime loyalty there.
61
 
 Upper Creek headmen cautiously approached the Superintendent in early July, 
when he arrived near the Tallapoosa River.  On July 3, he was greeted by twenty-one 
headmen from “6 Tallapoosa Towns.”  The six towns included Fusihatchee, White 
Ground, Autossee, Tallassee, Little Tallassee, and Tuckabatchee.  Head warrior of 
Fusihatchee, Yahah Tustunnuggee (Wolf Warrior), a close ally of Wolf of Muccolossus, 
welcomed Atkin to Upper Creek country.  As “Speaker” for the Tallapoosas, he opened 
by saying that “You come from the Great King, and we look upon you as himself.”  He 
admitted that “There are but few of us here you see. [Nor] are [there] old People among 
us.”  Wolf Warrior assured Atkin that the Tallapoosa delegation, though “young” and 
inexperienced in diplomacy, “represent[ed] the old People,” who had empowered the 
young men to greet the Superintendent and his small retinue.
62
  Atkin responded with 
kind words, but got down to brass tacks.  “I have heard a great deal of french Talks in my 
coming up here,” he said, “& you have a French Fort [Toulouse] in your Country.”  The 
“Great King” had sent the Superintendent “to see who are his Friends among the red 
People,” who, in any case, were “free” to trade with anyone they wished.  In the same 
breath, however, he said that if the Creeks “love the French better,” then “let them take 
care of you.”  Atkin aggressively implied that any Upper Creek town that welcomed both 
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French and British traders catered to Britain’s enemies.  He further threatened, by 
implication, to revoke British traders from towns that refused to part with the French.
63
 
 The Superintendent’s menacing stance prompted the Upper Creeks to assemble a 
trade coalition dedicated to preserving British trade, especially since they received the 
bulk of European goods from the British.  The coalition included those from most (in one 
case, all) Upper Creek province, which comprised roughly twenty-six Abeika, 
Tallapoosa, and Alabama towns.
64
  Both the Tallapoosas and Abeikas manned the 
coalition, though the Tallapoosa leadership initially predominated.  The July 3 meeting, 
for instance, featured Tallapoosa leadership.  Wolf Warrior apprised Atkin that “we have 
the Mouth of one of the greatest Mico’s in our Nation (The Talsey [Tallassee] Mico),” a 
prominent Tallapoosa headman who may have appointed the young delegation to meet 
with Atkin.  Moreover, the Tallapoosa speaker said that “I will send your talk to all” the 
Abeika and Tallapoosa “Towns [so] that they may know it.”  That evening he “sent” the 
Briton’s “talk” to Tallassee Mico.
65
 
 As a result of Wolf Warrior’s (and the Tallapoosas’ efforts), on July 7 “about 80” 
Tallapoosas and Abeikas greeted Atkin, encamped seven miles from Tuckabatchee.  
They represented a majority of Upper Creek towns (at least fifteen of twenty-six).  In 
addition to the Tallapoosa warriors who first met Hawkins on the 3rd, other Tallapoosa 
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headmen turned out, including Tuckabatchee’s “half Breed Captain, Head Beloved man 
& others of that Town.”  Abeika leaders, too, attended, such as the Okfuskee Captain; 
two Hillabee “Captains”; the Upper Eufaula Captain; Wewoka’s Second Man; Little 
Warrior of Sugatspoges, an Okfuskee village; Dog King of Woccoccoie; the “Head 
Warriour” of Kialijee; and Deval’s Landlord of Pucantallahassee (Table 2).  A Creek 
headman named “Chiskaliga of New Town” as well as some Choctaw “Chiefs” and 
“their People” also participated.  Within four days, then, Wolf Warrior of Fusihatchee 
and the Tallassee Mico nearly quadrupled the number of headmen and other Creeks who 
paid a visit to the new Superintendent.
66
 
 The numerical growth of headmen indicates that Upper Creek communities 
supported the emerging coalition.  It soon experienced a subtle political change, though.  
While Fusihatchee and Tallassee initiated talks with Atkin, seasoned diplomats from 
Okfuskee and Tuckabatchee led the July 7 meeting.  The Okfuskee Captain and 
Tuckabatchee’s Beloved Man, Half Breed, completed the process whereby Atkin was 
rendered an ally and fictive kinsperson, a process begun by Wolf Warrior.  After a series 
of rituals, the Okfuskee Captain opened, “I am one of the Abehkas, & I speak for them, & 
the Tallapoosas.”  He invited Atkin to Tuckabatchee, “a Friend Town to Coweta,” where 
the Superintendent had visited weeks earlier, telling him that “Headmen from every 
Town in the Upper Crick Country are met, & ready to receive you” there.  Half Breed 
                                                             
 
66
 Document No. 1, 7/7/1759, Cedar Creek, p. 4, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 
13, WHLP.  Although Tuckabatchee’s mico, Great Setter, did not attend, he sent other town 
headmen to meet Atkin in the woods.  According to etiquette, micos conducted diplomacy in the 
town square ground, sending their councilors outside of the town to speak for them.  Town 
spellings take from Ethridge, Creek Country, 29 (figure 2). 
 
80 
 
seconded the Okfuskee headman, saying “You have [spent] a considerable time in the 
Woods, & no doubt you are tired & hungry. and as we know you are come to see your 
Friends, we receive you as such.”  At that point, he gave Atkin “a white Wing” as “a 
Token of Friendship among us.”  Consequently, the Upper Creeks and British officially 
became allies.
67
 
 The Upper Creek towns sponsored Atkin’s reception in Tuckabatchee.  The July 7 
meeting was “the first time . . . ever” that headmen “came out of their Towns to receive 
[a European] Agent,” meaning Atkin, who remained encamped “in the Woods.”  The 
novelty of this diplomatic setting required the participation of hundreds of Upper Creeks 
to legitimize Atkin’s procession to Tuckabatchee, which lay seven miles west of camp.  
Breaking camp, dozens of Creeks conducted the Agent, his soldiers, and traders into 
Tuckabatchee.  Ritual specialists headed the delegation, singing “almost all the way” to 
town.  As the party approached, more than “500 Persons” thronged “[i]n and about the 
Square.”  Creek men and women “from every [Upper Creek] Town” (i.e., twenty-six 
towns) looked on.  Before allowing Atkin to enter the sacred square ground, 
Tuckabatchee leaders purified the Agent by stroking his face with “Eagle tails,” ritual 
symbols of peace.  Finally, he was permitted to sit in the mico’s cabin, where “the 
Headmen one after another came & shook hands” with him “& the Black Drink was 
handed [around] twice.”  Five hundred Upper Creeks hailing from dozens of towns 
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therefore constructed a formidable coalition that legitimized the Tuckabatchee welcome 
ceremony.
68
 
 Tuckabatchee became the node of Upper Creek politics during the French and 
Indian War.  While Joshua Piker shows that Okfuskee, as a town, helped forge Anglo-
Creek ties, I show that Tuckabatchee, as a town and as a headquarters of a multi-town 
trade coalition, did as well.
69
  Several factors made Tuckabatchee the coalition 
headquarters.  The turnout of five hundred Upper Creeks in the July 7 welcome ceremony 
privileged that town in encounters with Atkin.  Although Atkin visited other towns like 
Okfuskee and Okchai, Tuckabatchee appears to have been Atkin’s primary host town.
70
  
Likewise, Tuckabatchee’s geography was politically important.  Wolf of Muccolossus 
noted that it “is the properest place” for an Upper Creek meeting “as it is the most 
Central” between the Lower and Upper Creek towns.
71
  Kinship, too, centered 
Tuckabatchee in Creek politics.  The town shared kinship ties with the Lower towns and 
was, specifically, a “Friend” town of Coweta.
72
  In short, Tuckabatchee was well-
positioned to lead the Upper Creeks in diplomacy with the bellicose Superintendent. 
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 Tuckabatchee’s first official conference with Atkin opened on July 9.  Some “200 
Indians” turned out, a diminishment from the “500 Persons” who attended the welcome 
ceremony two days earlier.  The reduction in numbers is explained by the fact all Upper 
towns had already given their consent to headmen to conduct diplomacy with Atkin.  
Now that the welcome ceremony was over, diplomats could get down to business.  Even 
so, a majority of Upper towns sanctioned the July 9 conference.  Headmen represented, 
for instance, eight Tallapoosa towns and eleven Abeika towns for a total of twenty-one 
(of twenty-six) Upper towns.  Furthermore, the who’s who of Upper Creek country 
attended—Tallassee Mico, the Long Lieutenant of Tallassee, Tuckabatchee Mico Great 
Setter, Hoithlewaulee Mico, Second Man (“Eenyhah thlucko”) of Little Tallassee, and 
Gun Merchant of Okchai.
73
  The drop in numbers between July 7 and July 9 was 
therefore offset by the participation of major headmen and a majority of Upper Creek 
towns. 
 Backed by their communities, Upper Creek leaders managed to neutralize the 
Superintendent and preserve British trade.  Atkin began talks with a long-winded speech 
scolding the Upper towns for trading with the French and for refusing to pledge their 
loyalty solely to the British.  He directed his anger at Gun Merchant, especially his 
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an Upper Creek town, as well as “a few” Alabamas participated too (p. 4).  The Choctaws (“460 
Men & 20 Women”) tried to meet with Atkin during the conference, but “Some were advised to 
go back” (p. 11).  They came to renew Anglo-Choctaw trade.  Thirty Choctaws “with 4 Chiefs,” 
however, attended the actual conference (p. 7). 
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brother-in-law, Mortar, who snubbed Atkin by abstaining from the conference.  Atkin 
excoriated the Okchais for having invited the Cherokees to “this Nation.”  When Atkin 
finished speaking, headmen avoided this touchy issue.  Gun Merchant redirected the 
conversation to Britain’s relationship with the French-allied Choctaws, warning Atkin 
that “it will [not] be safe for the English, to go into the Chactaw Nation.”  The headman 
flattered Atkin by saying warmly, “I love the White People; or else I would not have 
given [Atkin] that advice.”  For his part, Long Lieutenant of Tallassee bragged to Atkin 
that five years earlier (in 1754) he had visited the Choctaws to try to repair a breach in 
Anglo-Choctaw relations.
74
  Gun Merchant and Long Lieutenant successfully shielded 
the Upper towns from Atkin’s wrath. 
 Weeks later, Tuckabatchee hosted a second conference with the Superintendent to 
keep British trade flowing.  On July 24, Great Setter, other town headmen, and Atkin 
assembled in the town square to discuss Tuckabatchee’s alliances with the Spanish, 
French, and British.  Great Setter opened by defending his choice to “take fast hold of the 
hand of all White People, & push none away.”  Atkin criticized the headman for 
obtaining commissions from all three empires and threatened to yank the British trader 
from Tuckabatchee should the mico refuse to produce his French commission for the 
Superintendent.  The headman promised to do so after the upcoming Busk, which was 
scheduled to begin “tomorrow” (July 25).  He informed Atkin that “you know we cant 
stir from our Square for 8 Days” during Busk.  Great Setter offered one concession.  He 
ordered the town speaker, Mad Dog, to surrender the town’s French flag to Atkin.  Upon 
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 Document No. 1, 7/9/1759, Tuckabatchee Square, pp. 8-12, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  Hahn, Invention, 255 (brother-in-law). 
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doing so, Mad Dog declared Tuckabatchee a “Friend Town” of the British, thereby 
fostering an Anglo-Tuckabatchee alliance.  In exchange, Atkin presented an English flag 
to Great Setter.
75
 
 Because Creek leaders’ legitimacy rested on community input, Tuckabatchee 
leaders invited the townspeople to participate in the Anglo-Tuckabatchee alliance.  For 
instance, headmen merged the alliance with the Busk festival by deliberately wrapping up 
negotiations with the Agent on July 25—the Busk’s opening day.  On the morning of the 
25th, the Superintendent, other British officials, and “about 30” Tuckabatchees, who 
were probably men, convened in the square ground.  After the ritual exchange of black 
drink, Atkin announced the formation of the Anglo-Tuckabatchee alliance, and appointed 
the head warrior Hopoya Mico to arbitrate future disputes with the town’s British trader.  
Attending the gathering was the former mico, Old Bracket.  According to him, the 
alliance merely renewed an old alliance with the British, saying that “I have had the 
Pleasure to see Three English Mico’s before you, & now I have seen you, my heart is 
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 Document No. 2, 7/24/1759, pp. 1-6, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, 
WHLP.  Recently, a Spanish official had visited Tuckabatchee and invited the headmen there to 
confer with the Spanish in Pensacola.  Great Setter promised that he would visit Pensacola “next 
Moon” (p. 1).  Relatedly, Great Setter had traveled to Fort Toulouse twice that summer to renew 
his French commission with the new fort commander.  For the moment, Tuckabatchee had only a 
French “Suit of Colours” (flag) (p. 1).  Offended, Atkin implied he would revoke trade: “if you 
love the French better than the English, the Great Kings [sic] People have no Business here” (p. 
2).  For the Busk beginning “tomorrow” or July 25, see p. 4.  For its lasting “2 [perhaps “8”] 
Days,” see p. 2.  Eighteenth-century Busks usually lasted anywhere from four to eight days; see 
John R. Swanton, Creek Religion and Medicine (1928; Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2000), 546-611.  While Mad Dog may have been Half Breed’s “Son” (p. 5), it is more 
likely that he was his nephew, according to the matrilineal norms of Creek leadership.  A year 
earlier, in October 1758, a British official reported that Tuckabatchee had once been “a 
remarkable Town for its Loyalty to the English but of late not so Stanch”; Courtonne, List, 
October 1758, box 8, WHLP. 
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very glad.”
76
  Later, Half Breed invited Atkin to take the black drink during the entirety 
of the Busk. 
 The women also helped seal the alliance by engaging in the Women’s Dance, a 
hallmark of eighteenth-century Creek Busks (Figure 5).  On the 24th, headmen gave 
“Orders . . . to the Women, to prepare Victuals for the Square; & to get ready to dance.”  
The dance may have taken place on the 25th, when headmen concluded negotiations and 
initiated the Busk or, possibly, the 26th, the second day of Busk.
77
  In accounts of 
nineteenth- and early-twentieth century Creek Busks, women danced at intervals, usually 
on the second, sixth, and sometimes the eighth and final day.  The Women’s Dance was 
the most common female dance at a Busk.  According to one anthropologist, women 
danced on the second and sixth days of the Tuckabatchee Busk.  In several towns during 
the Busk women provided food to the fasting men, perhaps on the third day, and brought 
the new fire to their homes.
78
  Women were addressed by unique ceremonial titles, 
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 Document No. 2, 7/25/1759, p. 7-10, 12 in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, 
WHLP.  Atkin gave the headmen presents before the conference in exchange for their consent to 
a policy change in trading relations.  For evidence suggesting that the Busk began on July 25, see 
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 For “Orders,” see Document No. 2, 7/24/1759, p. 7, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, 
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 Swanton, Creek Medicine, 605-606.  Swanton summarized the characteristics of two 
Tuckabatchee poskitás, one an “older form,” probably a reference to pre-Removal poskitás (605).  
The second description probably refers to early-twentieth-century Tuckabatchee poskitás.  In the 
“older” form, the “women dance[d]” on the sixth day.  It seems certain that across most Creek 
towns women danced on the second day.  The Hitchiti Jackson Lewis reported to Swanton that 
the women danced on the second day of the Eufaula Busk (604).  Benjamin Hawkins reported the 
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including “Hōmpita haya (‘food preparers’) or Tcukoleʹidji (‘having a house’).”
79
  These 
titles were gender-based and underscored the capacities of Creek women as culinary 
providers, clan leaders, and domestic property owners.  Based on ethnographic and 
archival evidence, we can conclude that Tuckabatchee’s women consented to the British 
alliance by dancing on the first or second day of the Busk and perhaps by preparing food 
for the Creek and European diplomats in and around the square ground.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
same for Cussita, although Cussita’s Turkey clan women held the Turkey Dance on the first day 
(603). 
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 Swanton, Creek Medicine, 614.  In Tuckabatchee, the title of “having a house” may 
have been addressed to only the four female leaders of the Women’s Dance.  In addition to 
women, children were probably addressed by this name. 
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Figure 5.  John Swanton, “The Creek Busk: The Women’s Dance,” ca. 1912.  Donning white 
regalia, women danced in the sacred square ground.  White was the symbol of peace, alliance, 
and friendship.  During the July 1759 Tuckabatchee Busk, the Women’s Dance may have looked 
similar to the one pictured here.  Source: John R. Swanton, Creek Religion and Medicine (1928; 
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), Plate 8, facing p. 588. 
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 In the wake of the Anglo-Tuckabatchee alliance, the Upper Creek trade coalition 
dealt with Atkin once and for all.  On September 21, probably with Tuckabatchee’s 
consent, Atkin called a “General Meeting,” where he wished to evaluate Creek loyalties 
and dissuade Creek warriors from teaming up with the Cherokees and French.  On the 
28th, the conference opened, and about 150 “Principal men of the Nation” arrived.  Of a 
total of thirty-six major Creek towns in 1759, headmen represented at least twenty-seven.  
A cross-stitch of towns from the major provincial divisions attended, including five 
Lower Creek, seven Tallapoosa, thirteen Abeika, and two Alabama towns.  Additionally, 
headmen from five Creek talofas attended.
80
  Granted, some communities, such as four 
Lower Creek towns and one Upper Creek town, refused to participate in the Upper Creek 
trade coalition and sent no headmen to the September 28 meeting.
81
  Yet, other towns not 
only attended but also probably encouraged one another to attend.  It is likely, for 
example, that Muccolossus and Wewoka co-agreed to send their headmen (Wolf and the 
Long Second Man, respectively); two documents suggest the closeness of these towns.
82
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 Great Setter (“General”), in Document No. 2, 7/24/1759, p. 3, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  For September 21 date, see Atkin to Lieutenant Richard Coytmore, 
Document No. 13, 10/20/1759, Okfuskee, p. 1, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  
For conference, see Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, pp. 1-2, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 
13, WHLP.  Hoithlewaulee, a Tallapoosa town, abstained.  Headmen from five talofas: 
“Chiayaychy” of “Chiskytahloofa,” Mad Warrior of Pucknawheatly, “Abekouchy mico” of 
“Talseyhatchey,” “Okeelysaneeka” (among others) of “Alcahatchy,” and “Ischally” of 
“Loustyhatchey” (p. 2).  On September 7, Atkin held a small meeting with Tallapoosa headman 
to try to “restore the Wolf to his lost Credit”; see Document No. 7, 9/7/1759, Muccolossus, and 
Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, Okfuskee, p. 7 (“restore”)—both in Atkin to Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
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 The Upper town was Hoithlewaulee, while the four Lower towns included 
Apalachicola and, likely, Oconee, Chehaw, and Ouseechee; see Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, pp. 
1-2, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
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 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, p. 3; and Document No. 18, 11/16/1759, p. 1—both in 
Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
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And among those towns where the leadership was divided, many headmen turned out in 
support of the trade coalition.  Although Mortar and Gun Merchant rejected the 
Superintendent, Okchai’s “H
d
 Warr,” “Chunosty mico,” and “Hoathlypoya hahgio” all 
attended the September 28 conference in Tuckabatchee.  The head warrior bore a British 
commission, and he may have wanted to keep it, despite Mortar’s hatred for the British.  
Moreover, although Tallassee Mico abstained, Tallassee’s Beloved Man and two 
prominent warriors attended.
83
 
 At least six Upper Creek towns sent a headman bearing the title of Okeelysa, 
suggesting that the Upper Creeks coordinated a formidable response to Atkin.  An 
Okeelysa was known as a “Master of the Ground.”  Usually a man, an Okeelysa belonged 
to a town’s founding clan, which owned the community’s farmlands.  He also bore 
responsibility for allotting any farmland to latecomer clans who settled in the town and 
partook of the sacred fire.  As a result, an Okeelysa interwove family into a harmonious 
township whole.
84
  The six Okeelysas who attended the September 28 conference, then, 
sought to protect the interests of their town’s families, including those in two Tallapoosa 
towns (Cooloome and White Ground), three Abeika towns (Hillabee, Woccoccoie, and 
Upper Eufaula), and one Abeika village (“Alcahatchy”).
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 Piker, Okfuskee, 115-117 (115 for quote). 
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 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, pp. 1-2, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, 
WHLP.  “Okeelysa” of “Coolamy,” “Okeelysa” of “Conhatky,” “Keelysaneehaha” of Hillabee, 
“Keelysaneeha” of Woccoccoie, “Okeelysa” of “Eufawla,” and “Okeelysaneeka” of 
“Alcahatchy” are listed (pp. 1-2).  The Okeelysa Heniha (“Keelysaneeha” of Woccoccoie) might 
have been the assistant to an Okeelysa. 
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 Some of the political heavyweights of Creek country balked at Atkin’s call for a 
meeting.  Although Tallassee and Tuckabatchee headmen attended, the micos of each 
town did not.  Tallassee Mico was “at home,” just across the river from Tuckabatchee, 
while Great Setter was in “Pansicola,” cultivating ties with the Spanish.
86
  Nor did 
headmen attend from the prominent Lower Creek town of Apalachicola or from three 
other Lower Creek towns.
87
  Although three Okchai headmen turned out, brothers-in-law 
Gun Merchant and Mortar were “Absent.”
88
  Mortar remained fiercely opposed to the 
British.  Evidence suggests that Mortar and Gun Merchant convened a meeting in Okchai 
in September, thus drawing away headmen from the “General Meeting” in Tuckabatchee 
in order to undermine Atkin.
89
  To some extent, then, the non-attendance of those like 
Great Setter and Gun Merchant exposed the divisions in how the Upper Creeks handled 
Atkin. 
 The Upper Creek trade coalition plunged ahead, however, and faced Atkin with a 
powerful political cohesiveness.  Atkin opened by expressing his “Pleasure” at seeing “so 
large a Meeting” of Creek headmen.  Minutes later, he created “a Buz” among headmen 
when he said “as the French have said to you[:] If you say be gone, I will go directly, & 
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 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, p. 1, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
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 Apalachicola shared Mortar’s distrust of Atkin; see Atkin to Coytmore, Document No. 
13, 10/20/1759, p. 1, Okfuskee, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  Captain 
Aleck of Cussita, “Speaker for [the] Lower Towns,” informed Atkin that “Headmen are absent 
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p. 3, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
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 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, p. 1, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP 
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 Document No. 4, Billy Germany to Atkin, 8/20/1759, p. 2-3, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 
11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  Okchai was a popular Upper Creek meeting place in the colonial 
period; see, for instance, item 22, Upper Creek meeting, 5/28/1751, “Oakehoy Town Square,” in 
Indian Treaties, ed. Hays, 46-47. 
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carry all the King’s People [traders] with me.”  He also boasted of British military 
superiority and announced that he “put a stop to the Trade” with the Alabamas, who did 
not view the British “as Friends.”  As headmen bristled from Atkin’s confrontational 
language, a head warrior of Cussita named Talhlalegey leapt up and attacked the 
Superintendent four times with a pipe hatchet, severely injuring but not killing him.  
Frightened, the “Whole Assembly” disbanded.
90
  Although headmen may not have 
supported (or known about) the warrior’s attempt to murder the Superintendent, they all 
repudiated Atkin nonetheless.  The coalition leveraged its power by refusing to invite him 
back to the square ground.  Instead, on the 29th leaders made Atkin deliver the remainder 
of his speech in the yard of Tuckabatchee headman, Half Breed.  Half Breed, who was 
allegedly “Sick,” abstained from the speech, a blow to Atkin’s credibility.  Several other 
headmen absented themselves from the unceremonious occasion, including Emistisiguo 
of Little Tallassee, who was also “Sick.”  Atkin again annoyed headmen by droning on 
about Franco-Creek alliances.  At one point, he expressed frustration over the fact that the 
Creeks had granted permission to the French to build Fort Toulouse in 1717, decades 
earlier.  In an unprecedented move, headmen refused to deliver a formal response to the 
talk.  One of Britain’s staunchest Creek allies, Wolf of Muccolossus, “had no Answer to 
make.”
91
  Gun Merchant of Okchai later remarked that “I never knew the time when no 
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 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, pp. 3-4, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, 
WHLP. 
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 Document No. 10, 9/29/1759, pp. 7-11, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, 
WHLP.  The minutes list the absent headmen, including Ufylegey of Coweta, Talhlalegey of 
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Answer was made to a Talk.”  The Creeks’ snub was historic.  Creek leaders were 
“surprized; & seemed to have lost their usual wits”; they were “daunted” and 
“confounded” and “could make no answer.”
92
  By October, some Creeks visited the 
Georgia Governor to call for Atkin’s dismissal.
93
  The Superintendent remained in Creek 
country until December and occasionally met with individual leaders, but he was never 
invited to speak again at a formal Creek assembly.
94
 
 If Atkin’s 1759 embassy was an abysmal failure, the Upper Creek trade coalition 
was a smashing success.  Having secured the removal of the Superintendent, who 
represented one of the most powerful empires in the early modern world, Creeks 
demonstrated their ability to unite and achieve results.  Tuckabatchee centered this 
coalition as its headquarters.  Locally, in the July 24-25 negotiations, the Tuckabatchee 
townspeople, including the mico, head warrior, beloved man, speaker, and common men 
and women, participated collectively in renewing the Anglo-Tuckabatchee alliance.  
Tuckabatchee promoted regional coalitions, as when all Upper towns welcomed Atkin on 
July 7 and when most Upper towns met with him on the 9th.  Local and regional ties, in 
turn, became the building blocks of an inter-provincial meeting on September 28 that 
included both the Lower and Upper towns.  The twenty-seven-town coalition grew to 
encompass major Lower towns like Cussita and Coweta.  That larger coalition 
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 Ellis to Lyttelton, 10/16/1759, Savannah, box 12, WHLP.  Wolf of Muccolossus 
indicated that most Creeks had come to distrust their agent; see Document No. 18, 11/16/1759, p. 
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 Juricek, Colonial Georgia, 258.  Fearing that he might cut off British trade as a 
punishment for Talhlalegey’s attempt to murder him, the Creeks tolerated Atkin’s presence in 
Creek country until December. 
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undermined Atkin’s authority in Creek country and successfully preserved Anglo-Creek 
trade, though the coalition undountedly remained fragile because it depended on 
individual leaders’ whims.  But it is all the more remarkable that many Creek towns 
banded together in 1759 to preserve their autonomy and interests.
95
 
 On September 18, 1759, just ten days before the Tuckabatchee conference 
opened, the French surrendered the city of Quebec to the British after a brief battle on the 
Plains of Abraham.  The fall of Quebec ensured Britain’s victory, and by the following 
September, the Governor-General of New France had surrendered French Canada to the 
British.  Only the Caribbean theater of war remained.  In 1761, France and Spain struck 
an alliance to defend their interests in the Caribbean sugar islands.  In response, Britain 
declared war on Spain in January 1762 and, within months, captured Spanish Cuba and 
French Martinique.  In February 1763, France and Spain conceded victory to the British 
in the Treaty of Paris, bringing the Seven Years’ War to an end.  Britain gained Canada 
and all remaining lands in North America east of the Mississippi from the French and 
Spanish.  Spain reacquired Cuba by surrendering Florida to Britain, and acquired New 
Orleans and Louisiana from the French.
96
  From 1763 to 1783, eastern North America 
remained in British hands, while the Spanish held sway in the western part of the 
continent. 
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 The Paris Peace marked a “turning point” in the history of Native North 
America.
97
  By it, Britain gained half of the continent and claimed sovereignty over all 
Indian people who lived there.  Because no Indians had been invited to the treaty 
conference in Paris, Native people were dumbfounded to learn by mid-1763 that the 
treaty awarded Indian lands to the British.  Mortar and Gun Merchant of Okchai were 
astonished that the British were “going to take all the Lands which they [i.e., the Creeks] 
lent the French and Spaniards” (my emphasis).  Creeks had merely “lent” the land to 
Europeans, whose occupation was to remain brief and who would one day retrocede it 
back to the Creeks.
98
  Aside from illegally claiming Indian land, British supremacy 
demolished the play-off system.  Creeks could no longer pit the French, Spanish, and 
British against each other to secure favorable trade prices and exact other concessions.  
Until the late 1770s, Britain dictated terms of trade, while Creek consumers accumulated 
massive debts to British traders.  To forgive Creek debts, imperial and colonial officials 
wrestled land cessions from the Creeks in the 1760s and 1770s.
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 The Paris Peace challenged Creek sovereignty in the postwar period, but it did not 
wholly diminish opportunities for political action in Creek society.
100
  The Upper Creek 
trade coalition of 1759 gave way to an Upper Creek “peace coalition” that provided a 
diplomatic template for the postwar Native South.  Mortar of Okchai spearheaded this 
coalition, crafting a cosmopolitan vision, a kind of “Pax Muskogeana,” for the Native 
South.
101
  Rather than Tuckabatchee, the coalition was based in Emistisiguo’s Tallapoosa 
town of Little Tallassee.  Moreover, as I show below, Mortar’s Bear clan association 
framed the coalition with kinship-rich language, indicating that he cultivated his authority 
by appealing to his clan ties, but that his own Bear people may have given him the 
greenlight to make peace with the British.  In turn, British authorities supported the 
coalition because they understood that British expansion and trading policy depended on 
stable relations with indigenous Southerners. 
 In May 1763, Mortar and Gun Merchant issued a message to the new Southern 
Indian Superintendent, John Stuart, and Georgia Governor James Wright.  This message 
became the ideological basis of Mortar’s vision.  Speaking for his brother-in-law, Mortar 
admitted that the “red People” had relied on Europeans trade, but that dependence on 
trade did not preclude Creeks’ sovereign right to freely exchange land with Europeans.  
Mortar was incredulous that the “white People have forgot [sic] or think” that the Creeks 
“have no Lands belonging to them.”  He had heard that the British “are going to take all” 
Creek lands, such as Mobile and Pensacola, “surprized [at] how People can give away 
                                                             
 
100
 Piker, Okfuskee, 66, makes a similar point about the Okfuskees. 
 
101
 For Native cosmopolitans in the nineteenth-century, see James Taylor Carson, 
Searching for the Bright Path: The Mississippi Choctaws from Prehistory to Removal (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 88. 
 
96 
 
Land that does not belong to them.”  Yet, for Mortar, the Paris Peace offered an 
opportunity to start over, to restore peace and honesty between the British and the Creeks.  
Although he believed that the “white People’s Physic” was “strong for War,” he admitted 
that Creek warriors, too, “have strong Physic,” implying that each side ought to adopt a 
peaceful stance towards the other.
102
  Mortar closed the talk by defending Creek land on 
whose foodstuffs and powers Creek families depended.  The Creeks “love” their “Lands a 
great deal,” for “the Wood is our Fire, and the Grass is our Bed, and our Physic when we 
are sick.”  As a British translator wrote for Mortar, “That he and his Family are Masters 
of all the Land, and they own [i.e., recognize] no Masters but the Master of their Breath; 
but he thinks the White People intend to stop all their Breaths by their settling all round 
them.”  Mortar balanced his hope for postwar stability with the sharp recognition that the 
Paris Peace was opening the floodgate of British settlement.
103
 
 Superintendent Stuart ignored Mortar’s eloquent defense of land.  In November 
1763, Stuart met some seven hundred Southern Indians at the Augusta “Congress” (a 
term for meetings used by the British) in Georgia.  He hoped to gain their formal consent 
to Britain’s acquisition of the South, and on the 9th, Indians touched pen to the Treaty of 
Augusta.  In the articles that applied to Creek country, Creek headmen ceded to Georgia 
land between the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers.  As one scholar argues, Lower Creek 
headmen, led by Captain Aleck of Cussita, were the principal signers.  Although Wolf of 
Muccolossus signed, Upper Creek leaders protested this treaty, for neither Mortar nor 
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Gun Merchant joined the delegation of Creeks.  Handsome Fellow of Okfuskee, another 
influential Upper Creek headman, also abstained.
104
 
 In the following months, the Upper Creek peace coalition took shape as a 
response to Georgia’s growing influence in the South.  In April 1764, Upper Creek 
headmen assembled in Little Tallassee; most like Mortar belonged to Abeika towns, 
although several, such as Emistisiguo, inhabited the Tallapoosa province.  Some like 
Topalga were Alabamas.  Coalition leaders, Mortar and Emistisiguo, each addressed a 
message to Superintendent Stuart and Governor Wright, agreeing to Britain’s recent 
request for the establishment of a boundary line between British West Florida and the 
Creek hunting grounds that resided near there.  Despite Mortar’s earlier protest, he and 
Emistisiguo also consented to Britain’s takeover of Pensacola and Mobile.  Emistisiguo 
spoke for the “Upper [Abeika?] and Tallipussie Creeks,” while Mortar represented the 
Upper Creek head warriors.  Because he may have taken part in the murder of two 
Cherokees a year earlier, Mortar claimed that “My head Warriours” of the Upper Creeks 
“are now taking pains to put things on a good footing.”  By 1764, then, Mortar preferred 
peace over war, a vision that applied to all Southern Indians.  Mortar indicated that “our 
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Talks” would be conveyed to “the [Chickasaws] and Chactaws.”
105
  The peace coalition 
was beginning to find its way. 
 In late July, three months later, coalition leaders explicitly called for peace across 
the entire region.  In a message sent to Stuart from Little Tallassee, Upper Creek 
headmen pledged their commitment to diplomacy.  Gun Merchant said that “it’s the Talk 
of the Upper Creeks in General” to promote good relations with the British.  For his part, 
Mortar invoked the symbols of war and peace, saying that he “has buried all Red [war] 
Talks, has and desires none but white [peace] Talks.”  Mortar coordinated 
communication around the region, receiving “Talks from All Nations of Indians,” and he 
was “now sending a good talk to the Chickesaws.”  He repeated the point that he “desires 
Peace with All.”  By encouraging peace with Britain, among other peoples, Mortar did 
not imply that the British were welcome to settle among the Indians.  With an eye 
towards the future, Mortar discouraged Stuart from building a fort or establishing any 
British settlements west of the Alabama River.  Doing so “will certainly Occasion 
disturbances between the English and their Nation,” Mortar warned.  His promotion of 
regional peace was backed by Emistisiguo, who said that Mortar “has given his promise 
through the whole Nation that a firm Peace shall be maintained” between the Creeks and 
British.
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 Hoping to confer with the Upper Creeks, Stuart invited them to Pensacola in 
1765.  In late May, Mortar, Emistisiguo, Topalga, and other Upper Creek headmen 
arrived for the Pensacola Congress.  Although Mortar rarely met Europeans face-to-face, 
postwar circumstances forced Mortar to directly engage the British victors.
107
  
Specifically, Mortar took the opportunity to announce his status as a peace-keeping 
headman, rather than a fearsome head warrior.  On May 27, he addressed a crowd of 
Creeks and Britons with a “Belt of Whampum” in hand.  He stated that the land around 
Pensacola belonged to the “Red people” in whose name he presented eagle wings as 
“Emblems of Peace.”  After calling Emistisiguo “my Head Warrior,” Mortar asserted that 
he himself had rejected warfare as a solution to the Indians’ problems: “henceforward 
you shall hear of no Act of mine, which does not tend to promote friendship and 
Harmony.”  Both he and his warriors threw in the towel.  “My warriors,” he said, “are 
Striped [sic] of their Warlike Implements which are now all buried in Oblivion.”  He was 
confident that “White [peace] Talks daily Increase in the [Creek] Nation.”
108
 
 A regard for clan and town shaped Mortar’s transition from head warrior to peace 
leader.  As he declared, “I am the Voice of my People who are all to abide by what I say 
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and do.”  Although it is difficult to know, by “my People,” Mortar most likely claimed to 
speak primarily for his clan (Bear) and town (Okchai).  Yet it was those community 
affiliations that made him a trusted international peace leader.  He represented not only 
town and kinship interests but also those of all Creeks and of the Cherokees, Choctaws, 
and Chickasaws, with whom he frequently communicated.  As a voice of the Southern 
Indians, he was “determined that the Path shall not only be made white and streight here 
[Pensacola] but every where” (my emphasis), one that linked all Southern peoples in a 
circuitry of peace and friendship.  To be sure, he privileged Creek interests, revealing that 
“I am a King and made such, in order to preserve Peace and good order in my [Creek] 
Nation.”  By taking a peace title (“King”), he discarded his war title, 
“Yahahtustunnogy”
109
 (Wolf Warrior).  He indicated, however, that his vision 
encompassed Creeks, other Indians, and non-Indians, for he “now look[ed] upon the 
Surrounding White Nations as all United and Children of the same Family.”  Using the 
language of kinship, he adopted his former British enemies as “Elder Brothers” and 
allies.  He promised to keep “my Young People” on the white path in exchange for 
Britain’s agreement to do the same.
110
  If the British did so, he promised to recite these 
peaceful talks whenever “I go through Different [Indian] Nations.”
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 Mortar’s Pax Muskogeana was innovative.  By pledging peace with Stuart and the 
“White Nations,” Mortar abandoned his militant stance against the British.  
Accompanying this departure was a ritual passage from warrior to peace-keeper, who 
deployed eagle wings and a wampum belt instead of the gun and war club.  Having had 
command over Upper Creek head warriors, by 1765 he encouraged them to swap war for 
peace.
112
  The Pax Muskogeana also broke from the past.  During the pre-1763 play-off 
era, Creek headmen avoided becoming dependent on one ally.  Although the Creeks 
tended to prefer British trade goods, many Creek headmen curried favor with the French 
and British.  Allying with a single power was unnecessary and dangerous.  By 1765, 
however, new geopolitical realities called for new solutions.  In an expansive, 
international, and cosmopolitan vision, Mortar attempted to join all Creeks and other 
Southern Indians to a single European power.
113
 
 Despite its newness, the Pax Muskogeana planted deep roots in clan custom.  For 
one, during the conference’s closing ceremonies on May 30, Mortar declared, “I am a 
King of the Ancient Bear family.”  As a Bear, Mortar belonged to the Muskogee-
speaking clan moiety known as the Hathagalgi (“white people”).  Those of the 
Hathagalgi commanded influence in Creek society, and the Bear clan was especially 
weighty, as this and three other clans bore responsibility for promoting peace in Creek 
country.
114
  Mortar invoked his Bears to couch the Pensacola Congress in the tradition of 
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kinship politics, allowing him to draw support from Bears and other non-Bear Creeks.  
Mortar explained that just as Stuart must report to the “different Governors” of the South, 
so “it is necessary for me to return to my Nation, in order to speak to my people whom I 
have left behind.”  In order to implement such a grand vision, his family of Bears, the 
Okchais, and other Creeks required him to acknowledge their interests, to check in with 
him from time-to-time.
115
  Although I have located no records to show when he actually 
did so, it is safe to take him at his word, considering that the consensual nature of Creek 
politics demanded that headmen fairely represent the family or town community.  Mortar 
had been in hot water before, so he was especially sensitive to the requirements of 
consensual leadership.  For instance, during the late war, Mortar’s Creek-Cherokee-
French coalition raised a “Clamour” among the Okchais, particularly among the “Women 
of that Town” and probably among his family, who feared that his coalition might harm 
kin and town interests by inadvertenly provoking a British invasion of Creek country.
116
  
As a traditional leader armed with an innovative vision, Mortar looked to protect the 
Creeks. 
 Mortar captures the changes and continuities of the postwar Native South, where 
Creeks built new coalitions from the stuff of tradition.  Although the Paris Peace 
narrowed Indians’ political opportunities, territory, and trading arrangements, the core 
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values of clan and town endured as explicit features of diplomacy, power, and coalition-
building.  Clan and town identities shaped alliances across Creek towns, between Creek 
towns and other Southern Indian towns, and between the Creeks and British.  In this vein, 
Mortar’s articulation of foreign policy resulted from the Upper Creek peace coalition, 
considering that Emistisiguo, Topalga, and Abeika headmen all discussed how to deal 
with the British in 1764 and 1765.  Mortar was certainly the primary voice of the Pax 
Muskogeana, but he was no lone wolf.  The basis of chiefly power in Creek society 
continued to rest on established clan and town customs, which simultaneously breathed 
new life into diplomacy.  Fundamentally, chiefly power rested on one’s accomplishments 
earned on behalf of one’s clan and town.  Although British patronage provided Mortar 
with an “outside” source of power, the “inside” sources of his power were rooted in clan 
and town affiliation, which legitimized his vision and the coalition that strove to 
implement it.
117
 
 Meanwhile, the Creeks’ neighbors to the north took a different tack in the Paris 
Peace aftermath.  After 1763, Indians in the Ohio and Great Lakes watershed formed 
what scholars call the “Western Indian Confederacy.”  The Delaware prophet Neolin, the 
Ottawa warrior Pontiac, and other Algonquian-speaking headmen called on Indians to 
resist British expansion.  Unlike the French, the British occupied the Upper Country 
(pays d’en haut) as aggressive invaders and ignored established traditions of Native gift-
giving that French diplomats had obeyed.  Invoking the powers of a pan-Indian “Great 
Spirit,” Neolin urged the Indians to end their dependence on trade goods, restore the 
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French to the region, and protect Indian lands from British incursion.
118
  Pontiac led the 
militant edge of the Western Confederacy, which waged war on several British forts in a 
conflict known as “Pontiac’s Rebellion” from 1763 to 1765.  Pontiac harnessed violence 
as a way to preserve Indian autonomy and roll back British expansion.  The contrast 
between the militant Western Confederacy and peace-promoting Creeks in the mid-1760s 
reveals that Indians in eastern North America dealt with the British on very different 
terms.
119
 
 In the era of the Seven Years’ War, the Creeks adapted to British expansion 
primarily by engineering cross-town networks.  Motivated by a desire to maintain peace 
and trade with the British, Lower and Upper Creek headmen parleyed with each other 
and constructed cross-community ties.  The Lower and Upper Creeks’ efforts to conclude 
the Creek-Cherokee War in 1753 and 1754 ignited this flurry of coalition-building 
activity for the remaining decade and beyond the Paris Peace settlement.  Individual 
towns serviced some of the coalitions.  In 1759, for instance, Tuckabatchee became the 
political capital of the Upper Creeks who, although partially divided by the Anglo-
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Cherokee War and a desire to remain allies of the French and Spanish, erected a 
formidable coalition that preserved British trade and countered the aggressive tactics of 
Superintendent Atkin.  By the early 1760s, the trade coalition gave way to a peace 
coalition led by Mortar and Emistisiguo, among others.  Mortar crafted an international 
vision of peace designed to pacify the British and respect local Creek interests. 
 Bonds of kinship partially generated and solidified many of the coalitions, 
although in different ways.  Wolf of Muccolossus dissuaded his clan from securing 
vengeance on the British, while Captain Aleck of Cussita stepped in to resolve a crisis 
between his Yuchi kin and the British.  Evidence suggests, for example, that while the 
law of retaliation required Wolf to carry out vengeance against the British, he substituted 
the interests of Anglo-Creek diplomacy for obeisance to clan law.  Furthermore, clan 
affinities shaped Mortar’s rhetoric and vision for regional unity in the postwar South.  As 
co-leader of the peace coalition with Emistisiguo, Mortar leveraged his influential Bear 
clan to legitimize his authority and craft diplomacy with Stuart and Wright.  The peace 
coalition of 1764 and 1765 exemplifies the ways in which traditional customs and 
innovative policies allowed the Creeks to adapt to a new world order, dominated by 
British influence. 
 Scholars of the late colonial Native South tend to focus on the connections 
between a town and an empire at the exclusion of the connections within, between, and 
among towns.  Although the Creeks traded with the Spanish, French, and British in order 
to avoid dependence on one empire, perhaps more importantly the Creeks established 
coalitions across society that allowed them to maintain access to goods and defend loved 
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ones from British encroachment.  By piecing together these town-based coalitions, it 
becomes apparent that the Creeks collaborated across communal lines more frequently 
and, at times, with greater success than scholars have noticed.  That the Upper Creek 
trade coalition of 1759 removed Atkin from a position of power, for instance, cannot be 
overstated and was a direct result of Creek political cohesion.  Headmen appealed to their 
relationships with and cultural allegiances to a particular clan, town, or province in order 
to reinforce their legitimacy as community leaders and to make the coalitions tenable.  
Towns formed the building blocks of the coalitions, with clans binding them together.
120
  
Creek communities powered a range of political responses to British colonialism in a 
rapidly changing world.  But that world was just about to get more violent.
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE INSTABILITY OF COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
 In 1766, the Creek-Choctaw War erupted.  Dashing Mortar’s vision for regional 
peace, this brutal ten-year conflict originated in the Paris Peace settlement.  Before 1763, 
Britain rarely traded with the Choctaws, who secured most of their goods from the 
French.  Britain’s emergence as the sole purveyor of goods in the South after 1763, 
however, ignited economic friction between the Creeks and Choctaws.  Each side’s 
competition for British trade boiled over into all-out war in 1766.  In the initial years of 
conflict, the Upper Creeks defeated the Choctaws repeatedly, but in 1773 and 1774, the 
Choctaws gained the upper hand.  Although British trade helped determine that seesaw, 
the reason that the war escalated was cultural.  A rising death toll activated clan 
retribution, which fueled endless cycles of attack and counter-attack, leaving perhaps 
hundreds on both sides dead by the war’s conclusion in 1776.  Creek-Choctaw rivalry 
with regard to the British clashed with Southern Indian clan retribution, precipitating one 
of the deadliest wars in the eighteenth-century Native South. 
 Two scholars have examined the Creek-Choctaw War in depth.  Kathryn E. 
Holland Braund argues that the accession of the British as the sole supplier of goods in 
the region caused the Southern Indians to scramble for the best prices and, as a result, 
prompted the war.  Greg O’Brien accepts this position but complements it by arguing that 
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Choctaw elites initiated the war to reinforce their own position.  By 1766, the growth of 
independent trading between common hunters and British traders had diminished 
Choctaw elites’ power, which in part rested on their exclusive ability to distribute trade 
goods to their villages, and widened the generational gap between elites and commoners.  
To recoup their power and authority, Choctaw headmen goaded young warriors to wage a 
“full-fledged war” on the Creeks.  Intertribal war served to redirect warriors’ aggression 
away from the British and towards a Native enemy, thereby preserving trade and 
allowing warriors to earn war honors by demonstrating their prowess in battle.  Likewise, 
O’Brien identifies evidence proving that a few Creek headmen also spurred their warriors 
to attack the Choctaws so as to preserve Anglo-Creek trade.  In short, O’Brien’s 
argument highlights the indigenous origins of the Creek-Choctaw War and traces it to a 
desire by elites to control the pace of colonial change.
1
 
 Several questions have been overlooked in examinations of the Creek-Choctaw 
War, however.  O’Brien’s contention that Choctaw and Creek elites redirected the 
“young” and “aggressive” warriors away from the British does not explain why elites 
themselves became engulfed in the war or why elites simultaneously conducted 
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diplomacy with and waged war on the Choctaws.
2
  At least among the Creeks, on whom 
this chapter focuses, headmen crafted elaborate peace initiatives only to fall prey to clan 
priorities that dragged them into the conflict and undermined peace.  Why did elites 
inhabit the role of what I call the “warrior-diplomat”?  Additionally, we must move away 
from an exclusively elite focus to consider why Creek warriors fought the Choctaws and, 
more generally, how towns and clans participated in the war, gaining a rich community 
perspective on the fighting of a devastating intertribal war. 
 I address these problems and questions by arguing that the Creek-Choctaw War 
exposed the instability of community membership.  During intertribal warfare, in other 
words, being a townsperson and clansperson was a liability.  Throughout the war, actual 
communities and headmen’s allegiances to their communities fostered peace and 
violence.  Each Creek town faced unique crises that called for unique responses, and 
while some of those responses were peaceful, others were more violent.  For instance, 
Tuckabatchee and Muccolossus reinterpreted spiritual customs to quell the war and 
cultivate internal solidarity and peace.  At the same time, the Seminole town of 
Cuscowilla, an offshoot of the Lower Creeks, repackaged several military customs to 
wage war on the Choctaws.  Likewise, clans embodied a tension between peace and war.  
On one hand, the law of retaliation was an important factor that triggered and fueled war 
with the Choctaws, but on the other, clans guided diplomacy between Creeks and their 
primary trader partner, the British, as they had done during the French and Indian War. 
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 If towns and clans each contained the possibility for diplomacy and violence, the 
merging of town and clan identities exacerbated the Creek-Choctaw War.  To be sure, 
much like during the French and Indian War, headmen forged coalitions from clans and 
towns, both of which became the building blocks of international peace.  At the same 
time, the law of retaliation fueled violence by obligating Creek headmen to launch 
revenge raids against the Choctaws.
3
  In fact, many Creek headmen like Mortar of Okchai 
and Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee became “warrior-diplomats.”  Such headmen served 
their towns and provinces as diplomats but obeyed the dictates of retributive justice.  As 
members of a town and a clan, those headmen could not escape the tug-of-war between 
their attachements to each, a tension that perpetuated the Creek-Choctaw War. 
 My research sheds new light on indigenous culture change in the pre-
revolutionary Native South.  Ethnohistorians have argued that Creek dependence on trade 
goods compelled the Creeks to cede land in five of six Anglo-Creek conferences from 
1763 to 1773.  But I suggest that in addition to dependence, the Creek-Choctaw War 
accounted for those land cessions.
4
   For the duration of the war, Creek society faced the 
threat and reality of Choctaw raids, prompting Creeks to turn inward by worrying about 
protecting their kin and towns.  As a result, the climate of war weakened the Creeks’ 
response to British colonialism.  As the borders of the Creek domain dwindled, Creeks 
strove to reduce violence.  Towns danced and sang for sacred powers, revived old 
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traditions to meet new circumstances, and mourned loved ones through ritual.
5
  Because 
the Creek-Choctaw War embroiled clans and towns in violence, moreover, Creek had no 
need to participate in the Western Indian Confederacy, which resisted British expansion 
after 1763.  While Shawnees and Miamis “acted in a world beyond the locality,” as one 
scholar notes, the Creeks promoted town and kinship interests.
6
  The “locality” took 
precedence in Creek society.  Indeed, Creek headmen tapped into the Confederacy’s lines 
of communication to cultivate peace with the Choctaws.  The Creeks had little to gain 
and everything to lose by attacking the British.
7
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concerns in diplomacy and warfare, although Kathryn Braund briefly notes that Creek women 
were “a potent political force, especially in matters of war and peace and clan retribution.”  See 
Deerskins, 23.  I agree with Joshua Piker that Creeks maintained political and cultural autonomy 
from the Paris Peace to the American Revolution.  As he puts it, they “still had some cards to 
play.”  See Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), quote on p. 66.  In The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-
1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), Steven Hahn contends that Creek diplomats 
responded to British requests for land by forging a “nation” with clearly-defined borders that 
Creeks defended in treaty conferences.  He points out that clan and town affiliation underwrote 
the authority of leadership and diplomatic practices. 
 
6
 Scholars fail to explain why the Southern Indians, at least the Creeks, did not participate 
in the activities of the Western Confederacy.  Gregory Evans Dowd is the foremost authority on 
the Confederacy.  See Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for 
Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xiii (“locality”), xxi-
xxii, 16-22, 35-40; and Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indians Nations, and the British 
Empire (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).  War under Heaven makes the 
important point that Pontiac’s Rebellion attempted to force the British into recognizing Indian 
people as British subjects, who must be respected, rather than as subordinate vassals.  For more 
on the Western Confederacy, see Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and 
Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 366-468; and Woody Holton, “The Ohio Indians and the Coming of the American 
Revolution in Virginia,” Journal of Southern History, 60:3 (August 1994): 453-478. 
 
7
 The colonial Native American scholarship is moving away from analyses of Native 
resistance and anti-colonialism, which serve to obscure rather than explain the intricacies of 
Native culture change and decision-making processes.  In Okfuskee, 52-63, for instance, Piker 
demonstrates that the Okfuskee uprising of May 1760 was not an anti-colonial resistance 
movement but, from the Okfuskees’ perspective, an intraclan conflict between the town and the 
British. 
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Figure 6.  Eighteenth-Century Creeks and Choctaws.  The Choctaws lived west of the Creeks in 
three principal divisions: the Western, Eastern, and Six Towns.  Source: Kathryn E. Holland 
Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; 
repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) p. 10.  
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Table 3. Creek Coalitions during the Creek-Choctaw War.  For clarity’s sake, only the major 
provinces, towns, and headmen are listed. 
 
Coalitions Major participating provinces, 
towns, and headmen 
Participating 
clans 
Participating non-
Creeks 
 
- Three intra-town 
coalitions, 1772-1775 
 
 
- Tallapoosa: Tuckabatchee 
- Abeika: Muccolossus 
- Seminole: Cuscowilla 
 
  
 
- Coalition promoting 
diplomacy with 
Choctaws, 1770-1773 
 
- Tallapoosa: Emistisiguo of 
Little Tallassee 
 
- Abeika: Mortar of Okchai 
and Handsome Fellow of 
Okfuskee 
 
 
- Tigers 
 
 
- Bears 
 
- Intermediaries: 
Shawnees, 
Cherokees, 
Chickasaws, and 
Charles Stuart 
 
- Congeetoo town: 
Creeks’ contact 
among Choctaws 
 
 
- Coalition of 1774-
1775, arising from 
New Purchase crisis 
 
 
- Tallapoosa: Emistisiguo and 
Second Man of Little 
Tallassee 
 
- Abeika: Mad Turkey, 
Handsome Fellow, and 
Cujesse Mico of Okfuskee 
 
- Lower Creek: Cussita 
 
 
- Tigers 
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Figure 7.  John Stuart or William Gerard De Brahm, “A Map of the Indian Nations in the 
Southern Department 1766.”  The Native South was an intricate riverine world where Native and 
Euro-American communities jockeyed for influence.  In the forests and valleys of this region, 
Southern Indians as well as Euro-Americans hunted fur-bearing animals.  Ranging far and wide 
for deerskins, Indian hunters ignored the boundaries (depicted by the dotted lines) separating the 
hunting grounds and in part fueled such conflicts as the Creek-Choctaw War (1766-1776).  Size 
[of original map]: 22
1/2
 × 18.  Scale [of original map]: 1ʺ = ca. 48 miles.  Source: John 
Stuart/William Gerard De Brahm (?), A Map of the Indian Nations in the Southern Department 
1766, in William P. Cumming, The Southeast in Early Maps, ed. and rev. Louis de Vorsey, Jr. 
(1958; repr., Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 297 and Plate 61.  
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 The Creek-Choctaw War claimed the lives of hundreds of Creeks and Choctaws.
8
  
While access to trade and hunting grounds initially sparked the war, clan vengeance was 
a large factor in the continuation of the war, as it tended to generate cycles of attack and 
counter-attack between Creek and Choctaw towns.  To pursue vengeance on behalf of 
their clan, warriors presumably fought alongside members of their clan.  Warriors 
demonstrated prowess, courage, and bravery in battle by taking one or a few enemy 
scalps, by capturing war booty, such as weapons or trade goods, and by safely returning 
home.  At home, successful warriors earned new ranked war titles, merited an increased 
social status among the townspeople, and showcased the scalps and war booty.  War 
leaders who led their men in battle and home to safety with very little loss of life had 
successfully mastered the proper spiritual powers over life and death.  Women, too, 
participated in warfare, especially when they urged the able-bodied men of the family to 
attack the enemy.
9
  As well, women and children were attacked and sometimes killed 
during town raids, as when the Tuckabatchees captured the niece of a Choctaw headman 
named Mingo Houma Chito.
10
 
 Violence erupted between the Creeks and Choctaws as early as 1763, although 
each side was not officially at war until 1766.  A recurring cycle of raid and counter-raid 
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 O’Brien, Choctaws, 27. 
 
9
 For a discussion of warfare, social honor, and male power, see Charles Hudson, The 
Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 239-257; O’Brien, 
Choctaws, 27-49; and Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 133-134, 248n58.  Hudson, Southeastern 
Indians, 251, suggested that “after just one or a few losses” a war party began to retreat, lest the 
war leader lose too many men and suffer military demotion. 
 
10
 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 6/12/1770, Pensacola, enclosed in Stuart’s dispatch “No. 
25,” 7/16/1770, Records of the British Colonial Office, Class 5 Files: Westward Expansion, 
1700-1783, The Board of Trade, The French and Indian War, ed. Randolph Boehm (Frederick, 
MD: University Publications of America, 1983), vol. 75 (hereafter cited as CO5/vol. number). 
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suggests that the law of retaliation fueled the violence.  Sometime between July and 
October 1763, the Creeks killed at least three Choctaws.
11
  Although we do not know if 
the Choctaws immediately responded with their own attack, Elias Legardere, who served 
as commissary to the Choctaws, wrote to a fellow official in 1765 that the Choctaws 
killed at least one Creek.  By March 1766, the Creeks had killed a Choctaw hunter near 
Fort Tombecbé, perhaps in response to the previous Creek’s death.
12
  Conflict persisted 
into the summer of 1766, by which time several Creek and Choctaw warriors lay dead.  
In August, a Choctaw war captain named “Hulachta Upai” complained to the British that 
by supplying ammunition to the Creeks, the British intentionally spurred endless 
retaliation.
13
  By September, the Creeks had declared war on the Choctaws, whom they 
sent some black wings as tokens of death.
14
  In the winter of 1766-1767, Creeks killed 
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 John Stuart to Thomas Boone, 10/15/1763, Fort Augusta, in “Minutes of the Southern 
Congress at Augusta, Georgia,” in The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, Vol. 11, 
Documenting the American South, University Library, The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr11-0084 (accessed 8/29/13) 
(hereafter, cited as CSRNC); and James Colbert, entry 8/3/1763, Copy of Colbert’s Journal, 
enclosed in Stuart to Boone, Arthur Dobbs, and Francis Fauquier, 10/23/1763, Fort Augusta, in 
“Minutes,” CSRNC.  For more on Colbert, see Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in 
Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 221. 
 
12
 Elias Legardere to George Johnstone, 3/27/1766, Fort Tombeckbe, in British Museum, 
Additional Manuscripts #21671, Part 1, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as 
BMAM).  The Choctaws in this example came from Tombeckbe village.  I thank Greg O’Brien 
for providing me with his research notes on the BMAM documents.  Legardere was the British 
commissary for the Choctaws; see James Adair, The History of the American Indians, ed. 
Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 529n337. 
 
13
 For Hulachta, see Ja[mes] Hendrie (a French interpreter), interpreting for R. Roi [?], to 
Brigadier Taylor, 8/29/1766, Mobile, BMAM, #21671, Part 1.  Two English traders named 
Goodwin and Davis were also killed around this time. 
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 Brigadier Taylor to General Thomas Gage, 9/18/1766, Pensacola, BMAM, #21671, 
Part 2. 
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two Choctaws near “Seanapa,” prompting a Choctaw warrior named Poussah Homa to 
slay two Creeks whose scalps and ears he cut off to demonstrate his martial prowess.
15
 
 The theater of war centered on the Escambia, Alabama, and Tombigbee River 
valleys (Figures 6 and 7).  In this deadly no-man’s-land, Creek and Choctaw warriors 
battled in forests, along streams, and in open fields.
16
  The Tensaw delta (“Tinsac”), for 
instance, became a battleground.  In September 1766, Frenchmen employed by the 
British met the Alabama Creeks at Tinsac.  While there, the French spotted a large 
butcher’s knife, a swan’s wing, a pair of breeches, and an unscalped Creek body.  
Nearby, it seems, they met some Creeks who reported that the Choctaws had attacked and 
killed two members of their party.  These Creeks, who had several extra blankets with 
them, lived in the Tallapoosa town of Hoithlewaulee (“Cheowalli”).
17
  Places like Tinsac 
bore the violent imprint of Creek-Choctaw hostilities. 
 Compromise was elusive and escalation was inevitable.  In May 1766, a British 
official Stephen Forrester reported that up to that point, the Choctaws had lost more than 
twenty men.  In response, they issued “a challenge” to Emistisiguo, war leader of Little 
Tallassee, daring the Creeks to “Fight them in Plains & not behind Trees like Cowards.”  
As Forrester learned from a Choctaw, the Choctaws pledged to send “100 men to lye 
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 For Poussah Homa, Lieutenant John Ritchey to Brigadier Taylor, 1/2/1767, 
Tombeckbe, BMAM, #21671, Part 3.  Sometime in 1766, Tallapoosa warriors killed an 
undetermined number of Choctaws; see Legardere to Charles Stuart, 3/4/1767, Fort Tombeckbe, 
BMAM, #21671, Part 4. 
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 William Bartram on the Southeastern Indians, eds. Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn 
E. Holland Braund (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 249-250n76.  Indian 
hunters avoided this war-torn environment, which consequently led to the rapid regeneration of 
the deer population. 
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 “Ja. Hendrie,” interpreter for “R. Roi,” to Brigadier Taylor, 9/22/1766, Mobile, 
BMAM, #21671, Part 2. 
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between Pensacola & the upper Creeks to kill all they can find.”  Choctaws of the 
Western and Eastern Divisions threatened to send their warriors against Muccolossus 
(“Wolf Kings Town”) and another one hundred against Pucantallahassee (“Paucana 
Talakasa”), probably because each town was responsible for the deaths of numerous 
Choctaws.  To protect their women and children, the Choctaws informed Emistisiguo that 
they would station five hundred warriors in Choctaw society.
18
  By 1767, Creek and 
Choctaw countries dug in for war, each anxiously awaiting attack from the other.  
According to one report, there was a “perpetual apprehension on both sides.”
19
 
 In the Native South, warfare followed a cultural logic.  Warriors organized into 
small war parties that tried to inflict maximum damage on the enemy and sustain minimal 
casualties.  Military tactics included brief skirmishes in forests and open fields, strategic 
invasions of towns, captive-taking, and ritual torture.  Torture was used to terrify the 
enemy.
20
  In the winter of 1767-1768, for example, a Creek war party attacked the 
Choctaws whose “Principal Leader” was “wounded . . . and . . . taken prisoner.”  Perhaps 
egged on by the women, the captors “Fles’d him alive, and Tortured him most 
inhumanly.”  The fleshing and death of the Choctaw leader “excited [such] a Spirit of 
Revenge” that the Choctaws avenged his death by invading Upper Creek country in 
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 Stephen Forrester to Governor Johnstone, 5/25/1766, “Chester-ca-lusfa,” BMAM, 
#21671, Part 1.  For the Choctaw divisions, see O’Brien, Choctaws, 35-36, 135n45. 
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 Taylor to Thomas Gage, 3/4/1767, BMAM, #21671, Part 4.  During the war, a group of 
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 Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 239.  Terrorizing an enemy and avenging a loved one’s 
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1768.
21
  This invasion was devastating.  According to Mortar of Okchai, the Choctaws 
had amassed a formidable “Army” that “killed and destroyed some of our People and 
Towns.”  At some point in the winter of 1768-1769, Mortar “got revenge” and his “Heart 
[was] wiped clean.”
22
 
 Creek men participated in the Creek-Choctaw War as affiliates of a clan.  When 
the Choctaws killed a Creek, clan law dictated that the men of the deceased’s clan avenge 
their kinsman’s death, and women exhorted warriors of the clan to avenge the loss by 
going to war.  Because hundreds of Creeks died during the war, Creek warriors 
frequently launched raids into Choctaw country in the attempt to avenge a clansman’s 
death.  As a result, each side was locked into a recurring cycle of violence.  For the most 
part, scholars have not considered the full impact of clan identity on inter-Indian warfare.  
What did it mean to be a Bear, a Tiger, an Eagle, or a Wind clan member during such a 
brutal war?
23
 
 Warriors far from home explicitly promoted their clan identity as a marker of 
pride, to humiliate the enemy, and perhaps to display their mastery of spiritual powers.  
In the fall of 1771, Dutch surveyor Bernard Romans surveyed Choctaw lands in West 
Florida.  He was accompanied by a small party of Europeans and Indians.  On September 
                                                             
 
21
 John Stuart to “Your Lordship’s,” 12/28/1768, Charles Town, CO5/70, frames166-167. 
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 The attack “made my Heart cross and black,” Mortar added.  See “Otis Mico” (Mortar) 
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30, Romans and his companions crossed a branch of Buckatunna Creek, near the 
Pascagoula River.  Traveling almost twelve miles, they camped at “Hoopah Ullah, (i.e.) 
the noisy owl.”  There, in Choctaw country, they “saw the hieroglyphick No. 2” (see 
Figure 8), a Creek pictograph, which was a  
 
painting in the Creek taste[. It] means, that ten of that nation of the Stag family 
[Deer clan] came in three canoes into their enemies country, that six of the party 
near this place, which was at Oopah Ullah, a brook so called on the road to the 
Chactaws, had met two men, and two women with a dog, that they lay in ambush 
for them, killed them, and that they all went home with the four scalps; the scalp 
in the stag’s foot implies the honour of the action of the whole family [clan].
24
 
 
 
According to Romans’ analysis of the “painting,” six Creek warriors killed two men and 
two women, and then triumphantly returned home with their scalps.  The pictograph 
corroborates Native military practice: a small war party surprises the enemy, attacks with 
guns, bows and arrows, and war clubs, takes scalps as a symbol of victory, returning 
home safely.
25
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 Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida, ed. Kathryn E. 
Holland Braund (1999; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2014), 268-269.  
Romans does not indicate whether the dog was killed. 
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 For Creek military practices, see Braund, Deerskins, 21, 23-24; for Choctaws’, see 
O’Brien, Choctaws, 37-40. 
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Figure 8.  Creek Pictograph, Reproduced on Copperplate by Dutch Traveler Bernard Romans, ca. 
1770.  This rare Creek “painting,” as Romans termed it, was etched into a tree in Choctaw 
country.  A Deer representing the “Stag” clan and clutching a Choctaw scalp is drawn at the top.  
Below it are Deer clan warriors, led by the head warrior.  After the skirmish, the warriors return 
home in canoes laden with four enemy scalps.  Source: Image from Bernard Romans, A Concise 
Natural History of East and West Florida, ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braund (1999; repr., 
Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2014 [1775]), 150.  
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 The Creek artist etched his clan totem and clan’s success in battle deep in the 
heart of Choctaw territory, suggesting that he deliberately promoted the military and 
spiritual powers of the Deer clan.  Collectively, the clan (“whole family”), led by a war 
leader, is singled out for its bravery and efficacy in war.  Symbolizing the Deer (or 
“Stag”) clan is a deer drawn prominently at the top.  The deer’s hooves clutch a Choctaw 
scalp to showcase to passing travelers, perhaps to Choctaw enemies, that Deer clan 
warriors are formidable opponents and ought to be avoided at all costs.  By marking the 
Deer clan on a tree in Choctaw country, moreover, the artist probably hoped to humiliate 
the defeated Choctaw clan members.
26
  (Seventeenth-century Iroquois warriors crafted 
pictographs into bark for similar purposes.
27
) 
 The Deer clan’s success contrasted with the landscape of death.  The vicinity of 
Noisy Owl, where the Creek artist crafted his “painting,” was scarred by death.  On 
September 28, just before Romans copied the pictograph into his journal, he “saw the 
head of a savage stuck on a pole, with many other marks of our being on the theatre of 
war.”  At night, the party rested at a “war-camp.”  On October 1, the day after 
discovering the pictograph, Romans’s party left Noisy Owl and traveled for more than 
twenty-two miles across “hilly, stony, boggy, swampy and oak land,” forging “several 
rivulets.”  Along the way, they “passed by three graves within the space of three quarters 
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of a mile from each other.”  In these graves lay a “soldier,” an Indian named “rum-
drinker,” and a “Mr. Brown,” who was a trader to the Choctaws and Chickasaws.
28
  
Whether these three men had perished in the Creek-Choctaw War is unknown.  But, 
clearly, the ominous graves contrasted with the success of the Deer clan and its ability to 
vanquish the enemy.
29
 
 It is unknown whether the Deer warriors were Upper Creeks or Lower Creeks.  
They could have been the East Florida Seminoles, who participated in this war.  The 
Seminoles were ethnic offshoots of the Hitchiti-speaking Lower Creek towns, such as 
Oconee, whose townspeople moved into Spanish Florida beginning in the early 
eighteenth century.  There, they established the town of Cuscowilla in the north Florida 
plains.  Like other Creek towns, it had a square ground and communal farmland.
30
  By 
the late 1760s and early 1770s, the Cuscowillas became embroiled in the Creek-Choctaw 
War.  Having maintained communication with Lower Creek kin, they would have been 
pulled into the war at least as a partial result of clan retaliation.  Around August 1770, for 
instance, the Cuscowillas and Yuchis captured or killed several Choctaws, and there are 
other examples of coordinated attacks on Choctaws by the Lower Creeks and 
Seminoles.
31
  In 1774, a Cuscowilla headman named Cowkeeper told East Florida 
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 Bartram, eds. Waselkov and Braund, 50-54, 223n67, 243n44; Calloway, American 
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12/13/1770, American Series, vol. 98, in Thomas Gage papers, William L. Clements Library, The 
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Governor Patrick Tonyn that he was “going away soon again with his people to go 
against the Chactaws, who they were at War with.”
32
 
 In late July 1774, Quaker naturalist William Bartram wrote of a “very large party” 
of Cuscowilla warriors “encamped in a grove” outside the walls of a trading post known 
as Spalding’s Lower Store.  The Store was located about twenty miles east of Cuscowilla 
on the St. John’s River.  To prepare for war against the Choctaws and perhaps to allay 
their nerves, the war party drank copious amounts of rum.  They acquired it by trading 
some horses they had received in St. Augustine for about twenty kegs of “spirituous 
liquors” from employees of the Lower Store.  During a ten-day “festival,” the warriors 
drank freely with “white and red men and women without distinction.”  Members of 
Cuscowilla town and the nearby trading store participated in the festivities.  According to 
Bartram, the drinking produced the “most ludicrous bachanalian scenes.”  Everyone 
“passed the day merrily with these jovial, amorous topers [i.e., warriors].”  The 
participants spent “the nights in convivial songs, dances and sacrifices to Venus, as long 
as they could stand or move.”  In “these frolicks both sexes take those liberties with each 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
University of Michigan.  Hereafter, cited as TGP.  Charles’s letter is confusing.  As he wrote, “the 
Latchaway [Alachua/Cuscowilla] Indians & it is [sic?] Supposed some of the Lower Creeks also 
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other, and act, without constraint or shame, such scenes as they would abhor when sober 
or in their senses.”  As they drank from their bottles, the Seminole men roamed the area 
around the store, as Bartram mused, “continually, singing, roaring and reeling to and fro, 
either alone or arm in arm with a brother toper.”
33
  Bartram’s Quaker beliefs caused him 
to interpret the “festival” as an unabashed drunken bacchanalia.  Quakers like him 
believed that all humans possessed an innate moral sense (an “inner light”) guiding them 
to the truth that God was immanent with nature.  Quakers’ belief in moral equality meant 
that through proper behavior and discipline, American Indians could find God in the 
same way that Euro-Americans could.  Although Quakers recognized and tolerated 
cultural difference, Bartram was horrified to witness bouts of heavy drinking, flirtation, 
and perhaps a free exchange of sex in the Cuscowilla festival of 1774.  His strict 
moralism led him to dismiss it as little more than an exercise in immorality.
34
 
 Yet, considering that it unfolded within the context of Creek-Choctaw War, the 
ten-day festival was an innovative gloss on Native war rituals.  Commonly, before war, 
Southern Indian warriors manipulated spiritual powers to ensure military success by 
purifying their bodies with an emetic called the button snakeroot and other herbs.
35
  
Native custom dictated that before battle, warriors isolate themselves from society, 
especially from the company of women.  As child bearers, women possessed life-giving 
powers.  If a warrior came into physical contact with a woman, particularly during her 
menses or in the act of sex, her power over life negated his ability to take life.  In turn, 
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male-female contact weakened the war party’s spiritual powers.
36
  The Cuscowilla 
warriors repackaged these martial customs to serve their own purposes, however.  Instead 
of taking the button snakeroot, they probably imbibed the alcohol during the festival in 
order to achieve an ecstatic spiritual state and cultivate spiritual power.
37
   Likewise, 
instead of ritually removing themselves from women, the warriors danced, sang, drank, 
flirted, and apparently had sex with both Indian and British women.  The exigencies of 
war pushed war habits into new directions among the Seminoles. 
 The festival reinforced the spiritual powers of Long Warrior (or Weoffki), leader 
of the war party.
38
  One example demonstrates his mastery over the cosmos.  Before 
departing for Choctaw country, Long Warrior requested trade goods from Charles 
McLatchy, manager of Spalding’s Lower Store, for the warriors.
39
  He promised to pay in 
deerskins after returning home, but McLatchy denied the request.  Disgusted, Long 
Warrior asked, “Do you presume to refuse me credit; certainly you know who I am and 
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what power I have[.] I could command and cause the terrible thunder now rolling in the 
skies above, to descend upon your head, in rapid fiery shafts, and lay you prostrate at my 
feet, and consume your stores, turning them instantly into dust and ashes.”  Although 
McLatchy publicly refuted Long Warrior’s powers, the war leader invoked the alliance 
between the “white people” and the “Siminole bands,” implying that McLatchy shirked 
his alliance duties.  Put on the defensive, McLatchy extended credit to the Cuscowillas 
for clothing and war paint, which the war party collected before departure days later.  
Thus, Long Warrior secured goods for his warriors and preserved his reputation as a 
military and spiritual leader.  As Bartram reported, the Indians believed he communed 
with “powerful invisible beings” and “esteemed [him] worthy of homage and great 
respect.”
40
  Although the fate of Long Warrior’s war party is unknown,
41
 the Cuscowilla 
warriors probably ventured to Choctaw country believing that Long Warrior’s spiritual 
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authority was intact, and that the Cuscowilla festival had guaranteed the warriors’ success 
in battle. 
 The Cuscowilla festival demonstrates that both clan and town affiliations 
prolonged the Creek-Choctaw War.  That war party was most likely composed of fellow 
clan members who were obeying the law of retaliation.  Despite living more than a 
hundred miles from the closest Creek towns along the Chattahoochee, the Cuscowillas 
remained linked into the webs of kinship that spanned Creek and Seminole society, thus 
obligating them to launch revenge raids against the enemy when necessary.
42
  Creeks as 
well as Seminoles fought their Choctaw opponents within the logic of clan identity.  Yet 
in this particular case, the whole town took responsibility for avenging the death of loved 
ones, not merely one clan.  The Cuscowillas even invited the British to participate in the 
spiritual and martial customs necessary to ensure a war party’s success.  Men and women 
from Cuscowilla and the nearby Spalding’s Lower Store danced, drank, sang, and 
engaged in sexual relations in order to equip the warriors with cosmic powers.  As a 
result, the Cuscowillas and their British friends ratcheted up regional violence. 
 Other towns, however, chose a more peaceful course of action.  Located on a 
bend in the middle Tallapoosa River, Tuckabatchee had been ravaged by war since the 
late 1760s.  By 1772, the Tuckabatchees were reeling from crisis.  On April 6, British 
Agent to the Upper Creeks David Taitt observed a dance there.  The Tuckabatchee 
headman Mad Dog was “very bussie preparing Physick and Causing the people to dance 
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every night on purpose to bring back to life their fire Maker,” the ritual specialist who 
extinguished and rekindled the town fire during Busk.  The late ritual leader had been 
married to Mad Dog’s sister, making Mad Dog his brother-in-law, and had been captured 
by the Choctaws late in 1771 and “by them Skined [sic].”  The widow, Taitt reported, 
“perswades the people that he comes to her sometimes in the night and that he keeps 
about the Square and hot house and will soon make his Appearance in publick if they 
make the Physick strong Enough, and take proper care.”  The “Physick” connoted the 
spiritual powers unleashed by dance, which, as the Tuckabatchees hoped, would revive 
the town priest.  Unfortunately, Tuckabatchee’s mico (name unknown) had grown “tired” 
of fasting, whereupon he ate “some victuals, which spoiled the Physick, and prevented 
the fire maker coming this night [April 6].”  Despite the ritual violation, Mad Dog 
“desired that the people might attend every night in the Square, untill the fire maker did 
come which he assured them would be soon.”
43
 
 The Tuckabatchee Resurrection Dance of 1772 aimed to restore life to a town 
priest, who oversaw town rituals.  Among other things, he appointed the day on which 
Busk began and, according to a later source, “dressed in white leather moccasins and 
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stockings, with a white dressed deerskin over his shoulders.”  Additionally, this headman 
lit the “new fire,” handled the new corn harvest, and communicated with the “great 
master of breath.”  Above all, the fire maker purified his townspeople, men and women 
alike, through world renewal ceremonialism.  Without him, Tuckabatchee risked 
celebrating the Busk festival of 1772 without established spiritual leadership.
44
 
 In response, Mad Dog and his widowed sister exercised their influence to keep up 
the Resurrection Dance.  On the evening of April 10, Taitt saw the square ground “where 
both Sexes were dancing round a fire.”  Seated, Mad Dog pled ignorance as to “the time 
when the fire Maker would come.”  He said “that it might be three or four nights” and 
“Ordered them all to attend untill he came.”
45
  That the townspeople danced on the 6th 
and 10th suggests that they did so on the 7th, 8th, and 9th.  Possibly, they had been 
dancing intermittently since first learning of the priest’s death, long before Taitt first 
noticed the ritual on April 6.  Apparently, the dance interfered with Mad Dog’s 
diplomatic schedule.  He refused, for instance, to attend Okchai for a meeting with Taitt 
and other headmen because he was “affraid to leave his women,” meaning his clan 
relations.  Mad Dog abstained from the meeting, which was held on the 18th and 19th.  
With his sister, Mad Dog focused on pressing town issues.
46
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 Whereas the Cuscowilla festival united families and townspeople around a shared 
commitment to warfare, the Resurrection Dance rallied a grieving clan and townspeople 
around ceremonies designed to restore life and peace.  Taitt assumed that the brother and 
sister did not have the greater town’s interests at heart, writing that Mad Dog was “a very 
Artfull fellow and is trying to impose on the Credulity of his people on purpose to free 
his Sisster from her widow hood, who by their Laws must remain a widow for four 
years.”
47
  While it is possible that she wished to exempt herself from this grueling 
custom, the fact remains that the Tuckabatchee townspeople, and not solely her clan, 
approved of her efforts to restore her late husband’s life and to call upon her townspeople 
to aid in that effort by dancing nightly.  As a widow, a clan leader, and the sister of a 
respected ritual leader, she certainly cared for her people.
48
  The Resurrection Dance may 
have been a singular product of the Creek-Choctaw War, for no other sources refer to 
such a ceremony.
49
  In most mourning dances, Creeks helped a deceased spirit reach the 
afterlife and did not usually dance for their resurrection and return.  At the turn of the 
twentieth century, for example, an anthropologist observed the “Skeleton Dance” led by 
the Tuskegee ritual specialist, Laslie Cloud (Raccoon Leader).  Also known as the 
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Human Bone Dance, this dance “quieted” the dead and prepared the spirit for entrance 
into the afterlife.
50
  Whether the Tuckabatchee Resurrection Dance was a reinterpretation 
of mourning custom is uncertain though likely.  The violence of the Creek-Choctaw War 
required grief-stricken families to adapt old customs in new contexts and for peaceful 
purposes.
51
 
 In 1775, three years later, another Creek town promoted peace in a war-torn 
world, this time drawing upon rituals of song and kinship to allay grief.  In that year, the 
Tallapoosa town of Muccolossus, which lay downriver from Tuckabatchee, indigenized a 
corpus of Choctaw songs.  As the town sang and danced to these songs, the Muccolossus 
people captured the enemy’s sacred powers and mourned loved ones slain by the 
Choctaws.  Additionally, the songs expanded the town’s web of kinship.  Through a 
complex transaction, a mixed-heritage Creek, or “Mustee,” as Bartram called him, 
initially introduced Choctaw musics to Muccolossus.
52
  The town trader, who was 
married to a female relative of Wolf, introduced the Mustee to Wolf.  In turn, Wolf 
oversaw the marriage of the Mustee to another female relative of Wolf.  By means of 
kinship and song, Muccolossus addressed the crises of war. 
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 According to Bartram, the mother of the unnamed Mustee Creek was a “Chactaw 
slave.”
53
  Her Choctaw town and clan affiliation are unknown, although her Creek 
masters may have lived in Muccolossus, given her son’s later connections to the town.  
The father was a métis (a person of Euro-Indian ancestry), “a half breed,” Bartram later 
learned, “betwixt a Creek [woman] and a white man.”
54
  According to matrilineal 
reckoning, the father inherited a Creek clan and town identity.  But because the Mustee’s 
mother was Choctaw, the Mustee inherited her status as a slave, a Choctaw, and an 
outsider in Creek society.  In the Creek language, the Mustee, like his mother, was an 
este-vpuekv or “domestic animal person,” the equivalent to a “slave.”
55
  This probably 
explains why the Mustee’s birth name escaped Bartram.  The Mustee’s father had taught 
his son “reading, writing and arithmetic,” and for Bartram, the son spoke English “very 
well,” as did many métis Southerners at this time.
56
 
 In the fall of 1775, the Mustee reconnected with his Choctaw heritage.  He “left 
the [Creek] Nation, went to Mobile, and there entered into the service of the trading 
company to the Chactaws, as a white man.”  Passing as a “white” person, the Mustee 
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ventured “every where” in Choctaw country, where he learned Choctaw “music and 
poetry.”  Before long, the Choctaws caught wind of “his lineage and consanguinity with 
the Creeks, by the father’s side.”  As a result, they “pronounced him a Creek” and 
declared him “an enemy and a spy amongst them, and secretly resolved to dispatch him.”  
To avoid this death sentence, the Mustee fled Choctaw country, and by November 1775, 
he was back in Mobile.  There, he “threw himself under the protection of the English” 
and gained employment with the licensed British trader to Muccolossus, John Adam 
Tapley, who was traveling north up to the town.
57
  Tapley’s trading caravan consisted of 
Tapley, other traders, several horses laden with wares, two packhorse men who steered 
the horses, William Bartram, and the Mustee.  During the trip, the Mustee befriended 
Bartram and worked as one of the packhorse men.
58
  As the caravan approached 
Muccolossus, Tapley went to meet with Wolf and other headmen.  Like other Indian 
countrymen, Tapley was married to one of the mico’s female relations, who gained him 
access to Muccolossus consumers.
59
 
 Tapley was a controversial figure in Creek society.  In late October 1771, the 
Upper Creeks conferred with the British in Pensacola.  During negotiations over trade, 
Emistisiguo complained about settlers illegally hunting on Creek lands.  He said that 
“there are many White Men in our Nation who follow no other Business but that of 
Hunting such as Mcfall, Humphry Hubbard, John Stripes and Adam Taply, who declare 
to our faces they will hunt on our Land, in spite of all opposition or Regulations to the 
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Contrary.”
60
  One year later, Tapley was in trouble again.  Lower Creeks informed British 
agent David Taitt that Tapley had been “digging up the Bodies of the Coweta Indians & 
likewise” committing other “Felonies.”  As a result of the desecration of Indian bodies, as 
Taitt wrote to Stuart, “Headmen want these People taken from amongst them.”
61
 
 Despite Tapley’s unpopularity among Creeks, Wolf controlled the brash trader by 
having him marry one of Wolf’s relatives.  It is unclear when Tapley married, but we 
know that Wolf and Tapley had formed ties as early as 1772.  Taitt’s journal provides 
clues about Wolf’s friendship with Tapley.  On February 24, 1772, Taitt visited 
Cooloome, a Tallapoosa town located just east of Wolf’s town.  Taitt went there to 
address Upper Creek grievances against British traders.  When he arrived, he sent for 
“some of the Head men” of Muccolossus “and some white men who were Idleing about.”  
Late in the morning, Wolf and Tapley arrived at Cooloome together.  After resting, Wolf 
accused John Pigg, the Cooloome trader, of stealing two of Wolf’s horses.  Two months 
later, Wolf was still complaining about Pigg.  Revealingly, during this period, Wolf 
lodged no complaints against Tapley.  Wolf and Tapley were apparently close allies, 
aided by an economically strategic marriage.
62
 
 By 1775, Wolf and Tapley were still on good terms.  So much so that after 
Tapley’s caravan entered Muccolossus with Bartram and the Mustee, the town held a 
“great dance and festival.”  During the festivities, the town “youth” discovered that the 
Mustee had been to Choctaw country, where he learned the Choctaws’ “most celebrated 
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new songs and poetry.”  The townspeople accordingly “pressed him, to give out some of 
his new songs.”  When he “complied,” the “songs and dance went round with harmony 
and eclat,” as the Muccolossus people weaved the songs into the cadences of the town’s 
musical repertoire.  Men and women probably sang while dancing around the fire in a 
“circle.”
63
  Bartram quoted one stanza of a song: 
 
All men must surely die, 
Tho’ no one knows how soon, 
Yet when the time shall come, 
The event may be joyful 
 
 
This song mourned those who died, encouraged warriors to meet death with bravery, and 
perhaps attempted to capture and weaken the Choctaws’ spiritual powers, all thanks to 
the Mustee.  The songs Bartram heard and translated were a fascinating Creek-Choctaw 
hybrid and reflected the horror of death in lower Tallapoosa country.
64
 
 The Creek-Choctaw songs signaled Muccolossus’ connections to the spirit world 
and to loved ones who had perished in the Creek-Choctaw War.  The new songs may 
have also opened up fresh positions of spiritual leadership, with the Muccolossus youth 
                                                             
 
63
 Muccolossus belonged to the Tallapoosa and not Alabama ethno-linguistic division. 
See Jerome Courtonne, List of Headmen of the Creeks, October 1758, in Box 8, William Henry 
Lyttelton papers, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan (hereafter WHLP); 
Joshua Piker, The Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler: Telling Stories in Early America (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 283n5.  Puzzlingly, Bartram wrote that “Mucclasse” and 
“Alabama” spoke the “Stincard tongue,” implying these were Alabama towns; see Bartram, eds. 
Waselkov and Braund (“Towns on the Talllapoose [sic] or Oakfuske river,” 108).  Yet Wolf 
himself indicated that he was a Tallapoosa, and that other Tallapoosa towns listened to him; see 
Taitt, journal, 4/14/1772 (“Tallapuses”), in DAR, 5:270.  Muccolossus and Sawanogi lay about 
ten miles upstream from the confluence of the Tallapoosa, Coosa, and Alabama Rivers.  These 
small towns were located on the southwestern bank of the Tallapoosa.  Sawanogi’s agricultural 
fields were located on both sides of the river; see Ethridge, Creek Country, 73, 82. 
 
64
 Bartram, eds. Waselkov and Braund, 124-125.  
 
137 
 
leading the vanguard.  Such “moral songs,” as Bartram labeled them, were akin to 
“religious lectures” that instructed the townspeople in ritual knowledge.  The songs were 
“doleful” and elegiac, having “a quick and sensible effect on their passions.”  These 
“passions” depended on the chorus and on the person leading each song.  The 
“countenance” of the singers might be “dejected” or “by an easy transition, [became] 
gently elevated, as if in solemn address or supplication” to the Master of Breath or any 
spirit being.  Aurally, such an address sounded “tremulous,” “sweet,” or “lamentable.”  
Under the proper spiritual state, the participant “is for a moment lost to himself.”  One 
could observe a “person immediately affected” and risk “revealing his own distress 
unawares.”
65
  
 Just as the town youth incorporated the songs into communal rituals, Wolf 
incorporated the Mustee into the town’s network of kinship.  In early December, Bartram 
wrote that the “young Mustee” married a “Creek girl of Mucclasse, daughter [i.e., niece?] 
of the chief and sister to our trader’s wife.”  As a result, he became an affinal kinsman of 
the town and an adoptive clansman of Wolf.  The wedding took place in a “secret nuptial 
chamber,” a square formed by the “trader’s house and store.”  In the evening, town 
members joined in dances, “music[,] and feasting,” and the “happy couple” consummated 
their marriage “all the next day.”
66
  By marrying into a Tallapoosa town and becoming a 
Muccolossus kinsman, the Mustee shed his slave identity and established himself as a 
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Creek.  Possibly, the Mustee ritually replaced a Muccolossus warrior who had died 
during the war.  Kinship and ritual song reestablished order in the town.
67
 
 Muccolossus’ incorporation of Choctaw music operated within a vibrant tradition 
of cross-cultural exchange dating back to the Mississippians.  In Bartram’s opinion, some 
of the Creeks’ “most favorite songs and dances” came “from their enemy, the Chactaw.”  
Each Creek town “strives to excel each other in composing new songs for dances.”  By 
the 1770s, Creek towns had “at least one new song, for exhibition, at every annual 
busque” (Green Corn Ceremony).
68
  In the early twentieth century, anthropologist John 
R. Swanton supported Bartram’s observations and argued that the Chickasaws probably 
“borrowed” many Creek customs in the colonial period, especially those Chickasaws who 
lived among the Creeks at the Upper Creek town of Breed Camp.
69
  The Cherokees 
borrowed music from the “Cherokee-Muskogeans” in the decades after Cherokee 
Removal.  In 1963, researchers obtained several Muskogean charm songs from a 
Cherokee medicine man, who believed that they were originally Creek or Natchez.  
Cherokees likely learned about these songs from the Creek Baptist churches located in 
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the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Cherokee Nation, where Muskogean “enclaves” 
influenced Cherokee culture.
70
 
 As Creek and Seminole towns and kin adapted to warfare locally, Creek 
diplomats dealt with the war internationally.  As early as 1770, Creek and Choctaw 
diplomats negotiated with one another via messages handwritten by British go-betweens.  
Off-and-on from 1770 to 1775, Upper Creek headmen, specifically, forged a series of 
coalitions aimed at concluding the war.  Diplomacy was the logical extension of clan and 
town, however, and this meant that the headmen who led those coalitions could not 
escape their town and, especially, clan affinities.  Consequently, quests for peace 
foundered on the requirement of clan vengeance.  Headmen served their towns and 
provinces as diplomats, but they also went to war to satisfy calls for retaliation.  As a 
result, the Upper Creek coalitions, precisely because they were woven from towns and 
clans, trapped the Creeks in a tragic cycle of peace and war. 
 In 1770, headmen from Okchai, Little Tallassee, and Okfuskee forged a peace 
coalition.  Each town contained some of the most respected diplomats in Creek society.  
Mortar of Okchai, Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee, and Handsome Fellow of Okfuskee 
each had preeminent credentials as political leaders and international diplomats.
71
  Mortar 
was the chosen voice of the Upper Creek peace coalition in 1764 and 1765, but 
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Emistisiguo too commanded influence among Tallapoosa and Abeika towns.
72
  
Moreover, the British honored Mortar and Emistisiguo as “Great Medal Chiefs” in 1765, 
acknowledging their ability to rule among the Upper towns.
73
  Furthermore, each 
headman belonged to powerful clans: Mortar was a Bear, Emistisiguo a Tiger.
74
  For his 
part, Handsome Fellow excelled in diplomacy with the British throughout the 1760s and 
1770s.
75
 
 As part of the 1770 Upper Creek coalition, Emistisiguo was appointed as 
principal speaker to serve in Creek-Choctaw negotiations, which began in Pensacola.  To 
that end, Emistisiguo visited Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart (John’s cousin) there 
in June.  On June 17, Stuart presented Emistisiguo with “a talk from the Choctaws” who 
wished to cease hostilities with the Creeks.  The Choctaws sent “three strings of white 
beads, one from the Six Towns” and one from the Eastern Division (“East party”), along 
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with “pipes and tobacco.”  The Little Tallassee headman was overjoyed.
76
  In response, 
Emistisiguo enlisted Charles Stuart to write a message to the Choctaws on behalf of the 
Creeks.  Because Creek and Choctaw diplomats risked death if they traveled in enemy 
territory, Emistisiguo instructed Stuart to send two “white wings and some tobacco” to 
the Choctaws “to wipe away all bad talks, that one wing and tobacco was from the 
Mortar, the other from himself.”  The headman said that if the Choctaws accepted these 
gifts, both sides would become “Friends.”
77
 
 Diplomats failed to reach a compromise, however, so in September the Upper 
Creeks designed a large “Belt of Whampum” to bolster the peace effort (Figure 9).
78
  
Wampum are small beads rendered from various seashells, most popularly the quahog 
clam (Mercenaria mercenaria).  The tradition of wampum diplomacy belonged to the 
Iroquoian-speakers of the Northeast and particularly to the Great League of Peace and 
Power, otherwise known as the Iroquois League.  The Iroquois fashioned belts and 
strings from wampum, deploying them as “mnemonic devices” and ritual gifts in 
diplomacy.  The arrangement and color of the beads communicated a precise message to 
the recipient from the speaker and, perhaps, from his lineage.  Belts possessed “inherent 
spiritual power.”  As a text, ritual object, and metaphor for life and death, a wampum belt 
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captured the fictive ties among Indians and between Indians and Europeans.
79
  In the 
South, by the mid eighteenth century Muskogean-speakers were creating “beaded” belts 
from European ceramic beads rather than from the more traditional medium of 
seashells.
80
  The Upper Creeks’ 1770 “Belt of Whampum” was probably a beaded belt.  
Despite its physical make-up, a beaded belt or wampum belt served to bring two (or 
more) peoples together in peace, harmony, and fictive kinship. 
 To that end, Emistisiguo, Mortar, Handsome Fellow, Gun Merchant, and Little 
Tallassee’s Second Man (“Neothlucco”)
81
 each sent messages to the Choctaws that 
accompanied the belt.
82
  Interpreting the belt for Stuart, Emistisiguo explained that one 
end of the belt contained a “Black Ring,” the color of death, that represented the “Whole 
Creek Nation” but particularly the “Tallapousses & Abekas,” who suffered more than the 
Lower Creeks from Choctaw violence.  A “White Bead,” invoking peace and life, lay at 
the opposite end of the belt and represented the Choctaw Nation.  Emistisiguo also noted 
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that the white bead designated the Western Division Choctaw town of Congeetoo 
(“Cungito”), where a headman named Taboca lived.  Charles may have been instructed to 
carry the belt there.  Following the logic of town-based diplomacy, the Congeetoos may 
have been the Upper Creeks’ contact town.
83
  Finally, in the middle of the belt was the 
“Strap,” which joined the Upper Creeks and Choctaws in a “Broad” and “Clear Path.”  At 
the belt’s center, colored shells portrayed Emistisiguo clasping hands with 
“Holaghtaobaye” (perhaps Taboca), with whom he wished to mediate in Mobile.  Charles 
was instructed to present the belt to the Choctaws only if they were “Real” (sincere).  If 
the Choctaws accepted it, they should “take Great Care of the White Belt as it is a Great 
Beloved Belt.”
84
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Figure 9.  Anthony Gonyea (Onondaga), Iroquois Wampum Belt.  The Upper Creeks’ “Great 
Beloved Belt” may have looked similar to this replica of a wampum belt commissioned by 
President George Washington to ratify the Treaty of Canandaigua of November 1794.  Made 
from ceramic beads, leather, and sinew.  Thirteen persons holding hands symbolize the thirteen 
American states.  The Mohawks (Keepers of the Eastern Door) and Senecas (Keepers of the 
Western Door) flank the longhouse, which represents the Iroquois League.  Source: Anthony 
Gonyea (Onondaga), 2014, The National Museum of the American Indian, Washington, D.C.  
Photographed by author.  For Canandaigua treaty, see The Collected Speeches of Sagoyewatha, or 
Red Jacket, ed. Granville Ganter (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 61-67.  
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 The Beloved Belt was a town-based roadmap.  Emistisiguo revealed to Stuart that 
the “White Beads round at each End” denoted “Peace from the Leading Town of the 
Nation to each other.”  The leading Creek town was actually a cluster of the “four” 
Alabama towns that lived near the “Alabama Fort,” previously French Fort Toulouse.  
This fort had been “always white & Clean” and connected the Alabamas to Mobile, 
formerly occupied by “the French.”  The headman contrasted the peace-going French 
with the aggressive British, who were currently supplying the weapons with which the 
Creeks and Choctaws killed one other.  Linked to the Alabamas was the leading town of 
the Choctaws, Congeetoo, marked by the “Round Ring of Beads.”  Perhaps the beaded 
ring was color-coded, for when the Choctaws “See” it, as Emistisguo indicated, they 
“will know to whom it belongs.”  Emistisiguo requested Stuart to give the belt to three 
Choctaw headmen—“Ullaughta Opoyah,” “Inlobshouma,” and “Laughtobo” (Taboca?).
85
  
The belt was an exercise in town localism, which fed an international agreement. 
 In addition to the belt, Emistisiguo forwarded eagle’s wings and beads on behalf 
of all Creek towns.  In the metaphorical presence of “all the Warriors in the [Creek] 
Nation,” Emistisiguo advanced a “White Wing” to all Choctaws, thereby committing 
Creek warriors to peace.  Moreover, he dispatched some “White Beads” that he had 
“been thinking of this Long Time.”  Should the Choctaws accept his beads, they would 
know “all is thrown away & nothing but Love & Friendship Shall be Confirmed” 
between the two peoples.  But though he spoke for all Creek towns, he relied on one 
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particular town to achieve Creek-Choctaw peace.  Apparently, Emistisiguo transmitted 
the beads via the Upper Creek town of Breed Camp, a small band of Chickasaws that 
settled in Upper Creek country earlier in the century.  Emistisiguo worked through Breed 
Camp, in addition to Deputy Superintendent Stuart, to draw upon the town basis of 
international diplomacy.  Since the Chickasaws remained neutral in this conflict and 
shared kinship ties to the Choctaws, particularly to Western Division towns like 
Congeetoo, Emistisiguo indirectly drafted Chickasaw support by working through the 
Chickasaw-descended Breed Camp.
86
 
 Other Upper Creek headmen transmitted objects of diplomacy that invoked their 
world of towns and cross-town ties.  Mortar gave “Tobacco & Beads Contained in [a] 
Blue Bag” on behalf of “the Cusadoes” or Coosada, an Alabama town.  Although Mortar 
was an Abeika of Okchai town, an Okchai village named Little Okchai had settled near 
the Alabamas earlier in the century, thus linking the Alabamas with the Abeikas.  Mortar 
presented the “Blue Bag” as a “Sign of peace to the Opoyah Mico who once lived among 
us & is well known.”  Mortar may have referenced a Creek who presently resided among 
the Choctaws and who therefore wedded the Creeks and Choctaws in kinship and 
alliance.  As international peace-keeper, Mortar said that “all the Headmen & Warriors of 
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this Nation” desired peace and by promising to monitor the “Rambling Young Fellows” 
itching for war.
87
  Handsome Fellow (“Handsome man”) of Okfuskee followed up on 
Mortar’s address by appealing to specific (though unnamed) towns.  He forwarded a 
“Long String of Barley Corn Beads” from the “Farthest part [town?]” of “our Nation” to 
the westernmost part of Choctaw country, thus tying the two peoples together in a “Long 
& White” path, bookended by towns.
88
 
 Around September, the Deputy Superintendent delivered the Upper Creek 
overtures to the Choctaws.
89
  Unfortunately, Upper Creek headmen’s efforts to extinguish 
the violence failed.  When Emistisiguo and other Upper Creek headmen arrived in 
Mobile in December to parlay with the Choctaws, Charles Stuart informed them that 
Choctaws warriors had killed “4 or 5” Creeks.  Knowing that the aggrieved clan would 
no doubt pursue vengeance, Emistisiguo said “it would be to no purpose to make the 
peace today [only to go to] war tomorrow.”
90
 
 In 1772, two years later, a rapproachment between Creeks and Choctaws 
remained elusive, but Upper Creek leaders pushed ahead.  To that end, they and the 
Indians across the Native South and Ohio valley launched an inter-tribal peace initiative.  
In late 1772, Mad Dog told David Taitt that the Chickasaws and Shawnees tried to broker 
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a Creek-Choctaw peace earlier that summer, when Mortar of Okchai had received a white 
beaded “String of Whampum” from the Shawnees on behalf of the Western Confederacy.  
In turn, Confederacy headmen asked Mortar to dispatch the string to the Choctaws via the 
Chickasaws.  The Chickasaws, recall, remained neutral during the war.  Tapping into his 
relationship with Okfuskee, Mortar had Handsome Fellow and Will’s Friend (another 
Okfuskee headman) send the beaded string along with a “Peace Talk” to the Chickasaws.  
In turn, the Chickasaws might have forwarded the message and string to the Choctaws, 
though the evidence does not confirm that.
91
 
 Indians in the Native South and Ohio therefore worked together in the attempt to 
restore peace between the Creeks and Choctaws.  For their part, Creek leaders tapped into 
the communication networks created by the Western Confederacy, though with Pontiac’s 
Rebellion fresh in mind, the British feared that the Southern Indians and the Western 
Confederacy were conspiring to attack the British backcountry.  Mad Dog assured Taitt 
that the Indians hoped to arbitrate a Creek-Choctaw peace rather than attack the British.  
The headman explained that the white string given to Mortar by the Western Confederacy 
was for making “peace with all Nations of Indians & was to be sent to the Chactaws to 
try to make peace with them.”  In turn, the Creeks “are to send it three Times from the 
Northward [i.e., Ohio valley Shawnees] to the Chactaws.”  But if the Choctaws “refuse to 
make Peace the fourth Time, then all Nations are to join & Cut them off.”
92
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 Despite the multi-tribal effort to cease Creek-Choctaw hostilities, the war raged 
on.  John Stuart wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth in late spring of 1773 that the Choctaws 
“obtained lately a considerable Advantage over” the Creeks, who, in turn, continued to 
seek diplomatic assistance from neighboring Indian nations.  For instance, the Upper 
Creeks were “desirous of engaging the Chickasaws and Cherokees.”  Stuart learned that 
in June, Mortar planned to travel to Chota, an influential Cherokee town known as a 
“beloved town.”  Like Taitt, Stuart and Georgia Governor James Wright mistook pan-
Indian diplomacy for anti-British conspiracy.  Just as Mad Dog calmed Taitt, so 
Emistisiguo assured Stuart that Mortar and other Creek headmen were securing help from 
third-party arbiters, such as Britain’s former enemies, the Shawnees and Cherokees.
93
  
According to Taitt, the Cherokee headman Little Carpenter was assuredly focused on 
brokering a Creek-Choctaw peace late in 1773.
94
 
 Community membership, however, plagued the Upper Creek and inter-tribal 
peace initiatives.  Upper Creek headmen failed to balance their role as diplomats and as 
clan affiliates.  As diplomats, Emistisiguo and Mortar promoted peace with the Choctaws 
on behalf of their towns, province, and nation.  But as members of a clan, they had to 
obey the law of retaliation.  Despite their peaceful gestures towards Choctaw country, 
clan vengeance trapped them in the clutches of war.  In late October 1772, Taitt reported 
that the Tiger, Emistisiguo, departed with “a large Party” to hunt along the Escambia 
River and, afterwards, “to War [against the Choctaws] before they Return to their 
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Towns.”
95
  As Taitt wrote Stuart in late November, Mortar and his Bear clansmen had 
“gone Over the Coosa River to War.”  In the same letter, Taitt confirmed his earlier 
report about Emistisiguo, writing that the Tiger warrior had “gone towards Pensacola to 
Hunt and afterwards to War against the Chactaws.”
96
  In 1773, Mortar was still 
participating in raids or, at least, he planned to do so.  Late that year, fourteen Cherokees 
visited the Alabama town of Hickory Ground, where they planned to launch an attack on 
the Choctaws.  None other than Mortar was appointed to lead them.
97
  Additionally, 
during the winter of 1773-1774, the Great Medal Chief and a Beloved Man of 
Puckatallahassee, Deval’s Landlord, killed several Choctaws.  As late as the spring of 
1774, Taitt remarked, the “Whole Creek Nation Intend going to War” against the 
Choctaws, perhaps to exact clan vengeance on a massive scale.
98
 
 That the Creeks vacillated between war and peace with the Choctaws unveils the 
instability of especially clan membership.  Particularly at wartime, when fellow kin 
perished in skirmishes, raids, and ritual torture, clan identity became an institution that 
fueled the Creek-Choctaw War.  Creek men exacted vengeance to satisfy clan law and 
release to the afterlife the spirits of slain kin.  Like the Deer clan warriors whose etching 
Bernard Romans observed, Mortar’s Bear kin and Emistisiguo’s Tiger kin showcased 
their bravery and prowess in war.  Thus, kinship custom thwarted diplomacy and 
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prolonged warfare.  Secondly, clan interests clashed with town interests.  Clan vengeance 
obligated a family’s men to wage war on an offending party, but towns like Tuckabatchee 
and Muccolossus tried to unite each town’s families into a shared ethos of peace.  In 
terms of diplomacy, Upper Creek headmen dispatched peace overtures to the Choctaws 
primarily on behalf of their towns and only secondarily on behalf of their clans.  
Nevertheless, those clans imposed limits on headmen’s authority by requiring those 
headmen, when necessary, to attack the Choctaws.  Community membership sparked a 
volatile balance between war and peace in late colonial Creek society.
99
 
 Meanwhile, Creek dependence on British trade goods crescendoed.  Because the 
war required Creeks to purchase massive quantities of weapons, ammunition, and other 
items, they accumulated a steadily growing mountain of debt to their traders.  As a result, 
the ability of British traders to extend lines of credit to Indian hunters/warriors in 
anticipation of future harvests of deerskins diminished.  Charleston merchants and 
London financiers demanded that the Augusta-based traders call in the Indians’ loans.  
The Creek-Choctaw War created a vicious cycle.  When Creek warriors avenged loved 
ones, they also took the opportunity to hunt white-tailed deer in the same woods and 
along the same valleys where Choctaws hunted.  Predictably, Creek and Choctaw hunters 
clashed, generating yet more cycles of revenge raids.  Renewed conflict interrupted the 
winter hunts and made it harder for Creek hunters to harvest the deerskins necessary to 
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procure trade goods.  Some headmen petitioned for price reductions—to no avail—by 
reminding British officials that the Creeks had generously overlooked the British 
settlement of Native hunting grounds in the Ogeechee and Oconee valleys since the 
1750s.
100
 
 Rather than extend assistance to the Creeks, Georgia Governor James Wright and 
Augusta traders like George Galphin demanded Native land to liquidate the traders’ debts 
and expand Georgia’s domain westward.  Wright secured permission from the British 
Crown and reluctant support from Superintendent John Stuart to negotiate a land-for-
goods deal with the Indians.  On June 1, 1773, Creek and Cherokee headmen signed the 
New Purchase Cession with Wright.  In this land “transfer,” the Creeks and Cherokees 
ceded about two-and-one-half million acres of land to Georgia in exchange for debt 
cancellation and the continuation of trade.  The Indians had been backed into a corner.  
As Kathryn Braund succinctly puts it, “It was a question of either no guns and cloth or 
loss of land.”
101
 
 Some Creeks protested the Cession with violence.  From late December 1773 to 
mid-January 1774, a small war party that included Houmatchla of Coweta and Ochlulkee 
of Okfuskee murdered a total of seventeen people (fifteen settlers and two black slaves) 
on the ceded lands near the Ogeechee River.
102
  Afterwards, the murderers took refuge in 
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“Houmatchla,” see Taitt to John Stuart, 1/24/1774, Little Tallassee, CO5/75.  Stuart identified 
“Houmachta & Sopia,” probably also a Coweta, as murderers; see John Stuart to Dartmouth, 
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the Cherokee town of Tugaloo.
103
  Houmatchla especially hated the “White People” who 
“burned” his “Settlement on Occoni Some Years ago.”
104
 
 In the wake of the New Purchase crisis, Wright demanded that the Creeks execute 
the murderers, in early 1774.  But Creek headmen refused, knowing that blood revenge 
would prompt the victims’ family to kill any executioners.  Also, headmen feared the 
spiritual powers of the ringleaders, Houmatchla and Ochlulkee.  Writing from Little 
Tallassee, Taitt remarked that “the Indians are much affraid of Houmatchla, as they say 
he is a very great Witch,” and that Ochlulkee and Houmatchla were “very great 
Villains.”
105
  Witchcraft and sorcery had deep roots in the Native South.  Southern 
Indians believed that witches possessed malevolent powers and used their connections to 
ghosts, monsters, and other spirit beings in the Under World to harm society.
106
  The 
otherworldly powers of Houmatchla and Ochlulkee alarmed headmen, who interpreted 
the New Purchase killings as both a spiritual and diplomatic crisis.  Particularly in the 
context of the Creek-Choctaw War, which claimed hundreds of lives on either side, the 
Creeks believed that larger forces were at play in the 1770s. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7/21/1775, St. Augustine, CO5/76.  For Ochlulkee’s town affiliation, see Taitt to John Stuart, 
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[an?] Okfuske Indian”).  For Young Lieutenant (or Escotchaby), see Piker, Okfuskee, 67. 
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 The Southern British colonies punished the Creeks, who refused to execute the 
ringleaders, by suspending Anglo-Creek trade.  The trade embargo likely thwarted the 
Creeks’ ability to fight the Choctaws, who during the winter of 1773-1774 had killed 
twenty Creeks.
107
  These deaths demanded vengeance, but Creek warriors now had 
limited access to weapons.  Trading on Creeks’ dependence, Governor Wright asked a 
group of Creeks in April, “And what are you to get by a WARR [with the British]? The 
Trade with you will be stopped, from all Parts. ... Can you make Guns, Gun powder, 
Bullets, Glasses, paint and Cloathing etc. etc. You know you cannot make these 
things.”
108
  Taitt had more immediate concerns.  He worried that if he called “a general 
Meeting of all the Heads of the Nation” and persuaded them to carry out the executions, 
Houmatchla and Ochlulkee might “Murder every [British] Trader” among the Lower 
Creeks, where he penned his letter to Stuart.
109
 
 To restore Anglo-Creek trade relations, headmen from Little Tallassee and 
Okfuskee spearheaded a cross-town coalition glued together by bonds of kinship.  Since 
Ochlulkee and Emistisiguo were Tiger clansmen, Emistisiguo was responsible for 
punishing his trouble-maker relative.
110
  Because Ochlulkee was an Okfuskee, the 
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Okfuskee headmen got involved and sought to repair their town’s historic alliance with 
the British.  Only weeks after the New Purchase killings, Coweta’s Escotchaby, another 
one of the murderers, relayed a peace talk to Okfuskee’s Mad Turkey.  The talk explained 
why Houmatchla, Ochlulkee, and Escotchaby had killed the Ogeechee settlers.  The 
Okfuskee headman forwarded the talk to officials at Fort Augusta, Georgia.
111
  As Mad 
Turkey worked with Coweta, Emistisiguo dispatched a message
112
 to Cussita in February 
to enlist that town’s new mico in the resolution of the New Purchase crisis.
113
  Two 
circumstances brought Little Tallassee and Cussita together.  The Cussitas ultimately 
executed Ochlulkee in the summer, so Emistisiguo’s decision to communicate explicitly 
with Cussita Mico might suggest that the two men shared kinship (Tiger) affiliation.
114
  
Secondly, Emistisiguo blamed Coweta for the New Purchase killings, probably because 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
probably Beaver Tooth King.  For Beaver Tooth King of “the Great Tallassies [Tallassee],” see 
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of Houmatchla’s and Escotchaby’s role in them.  The Little Tallassee headman therefore 
had little reason to trust Coweta.
115
 
 Upper Creek headmen selected Emistisguo to contact the Lower Creeks via 
Cussita, so that all the Creek towns could pressure the British into restoring trade.  
Speaking on behalf of the “Abekas, Tallapoosees and Alibamons,” Emistisiguo requested 
Cussita to convene the Lower towns, all of whom “are friend Towns” of the Upper 
Creeks, to discuss how best to apprehend the Creek outlaws.  Harnessing the language of 
kinship, perhaps because he and some Cussita headmen shared kinship ties, Emistisiguo 
said, “I am the Master of the White Wing and of the Black Drink,” and “when “the 
Cussitaws see this they will know that their youngest Brother has spoke to them to love 
their Women and Children, & not bring them into Poverty,” an acknowledgement of the 
trade embargo.  He transmitted a “wing, tobacco, and White Clay” to all the Lower towns 
via “the Cussitaw King and Succaigie [a Cussita?].”  Emistisiguo addressed the wing “to 
the Cussitaw King” as a metaphor for “our Bodies,” and Cussita Mico was to forward it 
to “the Lower Towns.”  Similarly, the “piece of Clay is heavy and is the Same as the 
Earth of our Square which is white, and this Chalk [clay?] is like our Bodies.”  Whenever 
the murderers could be apprehended, the Lower Creeks were to dispatch Emistisguo’s 
wing, a symbol of peace, to “Captain Stuart.”
116
 
 Mad Turkey’s murder by a British colonist in late March 1774 amplified 
Emistisguo’s influence among the Upper Creeks.  By April, Little Tallassee was 
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conducting diplomacy on Okfuskee’s behalf.  On April 14, the Creeks parleyed with 
Governor Wright in Savannah.  During the conference, Emistisiguo discussed the 
political position of the Abeika towns, and, by implication, Ochlulkee.
117
  Although a 
Tallapoosa, Emistisiguo narrated the Abeikas’ role in the Anglo-Creek alliance.  
Explaining that Okfuskee was a prominent British ally and remained so despite 
Ochlulkee’s actions, the leader said that “the Abecas is a very Ancient Town [referring to 
Okfuskee] and Were Allways Firm Friends to the English.”  Addressing Anglo-Creek 
ties, Emistisiguo related that Okfuskee’s “Great Men Allways told Them [the Creeks] to 
Hold the White People Fast by the Hand, And that he was determined to do so.”  With 
that in mind, he hoped the embargo would be rescinded.
118
 
 On May 23 or 24, headmen from “every” major Creek town (twenty-six total) 
assembled for a National Council meeting convened by Emistisiguo and Second Man in 
Little Tallassee.  There, they agreed to execute the outlaws in the hopes that Britain 
would resume trade.  Unfortunately, the murderers caught wind of the decision and, as 
Wright reported to Stuart, “were gone off with two more to guard them.”
119
  By July, 
however, the Cussitas had “shot” Ochlulkee, who lingered four days before expiring.  As 
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he lay dying, Ochlulkee “desired his Relations to revenge his Death on the Virginians 
[British],” rather than on the Cussitas, “and not give out untill everyone of his Relations 
should fall.”
120
  Ochlulkee acknowledged Britain’s extreme pressure on the Creeks to 
execute the ringleaders, explaining why he wanted to redirect clan vengeance towards the 
British interlopers. 
 If clan allegiance shaped Ochlulkee’s attitudes towards the British, then so did the 
headmen who authorized his execution.  In detail, Emistisiguo and other headmen 
executed him within the logic of clan law.  Although intra-clan punishment was rare and 
controversial, responsibility for disciplining a clansman ultimately lay with the clan.
121
  
Emistisiguo and other Tigers were therefore responsible for punishing Ochlulkee, a 
Tiger, so as to avoid reprisals towards any non-Tiger executioners.  In fact, the Cussita 
executioners or at least Cussita Mico may have been Tigers.  In February, recall, 
Emistisiguo requested the Cussitas and Cussita Mico to handle the executions.  By 
specifically addressing them and by doing so with kinship language, Emistisiguo was 
likely contacting fellow Tigers.  Moreover, Tiger headmen probably discussed the details 
of the planned executions at Little Tallassee’s May conference.  Afterwards, they 
informed Stuart of that decision.  Additionally, Okfuskee presumably consented to the 
agreement, for after Ochlulkee’s execution, any potential Okfuskee warriors sharing 
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kinship ties to Ochlulkee did not retaliate on the Cussitas.
122
  In fact, Cussita and 
Okfuskee maintained amicable relations.
123
 
 Ties of kinship continued to stabilize Anglo-Creek diplomacy, as they had during 
the French and Indian War.  The New Purchase crisis demonstrates that headmen 
cautiously navigated the labrinth of clan identity to forge coalitions, conduct good 
relations with the British, and maintain peace within their own society.  Yet, the British 
did not agree to restore trade until the Creeks executed the remaining murderers.  So, in 
August, nine Okfuskees led by Cujesse Mico traveled to Augusta to meet with Wright 
and Stuart.  He addressed a talk to them reminding them that the Creeks had executed one 
of the murderers (an Okfuskee, no less), and that the British had failed to compensate the 
Okfuskees for the death of Mad Turkey, Cujesse Mico’s uncle, that previous March.
124
  
Cujesse Mico underscored Okfuskee’s loyalty to the British in past decades.  Speaking on 
behalf of the Abeika towns, he explained that “Formerly the Oakfuskies and Charlestown 
were one Fire,” and that “we hope they will always continue as one, although at present 
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there seems to be some Difference between us but we want Peace.”  Cujesse invoked the 
death of his uncle as leverage but then backed away from the issue: “I am not come with 
a bad Talk for my near Relation that fell at this Place some time ago.”  Rather, he 
requested the pardon of his uncle’s killer in exchange for the resumption of trade.  The 
Abeikas desperately needed goods, for “we are now very poor for Goods and the Hunting 
Season near at Hand.”  Nor should the “Upper Towns” be held responsible for 
Houmatchla, a Coweta, who was on the lam.  “Neither the Abicas, Tallapuses nor 
Alibamas,” he informed Wright and Stuart, “desire to have any Thing to say to the 
Cowetas, but desire Peace.”  Therefore, they “think it hard to Suffer on their [Cowetas’] 
Account.”
125
 
 By October 1774, the Creeks had executed two additional murderers, for a total of 
three.
126
  Although Wright demanded that the Creeks execute a total of five murderers, 
the British partially resumed trade by late 1774.  In September 1775, nearly two years 
after the New Purchase killings, the Upper Creeks persuaded the British to exonerate the 
remaining two murderers, including Houmatchla of Coweta.  Clan law shaped the Upper 
Creeks’ reasoning.  Upper Creeks asked Taitt to request Stuart to “forgive Houmachta on 
account of the mad Turkey.”
127
  Handsome Fellow may have floated this request, for in 
early November, he traveled to Georgia as spokesperson for Mad Turkey’s kin.  
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Handsome Fellow pled with Wright to spare Houmatchla’s life in exchange for promising 
Wright that Mad Turkey’s kin would not avenge the late headman.  With the 
Revolutionary crisis consuming Georgia’s affairs, Wright had little choice but to consent 
to Handsome Fellow.
128
 
 By securing a pardon for Houmatchla, Handsome Fellow pulled a fast one.  
Strictly speaking, the Creeks owed Britain a life.  Although Mad Turkey’s death may 
have atoned for Houmatchla’s, Wright technically had grounds to request the execution 
of the fifth remaining murderer, a person named Sopia.
129
  Wright did not press the 
matter, nor did Handsome Fellow acknowledge it.  In the context of the Creek-Choctaw 
War, headman like Handsome Fellow strove to preserve life and promote diplomacy.  He 
probably knew, for instance, that Emistisiguo, a Tiger like Ochlulkee, barely survived a 
bullet wound during a Choctaw raid near his town a year earlier.
130
  The trick for 
headmen was to minimize violence against the British by carefully manipulating webs of 
kinship across Creek society. 
 At long last, in 1776, the Creeks and Choctaws reconciled.  Just as Cussita Mico 
assisted in the execution of Ochlulkee, so he helped the Upper Creeks broker a peace 
with their enemy.  In September, “the King of the Cussitas went up to the upper Creeks to 
meet the Chactaws that is come in with the peace Talk.”
131
  Negotiations bore fruit, for in 
October Upper Creek and Choctaw headmen convened with Superintendent Stuart in 
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Pensacola to conduct peace ceremonies.  Like Charles before him, John Stuart became a 
neutral third party.  Observing the headmen, Stuart wrote that each side had “a white 
Flagg as an Emblem of Peace and were highly painted. They halted about 300 yards 
distance from each other their principal Chiefs singing the Peace Song and waving Eagle 
Tails and Swans Wings,” symbols of peace, “over their heads.”  After practicing these 
rituals, headmen “advance[d] slowly when at a Signal given a Number of young men 
sallied out from each party and made a sham fight in the Space between them.”  Finally, 
“both parties met, and after saluting each other,” they “joined hands” before Stuart.  Next, 
the men entered Stuart’s “house, and delivered into my hands two War Clubs painted Red 
as the last Ceremony of laying down their Arms; which I promised to burry very deep in 
the Earth.”
132
  With Cussita’s and Britain’s mediation, Creek and Choctaw warriors 
concluded a brutal ten-year war in the Native South. 
 In late July 1777, a delegation of seventeen Choctaws visited Little Tallassee.  
The headmen probably selected Emistisiguo’s town since he had been the Choctaws’ 
major contact during the peace overtures of the early 1770s.  Sadly, Emistisiguo had died 
prior to this visit.  Among the Choctaw delegates were Franchimastabé, “Small Medal 
chief of Yassou [Yazoo], Capitan Houma, Taboca [of Congeetoo], & Testonnaco 
Mingo.”  They exchanged amicable words with the townspeople and “engaged to give the 
Creeks assistance [in the Revolutionary War] if they should stand in need of it.”  Postwar 
diplomatic visits were typical of Southern Indian diplomacy, so the Choctaws invited the 
Upper Creeks to Choctaw country at some future point.  The Choctaws wanted their hosts 
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to know that “no doubt or Supposition might remain on the minds of the young people of 
either Nation,” and “that their professions of Friendship were Sincere.”
133
 
 From 1766 to 1776, the Creek-Choctaw War took shape through the rhythms of 
clan and town affiliation in Creek society.  Although the war arose from economic factors 
and those relating to elite authority, the instability of town and clan membership 
sustained the violence for ten grueling years.  Among the Tallapoosas, towns and families 
rejuvenated community customs in the attempt to stabilize their world.  On the other 
hand, the families and townspeople of Cuscowilla reinterpreted martial rituals to wage 
war on the Choctaws.  Furthermore, the law of retaliation intensified warfare.  When a 
Creek perished in battle or a town raid, female clan leaders exhorted the male warriors to 
avenge the kinsperson’s death.   As a result, retaliation prompted a continual cycle of 
violence, sending hundreds of Creeks and Choctaws to their death.  The law of retaliation 
bound Creek headmen to clan law, which thwarted the peace initiates crafted by the very 
same headmen, such as Emistisiguo and Mortar.  As “warrior-diplomats,” Creek elites 
endangered the towns and provinces they were tasked protecting when they launched a 
revenge raid against the enemy.  In Anglo-British relations, however, headmen like 
Handsome Fellow and Emistisiguo followed their predecessors by forging provincial and 
interregional coalitions that repaired Anglo-Creek ties.  Headmen consolidated those 
coalitions with the peaceful tools of kinship. 
 During intertribal wars, Indians relied heavily on their clan and town allegiaces.  
For the Creeks, this reality was a liability, because it forced them to retreat inward and 
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subsequently negotiate with the British from an increasing position of weakness.  As 
Michael Green pointed out in 1982, the Creeks ceded land to the British in five of six 
Anglo-Creek conferences between 1763 and 1773.
134
  Although Creek dependence on 
British trade accounted for those cessions, especially the New Purchase Cession, so did 
the Creek-Choctaw War.  What is more, this chapter complements O’Brien’s contention 
that Native elites goaded their young and hot-headed warriors to attack a Native enemy, 
since I argue that clan and town affiliations engulfed Creek “warrior-diplomats” in 
violence.  Even if they persuaded their warriors to fight the Choctaws, Creek warrior-
diplomats failed to gain control of the community allegiances that pulled them into war, 
sparking a contradictory cycle of violence and diplomacy.
135
 
 Moreover, I suggest that since clans and towns immersed the Creeks in local 
concerns, Creeks leveraged their connections to the Western Indian Confederacy to instill 
peace in the war-torn Native South, not to join the Shawnees and Delawares in anti-
British resistance.
136
  John Stuart correctly remarked to General Haldimand in January 
1771 that “the continuation [of] the war between them [Creeks and Choctaws] may tend 
to defeat the schemes of the Western Confederacy & prevent the disaffected Creeks from 
joining them.”
137
  Still, Stuart failed to grasp what caused the “continuation” of this war: 
clans and towns that advanced coalition-building, diplomacy, and violence all at once.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 American Patriots declared their independence from the British Empire in July 
1776, while British Loyalists proclaimed their allegiance to the Crown.  In the midst of 
the Revolutionary War, the Americans and British courted the loyalty and assistance of 
some fifteen-thousand Creeks whose strategic geopolitical position in the Southeast made 
them a formidable friend (or foe).  Although Creeks preferred neutrality, warfare brought 
trade to a halt, forcing the Creeks to keep trade flowing by allying with both the British 
and American contestants.  In the Treaty of Paris 1783, America emerged victorious and 
inherited Britain’s claim to eastern North America.  By the doctrine of the right of 
conquest, America declared suzerainty over those Native lands lying east of the 
Mississippi River.  For its part, Georgia coveted all Creek hunting grounds east of the 
Oconee River.  Georgia gained that contested region in the Oconee Cession of 1783, 
leading one coalition ofCreeks to ally with the Spanish.  In turn, the Spanish became a 
counterweight to the expansion of the United States in the postwar period. 
 Scholars studying the Creeks during the American Revolution fall into two 
camps.  Those like Kathryn E. Holland Braund argue that Creek society was 
decentralized and thereby liable to factionalism and division.  She contends, for instance, 
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that the “pro-British” Upper Creeks, led by Little Tallassee’s Alexander McGillivray, 
traded with the British, while “pro-American” Lower Creeks cultivated ties with the rebel 
Americans.  According to Braund, these factions emerged from an “ill-defined” 
decentralized Creek society.
1
  By contrast, Claudio Saunt and Steven Hahn argue that in 
the colonial period Creek society underwent a process of centralization.  For them, a 
Creek “nation” gradually took shape in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras.  
They argue that the incubus of nationalization/centralization was the Creek National 
Council.  Saunt is perhaps the most vocal proponent of late-eighteenth-century 
nationalization.  He argues that the advent of capitalism in Creek society engendered a 
minority class of market-oriented headmen, such as McGillivray, who accumulated 
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wealth and property in land and slaves.  Wealth enhanced their authority and, according 
to Saunt, allowed them to coordinate and dictate national policy.
2
 
 This chapter challenges the centralization and decentralization schools by arguing 
that the British, American, and Spanish competition for Creek loyalties stimulated town-
based political organization both within and across the Creek provinces.  The Creeks 
became not centralized but highly organized so as to navigate the dangerous waters of 
revolution, but not without privileging townspeoples’ participation in political affairs.  
Although headmen occasionally used the term “Nation” when addressing the Euro-
Americans, their political actions at the ground level suggest that townspeople and their 
leaders foremost promoted the interests of their towns.  Still, although towns had the 
prerogative to act in isolation, most preferred to cultivate peace and trade with the Euro-
Americans as coalitions.  Those coalitions spun political webs across Creek society and 
united an otherwise shifting composition of towns.  Coalitions ebbed and flowed 
according to town interests, which forestalled the growth of a centralized Creek “nation.” 
 By contending that the Creeks organized into coalitions rather than centralized 
units or decentralized towns, this chapter makes the significant point that politics shaped 
diplomacy.  I therefore piece together and trace the process of revolutionary coalition-
building and identify the leadership.
3
  Put another way, I track the Revolution from Creek 
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 Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: 
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political perspectives and political change at the community level.  In 1775 and 1776, the 
Lower Creeks debated their options with respect to the European powers and gradually 
formed a relationship with the Americans.  Countering the Lower Creeks, in late May 
1777 Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee and Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee formed the 
Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition with several Abeika, Tallapoosa, and Alabama 
towns.  Although largely Upper Creek-based, the coalition featured leadership from the 
Lower Creek town of Coweta, too.  Tame King of Tallassee and Handsome Fellow of 
Okfuskee disagreed with that decision, so they forged a coalition with Fat King of 
Cussita.  The Cussita-Tallassee coalition partnered with the Lower Creek towns, 
specifically the Hitchiti-speaking towns, such as Apalachicola, Chehaw, and Hitchiti 
Town (Figure 10, Table 4). 
 Each coalition inaugurated a new generation of Creek leadership following the 
Creek-Choctaw War and French and Indian War.  After Mortar died in 1774, Mad Dog 
emerged as a skilled politician and diplomat among the Upper Creeks.
4
  He partnered 
with Emistisiguo, who remained an influential war leader among the Upper Creeks, as 
well as with Red Shoes of Coosada, an Alabama town.  Together these headmen and 
Sempeyoffee of Coweta maintained the Anglo-Creek trading relationship, which the 
Americans tried to undermine.  After the Revolution, Mad Dog appointed the young and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
networks in Creek country.  Bryan Rindfleisch, “‘Our Lands Are Our Life and Breath’: Coweta, 
Cusseta, and the Struggle for Creek Territory and Sovereignty during the American Revolution,” 
Ethnohistory 60:4 (Fall 2013): 581-603, has begun to tease out the inter-town ties of Coweta and 
Cussita during the Revolution. 
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 Editor’s note, Georgia and Florida Treaties, 1763-1776, ed. John T. Juricek, in vol. 12 
of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan 
(Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), 369. 
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literate McGillivray to spearhead an alliance with Spanish Florida, though Mad Dog and 
other coalition leaders seem to have worked behind-the-scenes to influence McGillivray’s 
diplomacy.  Although Tallassee had long been a powerful Upper Creek town, Tame King 
burst onto the international stage in 1777 and pursued ties with the Americans until the 
mid-1780s.  Assisting him in that endeavor was Fat King, who may have been a new and 
relatively young Cussita leader.  Together, Tame King and Fat King coordinated Creek-
American diplomacy with Okfuskee and numerous Lower Creek towns along the 
Chattahoochee River. 
 This chapter makes an additional contribution to the revolutionary and post-
revolutionary historiography on Creeks: political organization enabled the Creeks to 
survive a dangerous era relatively unscathed.  Scholars have overlooked that significant 
achievement.
5
  While the Americans destroyed numerous Cherokee towns during the 
Revolution, for the most part the Creeks suffered very little violence from Euro-
Americans.
6
  This resulted from the ability of Creek coalitions to block Euro-American 
expansion into Creek society.  Moreover, headmen’s peace-keeping efforts may have 
helped suppress the law of retaliation that had triggered perpetual violence during the 
Creek-Choctaw War.  Although I have located only sporadic references to the impact of 
clans on Creek political networking during this era, the available evidence suggests that 
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in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, Creek headmen leveraged their clan 
affiliations to foster coalition unity and maintain peace with Euro-Americans.
7
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 The Creeks did participate in battles and skirmishes outside of their towns, especially 
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British West Florida from rebel invasion.  See, too, O’Donnell III, “Southern Indians,” in Four 
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Figure 10.  Creek Coalitions during the American Revolution.  The Cussita-Tallassee coalition 
enveloped the underlined towns, and the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition encompassed the 
circled towns.  Denoted by an asterisk, Coweta had one foot in each camp.  (Note: I prefer Little 
Tallassee for “Old Tallassee,” Okchai for “Hookchoie,” and Little Okchai for 
“Hookchoieooche.”)  For corresponding table, see Table 4 below.  Source: Map copied from 
Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 29 (Figure 2).  Additional markings are mine.  For 
“Corn House,” a village of Okfuskee, see “Toohtocaugee,” in “A sketch of the Creek Country in 
the years 1798 and 1799,” in Letters, Journals and Writings of Benjamin Hawkins, ed. C. L. 
Grant (Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1980), 1:303.  
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 In early April 1775, perhaps days before the Revolutionary War erupted in 
Concord, Massachusetts, the Lower Creek towns discussed how the looming conflict 
affected them.  David Taitt reported that “all the Head Men from the Cussitas to 
Euffallies [i.e., Eufaula]” had assembled at that time in Apalachicola for a political 
assembly that featured an “Acorn Dance.”  These were the core Lower Creek towns that 
inhabited the Chattahoochee watershed, ranging from Cussita to the Hitchiti towns of 
Eufaula and Apalachicola.
8
  During the assembly, the Lower Creeks decided to reject 
overtures from the Spanish, with whom Escotchaby, a Coweta headman, had struck an 
alliance during a recent embassy to Havana, Cuba.  Unlike Escotchaby, most Lower 
Creek towns agreed with Cussita Mico Blue Salt, the Chehaw Warrior, and Pumpkin 
King of Ouseechee that the Lowers Creeks should side with John Stuart and report 
Spain’s activities to him.
9
  Blue Salt also rejected American advancements.  In an August 
                                                             
 
8
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tongue”; see William Bartram, “Travels Through North & South Carolina . . .,” 1791, in William 
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message to Stuart, Blue Salt remarked that he did “not think of throwing off his old 
Friends [the British] for the sake of New people [i.e., the Americans] who he did not 
know.”  The mico preferred to trade with the British, whose “beloved man,” meaning 
Taitt, “has lived among us” as a trustworthy ally.
10
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Bartram on the Southeastern Indians, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn E. Holland Braund 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 109. 
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 Cussita Mico to John Stuart, about August 1775, in Georgia and Florida Treaties, 
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Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 
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Figure 11. Major Rivers in the Native South.  The Oconee watershed became a hotly contested 
terrain in the 1780s, as Creeks and Georgians staked claims to it.  Source: Map photocopied from 
Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 
1685-1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), p. 10.  
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 By September, however, Lower Creek towns formally adopted a neutral stance in 
the war.  In that month, members of Cussita, Ouseechee, Chehaw, and Coweta (minus 
Escotchaby) met in Cussita, where a Coweta speaker (yatika) remarked that “All the chief 
head Ruleing men of the whole lower Creeks are now here and is all as one.”  Speaking 
for the Lower Creek towns, the speaker informed Stuart, known as “the great Beloved 
man,” that the Americans and British must “settle the matter yourselves and [we] will be 
glad to hear the differences settled and all at peace again.”
11
 
 The Lower Creeks wanted to keep trading with the British, however, for headmen 
viewed the Americans and British as “one people” who ought to keep “our old white 
tradeing Road” to the east open.
12
  Unfortunately, Stuart notified them in December 1775 
that the Americans had confiscated British “Goods, Arms and Ammunition” earmarked 
for Creek country.
13
  The Hitchiti towns grew skeptical of Stuart, and in March 1776, 
when Cussita hosted “The Headmen of all the Lower Towns,” the Hitchitis abstained 
from the meeting.  The “Head Warrior” of Cussita spoke for the remaining Lower towns, 
informing Stuart that they desired trade from British-held Pensacola since the “Trading 
Paths [to the American colonies] are shut up.”  The assembled towns sent a “Wing and 
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 John Stuart to Lower Creeks, 12/4/1775, Cowford (modern Jacksonville, FL), GFT, 
493-494.  Headmen from five Lower Creek towns attended his talk (450).  On December 8, 
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(498, 572n56). 
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Tobacco as a token of Friendship and desire that the Beloved Men [British officials] will 
Smoak the tobacco and look at the Wing and Agree to each others Talk.”
14
 
 But by May, most Lower Creeks echoed the Hitchitis’ skeptical stance towards 
the Stuart.  Around May 1, Taitt met with the headmen of “all the lower Creeks” in 
Chehaw, a Hitchiti town.  Taitt was dismayed to learn that headmen intended to meet the 
Americans in Augusta, Georgia.  Despite Taitt’s protests, some two hundred Creeks left 
for Augusta, where on May 16, the first Creek-American conference was underway.
15
  
Four commissioners hosted the proceedings, including prominent deerskin traders George 
Galphin and John Rea.  Nitigee, the “Head-Warrior” of Chowagla (Little Coweta), 
represented “all the other Head Men and Warriors of the Nation who are present.”  In his 
address to the commissioners, Nitigee repeatedly accused Taitt of dishonesty, saying that 
the deputy agent had “given out sundry very bad talks” that goaded the Creeks to kill 
Americans.  Unfortunately, Georgia refused to supply trade goods to the assembled 
headmen, prompting Nitigee to reply politely that he was glad to see Galphin and Rea.
16
 
 Though Creeks met the Americans primarily to establish trade relations, Creek 
kinship practices framed the meeting.  For one, Nitigee possibly shared clan affiliation 
with Galphin, who was married to Metawney, a Coweta woman.  By the 1770s, Galphin 
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and Metawney had three children, Judith, John, and George.
17
  Furthermore, Cussita 
adopted Galphin and Rea as fictive kin, probably because that town, according to Nitigee, 
was one of “the leading Towns of the Creek Nation.”  Cussita’s Captain Aleck was the 
intermediary in this process.  He closed the Augusta conference by reading a message 
addressed from Cussita Mico to the commissioners.  Cussita Mico pledged to support an 
alliance with America and adopt “Messrs. [commissioners George] Galphin and [John] 
Rae not only as my Elder brothers but as my father and mother.”
18
  Headmen commonly 
addressed European officials as “brothers,” a term of equality between two peoples, and 
as “fathers,” a sign of respect for statesmen who were expected to present gifts and 
supply trade goods to their Indian “children.”  Unlike one’s brother or father, however, 
one’s mother possessed authority in the matrilineal societies of the Native South.
19
  By 
adopting the commissioners as brother, father, and mother, Cussita Mico invoked 
unusually expansive kinship language to solidify the Creek-American alliance, with the 
goal of securing trade. 
 Cussita’s adoption of the Georgia commissioners required that they, as adoptees, 
look after American and Cussita interests.  So when conflict erupted in August or 
September of 1776 and “the Rebels” killed a Cussita, Galphin and Rea were obligated to 
compensate their Cussita adopters.  The Cussita’s death “exasperated that Town beyond 
measure” and rendered the Cussitas distrustful of Georgia.  British assistant agent 
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Thomas Brown reported to Stuart that “Fool Harry[,] Cussita Billy[,] Omatah & some 
others of the same Stamp have mentioned in public that they have thrown away the 
Virginians [Americans] & [propose] to hold you fast.”
20
  Likely members of the slain 
Cussita’s clan, they contemplated taking vengeance on the Georgia frontier.  In the 
attempt to sway the aggrieved Cussitas, Galphin fulfilled his role as adoptee.  In early 
1777, twelve Cussitas met him at his planation in Silver Bluff, South Carolina, where he 
gave them “very large presents.”  An experienced trader and knowledgeable of Creek 
culture, Galphin understood that gifts helped atone for past offenses.  According to 
Superintendent Stuart’s report, the Cussitas returned home satisfied.
21
 
 To counter Lower Creek overtures to Georgia, the Upper Creeks engineered the 
Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition.  It took shape on May 30, 1777, when Upper 
Creek leaders gathered at Little Tallassee.
22
  There, headmen decided to send a “large 
body of their people against” the Georgians late in the summer.  Although the records 
contain no information about the identities of these headmen, a report from Taitt indicates 
that Mad Dog founded the coalition.  Taitt reported that following the May 30 meeting 
McGillivray arrived in Little Tallassee with a communiqué from Sempeyoffee of Coweta.  
Addressed to Mad Dog, Sempeyoffee’s message “requir[ed]” the Tuckabatchee headman 
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21
 John Stuart to George Germain, 3/10/1777, Pensacola, CO5/78. 
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“to get the Warriors” of Tuckabatchee, Sawanogi, Coosada, and Okchai “to send out men 
immediately to their [Coweta’s] assistance against” Georgia.
23
  After consulting with 
Emistisiguo, Mad Dog left for Coosada, an Alabama town that lay downstream from 
Little Tallassee.  In Coosada, Mad Dog “met the Chiefs” of the Alabama towns (“the 
Alibamas”) and the Koasati towns (“Tuckegee and Coosada”), who “agreed to Join him” 
in the proposed frontier raid “whenever he was ready to lead them.”
24
  After meeting with 
the Alabamas and Koasatis, Mad Dog moved onto the Tallapoosa town of Sawanogi, 
who “agreed to go with him.”  (He apparently bypassed Okchai.)  By June 5, the 
Tuckabatchee leader had gone “home . . . to muster his own people.”  Mad Dog’s 
“design,” as Taitt wrote to Stuart, “is to Carry out what he Can in a Body and afterwards 
disperse in small parties along the frontier in Order to keep the Georgians in play untill 
the main body of the Nation can turn out.”  That “main body” would not launch a 
coordinated attack until the 1780s, however.
25
 
 The Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition may have tried to enlist support from 
other Southern Indian populations as well as the Western Indian Confederacy.  During 
the May 30 meeting in Little Tallassee, the Upper Creeks queried Taitt about the status of 
a “Northward belt.”  The Creeks had tasked Superintendent Stuart with sending the belt 
“with their tokens through the Chactaws and Chickasaws.”  Like a diplomatic 
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boomerang, the belt was “to be forwarded through the different nations on the mississippi 
and Ohio untill [sic] it returns to the [Creek?] nation from whence it came with the 
Tokens of the different nations that takes hold of it.”  The Upper Creeks told Taitt that “if 
it is not already sent they desire . . . that [Stuart] will immediately forward it as they mean 
to Send in the Shawanee Warrior [from Sawanogi?] to the Northward nations to see how 
they stand affected and what part they have taken in” the Revolutionary War.
26
  This 
international initiative coincided with Sempeyoffee’s request that Mad Dog visit the 
Upper towns, suggesting that coalition leaders were looking to ally with non-Creeks 
against the Americans. 
 But some Upper Creek headmen defied the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee 
coalition by opening a dialogue with Georgia.  On June 17, 1777, a little more than two 
weeks after the Little Tallassee assembly, Upper Creek headmen from Tallassee and 
Okfuskee joined leaders from Cussita, Yuchi Town, and Apalachicola for a Creek-
American conference along the Ogeechee River.
27
  Georgia’s commissioners opened the 
conference, informing the Creeks that the state possessed “Goods in Abundance” and 
promised to supply the Indians with goods in exchange for the protection of American 
traders who would travel to Creek country to open trade relations.  The following day 
Tame King of Tallassee delivered the Creeks’ reply.  “This, Friends and Brethren,” he 
began, “is the first Time I ever came to see the beloved men here.”  Remarkably, Tame 
King claimed to speak for the majority of Creek towns clustered along the Tallapoosa, 
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Coosa, and Chattahoochee Rivers.  As he declared, “I am the Breath and Master of the 
Towns on the Three Rivers, Tallapussee, Coosahatchee and Otchsatchee [a corruption of 
Chattahoochee?].”  “I am appointed to Speak for them,” he told the commissioners, “and 
shall not dissemble.”  Members of the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition would 
have balked at Tame King’s claim, not to mention the fact that he was an inexperienced 
diplomat.  He admitted to the audience that “his Father” had sent him, and that, although 
he himself was young, “he will grow in Experience.”
28
 
 Despite these shortcomings, Tame King marshaled the ritualized language of 
diplomacy to establish his authority and cultivate an alliance with the Americans.  “I 
came down to make the path white and plain,” indicating that he wished for peace and 
trade with his potential allies.  He also said he was “happy” to learn that the Americans 
possessed abundant goods.  To demonstrate his commitment to the Americans, he 
presented the commissioners with a “white Pouch” filled with tobacco on behalf of the 
“Three Rivers.”  He explained that the tobacco smoke “will ascend white” and seal the 
alliance between the Creeks and Americans.  After smoking the tobacco with the 
Georgians, Tame King informed the commissioners that the “white Pouch” was a gift 
from “the largest Town,” Cussita, which boasted nine hundred persons.  Tame King then 
gave the officials a “String of Beads” as “a Token of the white Path from the Three 
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Towns.”  “I offer you one end for as long as you hold one and I the other[. Therefore,] 
nothing shall happen to stop the Path.”
29
  Later, Handsome Fellow of Okfuskee seconded 
the young headman.  He reminded the Americans that in “former Times our Ancestors 
met yours at the Water edge” and became friends.  During this friendship, the “Path” had 
always been “straight and open,” abounding with trade.  The Okfuskee diplomat followed 
up by saying that Cussita and Tallassee were the “largest” Creek towns, which ought to 
therefore oversee trade with the Americans.  But while Cussita was the most populous 
Creek town, Tallassee was only an average-sized town consisting of roughly 360 
inhabitants.  Perhaps Handsome Fellow meant that politically Tallassee was an influential 
town, not necessarily numerically.  In any case, he apprised the commissioners that “One 
of our large Towns will require 15 or 20 loads of goods and 4 of ammunition as a 
Supply.”
30
  With Handsome Fellow’s support, Tame King bolstered his own authority 
and emerged as an important figurehead in Creek-American diplomacy. 
 The seeds of the Cussita-Tallassee coalition were planted at the Ogeechee 
conference.  Eventually, it would grow into a powerful alliance encompassing Creeks 
from Cussita, Coweta, Yuchi, Ouseechee, Chehaw, and Apalachicola as well as the 
Upper Creek towns of Tallassee and Okfuskee.  Because Tame King claimed the mantle 
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of speaker, having been “appointed” to that position, it is likely that several other Upper 
towns belonged to the coalition.
31
  But althohgh its primary goal in the summer of 1777 
was to obtain trade goods from Georgia, the rebel colony largely supplied the Creeks 
with “amazing quantities of Rum.”  It is unclear whether the rebel officials gave them 
more practical goods, such as guns, ammunition, and clothing.
32
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Table 4.  Two Creek-Led Coalitions, 1777-1786.  For the political geography of each coalition, 
please refer additionally to Figure 10. 
 
Two coalitions  Participating provinces, 
towns, and talofas 
Major leaders Allies 
 
- Tuckabatchee-
Little Tallassee 
coalition 
 
- Lower Creek: Coweta 
 
- Tallapoosa: Tuckabatchee, 
Little Tallassee, Sawanogi 
 
- Abeika: Nuyaka (talofa), 
Hillaubee 
 
- Alabama: Coosada, Little 
Okchai, Tuskegee 
 
 
- Sempeyoffee of 
Coweta 
 
- Mad Dog of 
Tuckabatchee; 
Emistisiguo and 
Alexander McGillivray 
of Little Tallassee 
 
- Red Shoes of Coosada 
 
 
- British and 
Spanish 
- Western Indian 
Confederacy 
 
- Cussita-
Tallassee 
coalition 
 
- Lower Creek: Cussita, 
Apalachicola, Oconee, 
Chehaw, Hitchiti Town, 
Coweta, Ouseechee, 
Sauwoogelo, 
Sauwoogelooche (talofa), 
Lower Eufaula, Padjeeligau 
(talofa), Yuchi Town 
 
- Tallapoosa: Tallassee, 
Autossee, Cooloome, 
Sougohatche 
 
- Abeika: Okfuskee, Corn 
House, Kialijee 
 
 
- Fat King of Cussita 
and Hallowing King of 
Coweta 
- Head warrior of 
Apalachicola 
 
 
 
- Tame King of 
Tallassee 
 
 
 
- Handsome Fellow and 
White Lieutenant of 
Okfuskee  
 
- Americans, 
British, and 
occasionally 
Spanish  
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 The Cussita-Tallassee coalition revealed the divisions within the Upper Creek 
towns.  Handsome Fellow admitted to American commissioners on the Ogeechee that 
“Tait, the big Fellow and the Tallasee Second Man told me I would hear nothing but lies 
if I heard your Talks.”
33
  The “big Fellow” refers to Emistisiguo, an intergral leader of the 
Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition.  Nor did Tallassee’s Second Man support Tame 
King, which must have undermined Tame King’s credibility among the Upper towns.  
Furthermore, the popularity of the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition among the 
Upper towns cut against Tame King’s assertion that he represented the “Three Rivers” 
(all of Creek society).  Possibly, his Lower Creek allies neither comprehended nor cared 
about his status among the Upper towns.  What mattered was that Tame King presented 
himself as a confident headman who could lead the Cussita-Tallassee coalition in 
diplomacy with the Americans. 
 The Cussita-Tallassee coalition did attract support, however, among the Lower 
Creeks.  In July 1777, British assistant commissary to the Lower Creeks, William 
McIntosh, reported to the Cherokee agent that the “Cussitaw King according to Mr. 
Galphins desire Intends to have a meeting with the whole of the Lower Creeks, and has 
promised the Rebels to get all the different Towns to join them.”  Tame King was 
“likewise to act in the same manner in the Upper Towns,” suggesting that Tame King and 
Cussita Mico began to politically coordinate across Creek society in the summer of 1777.  
McIntosh explained that each headman was attempting to persuade as many Creeks as 
possible “to drive all the Beloved men [i.e., British] out of the Nation.”  Several Creeks 
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listened to these “Talks,” for on July 5, “a fellow called long Crop from the Cussitaws 
with some others ... came over here with a View to take my [McIntosh’s] Scalp, but he 
mist his Aim.”
34
  Tame King’s and Cussita Mico’s strategy bore political fruit.  In mid-
August, the following headmen met with Georgia authorities in Augusta: “the Handsome 
Man, in the presence of the Head-Tallasie Warrior, the Handsome Mans Son, and 
Nephew, the Oakchoi Warrior the Cussatau second Man, the Hallowing King Lingee 
[i.e., Singee] and his Son and the Palachocola second Man.”
35
 
 The leaders of the Cussita-Tallassee coalition turned out for the Augusta 
conference.  Handsome Fellow, his “Son, and Nephew” joined the unnamed Tallassee 
head warrior, while the Cussita Heniha (second man) attended for Cussita Mico.  For his 
part, Apalachicola Heniha represented the influential Hitchiti town.  Coweta sent a 
prominent diplomat, including Hallowing King (also known as Yahola Mico), who was 
an opponent of Sempeyoffee.
36
  Unlike the other headmen, Singee had previously aided 
the American military effort.  According to one document, on December 9, 1776 “Singee 
his Son & Daughter arrivd at Fort Barrington,” which may have been located in Georgia.  
They remained there until January 14, at which time they left for “the Nation.”  The three 
Indians “servd [Georgia for] 8 days.”  Since Georgia provided them with rations for 
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forty-four days, Singee’s family probably served the colony on a long-term basis.
37
  The 
Cussita-Tallassee coalition may have attempted to parlay Singee’s ties to Georgia into a 
trade alliance, especially since trade goods, even food, remained scare that summer.  
According to one report, there “is such a scarcity of Provisions [among Creeks] as 
borders upon a Famine.”
38
  Unfortunately, Georgia official Samuel Elbert, who hosted 
the Augusta conference, failed to supply the Creeks with goods.  In fact, he threatened the 
delegation, saying that the Americans “are as numerous as the Trees” and “are able to 
crush you, and them [the British], and any body else, who dare to make War with them, 
to Atoms.”
39
  The conference was not a complete failure since it united several Creek 
towns around a shared goal of gaining access to trade.  For instance, weeks after the 
conference, Handsome Fellow and a party of Cussitas traveled to Charles Town, probably 
hoping to acquire trade goods from another rebel colony.  Although the delegation seems 
to have returned home empty-handed, the visit solidified the political ties between 
Cussita and Okfuskee.
40
 
 In 1778, Creeks’ access to goods became even more tenuous, especially after the 
Cowetas killed three “Rebel Rangers” early that year.  The Americans cut off trade with 
the Creeks, although they had supplied very little.  Moreover, Stuart gained some 
leverage over the Lower Creeks by discontinuing the trade to all Lower towns, justifying 
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his decision by blaming the Lower Creeks for Cussita’s ties with the Americans.  Facing 
the immediate future with little hope for trade, the Cussita-Tallassee coalition reopened 
ties with the British.  Cussita Mico led the way, empowered “Hycout” (Hycat) as the 
“Deputy from the Rebel Towns,” and sent him to Pensacola where Stuart resided.  Hycat 
arrived in tow with “all the Chiefs of the Lower Towns attached to” the Americans.  
There, in Pensacola, the headmen implored Stuart “to let [William McIntosh] my 
Commissary return with them to their Towns.”
41
 
 To dispel Stuart’s fears that the Americans would goad the Lower Creeks into 
killing McIntosh, the Lower Creeks drew upon Apalachicola’s position in the Cussita-
Tallassee coalition.  The “Head Warrior of the Appalachicolas” seems to have assured 
Stuart that McIntosh would not be harmed.  Stuart learned that Apalachicola “is 
considered as the Mother & Governing Town of the whole Nation” and therefore could 
be trusted with protecting McIntosh.  Consequently, Stuart reappointed McIntosh, writing 
that “I am so thoroughly convinced of” the Apalachicola head warrior’s “Power to 
protect [McIntosh] that he sets out in a few days accompanied by the Traders for the 
Lower Towns.”
42
  McIntosh traveled with “Alagatai” and the Cussita headman, Hycat.  In 
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late March 1778, McIntosh arrived safely in Hitchiti Town (“Hitchitaws”) just 
downstream from Cussita.
43
 
 On April 2, Hitchiti Town hosted McIntosh to discuss the reestablishment of 
British trade in the province.  Fat King of Cussita attended with “some other Chiefs from 
the Cussitaws,” who hoped to secure trade goods from McIntosh.  According to the 
commissary, the Cussita headmen “made great Promises to me before all the Lower 
Creek Chiefs, that they will for the time to come have no further communication with the 
Rebels.”  Cussita promised to expel its American trader (a Mr. Lambeth), take up Stuart’s 
talks and, as McIntosh wrote Stuart, “receive their goods entirely from you.”  The 
strategy worked, for McIntosh sent “Mims” and “Thomas Millter” to Cussita with eight 
pieces of stroud and “every thing equivalent.”
44
  In fact, in 1778, several towns in the 
Cussita-Tallassee coalition requested British trade, as when Okfuskee welcomed British 
traders in mid-April.  White Lieutenant of Okfuskee may have made this decision after 
his uncle, Handsome Fellow, died one year earlier.  After that prominent headman’s 
death, town leadership passed to White Lieutenant as well as Will’s Friend.
45
  Moreover, 
on March 30, Taitt decided to permit “the Trade” into Tame King’s town of Tallassee and 
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into two Okfuskee villages named Sugatspoges and Corn House.  His decision suggests 
that these towns, like Cussita and Apalachicola, had appealed to Taitt for British trade.
46
 
 Thus, although the Cussita-Tallassee coalition got its start by treating with the 
Americans, it maintained contact with the British.  Since the summer of 1777, the main 
goal for the coalition had been to access trade from whichever side was able (or willing) 
to provide it.  During the Revolution, then, Creeks were neither “pro-American” nor 
“pro-British.”  Simultaneous trade with the Americans and British was not mutually 
exclusive.  Rather, coalition leaders addressed their towns’ need for goods by engaging 
with and occasionally manipulating American and British officials.  Cussita captures the 
ways in which Creeks deftly maneuvered between both Euro-American powers to serve 
Creek, not American or British, goals.  Only months after reestablishing trade with 
Stuart, for example, Cussita leaders resumed their relationship with the Americans 
sometime in July or August of 1778.
47
 
 Creek headmen were pro-Creek in other ways.  In early April 1778, for example, 
Mad Dog and Coosada’s Red Shoes teamed up and, according to Taitt, went “to try what 
they can do with the Tallassee King & his Son [i.e., nephew],” Tame King.
48
  Taitt’s 
letter suggests that Mad Dog and the Alabamas sought to correct what they perceived as a 
diplomatic misstep by Tallassee.  Perhaps they believed that they could exert greater 
influence on the British if they enlisted Tallassee Mico’s and Tame King’s leadership.  
                                                             
 
46
 Taitt to Stuart, 4/7/1778, Little Tallassee, CO5/79.  See Piker, Okfuskee, 9 and 127 
(Sugatspoges), 83 (Corn House).  
 
47
 See Alexander McGillivray to Colonel Stuart, 8/6/1778, Little Tallassee, CO5/79.  
McGillivray was Britain’s assistant commissary for the Creeks. 
 
48
 Taitt to Stuart, 4/13/1778, Little Tallassee, CO5/79. 
 
191 
 
But according to one report penned months later by McGillivray, Tame King and another 
Tallassee headman remained an ally of the Americans.
49
  We should be cautious of 
McGillivray’s statement, however, and one example demonstrates why that is so.  In the 
summer of 1778 the Tallapoosa town of Sougohatche and its headman, Efau Mulgau, 
linked up with Tame King.
50
  Tame King, the “Half Way House Indians” (Tallassees), 
and “[s]ome of the Sougahatchee Men” then left for the point below “Yellow Water” 
sometime before August 16.  Along the way, they “robbed” the “Cowpen” of a British 
trader named McQueen.
51
  While the robbery could be interpreted to mean that Tame 
King and his allies were “pro-American,” more likely is the explanation that their people 
needed meat for the approaching winter. 
 The Cussita-Tallassee coalition blossomed later that December, when Fat King of 
Cussita and headmen from “four other Towns” traveled to Georgia.  They convened on 
the Ogeechee River with three American commissioners, including the Lower Creeks’ 
fictive kinsman, George Galphin.  Relaying a message from Tame King, Fat King 
pledged that no less than thirteen towns preferred peace with the Americans.  Many of 
these towns were established coalition affiliates, including “the Cussitas, Parachuckles 
[Apalachicola], Hitchatas [Hitchiti Town], Tallasees &c.”  Yet new coalition allies 
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entered the picture, namely Autossee, whose headman sent “this Tobacco for your friends 
to smoke”; Cooloome (“Coolamies”); and the Abeika town of Kialijee (“Killigees).”  The 
following Lower Creek towns may have recently joined the Cussita-Tallassee bloc, and 
they would certainly play a more prominent role in the years to come: Yuchi Town, 
Sauwoogelo, “Swaglahatches [Sauwoogelooche],” “Tomathlies[,] the [Okmulgee?] old 
fields,” and one Seminole town named “Muckasukey.”
52
  Fat King’s talk to the 
commissioners demonstrates that by December 1778, the Cussita-Tallassee alliance had 
gained popularity across Creek society.  More than a dozen towns entrusted Tame King 
and/or Fat King to speak for them.  Moreover, the influence of Cussita and Tallassee in 
this coalition was mutually reinforcing.  By speaking for Tame King, Fat King 
represented numerous Upper Creek towns, while Tame King’s influence among the 
Lower Creeks echoed in Fat King’s leadership.
53
 
 As each Creek coalition stabilized in 1778, John Stuart’s death in March 1779 
created panic among the Creeks, testing the coaltions’ leadership throughout that year.  
Since Stuart had become the British Superintendent for the Southern Indians in 1762, he 
labored to keep the Indians satisfied through fair imperial policy and an abundance of 
inexpensive goods.  After his death, a British board of Indian commissioners operated out 
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of Mobile and Pensacola to oversee Anglo-Indian trade relations.  Around late April, 
leaders from the Alabama towns and from the Abeika town of Okchai traveled to 
Pensacola to discuss trading arrangements with Stuart’s successors.
54
  Whether the 
commissioners satisfied the economic goals of the Alabama-Okchai delegation is unclear.  
More clearly, however, the Alabama and Abeika headmen cultivated unity.  Their trip to 
Pensacola drew upon and strengthened the kinship ties between each town.  Those ties 
had been established in the colonial period, when members of Okchai founded Little 
Okchai among the Alabamas.
55
  In a larger sense, too, the 1779 Alabama-Okchai 
embassy fortified relations among the Alabama, Abeika, and Tallapoosa towns within the 
Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee bloc. 
 Tallassee townspeople also found common ground in the wake of Stuart’s death.  
On June 6, 1779, thirty-seven “Head men” and warriors of “the Great Tallassie Town” 
(Tallassee) convened with British commissioners in Mobile to request that British trade 
resume in Tallassee.  At the time, the town had a “Poverty” of goods, according to one 
headman.  The commissioners were surprised by the “Visit,” since Tallassee was 
“Strongly attached to the Rebell Interest and hath created great uneasiness and 
disturbance in the Creek Nation.”  The commissioners reported that “we renewed our 
friendship and assured [Tallassee that] we would forget all things past,” including 
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presumably the plunder of McQueen’s cowpen by Tame King and Sougohatche a year 
earlier.  But perhaps because the British commissioners had few goods to give them, the 
Tallassees returned home empty-handed.
56
 
 As a result, Tallassee later petitioned the Americans for trade.  On November 3, 
Tame King led a delegation of “Thirty Indians” that met George Galphin at his home of 
Silver Bluff in South Carolina.  Galphin’s fictive ties to Tame King’s coalition 
(especially Cussita) facilitated relations between the Americans and Tame King.  The 
Tallassee headman carried a “white wing and String of Beads,” which “Denotes that the 
[trade] path may be kept perfect Clain [sic] and white from heare to the [Creek] Nation.”  
The speaker hoped that the path would remain “White through the Cussitas,” Tallassee’s 
close ally and Galphin’s adopters, “and from there through the whole Nation.”  In 
particular, Tame King claimed to represent “all the headmen in the upper Towns,” who 
“had met together and had sent him Down” to speak to Galphin.  But while Tame King 
certainly did not represent all the Upper Creeks, Autossee, Cooloome, Kialijee, and 
Sougohatche did support him.
57
  Tame King’s coalition leadership combined with 
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Galphin’s attempts to secure the fealty of the Creeks, shaping Galphin’s decision to 
supply the assembled Indians with a small amount of ammunition.
58
 
 In the early years of the Revolution, two town-based coalitions crystallized in 
Creek society.  Each sought trade from the competing Euro-American powers.  The 
Cussita-Tallassee coalition partially secured trade with the Americans, doing so by 
manipulating kinship ties to Galphin.  Bonds of kinship also came in handy when the 
Cussitas enlisted that trader to maintain peace between the Americans and Creek towns.  
Of course, when Georgia officials like Samuel Elbert withheld trade from their Native 
allies, the Cussita-Tallassee coalition smoothly treated to the British.  For their part, Mad 
Dog and Emistisiguo relied for trade and protection on John Stuart, who had fastened 
bonds with these leaders after 1763.  Diplomatic relations between Creek and Euro-
American authorities depended on the political activity taking place behind-the-scenes.  
Scholars have glossed over the ways in which headmen spun webs of cross-town linkage 
that helped make alliances possible in the first place.  Diplomacy in the revolutionary 
South took its shape from the rhythms of Creek town politics. 
 Creek politics also shaped Creek contributions to the battles, skirmishes, and 
sieges of the Revolutionary War.  Before launching a raid or fighting beside a Euro-
American army, Creek head warriors tapped into the the political networks of their town 
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world to assembly a war party.
59
  In the summer of 1781, for instance, Emistisiguo 
brought his formidable skill and influence as a head warrior to bear on his alliance with 
Britain.  One British official reported that Emistisiguo donned the title of “Chief of the 
Creeks,” perhaps from leaders of the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition, and 
commanded a massive force of “about 1000” warriors.  His men were “well provided 
with Amunition” by the British, and he led them “to War against the Rebel Banditti” 
along the American frontier.
60
  Since Little Tallassee contained only about 200 
townspeople, Emistisiguo must have formed the one-thousand-man war party from 
numerous towns among the Upper Creeks.
61
  He could not simply coerce these men to 
join him; he had to persuade them to do so, navigating the contours of the Tuckabatchee-
Little Tallassee coalition.  He would have had to advertise his credentials as a head 
warrior and convince them that he had mastered spiritual power to safely lead men in and 
out of battle.  Thus, just as coalitions shaped diplomacy, so too they made Creek military 
contributions possible at wartime. 
 The Revolutionary War ceased in October 1781, when a combined force of 
Americans and French defeated the British at the Battle of Yorktown.  The American 
victory at Yorktown led to a tag-team effort by Fat King and Tame King to amplify ties 
with the Americans.  Their goal remained the promotion of Creek-American trade and 
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peace.
62
  Months after Britain’s surrender, on May 28, 1782 Tame King and “his Head 
Men of the Tallasee” convened with American commissioners in Augusta.  Speaking for 
the Upper towns, Tame King reminded the commissioners of the “Friendship their Fore 
fathers [had] made before them,” a friendship that had been interrupted by the late war.  
The time was drawing “near that there will be nothing but Peace [added: & quietness] in 
the Land,” and that “our Children should eat out of one Dish that is one with a Red Hand 
and the other with white.”  Cross-cultural peace was a means of protecting the “Women 
and Children which they Love.”  He requested that the commissioners pass along “this 
Talk” to American politicians in Savannah, Charleston, and Philadelphia, so “that when 
these Places are taken [by the U.S.?] and the French and Spaniards may [meet for a 
treaty,] they may all know that the upper Towns of the Creek Nation in general have been 
their Friends.”
63
  Tame King was requesting that the Americans and their allies remember 
the Creeks in the soon-to-be Paris Peace of 1783. 
 The Lower Creeks approved Tame King’s vision for an amicable postwar South.  
Evidence for this appears near the end of his talk, as he presented “a number of white 
Beeds [sic] as a Token of Friendship from Sundry Towns” of the Lower Creeks.  He 
explained that the beads were given to him by Cussita as well as by five Hitchiti-speaking 
towns, explicitly naming Hitchiti Town, Apalachicola, Oconee, Sauwoogelo, and 
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Sauwoogelooche.  Tame King therefore offered proof that several Creek towns desired 
peace with the American victors.  To futher legitimize his peaceful talk, Tame King 
informed the commissioners that one of the warriors standing beside him “had turned 
white [the color of peace] and that now he intends nothing but Peace and Friendship.”
64
 
 Later that December, Fat King followed up on Tame King’s message by 
transmitting a message of his own to James Rae, another Cussita adoptive kinsman.  In it, 
Fat King said that “We the red People and the white should live in Peace.”  For their part, 
“the Cowetaws and broken Arrow People,” referring to a village of Coweta, “have agreed 
to be at Peace” with Georgia.  Fat King hoped to parlay this peace into a lucrative trade 
alliance.  Because the Creeks were a “poor” people, they needed goods “of every kind.”  
In exchange for trade, Fat King pledged that Cussita, Coweta, and Broken Arrow would 
restore to the Americans all the “Negroes & Cattle & Horses” that members of these 
towns had pilfered during the war.  He closed by saying that the “Head Men of the 
Cowetaws” and, possibly, the Apalachicolas and Yuchis would return any stolen property 
to the Americans.
65
  Although the debate over stolen property remained unresolved 
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throughout the 1780s, by 1782 Fat King and Tame King had established the political 
groundwork for a postwar Creek-American alliance.  They were backed of course by 
numerous Creek towns.  Unfortunately, that alliance was undermined by the emerging 
Paris Peace settlement. 
 Late in 1782, British, American, and French diplomats assembled in Paris to 
debate articles of peace.  In Article 2 of the Preliminary Articles of Peace, the British 
Empire ceded its claim to all territory east of the Mississippi River and north of the thirty-
first parallel to the Americans.
66
  All of the Southern Indians’ lands lay within this 
proposed land transfer.  Although the treaty was not officially signed until September 3, 
1783, the Southern Indians caught wind of it earlier in the year.  By May 15, a Creek 
delegation led by Coweta had traveled to British-occupied Saint Augustine to air their 
grievances.  Coweta headman Fine Bones spoke for his town and the “upper Creeks” 
when he reminded the British that the Creeks had fought the “Indians Spaniards or 
Virginians” on behalf of Britain.  “If the English mean to abandon the Land,” Fine Bones 
continued, “we will accompany them       We cannot take a Virginian or Spaniard by the 
hand we cannot look them in the face.”  Coweta’s Long Warrior seconded Fine Bones’ 
protests, saying that Coweta and some unidentified “upper Creek” towns eschewed any 
alliance with the Americans.
67
  Moreover, some Creek towns may have received and 
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accepted an invitation from the Chickasaws to defend the Southern Indians’ lands.  
According to one Spanish report, Chickasaw headman Payamataha (“Paymataa”) and 
another Chickasaw “chief” ventured east “to make peace with the Cherokees and 
Talapoosas [Creeks].”
68
 
 The Paris Peace settlement recognized United States independence and 
transferred Britain’s claims in eastern North America to the U.S. by right of conquest.  
Again, Creeks contested the illicit land transfer.  In December 1783, the Upper Creeks 
met the British in Tallahassee (“Talhassie”), West Florida.  Supporting Fine Bones’ 
earlier protest, Upper Creek headmen declared that “whilst we live we will not take a 
Spaniard or Virginian [American] by the hand.”
69
  The Upper Creeks sensed the profound 
geopolitical reconfiguration of Native North America ushered in by the Treaty of Paris.  
Although the British continued to occupy a series of forts in the Ohio, Britain’s influence 
with the Indians was eclipsed by the U.S. and by Spain, who had conquered Mobile and 
Pensacola during the war and who subsequently gained West Florida in the treaty 
settlement. 
 The two major Creek coalitions adjusted to the Paris Peace in different ways.  Fat 
King and Tame King augmented their peace talks of 1782 by negotiating with the 
Americans more frequently than they had during the Revolution.  To that end, they 
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negotiated three treaties with Georgia: the Treaty of Augusta (1783), Galphinton (1785), 
and Shoulderbone Creek (1786).  In response to the Augusta treaty, the Tuckabatchee-
Little Tallassee coalition began treating with the Spanish, whom Mad Dog and 
McGillivray saw as a counterweight to Georgia.  Although some of this coalition’s 
members, such as Coweta, bemoaned Britain’s evacuation, they quickly accepted Spain 
as a trading partner, preferring the goods supplied by Gulf Coast traders associated with 
Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
 A rivalry emerged between Mad Dog and McGillivray, on one hand, and Tame 
King and Fat King, on the other hand.  That rivalry can be traced to the three treaties 
signed with Georgia.  Scholars correctly point out that a “small number” of headmen 
allied to Tame King and Fat King agreed to the land cessions in the Augusta treaty and 
one in the Galphinton treaty.
70
  By making that argument, however, scholars echo the 
biases of McGillivray, who tried to create a Creek “Nation” that would pursue a unified 
foreign policy and pass coercive laws designed to unite all Creeks against the Americans.  
Moreover, by focusing on treaties alone, scholars ignore how political discussions within 
and across towns Creek towns fired diplomacy.  Cross-town political debates in non-
treaty settings frequently determined a coalition’s strategies for treaty-making with the 
Americans or Spanish.  In short, we must consider what happened within and across 
Creek towns before a treaty conference opened in order to understand what happened 
afterwards.  In sum, Creek headmen shaped and were shaped by their coalition as they 
conducted diplomacy with Euro-Americans between 1783 and 1786. 
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 In late 1783, Georgia invited the Creeks to a conference to discuss a possible 
cession of Lower Creek hunting grounds east of the Oconee River.  In early November 
Fat King and Tame King, having had a clear mandate in 1782 to treat with Georgia, led 
thirteen headmen from the Lower Creek towns and possibly a Seminole town to Augusta.  
On November 1, all but one delegate consented to the “Oconee Cession” by touching pen 
to the Treaty of Augusta.  The circumstances under which the delegates signed the treaty 
are unknown, but Georgia possibly coerced the headmen into signing the treaty.  Months 
later Tame King told McGillivray that the headmen were “threatend [sic] with Instant 
death if they did not comply.”  On the other hand, at least one headman felt safe enough 
to abstain, namely “Okoney,” whose signature does not appear on the treaty but whose 
name is listed on the roster of attending delegates.  He was presumably a headman from 
Oconee town on the Chattahoochee River.  Although we cannot know for sure, Georgia’s 
promise to trade with the signing towns may have convinced most headmen that signing 
the treaty was in their best interest.
71 
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 As news of the Oconee Cession trickled into Upper Creek country, the 
Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition disputed its legitimacy.  According to 
McGillivray, in the spring of 1784 “Thirty four of the principal Towns” among the Upper 
Creeks assembled in Tuckabatchee.  There, McGillivray skewered Tame King by saying 
that his coalition lacked a national mandate to cede the Oconee lands, which belonged to 
the “Nation.”  The Tallassee headman responded by saying that Georgia commissioners 
threatened him as well as Fat King and “their followers” with “Instant death if they did 
not comply” with Georgia’s terms.  Later, the “Chiefs” appointed McGillivray as speaker 
(“head of the meeting”).  Speaking for the assembled towns, McGillivray authored and 
dispatched a message to the Georgia Governor, threatening to declare “War” on Georgia 
should the Governor open the “Oconee Lands” to American settlement.
72
 
 Although numerically the Tame King-Fat King coalition represented only a small 
percentage of the Creek “Nation” at the Augusta conference, debating majorities and 
minorities, as McGillivray understood, was a slippery slope.
73
  Consider, for instance, a 
census of the Creek towns taken by Spanish officials Pedro Olivier and James 
Durouzeaux just a decade after the Oconee Cession.  They identified a total of fifty-six 
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Creek towns containing no less than “15,160 souls.”  More than one-third (6,445) of the 
Creeks inhabited at least twenty-five Lower Creek and Seminole towns, whereas more 
than one-half of the Creeks (8,715) clustered among the Upper Creek towns, the heart of 
the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition.
74
  Although the Upper towns contained 2,270 
more souls than the Lower towns, that figure did not give Upper Creek headmen like 
McGillivray the authority to claim that they spoke for the majority of towns. 
 What mattered in Creek country and what frustrated McGillivray’s efforts to build 
a unified Nation was that Creek politics remained town-based in the 1780s, as it had since 
the Creek Confederacy formed from the ashes of the Mississippians in the seventeenth 
century.  Individual towns and headmen freely negotiated with Euro-Americans and other 
Native people, and forged coalitions with other towns and headmen according to 
perceived needs and goals.  Political decisions were localized and based upon how well a 
leader represented his own town and on how well he persuaded other towns to ally with 
him.  As a result, if a headman wished to cultivate influence among a given number of 
towns, he marshaled the support of anyone in a given town who would listen to him.  In 
short, Creek politics was driven by consensual authority.  To McGillivray’s chagrin, 
Tame King and Fat were extremely capable organizers who massaged their coalition in 
the service of Creek-American diplomacy.  The population of individual towns might 
explain why the Cussita-Tallassee coalition mustered support among Lower and Upper 
Creeks.  Fat King’s Cussita was, for instance, the largest town in all of Creek country, 
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boasting nine hundred people and providing the Cussita-Tallassee coalition with clout.  
Cussita’s ally, Okfuskee, was the second most populous with 860 inhabitants.  Other 
towns in the Cussita-Tallassee coalition included Yuchi Town, ranked at fifth (with 550 
people); Hitchiti Town, sixth (480); and Tallassee, eleventh (360).  Similarly, towns in 
the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition were quite large, too, including 
Tuckabatchee, at third (780).  Yet, Little Tallassee was the eighteenth largest Creek town, 
supporting 195 inhabitants.
75
 
 Despite the actual numerical size of the Cussita-Tallassee bloc, however, it 
translated demographic statistics into political influence.  Take the Augusta treaty of 
1783, for instance.  Although only fifteen headmen actually touched pen to the treaty, just 
a year before both Tame King and Fat King had demonstrated to Georgia officials that 
numerous towns entrusted these headmen with their interests.  Recall that Tame King 
explicitly identified six Lower Creek towns that had given him “white Beeds” to transmit 
to Georgia on their behalf.
76
  So, in a way, those towns approved his decision to confer 
with Georgia, even if they may have disagreed with the Oconee Cession that Georgia 
gained during the Augusta conference.  In the world of community politics, the 
connections across and agreement among individual Creek towns gave weight to 
diplomacy.  McGillivray was powerless to overturn consensual political practices. 
 Further problematizing the issue of representation was McGillivray’s tendency to 
inflate the number of Creek towns so as to downplay his opponents’ power and enhance 
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his own.  Coupling Olivier’s census with other records, it is fair to posit that late-
eighteenth-century Creek society comprised roughly sixty major towns.
77
  At one point, 
however, McGillivray wrote to a U.S. official claiming that “ninety-eight towns” had 
empowered him at the Tuckabatchee assembly of 1784 to send a “talk” to Georgia 
condemning the Oconee Cession.  Thus, it seems that McGillivray exaggerated the 
number of Creek towns to buttress his own authority among the Americans and to 
delegitimize Tame King and Fat King.  What’s more, McGillivray argued that the 
Cession had been made without “the unanimous voice of the whole.”
78
  But since there 
was no “Nation” or “whole” in an operable political sense, Creek society followed the 
logic of town politics. 
 The Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee bloc was subject to the same logic, as when it 
courted Spain in early 1784.  At that time, McGillivray wrote to Pensacola Commandant 
Arturo O’Neill to draft an alliance between the Creeks and Spain.  McGillivray advised 
O’Neill that “One Principal Consideration” in the proposed alliance “Shoud be a 
plentifull Supply of Goods [that] Shoud be carried to trade in the Nation on the footing 
that the English used to do.”  Spain easily filled British shoes.  On June 1, a Creek 
delegation led by McGillivray signed a treaty of alliance with Governor of Spanish 
Louisiana, Estevan Miró, and other Spanish officials in Pensacola.  By it, McGillivray 
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earned a salaried appointment as Spanish commissary to the Creeks.
79
  Although 
McGillivray spearheaded the Hispano-Creek alliance, his authority rested on the consent 
of other towns, especially Tuckabatchee.  According to one Spanish report from the mid-
1780s, Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee was the “king and chief of the whole [Creek] nation,” 
and three other unnamed headmen were known as “the principal chiefs” of the Creeks.
80
  
Possibly, these unknown headmen hailed from the Alabama towns, the Abeika town of 
Hillabee, an Okfuskee village named Nuyaka, or a Coweta village named Broken 
Arrow.
81
  That McGillivray was left unmentioned in this report suggests that real political 
                                                             
 
79
 McGillivray to Arturo O’Neill, 1/1/1784, Little Tallassee, RC, 378; “Treaty of 
Pensacola,” 6/1/1784, Document 13, in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 
introduction by William J. Bauer, Jr. (1938; repr., Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2007), 75-76 (and p. 25 for McGillivray’s commission). 
 
80
 “Mr. J. Linder, Senior” to Pedro Favrot, 11/13/1786, “Tinsa [Tensaw?],” SMV, 3:190.  
Admittedly, this letter contains third- and fourth-hand information. 
 
81
 Unfortunately, the Treaty of Pensacola does not list the headmen who signed it.  We 
can reasonably speculate that the towns I’ve identified in the above paragraph supported the 
treaty in some fashion.  For instance, in October 1785, O’Neill proposed building a Spanish fort 
on the Tombigbee, saying that McGillivray, the Alabamas, and other Creeks will defend it; see 
Arturo O’Neill to Conde de Galvez, 10/31/1785, “Panzacola,” in the Papers of Panton, Leslie, 
and Company (Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, 1986), film, reel 2 (hereafter, PLC).  
O’Neill wrote, “… convendría hacer una Fortaleza en el puesto de Tomdigby hacia la caveza del 
Tinisaw cinquenta leguas de la Movila, a lo que se avendrian gustosos los Alivamones y demás 
Indios Criques; por quanto se comprueva que estas Naciones son preferentemente afectas a los 
Espanoles a cuyo logro he contribuido con particular esmero lo que resulta en favor” of our 
monarch. 
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letter he had received from U.S. commissioners, who spread the rumor that American forces were 
preparing to invade Creek country and rape Creek women.  Among others, the “Principal warior 
of the Hillibies” (Hillaubee) attended the conference.  After the “public Talk,” McGillivray, Mad 
Dog, Broken Arrow’s “Head man,” and “Two other warriors” conferred in “private.”  A U.S. 
agent learned that the headmen were probably discussing the acquisition of “Ammuanition” from 
the Spanish.  For McGillivray’s conference, see “Information of Abner Hammond,” 4/20/1786, 
pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD.  Hammond was in Hillaubee when its head warrior 
relayed McGillivray’s talk.  He learned about the ammunition and a plan by the Creeks to attack 
the Georgia frontier or the Cumberland watershed from the “second man man [sic] of new york,” 
i.e. Nuyaka, a village of Okfuskee.  For Nuyaka’s history, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 171. 
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authority rested with Mad Dog and the three other headmen, with McGillivray serving as 
the speaker and conduit between Spain and the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition.  
Like Tame King or Fat King, McGillivray’s influence stemmed from Creek towns. 
 In early November 1785, the Cussita-Tallassee coalition met the Georgians in 
Galphinton, a small settlement on the Oconee River, to discuss an additional land cession.  
Like the Augusta treaty conference, the Galphinton congress featured only fifteen 
headmen, who put their mark to the Treaty of Galphinton on November 12.  This 
confirmed the Oconee as the international boundary and created a “temporary line” from 
the Oconee-Okmulgee fork to the “most southern part” of the St. Marys River in 
Seminole country.  The “temporary line” was effectively a second land cession.  
Additionally, the treaty outlined the steps for punishment for cross-cultural murder and 
theft.  It also at least partially recognized Creek autonomy by empowering the Georgia 
governor with the authority to arrest settlers who squatted on Creek “hunting grounds.”  
While a few signatories were Upper Creeks, including Tame King of Tallassee and 
perhaps an Abeika warrior, the majority of headmen hailed from Lower Creek towns and 
at least one Seminole town.
82
  Fat King of Cussita, Tussekiah Micco of Upatoi (Cussita’s 
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 For the treaty and list of signers, see Treaty of Galphinton, 11/12/1785, in RC, 390-
391.  “Warrior King [of Upatoi],” “O’Kemulgey Tuskonucky [Okmulgee Warrior],” “Tuskia 
Mikco” (duplicate; cf. “Warrior King”), “Cusrater Micko,” “Enchalucko,” “Pohillke Oakfuskies,” 
“Innehana Ufollies [Eufaula Second Man],” “Abico Tuskanucky [Abeika Warrior(?)],” “Inneha 
Micko [Fat King],” “Yaholo Micko [Hallowing King],” “Coso Micko,” “Opohelthe Micko [Tame 
King],” “Cuso Micko (duplicate; cf. “Coso Micko”?),” “Dickson Tallicus,” “Upalahajoe,” 
“Opoyhajoe [Hopoie Hadjo]” and “Wartucko Micko” signed the document (391).  According to 
one report, only two towns attended the meeting; however, the report’s authors left several days 
before the treaty was signed, meaning that additional headmen may have arrived to represent 
additional towns.  See Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin, and Lachlan 
McIntosh to Charles Thompson/ Henry Knox, 11/17/1785, Keowee, in American State Papers, 
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sole village settlement),
83
 Eufaula’s Second Man (or Heniha),
84
 Hallowing King of 
Coweta, perhaps a warrior from Okmulgee town,
85
 and a Seminole warrior named 
Hopoie Hadjo all put their mark to the treaty.
86
  Why the Lower Creeks and one Seminole 
headman agreed to the “temporary line,” which would have reduced the acreage of 
hunting lands available to them, is unclear, although they may have been tempted by 
trade.  As stipulated in Article 9, “the trade . . . shall be carried on as heretofore.”
87
  What 
is clear, however, is that Fat King’s and Tame King’s efforts to cultivate support from the 
Lower towns since 1782 vis-à-vis the Americans continued to bear fruit. 
 In fact, in the months following Galphinton the Cussita-Tallassee coalition 
reached a high-water mark.  That change was spurred by cross-cultural violence.  In the 
spring of 1786, a party of Creeks killed several Americans and burned some “habitations” 
near the Oconee Cession.  American officials suspected that McGillivray had sent the war 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Indian Affairs (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 1:16 (hereafter cited as ASPIA), 
enclosed in Henry Knox to President George Washington, 7/6/1789, ASPIA 1:15. 
 
83
 For Upatoi (or “Auputtaue”), see Benjamin Hawkins, “A sketch of the Creek Country 
in the years 1798 and 1799,” in Letters, Journals and Writings of Benjamin Hawkins, ed. C. L. 
Grant (Savannah: Beehive Press, 1980), 1:311.  In 1798 or 1799, Hawkins visited Upatoi, where 
he met “all the men at the house of Tussekiah Micco; that Chief addressed” Hawkins accordingly: 
“‘. . . I have been six years at this village and we have not a man here, or belonging to our village, 
who ever stole a horse from or did any injury to a white man.’”  This talofa may have been 
founded as early as the mid-eighteenth century (Ethridge, Creek Country, 96, 143, 170).  
Tussekiah Mico also means Warrior King (RC, 596n40). 
 
84
 Eufaulas lived on both the lower Chattahoochee and middle Tallapoosa Rivers 
(Ethridge, Creek Country, 29, 63-64). 
 
85
 In the early nineteenth century, as reported by a “Capt. Young,” “Oakmulges” had a 
population of 220 people and resided east of the Flint River, near “Talle-whe-anas,” which itself 
was “not far from Chehaws.”  Chehaw was a Hitchiti town.  See Swanton, Early History, 409.  
For the location of “Talle-whe-anas” (Otellewhoyanunau), see Ethridge, Creek Country, 29. 
 
86
 Editor’s note, RC, 597n47. 
 
87
 Treaty of Galphinton, 11/12/1785, RC, 390-391. 
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party so as to keep the Americans away from the region.
88
  As tensions on the frontier 
escalated, the Cussita-Tallassee coalition hosted three meetings aimed at restoring order 
along the contested Oconee watershed.  Those meetings reflected a tremendous growth in 
the allied members of the Cussita-Tallassee coalition.  In the first meeting, “Headmen 
and Warriors of the Lower Creek[s]” assembled in Cussita in April 1786.  Leaders 
appointed Fat King and “Folottivyege” of Chehaw (“Chehauess”), a Hitchiti town, as 
speakers.  In a talk addressed to Georgia, they advised the state to ignore McGillivray’s 
“baed Talk in the upper[?] Touns,” seeking to convince the Georgians that “Our 
people”—the “Lower touns”—preferred peace.  The headmen warned Georgia, however, 
that Creek-American peace was contingent on that state’s respect for the Oconee River 
boundary.  For instance, Fat King and Folottivyege prohibited settlement “any Whaer 
Over the Ockoney River.”
89
 
 Two months later, on June 4, ten Lower Creek towns assembled for a second 
meeting in Cussita.  Fat King was selected again as “Speacer [sic]” for the “Kings[,] 
Beloved men[,] and Warriors of the Lower Creek[s].”  In that capacity, Fat King 
addressed a message to the Creeks’ U.S. agent, Daniel McMurphy.  Condemning the 
springtime raid, Fat King opined that the warriors had operated “against the will” of the 
headmen currently assembled in front of McMurphy.  Fat King hoped that the Americans 
might remain calm while the “Beloved man,” meaning McMurphy, visited the “upper 
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 Enclosure of treaty minutes in John Habersham to Edward Telfair, 10/25/1786, 
“Shoulder Bone,” Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
 
89
 Lower Creeks to Georgia “Governor” and “comissionors”, 4/23/1786, “Cussitau 
Squaer,” Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
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towns” to see where they stood in the matter.  The Cussita speaker closed by reiterating 
that “we” on the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers “mean Nothing but peace.”
90
 
 Piggybacking on the Lower Creeks, Okfuskee hosted the third and last coalition 
meeting on June 25.  Thirteen Upper Creek towns attended in McMurphy’s presence.
91
  
Upper Creek headmen elected Tame King as speaker and ceremoniously called him the 
“good child of the Halfe way house.”  This title reflected his recent migration upriver 
from his former town of Tallassee to his new town, Halfway House, symbolizing the 
Tallassees’ preference to reside halfway between their Lower and Upper Creek allies.  
Tame King addressed a message to Georgia, saying that the Creeks were a “poore 
people” who wanted to keep the trade path “open and Streight.”  He admitted that there 
were “bad talks hear [sic] amongst us,” yet explained that they were “not [given] by the 
Consint of” all Creeks.  Tame King implicitly attacked the legitimacy of McGillivray and 
the Tuckabatchee-Little Tallassee coalition in order to uphold the legitimacy of his own 
coalition partners.
92
 
 The Okfuskee and Cussita meetings occurred successively within weeks of each 
other, suggesting that coalition leaders coordinated the three meetings.  The Cussita-
Tallassee coalition had become a highly organized political unit in post-revolutionary 
Creek country.  By adding the number of participating towns in the second and third 
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 Lower Creeks to Georgia, 6/4/1786, Cussita, pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler Collection, 
SNAD. 
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 Possibly, White Lieutenant of Okfuskee brokered this meeting.  He was born to a 
Creek woman and a Euro-American father, making him “‘a half breed’” (Piker, Okfuskee, 140).  
It is unclear whether the “White” in his name signaled his racial status or the color of peace. 
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 Upper Creeks to Georgia, 6/25/1786, Okfuskee (“Aukfuskey Towne”), pp. 1-2, 
Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD.  Tame King told Georgia that the Creeks could not commit 
to a foreign policy without a meeting of “all the towns” at “Tuckabatchey Square,” soon to take 
place. 
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assemblies—ten in Cussita, thirteen in Okfuskee—we may assume that the coalition 
boasted a total of twenty-three towns in late June 1786.  The coalition reached its apex by 
that point.  Far from the scholarly notion that Fat King and Tame King lacked real power 
among Creeks in this period, their coalition was woven from an influential multitude of 
Lower and Upper Creek towns. 
 In late October 1786, about three hundred Creek “men, women, and children” 
traveled to a tributary of the Oconee known as Shoulderbone Creek.  There, they held a 
third and final treaty conference with Georgia.
93
  Clearly, that figure demonstrates the 
growth of the coalition in Creek-American treaty conferences.  On the other hand, the 
delegation represented perhaps only fifteen of the twenty-three towns that had 
participated in the three political gatherings in Cussita and Okfuskee earlier that 
summer.
94
  That diminishment, however, is explained by geopolitical realities.  Since 
Georgia had expanded into areas where the Lower Creeks and Seminoles hunted, 
headmen from only those towns decided to treat with state authorities.  Georgian 
expansion was a Lower Creek issue.  In fact, most headmen attended from among the 
Lower towns, including Cussita, Coweta, Apalachicola, and Upatoi, and at least one from 
a Seminole town.
95
  Trade was always a motivating factor, too, for the delegation 
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 According to Linder to Favrot, 11/13/1786, “Tinsa [Tensaw?],” SMV, 3:189, four 
hundred “Talapoosa” Indians attended (and for quote).  For two hundred in attendance, see John 
Habersham to Edward Telfair, 10/19/1786, Camp Shoulder Bone, in Box 3, Edward Telfair 
Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University.  I averaged the 
figures at three hundred Creeks. 
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 For “fifteen” attending towns, see John Habersham (a Georgia commissioner) to John 
Houstoun, 10/26/1786, “Camp” near the Oconee, p. 4, Keith Read Collection, KRC093, SNAD. 
 
95
 See Treaty of Shoulderbone Creek, 11/3/1786, RC, 435-436.  The treaty lists fifty-nine 
signing headmen, but because at least four of these names are duplicates, I believe only fifty-five 
headmen signed the treaty.  The list of signers includes: “Cusa Mico,” “Ninnehomohta Tuste,” 
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probably hoped to persuade Georgia to fulfill its trading obligations as stipulated in the 
treaties of Augusta and Galphinton. 
 Georgia used threats of violence to get its way.  As soon as the Creeks arrived at 
Shoulderbone Creek, an isolated area “in the middle of the woods,” some “three thousand 
armed Americans hidden nearby . . . surrounded them and made them all prisoners.”
96
  
Negotiations began in late October and lasted until November 3, when a treaty was 
signed.  With the Creeks under military guard, Georgia commissioners demanded that 
Creeks, at some point after the conference, execute any six Creeks to atone for the deaths 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Nuckie Mico,” “Mico Chee,” “Hothlepoya Mico,” “Opohethle Mico, or Tallisee king,” “Opaya 
Lata,” “Opaya Hajo,” “Eufala Teslonoky,” “Okellasa Hajo,” “Eneathlaco Opaya,” “Wawlata 
Mico,” “Opaya Emathla,” “Ockehan Hajo,” “Olackta,” “Tuljisca Mico,” “Tusto Nuckie,” 
“Hottesy Mico,” “Osuchee Mathta,” “Cussita Mico,” “Enea Mico” (duplicate), “Enea Thlaco,” 
“Epha Tusto Nuckie,” “Espane Tusto Nukis,” “Goppitchu Tusto Nuckie,” “Oke Lesa” 
(duplicate?), “Cousa Tustomuckie,” “Yahola Mico,” “Econehot Hajo,” “Cusa Mico” (duplicate), 
“Cuchas Mico,” “Ochunnee Hola,” “Fousachee Mico,” “Holau Hajo,” “Tusikia Mico,” 
“Ausunuck Tustonuckie,” “Tusikia Mico” (duplicate), “Jeomy Justo Nuckie,” “Tolobe Mathla,” 
“Hitcheta Mico,” “Opaye Justo Nuchie,” “Tusto Nuchie,” “Aulack Hajo,” “Enea Thlaco,” 
“Hopaye Mico,” “Othlepoya Mico” (duplicate), “Chuwackle Mico,” “Eneuthlocko,” “Olacte 
Emathla,” “Muojoy,” “Hallatoweigie,” “Will Jones,” “Chatossaha,” “Sokakonay,” “Cuchas 
Hajo,” “Toutkis Hajo,” “Opayouchee,” “Tusk Encha,” and “Wakse Hajo.”  Doubtless four names 
are duplicates, perhaps forgeries.  Thus, fifty-five legitimate headmen appear in the list.  Because 
several names are war titles, they are probably not duplicates.  Three other headmen also attended 
the conference, but may not have signed, including “Suckawockie, brother to” Cuchas Hajo of 
Cussita; “Emathlocks, second man of the Broken Arrow,” a Coweta village; and “Enautaleche, 
nephew to the head man of the Swaglos.”  These three headmen are listed with “Chuuocklie 
Micko, of the Cowetas,” and “Cuchas, of the Cussetas,” in Article 12 (RC, 435).  The five men 
served as hostages to enforce Article 12.  “Swaglos” refers to Sauwoogelo, a Hitchiti town 
(Swanton, Early History, 11).  For “Big” and “Little” Sauwoogelo, see Swanton, Early History, 
141-143, 143. 
 Although Habersham indicated that “fifteen” towns attended, based on the list of signers 
only six (five talwas, one talofa) can be identified with any reasonable accuracy.  See: “Opohethle 
Mico, or Tallisee king” attended for Tallassee; “Cussita Mico,” “Enea Mico [Fat King],” and 
“Cuchas Hajo” for Cussita; “Yahola Mico [Hallowing King]” and “Chuwackle Mico” for 
Coweta; “Tusikia Mico [Warrior King]” for Upatoi, the Cussita talofa; and “Aulack Hajo [Alec 
Hajo]” of Yumersee, a Seminole town.  One or more leaders from Apalachicola likely attended as 
well; see McGillivray to Favrot, 11/8/1786, Little Tallassee, SMV, 3:189. 
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 Linder to Favrot, 11/13/1786, “Tinsa,” SMV, 3:189. 
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of those settlers who had perished in the Oconee raid earlier in the year.  Creek delegates 
blamed the attack on two white men who lived in Creek society and suggested that 
because “two Indians” had perished in the raid, the matter ought to be concluded.  The 
commissioners rejected that line of reason.  Instead, they demanded that six hostages 
return to Georgia following the conference to enforce the proposed executions.  
Georgia’s aggressive tactics caused at least one headman and nine of “his Warriours” to 
flee the area.  Still under military guard, the Creeks eventually consented to the hostage 
proposal.  On November 3, fifty-five headmen signed a treaty that confirmed the Oconee 
Cession, and that stipulated that headmen must execute six Creeks if the hostages were to 
be ransomed.
97
 
 Whether the Creeks executed the six ringleaders is unconfirmed, but Cussita 
leaders managed to ransom the hostages, two of whom were Cussitas.  To do so, it allied 
with the Yuchi village of Padjeeligau, several of whose townspeople were Cussita 
migrants.  In the spring of 1787, headmen from each of these polities co-authored a 
message to Georgia, pleading for the release of the hostages whose “friends and [clan] 
relations,” they explained, “Grow very uneasy.”  The headmen argued that punishing the 
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 Unfortunately, we don’t know whether the Creeks executed six victims.  For 
negotiations, see John Habersham (a Georgia commissioner) to John Houstoun, 10/26/1786, 
“Camp” near the Oconee, pp.1-4, Keith Read Collection, SNAD; and Creeks to commissioners, 
10/22/1786, Oconee River, pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD.  Although Tame King 
“for once in his life behaved like a Man” and “thundered out a furious Talk” against the hostage 
proposal (McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill, 12/3/1786, Little Tallassee, RC, 437), he 
consented to having the “murders kild” (Galphin to commissioners, 10/26/1786, p. 3, Telamon 
Cuyler Collection, SNAD).  For the twelve articles of the treaty, see Treaty of Shoulderbone 
Creek, 11/3/1786, RC, 433-435.  The five hostages were Lower Creeks: “Suckawockie, brother 
to” Cuchas Hajo of Cussita; “Cuchas, of the Cussetas”; “Emathlocks, second man of the Broken 
Arrow,” a Coweta talofa; “Chuuocklie Micko, of the Cowetas”; and “Enautaleche, nephew to the 
head man of the Swaglos” (Article 12, RC, 435). 
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Lower Creeks for the Upper Creek-led Oconee raid was unfair, and that “detaining [the 
hostages] will be no restraint on the Bad inclind people of the upper Towns who do not 
wish them ever to return.”  As a result, the headmen apprised Georgia that “We your 
friends and Brothers of roust [Padjeeligau] and Cussetas Can Speak for ourselves.”
98
  
Their exertions paid off.  Sometime in 1787, the new U.S. Agent to the Southern Indians, 
James White, convinced Georgia to release the five captives.
99
 
 Renewed Georgian aggression during the summer of 1787 spurred a 
rapprochement between the two Creek coalitions.  At that time, the Georgia militia 
attacked one or several Lower Creek settlements, resulting in the deaths of twelve 
Creeks.
100
  McGillivray reported to Arturo O’Neill that the militia “Scalped & otherwise 
abused the dead bodys in a Shamefull manner.”  To protect their people, Fat King and 
Tame King requested military aid from the Spanish via McGillivray, who gave them 
“Certificates . . . to receive [Spanish] ammunition.”
101
  Weeks later, Fat King messaged 
Georgia Governor George Mathews, indicting him for allowing settlers to “[destroy]” 
twelve of “our people.”  He reasoned that Georgia had violated the Shoulderbone Creek 
treaty, which stipulated that “no hasty revenges shoud be taken in future[?] by either 
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 Padjeeligau and Cussita to Georgia governor (interpreted by Timothy Barnard and 
recorded by Abner Hammond), 5/1/1787, Padjeeligau, pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler Collection, 
TCC672, SNAD, enclosed in Timothy Barnard to Georgia governor, pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler 
Collection, TCC673, SNAD.  For Padjeeligau as Buzzard Roost and a “Yuchi satellite town,” see 
Ethridge, Creek Country, 64. 
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 For information on White, appointed in October 1786, see RC, 362, 599n19, and 
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 Fat King and McGillivray to Georgia, 7/27/1787, Cussita, p. 1-2, enclosed in Barnard 
to George Mathews, 8/1/787, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD.  Possibly, the “Oakgees” first 
attacked the frontier, which prompted Georgia’s response; see Fat King and Hallowing King to 
Matthews, 6/14/1787, Cussita, ASPIA, 1:32. 
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Side” until both sides negotiated a satisfactory arrangement.  To that end, Fat King 
argued that the settlers were a “mad people” who must “fall for Satisfaction. (tis our 
Custom so [to] give it.) [Then the] tears of the relations of the dead will be dried up & our 
hearts” will no longer be “hot[?] against you.”  To restore peaceable relations, they 
suggested, Georgia must obey Creek clan law—or else war might erupt.  Demonstrating a 
newfound unity in Creek society, McGillivray signed Fat King’s message.  The two 
coalitions had dissolved into one another.
102
 
 In the summer of 1787, too, the Creeks coordinated internationally with other 
Native populations to resist the expansion of America into the Native South.  Fat King 
and Hallowing King reported to Governor Mathews on June 14 that “We have had a 
meeting lately with the Northward Indians.”
103
  That meeting, in turn, was referenced by 
a Chickasaw headman who, two weeks earlier (June 1), informed Spanish official Carlos 
de Grande-Pré that a “confederated league [was] just formed by the Talapoosas [i.e., 
Creeks] . . . in conjunction with” the Shawnees, Panimahas (“Lobos”), Cherokees, 
Abenakis, and “half” of the Chickasaws.  Allying with Spain, the pan-tribal league 
planned to attack the Americans in the Mississippi delta.  While the Creeks were to “ruin 
all the villages that have taken sides with the Americans,” the remaining Indian groups 
were supposed “to surprise and destroy the Americans established” at or near the 
Chickasaw Bluffs along with American-allied Chickasaws.  Grand-Pré’s letter fails to 
clarify which Creek towns had confederated with the other Indians.  But it seems certain 
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 Fat King and McGillivray to Georgia, 7/27/1787, Cussita, p. 1-2, enclosed in Barnard 
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 Fat King and Hallowing King to Governor Mathews, 6/14/1787, Cussita, ASPIA 1:32. 
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that members of both of the former Creek coalitions joined in this endeavor, given their 
shared distrust of America and especially Georgia.
104
 
 This chapter has shown that Creek headmen survived the American Revolution by 
organizing their towns into structured coalitions from 1775 to 1787.  In 1775 and 1776, 
several Lower Creek towns forged economic ties with the Americans, doing so with the 
tools of kinship.  To counter that alliance and to preserve ties with Stuart, Tuckabatchee 
and Little Tallassee headmen launched a coalition among the Upper Creeks and with 
Coweta’s Sempeyoffee.  Weeks later, a partnership among Tallassee and Okfuskee 
coalesced into an alliance with Cussita and the Hitchiti-speaking towns on the 
Chattahoochee River.  The Cussita-Tallassee coalition hammered out a relationship with 
both the Americans and British.  After Britain’s defeat at Yorktown, Fat King and Tame 
King amplified their relations with America, while Mad Dog and Alexander McGillivray 
fastened an alliance with Spain, which emerged as a somewhat useful counterweight to 
America. 
 The emergence, operation, and fluctuations within each coalition suggest that 
Creek society in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods resembled neither a 
                                                             
 
104
 Carlos de Grande-Pré to Governor General Estevan Miró, 6/1/1787, “Fort Panmure of 
Natchez,” SMV, 3:210 (additional quotes from document removed).  The “uncle” of Grand-Pré’s 
Chickasaw informant was the “Great Chief Takapoumas,” who was the “faithful son and friend of 
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Rivas to Miró, 8/13/1787, Fort Bute de Manchac, SMV, 3:231. 
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centralized indigenous nation nor a decentralized town world.
105
  On one hand, the 
formation of two town-based coalitions rather than one National Council-oriented 
coalition indicates that the Creek “Nation” remained only an elusive concept that had 
little meaning in the Creeks’ town- and kin-based world.  On the other hand, though, 
Creek headmen organized their towns into impressive blocs that searched for trade goods 
and whose political mechanics shaped diplomacy between Creeks and outsider peoples, 
including the Euro-Americans and other Native groups.  Towns formed the political basis 
of both coalitions, and networks of kinship intermittently shaped diplomatic exchanges 
between those towns and outsiders.  Almost no evidence reveals how clans structured the 
coalitions from within, but a limited number of records suggest that coalition leaders used 
the symbols and language of kinship to forge ties with, for example, Galphin and Rea. 
 By politically organizing into town-based coalitions, the Creeks navigated the 
dangers of Atlantic revolution with success.  Scholars have overlooked the ways in which 
Creek headmen protected their towns from warfare, having dealt with the competing 
Euro-American powers as fluid, formidable coalitions.  By contrast, the Creeks’ eastern 
neighbors were ill-organized and suffered from American violence.  In 1776 and again in 
1780, the Southern colonies laid waste to Cherokee country where rebel militias 
destroyed numerous Cherokee towns and cornfields.  The destruction of Cherokee society 
precipitated famine, land loss, and dislocation, and many Cherokees took refuge among 
the Creeks.
106
  The Cherokees’ close proximity to the Southern backcountry explains why 
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the Southern colonies crushed the Cherokees.  Fortunately, the Creeks, Chickasaws, and 
Choctaws lived hundreds of miles west of the main theater of war.  Yet, aside from 
geography, the Creeks preserved a measure of order and trade by organizing into 
coalitions that kept the Americans, British, and Spanish at bay. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE THREE RIVERS RESOLUTION 
 
 
 In the late 1780s and early 1790s, the acceleration of U.S. expansion into the 
Native South engulfed the Creeks in a two-front war.  On the eastern and northern sides 
of Creek country, Americans settled in unprecedented numbers on hunting grounds along 
the Oconee, Tennessee, Tombigbee, and Cumberland Rivers.  Creek warriors defended 
those lands by attacking the newcomers’ settlements, sometimes doing so in partnership 
with other Indian warriors.  In turn, Americans raided Creek towns or killed Creek 
hunters in the woods and valleys of the region.  Additionally, the growth of American 
homesteads at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River and of the Cumberland Settlements 
along the Cumberland River interrupted the winter hunting season of the Upper Creeks 
and Chickasaws.  Ever since the colonial era, these Indians hunted white-tailed deer and 
other fur-bearing animals so that they could sell the skins for American and Spanish trade 
goods.  Those hunters eventually came to blows in 1793, triggering the Creek-Chickasaw 
War (1793-1797) (see map in Figure 12). 
 For the most part, scholars examining post-revolutionary Creek history focus on 
U.S.-Indian frontier conflict.  Robbie Ethridge argues that people of all racial stripes 
engaged in property theft that generated endless violence on the Southern frontier, where 
whites stole horses from Indians, Indians from whites, and Indians from Indians.  When
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someone was caught in the act, he might be killed.  If an Indian was killed, his clan might 
seek retribution, which only escalated violence on the frontier.  Moreover, drunken 
brawls erupted between Indians and whites in roadside taverns and on isolated roads, and 
unscrupulous land speculators plied Indians with rum in the attempt to secure illegal land 
cessions.
1
  As well, Angela Pulley Hudson explores the impact of colonization on cross-
cultural relations.  She contends that a number of factors, including property disputes, 
American settlement along the Oconee and Okmulgee Rivers, and the passage of 
thousands of Americans through Creek country, challenged Creeks’ conceptions of 
mobility and space.  Colonization hindered travel and communication among Creek 
towns, villages, and clans.
2
 
 By analyzing frontier warfare, however, scholars elide the Creek-Chickasaw War, 
which enflamed Upper Creek country between 1793 and 1797.  This chapter corrects that 
oversight by examining how Creeks addressed both U.S.-Creek conflict and the Creek-
                                                             
 
1
 For American settlement in the region, see William Panton to Esteban Miró, undated 
(probably sometime in 1790), in D. C. Corbitt, “Some Papers Relating to Bourbon County, 
Georgia,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, 19:3 (September 1935): 251-263, here 259 (hereafter 
cited as GHQ).  For pan-Indian war parties, see Simon Favre to Vicente Folch y Juan, 4/12/1790, 
“Choctaws,” in “Papers from the Spanish Archives Relating to Tennessee and the Old Southwest, 
1783-1800,” trans. and ed. D. C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, East Tennessee Historical Society 
22 (1950), 145 (hereafter cited as ETHS, volume number, page number).  Nephew of Governor 
Miró, Vicente Folch was commandant of Mobile from 1781 to 1795 and governor of Pensacola 
from 1795 to 1811 (145n66).  At times, Creeks and white men made common cause by 
participating in an illicit trade in alcohol and guns.  See Ethridge, Creek Country, 112-113, 181-
186.  According to Ethridge, “Stealing had no political, national, or ethnic bounds. Everyone stole 
from everyone else” (182).  For the sorts of goods stolen, see p. 182. 
 
2
 Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves 
and the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2010).  Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the 
Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), interprets frontier 
conflict as a proxy for emergent class divisions in the Native South.  For other analyses of frontier 
conflict, see Joshua Haynes, “Patrolling the Border: Theft and Violence on the Creek-Georgia 
Frontier, 1770-1796” (PhD diss., 2013), 
http://history.uga.edu/sites/default/files/CVs/haynes_joshuacv.pdf (accessed 9 August 2015). 
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Chickasaw War.
3
  I argue that Creek headmen attempted to suppress each conflict by 
chartering a peace-keeping initiative referred to hereafter as the “Three Rivers 
Resolution.”  I have culled the American and Spanish records to piece together the 
origins of the Resolution and its impact on Southern international relations.  Framed by 
Creek headmen in the spring of 1793, the Resolution promoted diplomacy with the U.S. 
in order to preserve the U.S.-Creek trading relationship, since the Creeks remained 
dependent, in part, on American goods in this period.  Additionally, headmen designed 
this policy in order to reduce Creek-Chickasaw animosity.  The Resolution takes its name 
from Cussita headmen who announced to U.S. authorities in April 1793 that “The three 
rivers have talked, and wished for peace.”  This quote invoked the dozens of towns that 
clustered along the Chattahoochee, Tallapoosa, and Coosa Rivers.
4
 
 The Three Rivers Resolution officially codified the participation of towns and 
clans in Creek political and diplomatic affairs.  It is no accident that headmen crafted the 
Resolution on the heels of Alexander McGillivray’s death in February 1793.  Since the 
1780s, as Claudio Saunt argues, McGillivray had attempted to forge a “Nation” with 
                                                             
 
3
 James R. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People: The Chickasaw Indians to 
Removal (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 139-179, investigates the Creek-
Chickasaw War from the Chickasaws’ perspective, but fails to consider the ways in which 
intertribal and Indian-settler conflict shaded into one another. 
 
4
  Bird Tail King (“BIRD KING”) and Cussita Mico (“CUSSETAH KING”) to Major 
Henry Gaither, 4/13/1793, Cussita, in American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and 
Executive, of the Congress of the United States, from the First Session of the First to the Third 
Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1789, and Ending March 3, 
1815, ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 
1832), 1:420 (hereafter cited as ASPIA, volume number, page number), enclosed in Henry 
Gaither to Henry Knox, 4/19/1793, Fort Fidius, ASPIA, 1:419.  U.S. Deputy Agent Timothy 
Barnard called it a “resolution”; see Barnard to Gaither, 6/21/1793, Flint River, ASPIA 1:422. 
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centralized authority aimed at blocking U.S. expansion.
5
  The framers of the Three Rivers 
Resolution partially met McGillivray’s goals.  While in many cases they united against 
the Americans, this policy sprang from a cross-town coalition, forged from the ground 
up, and not foisted onto Creek towns from the top down.  Thus, the Resolution did not 
resemble McGillivray’s nation-building project; rather, it recognized and drew upon the 
agency of individual towns.  Precisely because this policy took shape from the bottom up, 
it rested on a political foundation rendered unstable by the families that lived within the 
towns and provinces of Creek society.  Consequently, the fulfillment of retaliation 
obligated clans to attack the Americans and Chickasaws.  Indeed, the term “The three 
rivers” captures the competing community loyalities of the headmen announcing the 
policy.  Although the Chattahoochee, Tallapoosa, and Alabama River towns agreed to 
work together to promote peace, the clans that lived along those rivers frequently took 
revenge on their enemies, breaking away from the policy to service localized kinship 
interests. 
 The persistence of community influence in late-eighteenth-century Creek politics 
revises the scholarly notion of a “generational conflict” between Native elites and 
commoners.  According to Gregory Evans Dowd, the Southern Indians’ dependence on 
trade goods and the debt it generated caused many young “nativist” Southern Indian 
warriors to defy their “accommodationist” village leaders by raiding American 
settlements, typically in union with the Western Indian Confederacy.
6
  Likewise, Saunt 
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 Saunt, New Order, 67-110. 
 6 For the generational thesis, Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North 
American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
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and Tiya Miles demonstrate that class divisions arose between elites and commoners 
since a minority of Native elites abandoned the hunt, accepted Euro-American norms of 
property and power, and amassed new forms of wealth, such as African American slaves, 
livestock, and other private property.  As a result, rich headmen made market-oriented 
decisions that harmed poor commoners in Creek and Cherokee societies.
7
 
 While the generational thesis reveals the ways in which age and economy placed 
a wedge between elites and commoners, it misses the bottom line in Southern Indian 
societies: rule by consensus.  Since Creek society lacked enforcement mechanisms to 
implement policy, clans and towns required their leaders to rule by majority interest, 
which necessitated the construction of coalitions to get things done.  Communities were 
willing to (and did) listen to their leaders, but only insofar as those leaders made a 
compelling argument that a majority should pursue some course of action.  If they did 
not, communities resisted or simply went their own way.  Creek division resulted 
therefore from cultural, not generational, imperatives.  To demonstrate this, I will 
occasionally examine the custom of clan retaliation.  The generational school misses 
those moments when retaliation obligated both commoners and headmen to launch a raid.  
Moreover, it also overlooks the fact that headmen had to persuade warriors to withhold 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Press, 1992), especially 90-115, 148-166; Braund, Deerskins, 156-163; Colin G. Calloway, The 
American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 182-212; Saunt, New Order, 81-82, 81n64, 
81n65, 104-109; and Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 46-48. 
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 For Creeks, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 175-194; Saunt, New Order, 90-110, 205-229; 
and Hudson, Creek Paths, 67-89, 121-166.  For Cherokees, see “The Census of 1835,” in Theda 
Perdue and Michael D. Green, The Cherokee Removal: A Brief History with Documents, 2nd ed. 
(Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005), 25-26, 54-57 (census); and Tiya Miles, Ties that Bind: 
The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2005), . 
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retaliation; headmen could not physically force them to do so.  Consensual power, then, 
shaped the decision to attack an enemy or remain cool-headed.
8
  
                                                             
 
8
 Saunt, New Order, 90-110 argues that headmen coerced warriors into not carrying out 
retaliation against the Americans.  By contrast, I will show that leaders relied on consensual 
patterns of authority to persuade warriors to withhold retaliation on the Americans.  Moreover, 
his argument neglects the fact that during the Creek-Chickasaw War, headmen and warriors 
vigorously obeyed clan justice. 
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Table 5.  Creek Coalitions in the Late Eighteenth Century. 
Coalitions Participating provinces, towns 
and talofas 
Major leaders Major towns 
involved in 
Creek-Chickasaw 
War 
- Coalition of 
1793, resulting in 
Three Rivers 
Resolution 
- Lower Creek: Cussita, Upatoi 
(talofa), Hitchiti Town, Coweta, 
Chehaw, Broken Arrow (talofa), 
Ouseechee, Sauwoogelo 
 
- Tallapoosa: Tuckabatchee 
 
 
- Abeika: Okfuskee 
 
- Alabama: Little 
Tallassee/Hickory Ground 
 
- Bird Tail King of 
Cussita 
 
 
 
- Mad Dog of 
Tuckabatchee 
 
- White Lieutenant 
of Okfuskee 
 
 
- Tuckabatchee, 
Woccoccoie, 
Coosa, 
Aubecooche 
- Coalition of 
May-October 
1794, resulting in 
defense of 
Oconee boundary 
 
- Lower Creek: Cussita, Coweta, 
Broken Arrow (talofa), 
Ouseechee, Chehaw 
 
-Tallapoosa: Tuckabatchee, 
Tallassee, Hoithlewaulee, White 
Ground, Muccolossus 
 
-Abeika: Okfuskee, Kialijee 
 
-Alabama: Tuskegee, Hickory 
Ground, Coosada 
- Cussita Mico 
 
-Mad Dog of 
Tuckabatchee 
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Figure 12.  The Native South in 1805.  Upper Creeks and Chickasaws hunted fur-bearing animals 
along the Tombigbee and Tennessee Rivers, in part provoking conflict between the two groups.  
The Muscle Shoals communities and Cumberland Settlements lay north of Upper Creek country.  
Source: Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves 
and the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2010), p. 52 (Map 2).  
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 American expansion provoked conflict with Creeks across the Native South.  In 
some cases, rumor led to death.  In late July of 1787, two white men known only as 
“Jones and Jarvis” arrived in Padjeeligau, a Yuchi talofa, with a “negroe boy.”  Jones and 
Jarvis told the inhabitants there that “Six hundred men” were assembling near the 
Oconee, poised to fall on Padjeeligau, and that those soldiers had already killed two 
Cussitas, Padjeeligau’s allies.  Upon hearing the news, the Padjeeligau people killed 
Jones and Jarvis, and within “twenty four hours,” Padjeeligau runners had notified the 
“whole nation” of the purported Oconee invasion force.  Hundreds of warriors from the 
“lower” and “upper” towns prepared to march on the Oconee to defend their people.  
Before leaving, however, the African American “boy” apprised the Creek headmen that, 
in truth, Jones and Jarvis actually killed the Cussitas and fabricated the story about the 
six-hundred-man force.  Apprised of the facts, the “cussetaw people” sent out runners to 
turn back the Creek warriors.
9
 
                                                             
 
9
 Timothy Barnard to Governor Mathews (?), 8/18/1787, “flint river lower Creeks,” pp. 
1-3, Telamon Cuyler Collection, TCC671, Southeastern Native American Documents, 1730-1842, 
Digital Library of Georgia, <http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu> (hereafter cited as SNAD).  The two 
Cussitas seem to have been killed near Rock Landing on the Oconee.  Barnard’s report on the 
American attack reads: “there come in a runer from the cheroke river that one hundred and thirty 
of the cumberland people pilated by two chickesaw Indins, had marched agains Some french 
trader that had felled a tradeing house below the mussel Sholes and the cheroke river, and killed 
Indians and all that fell in there way, those were killed were two creeks, one a lower and one an 
upper creek fellow, two northward indians, two chickesaws, their friends two frenchmen, Six 
chero[added: kees] and caried of Several cheroke women and children prisonors” (pp. 2-3).  
Curiously, six Padjeeligau Creeks were killed by Georgia settlers near the Oconee on June 3 or 4, 
1787, yet these deaths are not mentioned in Barnard’s 8/18 report.  For the six deaths, see Barnard 
to Mathews, 6/8/1787, “flint river,” pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler Collection, TCC674, SNAD. 
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 Only days later, the Creeks learned that Americans from the Cumberland 
Settlements had killed several Indians, including a Lower and Upper Creek each.
10
  The 
law of retaliation required the appropriate families to mete out punishment.  
Consequently, by August 18 the Upper Creeks had “gone oute” against the Cumberland 
but failed to kill an American.  For their part, “fat King and [the] rest of the head men of 
the lower creeks” craved satisfaction for the death of the Lower Creek man.
11
  Although 
evidence does not confirm whether the Lower Creeks secured revenge, we know that 
Creeks attacked American settlers near the Oconee Cession throughout 1788.  In one 
example, a Georgia militia officer reported in March that “a great number of Indians,” 
probably Creeks, killed and scalped a man named “Hogans” in the vicinity of present-day 
Macon, Georgia.  Warriors also “Killed Mr David Jackson[’s] Family Consisting of his 
Brother and wife four Children and Two Negroes and Scaulped another Small Girl[.]”
12
  
In another Georgia settlement, Creek raiders made off with several cattle, horses, and 
hogs as well as five slaves.  They also killed two slaves and torched five houses.
13
 
 Creek leaders tried to rescind the Oconee Cession since it was the primary cause 
of U.S.-Creek conflict.  In April 1789, Alexander McGillivray, Tame King, and 
Hallowing King of Coweta conferred with the U.S. Superintendent of Indian affairs, 
James White, and Commissioners Timothy Barnard and John Galphin, a son of the 
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 Timothy Barnard to Governor Mathews (?), 8/18/1787, “flint river lower Creeks,” pp. 
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 Barnard to Governor Mathews (?), 8/18/1787, “Flint river,” pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler 
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 Jared Irwin to John Twiggs, 3/26/1788, Washington Country, Georgia, pp. 3-4, 
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 John Burnett, deposed to Alexander Bessett, 10/31/1791, location (?), p. 1, C. Mildred 
Thompson Collection, CMT008, SNAD.  Burnett’s account refers to depredations in 1788. 
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Augusta trader, George Galphin.  They met near the Oconee River, perhaps at the Rock 
Landing settlement.  Opening the talks, McGillivray told the assembled Creeks that 
White would objectively evaluate the Oconee Cession, leading Tame King to remark that 
the Georgians, with “long knives in their hands,” had coerced him into ceding the Oconee 
lands during the Augusta treaty conference in 1783.  Though Tame King had consented 
to the Cession in the Galphinton and Shoulderbone Creek treaties in 1785 and 1786, the 
hostage crisis at Shoulderbone Creek and the rapid expansion of Georgia probably 
accounts for why he now objected to the Cession.  Hallowing King echoed Tame King’s 
sentiment.  According to the conference minutes, he “seemed . . . to speak for the Indians 
in general” when he told the commissioners that the U.S. Congress must intervene in the 
debate over the Cession.  He gave “an historical account” of American expansion, which 
“he had seen himself, or [had] been informed [of] by older men” throughout his life.  
Worried that America might soon possess Creek lands, Hallowing King vowed to defend 
“‘our lands.’”
14
 
 In the summer of 1790, renewed conflict resulted in several Creek deaths.  On 
July 10, Fat King (“Cussetaw King”) reported to Barnard that one week earlier, three 
“young” Cussita men had been hunting near Rock Landing and trading with American 
women in a kind of small-scale frontier exchange economy.  According to Barnard, the 
men had been “Eateing at the white peoples houses and buyeing goods of them wich the 
white women had made up into Shirts and frocks for them.”  Later, when the Cussitas 
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 Lower Creek-Georgia conference, 4/10/1789, RC, 507-508.  Tame King is referred to 
as the “Half-way-house king” (507).  We know that James White presided at the 4/10 conference 
from a “Talk” from the “Lower Creek Nation” to U.S. commissioners, 6/1/1789, RC, 515-516, 
516 (“Col. White”). 
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made camp, two armed “white men” rode up on horses, demanding that the Cussitas 
return the goods for which they had traded.  When the Indians refused, the aggressors 
shot them and killed one, Fat King’s “nephew,” who was “much beloved among his 
family.”  Although the late Cussita’s “relatives might goe rashly to work to Seek 
[Satisfaction],” Fat King persuaded his aggrieved kin to remain calm.  He told them that 
U.S. authorities would locate and execute any white settler who “Spilt the blood of an 
indian.”  Knowing that by fulfilling clan vengeance his family would surely provoke a 
reprisal by Georgia, Fat King “Says he himself and the rest of the head of the nation 
according to Mr. McGillivarys Instructions to them has been daily chargeing there young 
people to beware of commiting any violencyes on the white Settlements.”  Apparently, 
for a time, Creek warriors “adherd to” Fat King’s advice “Strickly” (my emphasis).
15
 
 Though bound by retaliation, Fat King’s family adopted a peaceful stance towards 
their eastern neighbors.  Like Wolf of Muccolossus, who in 1756 and 1757 dissuaded his 
Tallapoosa relatives from launching a revenge raid on the British, Fat King convinced his 
family to uphold diplomacy.  Headmen like Fat King and their kin relations continued to 
use the potential for clan-initiated violence to advance good relations and preserve trade 
with the United States.  By doing so, Creek leaders demonstrated their capacity to rely on 
consensual authority to get their families to take a course of action, up to and including 
withholding retaliation on the U.S. 
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 “Timy” (Timothy) Barnard to Edward Telfair (?), 7/12/1790, Flint River, pp. 1-7, 
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 To prevent additional frontier dust-‘em-ups, Creek headmen made a final bid to 
resolve the debate over the Oconee Cession in the summer of 1790.  At that time, federal 
authorities hosted the Creeks at a treaty conference in the U.S. capital of New York City.  
On August 7, twenty-four leaders touched pen to the Treaty of New York, among them 
Alexander McGillivray, Bird Tail King of Cussita, and other prominent headmen.
16
  
Leaders authorized the Oconee Cession, thereby ceding the lands east of the Oconee to 
the U.S.
17
  In exchange, commissioners established the annuity system, which paid an 
annual stipend of $1,500 to the Creeks in perpetuity.
18
  As part of this cash-for-land deal, 
U.S. authorities rewarded specific headmen for their cooperation.  Although he had 
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 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., “Creek-American Treaty of 1790: Alexander McGillivray and 
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379-400, argues that the treaty established the foundation of “American policy toward the 
southern Indians” (380).  Apparently, the delegation was composed of thirty headmen, yet only 
twenty-four signed.  Wright argues that the remaining six were probably Lower Creeks and 
Seminoles who had committed themselves to William Augustus Bowles.  Bowles was an 
American adventurer who paraded as the “Chief” of the Creeks and who promised his Native 
allies trade goods.  Naturally, he competed with McGillivray and the latter’s economic allies in 
Panton, Leslie, and Company (392-393). 
 
17
  For the signers, see “Treaty with the Creeks, 1790,” 8/7/1790, New York, in Indian 
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(“Juleetaulematha”); Broken Arrow’s [or Coweta’s?] “Chawookly Mico”; Coosada’s 
(“Coosades”) Measurer (“Coosades Hopoy”), Misser (“Muthtee”), and Good Humor 
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18
 Ethridge, Creek Country, 199. 
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argued vehemently against the Oconee Cession since 1783, McGillivray accepted a secret 
provision in the treaty that awarded him with an annual subsidy of $1,200 and a U.S. 
military commission.  Moreover, a few other leaders received an annual payment of 
$100.
19
 
 When news of the concession of the Oconee lands reached Creek country in the 
fall of 1790, Creeks were livid.  On November 13, a Georgia settler named John 
Bradshaw deposed to the Justice of the Peace of Wilkes County, Georgia, that he and 
three other “white men” had recently entered Creek country to retrieve stolen horses.  
When they arrived in “Coweta Town,” the Indians there “seemed very surly, morose and 
much displeased at seeing them.”  Days later, the Cowetas nearly succeeded in killing the 
travelers.  Bradshaw and his companions eventually learned that “the Indians in general 
were very much disatisfied with the Treaty held at New York and also with McGillivray, 
paying very little respect to his authority, and declaring that [the U.S.] Congress might do 
what they pleased with the Treaty, [but] they intended to do as they pleased with it.”
20
 
 Bradshaw’s deposition demonstrates that Creeks divided not along generational or 
economic lines but, instead, when headmen failed to obey consensual political norms.  
While scholars have pointed out that McGillivray was a wealthy slave-holding headman 
who likely agreed to the Cession for economic gain, the signatories, simply put, approved 
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the land deal without securing support from the Creeks.
21
  In short, they failed to build a 
coalition that persuaded their constituents to consent to the Oconee Cession.  Creeks 
resisted the New York treaty from at the town level, redoubling their commitment to 
town-based consensual practices. 
 Still, although the Creeks contested the New York treaty, they traded with the 
Americans.  Although Creeks in the late eighteenth century received a large percentage of 
their goods from the Spanish, they continued to rely at least partially on American factors 
for trade items.  The Western Indian Confederacy, however, threatened to upend U.S.-
Creek trade.  In November 1791, the Confederacy of Miamis, Shawnees, and Delawares 
defeated U.S. military forces under General Arthur St. Clair.  Hundreds of St. Clair’s men 
perished in the fighting.  In the wake, Confederacy diplomats invited the Creeks to join 
the struggle against American expansion.  Demonstrating their commitment to U.S.-
Creek peace and trade, the Lower Creeks objected, and in November 1792 they convened 
with the new U.S. Agent, James Seagrove, at Fort Coleraine on the St. Marys River.  The 
Lower Creek delegation boasted hundreds of Lower Creeks, who were led by forty-five 
“principal chiefs” hailing from eighteen “principal towns.”
22
  They disavowed the 
Confederacy and, as Seagrove wrote, “declare[d] pointedly against joining the Northern 
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Ground, ASPIA, 1:385-386.  “Wocke Coys” resembles Woccoccoie, an Upper Creek town. 
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tribes.”
23
  Betraying their need for goods, they parlayed their expressions of loyalty into a 
request for “corn and clothing.”
24
 
 But while the Lower Creeks objected to the advances of the Confederacy, they 
maintained ties with the Spanish so as to exert leverage against the Americans.  In 
November, headmen from the Lower Creek town of Cussita attended both the Coleraine 
meeting and a conference hosted by Spanish Governor of Louisiana and West Florida, 
Baron de Carondelet.  The “Great Chief” of “Cussetaws” as well as Chickasaw, Choctaw, 
and Cherokee headmen convened with Carondelet in New Orleans and discussed the 
possibility of forming a “permanent congress composed of three chiefs” from each of the 
four nations.  They were taking a page out of the Western Confederacy’s handbook.  The 
Governor promised to pay the “12 envoys” a total of 2,500 pesos annually for any 
expenses incurred in that capacity.
25
 
 Unfortunately, the gradual breakdown in Creek-Chickasaw relations stalled the 
proposed Hispano-Indian congress.  As early as 1789, the Upper Creeks and Chickasaws 
had been raiding one another’s towns for cattle, horses, and slaves.  Hostilities intensified 
in the following years as Americans, Upper Creeks, and Chickasaws hunted for game 
along the Tombigbee, Tennessee, and Cumberland River valleys.  To the Americans, this 
region was known as the “Southwest Territory,” where American hunters hailed from the 
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Muscle Shoals communities and Cumberland Settlements.  American expansion 
interfered with the Upper Creek and Chickasaw winter hunting seasons and exacerbated 
Creek-Chickasaw relations.
26
  A turning point in Creek-Chickasaw relations came on 
September 30, 1792, when a war party composed of Creeks and Cherokees raided 
Buchanan’s Station near the Cumberland settlements.  During the raid, a Creek killed 
another Creek in order to acquire his comrade’s gun, and since apparently no one 
witnessed the altercation, the manslayer shielded his clan from revenge by blaming the 
death on the Chickasaws.
27
  Although the victim’s family did not immediately take the 
life of a Chickasaw, Creek war parties did raid the Chickasaws for horses.
28
  According 
to one report, around October, “Some Chickasaws had been sent” to the Creeks 
demanding “Satisfaction for the horses,” but the Creeks “refused” to restore the pilfered 
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property.  An official of the Panton, Leslie, and Company speculated that the Chickasaws 
“would retalliate.”
29
 
 To gain leverage over the Upper Creeks, Chickasaw war leader Piomingo forged 
a pact with the Governor of the Southwest Territory William Blount.  Since the 1780s, 
Piomingo had earned the nickname “Mountain Leader” from the Americans, who 
respected his status as a powerful warrior.  During the emerging conflict with the Creeks, 
Piomingo’s American allies supplied him with ammunition and food in exchange for his 
agreement to prevent Chickasaw warriors from raiding U.S. settlements.  Predictably, the 
Upper Creeks feared that Piomingo and his warriors planned an attack on their towns.  So 
on December 10, 1792, they sent a war “talk” to the Chickasaws “announcing that they 
were determined to go and kill all the Whites . . . in that area [the Southwest Territory] 
just as they have also resolved to destroy the ammunition [acquired from the U.S.] that . . 
. Piamingo has stored.”  Three hundred Creeks assembled a war party and prepared to kill 
“the Tombigbee Residents.”
30
 
 In response to these threats, the Chickasaws attacked a party of four Creeks near 
the Cumberland River in January 1793.  These Creeks hailed from the Upper Creek town 
of Woccoccoie (“Wackakay”).  Two Woccoccoies perished in the attack, and the 
Chickasaws took the other two prisoner.  When Upper Creek hunting parties caught word 
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of the attack, they swore vengeance.
31
  On February 8, Upper Creeks killed the “first 
warrior of Piomingo” (also known as the “Warrior of Piomingo”).
32
  Angered, Piomingo 
issued a stern message to Governor Carondelet, telling him that “we are going to take 
revenge” on the Upper Creeks who “receive ammunition from you and kill all the white 
traders in the [Chickasaw] nation and pillage anything they can lay their hands on.”
33
  By 
late February, a Chickasaw war party had killed “three or four” Creeks in a Spanish 
trader’s house in Chickasaw country.
34
  The slain Creeks included a brother and a 
nephew of Mad Dog, who was the war leader and headman of the Upper Creek town of 
Tuckabatchee.
35
  After the attack, additional Chickasaws went out “against” the Upper 
Creeks.
36
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 By the spring of 1793, the Creek-Chickasaw War was in full swing.
37
  Attempting 
to recruit indigenous allies, Upper Creek leaders asked the Shawnees to fight (“Cut 
of[f]”) the Chickasaws.  Acknowledging their role as intermediaries among the Southern 
Indians, such as during the Creek-Choctaw War, Shawnee leaders ignored the Upper 
Creeks’ war talk and, instead, “Brought a friendly talk” to the Chickasaw “King,” 
Taskihatoka, in early April.
38
  More than likely, the Upper Creek message issued from 
Mad Dog, possibly an Eagle clansman, who vowed to avenge his late brother and 
nephew.
39
  Mad Dog and his clan relations may have fulfilled their duties by early April, 
when a Spanish official learned that a Chickasaw war captive was ritually tortured and 
burned to death in an unidentified Upper Creek town.  The luckless fellow was the 
nephew of Wolf’s Friend (Ogoulayacabe), a Chickasaw headman who had previously 
favored peace with the Upper Creeks.  Upon learning the news, Wolf’s Friend told a 
Spanish official that he wished “to take complete revenge” on the Upper Creeks.
40
 
 The eighteenth-century Southern Indians commonly tortured male captives of war 
by burning or flaying them alive.  Fundamentally, torture was a community tradition.  
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Clanswomen demanded that the male relatives burn or flay a captive to death, usually in 
the presence of the town.  Southern Indian torture resembled the Iroquoian 
“Requickening” ceremonies whereby a male captive was either adopted into a lineage or 
burned alive from the feet upward.  The Iroquois, like the Creeks, believed that ritual 
torture allowed a family in mourning to capture the enemy’s “spiritual power.”
41
  During 
his travels through Creek country in the 1770s, the naturalist William Bartram learned 
that “some old Trader[s] . . . had been present at burning of captives,” although he 
suggested that the Creeks “do not now” burn their captives “to ashes.”
42
  In 1793, 
however, the Creek-Chickasaw War had resurrected this terrifying community tradition. 
 While the Upper Creeks were locked in a war with the Chickasaws, the Western 
Indian Confederacy (again) prodded the Lower Creek towns to attack American 
settlements.  In January 1793, William Panton of Panton, Leslie wrote Carondelet that “a 
deputation from the Northern Indians had arrived at the Coweta Town, with a war Belt, 
the Signal for a general reunion against the Americans.”  The Confederacy made “threats 
of extirpation ... against those Towns” that “decline[d]” to join and bragged that it had 
beaten the “American Army” led by St. Clair two years earlier.
43
  It appears that some 
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Lower Creek warriors received “talks” from nine Shawnee delegates, who may have 
persuaded their would-be allies to raid Muscle Shoals and the Cumberland Settlements.
44
 
 In other cases, evidence confirms that Creeks assaulted the Americans in early 
1793.  Around March, warriors from the Lower Creek town of Chehaw robbed U.S. 
Agent Seagrove’s trading “Stores” on the St. Marys River, “set fire to the buildings,” and 
killed his brother, Robert, as well as five others there.  Panton explained that the Chehaws 
struck the Americans “in retaliation for an Indian killed last Summer” by American 
settlers.
45
  Perhaps emboldened by the Chehaws, Tame King of Tallassee led a war party 
against Georgian settlements along the Oconee River sometime in the spring.
46
  By 
attacking the Oconee settlements, Tame King defended the international boundary that he 
agreed to in the New York treaty.  His raid on the Oconee frightened Creek headmen, 
who may have feared a subsequent U.S. invasion of Creek country.  As Tuckabatchee 
headman and interpreter Alexander Cornells later put it, Tame King and his men “are like 
mad people, running crazy.”
47
 
 To reduce tensions with the U.S., numerous town headmen pursued diplomacy 
with American officials.  To that end, the Creeks assembled in Cussita, one of several 
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“peace” towns in Creek society, on March 22.  This meeting boasted several Lower 
Creek towns, including Hitchiti, Coweta, Cussita, Broken Arrow, Ouseechee, and 
Sauwoogelo, and influential Upper Creek leaders, such as White Lieutenant of Okfuskee, 
Cornells, and another Tuckabatchee leader, Mad Dog.  U.S. deputy Agent Timothy 
Barnard served in the capacity of translator and scribe.
48
  Appinted speaker (yatika), Mad 
Dog addressed a message to Agent Seagrove via Barnard, inviting the Agent to Creek 
country to discuss the animosity between his people and the U.S.
49
  Although the 
Chehaws did not attend the March assembly, Chehaw headman Malitea dispatched his 
own peace talk to Seagrove.  In the talk, Malitea blamed the Shawnees for the Chehaws’ 
“mischief” on the St. Marys.  Malitea nonetheless apologized for the Chehaws’ actions 
and, like Mad Dog, he expressed his wish to cultivate ties with Seagrove and by 
extension the United States.
50
 
 Creek headmen advanced U.S.-Creek relations throughout April.  On April 8, 
Mad Dog addressed a second talk to Seagrove on behalf of thirteen Upper Creek 
(probably Tallapoosa and Abeika) towns, including his own (Tuckabatchee).  Mad Dog 
told “Mr. Seagrove” that “My name is the Mad Dog that is going to send these talks to 
you, and when you see my talk, it is all the same as if you seen me. . . .”  The headman 
forwarded Seagrove two beaded belts.  As part of Indian diplomacy, headmen solidified 
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kinship bonds with Euro-Americans and other Indians by presenting a presumptive ally 
with such a belt.  The first of Mad Dog’s belts contained three “stripes” emblematic of 
President (and “General”) Washington, Agent Seagrove, and the “brothers” of the U.S.  
The second belt was crafted for Seagrove “and his lady.”  In this way, the Upper Creeks 
transformed American authorities into fictive kin and established the kinship groundwork 
necessary for diplomacy.
51
  Consequently on April 13, just five days after Mad Dog 
authored his second talk, Bird Tail King of Cussita and Cussita Mico informed a U.S. 
official that “The three rivers have talked, and wished for peace” (Figure 13).
52
 
 Those words signaled the birth of the Three Rivers Resolution peace initiative.  
The Resolution emerged between the March 22 assembly and Mad Dog’s second talk of 
April 8 and encapsulated the coalition of Creek towns inhabiting the bends and valleys of 
the Chattahoochee, Tallapoosa, and Coosa Rivers—the “three rivers.”
53
  The Americans 
acknowledged the existence of the Resolution, such as when deputy Agent Barnard wrote 
to Major Henry Gaither that “This [was a] resolution that the Upper Creeks and 
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Cussetahs have fell into.”
54
  Creek headmen improved relations with the Americans 
immediately after the Resolution’s passage.  Around April 19, Barnard dispatched a 
runner to Upatoi, the sole village of Cussita, to persuade the headmen there that a war 
party led by Tame King must be stopped from raiding the “upper parts” of Georgia.  In 
turn, Tussekiah Mico and a head warrior of Upatoi sent off runners to turn back Tame 
King.  By May 12, Cussita Mico confirmed to Barnard that the “Tallassee King’s people” 
have been “stopped.”
55
  By marshaling the peaceful tenets of the Resolution, Cussita and 
Upatoi managed to prevent another violent episode on the Southern frontier.  But for the 
Resolution to have teeth, Creek headmen understood that both Lower and Upper Creeks 
towns needed to work together to maintain frontier stability. 
 To that end, Cussita and Tuckabatchee headmen leveraged their towns’ political 
strengths to persuade Lower and Upper Creeks to implement the Resolution.  In 1793, 
15,160 people lived in Creek society, where Cussita was the largest town, boasting 900 
people.  Tuckabatchee was the third most populous town, at 780.
56
  Aside from numerical 
influence, each town possessed unique features that nourished peace.  Tuckabatchee 
Mico belonged to “the Eagle family [clan] and claims relationship with the Eagle of the 
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United States.”
57
  Thus, the mico’s high-status clan affiliation overlapped with U.S. 
political symbolism, serving to encourage peace among Tuckabathcee, the Creeks, and 
American officials.  This probably explains why Mad Dog, speaking for Tuckabatchee 
Mico, had adopted Seagrove and George Washington, as well as their wives, into Creek 
kinship structures. 
 Cussita served the Creeks as a prominent white or “peace” town.  Since the early 
colonial period, Cussita was known as a peace town, a sacrosanct polity that granted 
asylum to criminals and that ideally promoted peace in diplomatic meetings.
58
  Cussita 
maintained its reputation into the late eighteenth century, when Seagrove wrote that 
Cussita was “the great mother town” of the Creeks.
59
  In fact, Cussita headmen enhanced 
the Creeks’ commitment to the Three Rivers Resolution by trading on their town’s 
unique status as a peaceful polity.  For instance, on April 15, just two days after the 
announcement of the Resolution, Bird Tail King and Cussita Mico sent Seagrove a 
“beloved wing” to give to “our great father, General Washington.”
60
  In Muskogean 
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diplomacy, a beloved wing was also called a “white wing,” which symbolized peace and 
alliance.
61
 
 That Cussita sent a white wing to Washington demonstrates that Cussita fictively 
adopted American authorities, just as Mad Dog had done one week earlier on April 8.  As 
well, the timing of Cussita’s gift suggests that Tuckabatchee and Cussita coordinated 
their diplomacy and appealed to the cultural strengths of each town to highlight the 
Creeks’ commitment to U.S.-Creek diplomacy via the Resolution.  Likewise, on April 15 
Alexander Cornells of Tuckabatchee addressed a talk to Seagrove.  Speaking in Cussita, 
Cornells said that the towns of Tallassee and Cooloome (“Colemmys”) “are turned out 
for war,” and apprised Seagrove that Cooloome and Tallassee supported the militant 
“Northern Indians coming among us [from the Western Confederacy].”  Reiterating his 
point from Cussita, Cornells spoke on behalf of several Upper Creek headmen by telling 
the U.S. Agent that “All the Upper towns are strong for peace,” and that Seagrove should 
not interpret the actions of the part for the whole.
62
  By messaging Seagrove from 
Cussita, Cornells underlined the way in which the Resolution inspired the Creeks to 
pursue amicable relations with the U.S.  Moreover, Cornells addressed his talk the same 
day that Cussita sent that white wing to George Washington and Seagrove, further 
indicating that Tuckabatchee and Cussita collaborated diplomatically.  
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Figure 13.  Bird Tail King (Fusihatchee Mico) of Cussita, 1790.  A signer of the Treaty of New 
York, he framed the Three Rivers Resolution with Cussita Mico and Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee.  
In partnership with Mad Dog, the Cussita headman worked tirelessly to advance U.S.-Creek 
relations in the mid-1790s.  Source: The National Museum of the American Indian, Washington, 
D.C.  (Photographed by author.)  
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 To fortify U.S.-Creek ties, Cussita and Tuckabatchee partnered with other Creek 
towns.  The opportunity to do so came when Agent Seagrove demanded that the Creeks 
punish those responsible for the murder of several Americans, including his own brother, 
on the St. Marys River earlier in the spring.  So, on May 16, Cussita Mico and Mad Dog 
joined forces with White Lieutenant, a headman of the Abeika town of Okfuskee, and 
métis headman Jack Kinnard of Hitchiti Town.  The four headmen met in Hitchiti Town.  
Although Chehaw had been a primary culprit in the St. Marys raid, the four headmen 
concluded that warriors from five towns—Coweta, Broken Arrow, Ouseechee, Yuchi 
Town, and Halfway House—were to blame.  Accordingly, in a “talk” to Seagrove, 
Kinnard invited U.S. military forces to give “one drubbing” to these “five towns [since 
these towns are] all that are against you.”  Speaking with the rhetoric of the Resolution, 
Kinnard told the Agent that “the Tallapoosa river and the Coosa river are all our friends,” 
as were, of course, the Hitchiti towns politically affiliated with Kinnard.
63
  
 Kinnard’s invitation to the U.S. to invade Creek country was largely rhetorical; 
Creeks themselves handled the punishments.  On June 8, twenty-four Upper Creek 
headmen and eight Lower Creek headmen attended a meeting in Tuckabatchee, where 
they agreed to punish “six of the ringleaders,” whose names are unknown but who, 
apparently, were principally responsible for the American deaths on the St Marys.  After 
reaching this decision, David Cornells, “a head warrior” of Tuckabatchee, traveled to 
Cussita “by order of the whole Upper Creeks.”  Cornells announced the verdict to the 
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Cowetas, who were ordered to assist Cussita with the executions.  Later, Lower Creek 
men were “appointed, and sent off, by the Cussetahs” to execute the ringleaders.
64
  
Ultimately, the Cussita-led executioners failed to carry out their task, leading Agent 
Seagrove, for whatever reason, to put the issue on the backburner.  What is important 
about this scenario is that not only did Creeks dodge Seagrove’s request but they also 
maintained stability with the U.S.  The Resolution therefore helped achieve cross-cultural 
peace.  Deputy Agent Barnard later reported to an American officer that “This resolution 
that the Upper Creeks and Cussetahs have fell into, seems to have put a stop to hostilities 
for a while.”
65
 
 Meanwhile, the Resolution spurred the Upper Creeks to open a dialogue with the 
Chickasaws.  Spanish official Benjamin Fooy reported that “two [Upper] Creek” envoys 
traveled to the Chickasaws a month after the announcement of the Resolution to “propose 
peace” on behalf of “the chiefs of a party of 800 men [probably Upper Creeks].”  Fooy 
observed most of the negotiations that unfolded between the Upper Creek delegates and 
Chickasaw headmen, including Wolf’s Friend, whose nephew had been burned to death 
by the Upper Creeks in the previous month.  Wolf’s Friend “accepted the talks” carried 
by the Creek envoys, and in exchange, he presented them with “some beads to assure the 
Creeks” that the Chickasaws wanted nothing more “than to live at peace with them.”  The 
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envoys promised to give the beads to the appropriate Upper Creek headmen and to return 
“with the reply of the Chiefs.”
66
 
 Since Southern Indian diplomats enlisted neutral third-parties to mediate between 
two warring peoples, the Upper Creeks turned to the Choctaws for arbitration.
67
  In early 
May, around the time that Upper Creek envoys arrived in Chickasaw country where Fooy 
was located, Mad Dog dispatched a message to Franchimastabé, a Choctaw headman of 
West Yazoo.  In it, Mad Dog asked Franchimastabé to “convoke an assembly” of 
Choctaw leaders so that they might consider the possibility of arbitrating between the 
Upper Creeks and Chickasaws.  Franchimastabé accepted Mad Dog’s request by hosting 
a Choctaw “assembly” on May 22 in West Yazoo.  Perhaps fearing that the Creek-
Chickasaw War would engulf their towns in violence, “all the [Choctaw] chiefs” agreed 
to “propose peace” to the Chickasaws on the Upper Creeks’ behalf.
68
  Possibly, too, 
Choctaw headmen wanted to protect those Choctaws who lived in Chickasaw country.
69
  
The Choctaws appointed an influential headman named Red Shoes to “take charge of 
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making peace” between Chickasaws and Upper Creeks.
70
  Other Choctaws became 
intermediaries for the warring parties.  On June 1, for instance, Choctaw and Chickasaw 
leaders conferred at the home of Piomingo, the Chickasaw head warrior and inveterate 
enemy of the Upper Creeks.  During the meeting, a Choctaw leader presented a “belt of 
Wampum” to the Chickasaws on behalf of Mad Dog (“Offey Hago”), who originally sent 
it to the Choctaws for such purpose.
71
  The peace efforts spearheaded by Mad Dog and 
the Upper Creeks in May and June bore fruit, and by late July, a Spanish official wrote 
that the Choctaws had brokered a “Peace” between the Upper Creeks and Chickasaws.
72
 
 If the Resolution compelled the Creeks to pursue peace with their Native and non-
Native neighbors, nothing about it required the Americans to do so.  On September 21, 
1793, for example, Georgia militiamen “plundered and burnt” an Okfuskee talofa named 
Little Okfuskee/Hoethletiaga, which lay on the northern Chattahoochee River.  Believing 
that members of this village had stolen their horses, the frontiersmen torched ten houses, 
killed six men, and captured eight persons (three women and five girls).  White 
Lieutenant’s “people [were] killed” in the attack, and one of the captive women was the 
Okfuskee headman’s “own relation” as well as “wife to a head-man of the town.”  As it 
turned out, Burnt Village (or Okfuskenena), as it became known, was blameless.  As 
Barnard reported to Seagrove, Burnt Village was “among the most friendly of the Creeks, 
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and no way concerned in stealing horses.”  Rather, the Cowetas likely bore responsibility 
for the horse theft.
73
 
 The threat of retributive justice ignited a flurry of political discussion among town 
headmen, who labored to preserve peace on the U.S.-Creek frontier.  In the vanguard 
were Cussita and its talofa, Upatoi.  By October 1, Tussekiah Mico of Upatoi (“Warrior 
King, of the Cussetahs”) had left for the Upper towns to apprise White Lieutenant and 
other “heads of the Upper Creeks” of the news.  The Upatoi headman may have held a 
second meeting with the Upper Creeks in Tuckabatchee.
74
  On October 15, the Creeks 
probably held a meeting in Cussita with Tussekiah Mico.  The métis John Galphin, son of 
George Galphin and a Coweta woman, participated in that meeting and addressed a 
message to Seagrove.  In it, he scolded the U.S. for its deception and violence: “We view 
with astonishment the steps taken by your people when sending Peace Talks in our 
Nation continually:   We were at a Meeting in the Ocfusqui [Okfuskee] to [hear] a Talk 
that you sent up” when the Georgia militiamen came “into one of our out-towns and 
carried off eight women and children, besides killing the old men in the Town, burnt our 
provision & houses, took off all the property you could find.”  Perhaps, they suggested, 
the U.S. had sent that peace talk intentionally “to deceive us.”  Above all, however, the 
Creeks wished to have their women and children ransomed and to “live in peace and 
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friendship with all people” (my emphasis), an indirect invocation of the Three Rivers 
Resolution.  The Creeks closed by reminding Georgia that that state was the true 
aggressor since it grasped after Creek lands.  Georgia had been encroaching on the 
“limits and border of our Country. We actually see our hunting Grounds laid out into 
districts, without considering us to have any claim or right to which Nature has bestowed 
upon us, and of which oppression or prejudice alone can attempt to rob us.”
75
 
 Creek headmen dissuaded the aggrieved relatives from exacting retribution, doing 
so by careful persuasion.  Galphin, who sent a copy of the talk to Panton, explained that 
he “advised” the Creeks “to wait twenty days to see whether we would get our Women & 
Children back, and then it was time enough.”  In the meantime, the Creeks planned to 
“defend our Country. We have fixed out strong guards in all the roads that we are not 
afraid of a surprize.”  Obviously, “we cannot sit still and see our Women and Children 
carried off and our Towns and Provisions laid in flames.”
76
  Galphin indicated that the 
most pressing concern was clan retaliation.  Those in mourning itched for vengeance, as 
“the young people Regraetts mutch the Loss of thaer Relations Kild by the Georgians.”
77
  
As it turned out, however, the Creeks were “under an Nessessitey of Macking a peace 
Mutch against thaer Wills.”  White Lieutenant and Mad Dog were “Very Decieroes of a 
peace” and convinced the relatives that it was in their best interest to back down.
78
  By 
October 21, the Creeks had informed deputy agent Barnard that the Cowetas replaced 
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Georgia as the target for vengeance.
79
  By manipulating cross-town connections to reach 
a consensus with the aggrieved kinspeople, Creek leaders deterred the clan from getting 
revenge on the U.S. 
 Conversely, the clans among the Upper Creek towns did not miss an opportunity 
to retaliate against the Chickasaws during the Creek-Chickasaw War.  Within the bounds 
of intertribal warfare, Indians pursued retaliation with consistency and brutality.  While 
initially encouraging Upper Creek leaders to open a dialogue with Wolf’s Friend, the 
Three Rivers Resolution did not suppress intertribal clan retaliation.  To a degree, 
headmen applied the Resolution more consistently to the Americans, who were more 
numerous and threatening than the Chickasaws.  After a brief hiatus during the summer 
of 1793, the Creek-Chickasaw War resumed sometime between August and early 
September 1793.
80
  Perhaps Piomingo was to blame, for Piomingo’s rival, Wolf’s Friend, 
“doubt[ed]” that the war leader would ever “consent to [a] peace because he is urged on 
by the Americans” to attack the Upper Creeks.
81
  On the other hand, the Upper Creeks 
may have reignited the war after raiding a Chickasaw town, but we cannot know for 
certain. 
 Before long, the Creeks sued for peace.  In January 1794, Lower and Upper Creek 
leaders “empowred” Mad Dog and White Lieutenant to recruit the Choctaws as 
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emissaries for a second time.  Capable diplomats and key framers of the Three Rivers 
Resolution, White Lieutenant and Mad Dog sent a talk to the Choctaws on January 19.  
They addressed it to a Choctaw headman named “Tuscabulapo Mingo” of Macaw, 
explaining that “our Land hath been in much confusion and trouble for some years past.”  
Tapping into the rhetoric of the Resolution, the headmen said that “The Eyes of our 
whole nation we think is now open and it is detirmined by the Chiefs of our Land that we 
Establish afirm [sic] and lasting Peace with all Nations and people.”  In order to forge 
such a peace, Mad Dog and White Lieutenant asked Tuscabulapo Mingo to forward an 
invitation to the Chickasaws to attend a peace conference scheduled to meet in 
Tuckabatchee later that spring.
82
  Evidence confirms that the Choctaws relayed that 
invitation to Wolf’s Friend.  On February 22, he informed a Spanish official that he 
“Expect[ed]” to travel to Tuckabatchee to meet with the Upper Creeks.
83
  Yet Wolf’s 
Friend changed his mind when he learned in early March that the “Creeks are on a Good 
understanding with the Virginuns [Americans],” prompting Wolf’s Friend to believe that 
the Americans had persuaded the Creeks to assassinate him.
84
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 No extant records prove that the Creeks planned to eliminate Wolf’s Friend, but 
the Chickasaw headman’s fears were justified nonetheless.  Even if Wolf’s Friend trusted 
Mad Dog and White Lieutenant, these and other Upper Creek headmen could not 
guarantee him safe passage through Upper Creek country since Upper Creek warriors, 
like other Southern Indian warriors, waged intertribal war at their own leisure and for 
their own reasons.
85
  There was a strong possibility that had Wolf’s Friend traveled to 
Tuckabatchee in the spring of 1794, an Upper Creek war party would have killed him.
86
  
Intertribal relations in the late-eighteenth-century South crumbled at a moment’s notice.  
Although, for example, the Upper Creeks and Chickasaws ceased hostilities in May, 
June, and July of 1793, the Creek-Chickasaw War resumed by September and continued 
into the winter of 1793-1794. 
 Although in 1794 Mad Dog and White Lieutenant had promoted peace with the 
Chickasaws, doing so with the tenets of the Resolution, Creek clans launched retaliatory 
raids on the Chickasaws.
87
  Local traditions therefore clashed with national policy; it was 
not that young commoners clashed with elder leaders.  While scholars of the generational 
school believe that ordinary warriors defied the elites by launching a raid against an 
enemy and therefore undermining international peace, they have missed the point that 
during intertribal war, retributive justice generated, escalated, and prolonged regional 
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violence.  Unlike U.S.-Creek affairs, which required a measure of stability to maintain 
trade, intertribal warfare had its own indigenous logic that neither indigenous nor Euro-
Americans authorities could control.  Intertribal wars erupted not because young warriors 
defied their elders but because warriors dutifully followed the logic of retaliation by 
meting out punishment on a killer (or his family), which usually ignited a war.
88
  The 
corollary is that retribution obligated the elites to assemble war parties and launch raids 
as frequently as ordinary warriors.  Neither common warriors nor headmen therefore 
could escape their clan duties. 
 In fact, in some cases, headmen promoted peace and waged war simultaneously.  
Mad Dog captures the ways in which localism thwarted national policy.  As a town leader 
and international diplomat, he attempted to end the Creek-Chickasaw War in 1793 and 
1794, armed with the Three Rivers Resolution.
89
  But as a clan affiliate (his clan totem 
may have been the Eagle), retaliation obligated him to attack the Chickasaws.  In June 
1794, after learning that a relative had been killed in Chickasaw country, Mad Dog and 
his “Older brother or Uncle” assembled a war party that planned to raid “Thishatare” and 
kill Wolf’s Friend who lived there.
90
  Despite Mad Dog’s repeated attempts to cultivate 
ties with the Chickasaws via Wolf’s Friend, retaliation threatened to undermine that 
enterprise.  Unfortunately the records do not confirm whether Mad Dog carried out the 
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attack in the summer of 1794, but we do know that he led a war party against the 
Chickasaws one year later and incurred severe losses.
91
  By pursuing peace with and 
waging war on the same society, Mad Dog succumbed to the tension between local 
tradition and national policy. 
 Likewise, that tension divided elites.  As Mad Dog assembled his war party in 
June 1794, Wolf’s Friend received “Express News” from two Creek “chiefs” known only 
as “Spandahayo & Neuhayo.”  These headmen informed Wolf’s Friend that two war 
parties, including Mad Dog’s, were gunning for the Chickasaws.  Spandahayo and 
Neuhayo advised the Chickasaws “to be on there [sic] Gard and to hunt for them and to 
kill Anny of the Creek they Should Meet With” in Chickasaw country.  Possibly, 
Spandahayo and Neuhayo were Tuckabatchee headmen since they knew that Mad Dog, 
who assembled his war party within Tuckabatchee, planned to attack the Chickasaws.  
Mad Dog’s preparations against the enemy therefore prompted Spandahayo and Neuhayo 
to alert the Chickasaws to potential Creek raids and to encourage them “to kill Anny” 
Creeks they saw.
92
  By forming a war party against the Chickasaws in June 1794, then, 
Mad Dog obeyed his clan, ignored national policy, and came into conflict with other 
town leaders. 
 Mad Dog paid greater attention to his town, however, by pursuing diplomacy with 
the Americans.  In coordination with Cussita headmen, co-framers of the Resolution, he 
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invited U.S. Agent Seagrove into Creek society to discuss the possibility of ransoming 
the Burnt Village prisoners.  On November 14, 1793 Seagrove arrived in Cussita, having 
been conducted there from the Okmulgee River by one hundred and thirty “chiefs and 
warriors.”  Days later, he traveled to Tuckabatchee, where a meeting of eleven major 
Creek towns opened on the 23rd.  Seagrove rekindled the Burnt Village controversy, 
informing the assembled headmen that Georgia refused to ransom the captive women and 
children.
93
  Yet the Agent promised to ransom them as long as the Creeks agreed to 
release an unnamed “White prisoner” in the Nation.
94
  As a result of Seagrove’s amicable 
intentions, the Tuckabatchees and no doubt Mad Dog invited the Agent to winter in their 
town, and he did so.
95
 
 Seagrove remained among the Upper Creeks until April 14, 1794, when he left 
with two-hundred Indians for Rock Landing, where he promised to give them 
“presents.”
96
  Among the retinue, some forty Creeks continued traveling eastward with 
Seagrove to Georgia’s capital, Augusta.
97
  Led by Bird Tail King and “Little Warrior” of 
Cussita as well as Mad Dog’s nephew and the Tuckabatchee “King” (mico), the 
delegation met with Governor George Mathews in late April or early May.
98
  There, they 
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probably implored him to release Burnt Village’s captive women and children.  Although 
the delegates returned home in late May empty-handed, by June the Lower Creeks 
notified Tuckabatchee that three “prisoners,” perhaps those of Burnt Village, had 
returned to the Creeks.  Unfortunately, the records do not clarify the fate of the remaining 
hostages (roughly seven).
99
 
 Peace foundered on the conflict-ridden Oconee lands, however.  In early May, 
Georgia settlers killed three Creeks from the Lower Creek talofa of Broken Arrow who 
had pilfered horses from the Georgia settlements near the Oconee.  No evidence proves 
whether the aggrieved family took revenge on Georgia, but headmen did resolve the 
affair diplomatically.  Weeks after the killings, leaders from Coweta, Broken Arrow, 
Cussita, and Ouseechee co-authored a talk to Governor Mathews.  Invoking the Three 
Rivers Resolution from within the Cussita square ground, the headmen said that “The 
talks we [the Creeks] had in this square we still hold fast,” although they admitted that 
they could not always prevent some “bad people” from stealing property.  They hoped 
that the “beloved man” Seagrove “will remember in the Tuckabatchys as well as in this 
square all our talks were for peace[.] we are desirous of keeping a peace.”  They stressed 
that they would “use our best endeavours to prevent it at all our meetings.”  As for 
Mathews, they implored him to “prevent your people from coming over the river a 
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hunting or scouting in our hunting ground,” the root cause of Creek hunters’ 
grievances.
100
 
 Lower Creek headmen believed that making peace with Georgia was a national 
concern.  They hoped to fulfill that goal by restoring stolen property, both horses and 
African American slaves, to the appropriate owners in Georgia.  To that end, in June they 
notified Tuckabatchee headmen that Cussita, Coweta, and Chehaw had begun collecting 
the “negroes & horses” that Creek warriors had stolen from Georgia settlements over the 
years.  Cussita Mico understood the stakes: If “we do not exert ourselves it appears our 
nation is on the brink of ruin.”  Moreover, the Mico advised the Upper Creeks to stop 
raiding Chickasaw towns and, apparently, a few American settlements: If “the practice of 
committing hostilities on the American Frontiers is not stopp’d it will bring war on our 
nation,” “for we well know that it is best for us to set down in our towns in peace & mind 
our hunting.”  Cussita Mico blamed the Upper Creek town of Aubecooche “& other 
towns [among the Upper Creeks] for they are so far off that they think themselves out of 
danger but that is not the case with us, for they are bringing ruin on us.”
101
  The Cussita 
headman feared that the Upper Creeks’ war on the Chickasaws and, to some degree, the 
Americans, would prompt Georgia militiamen to re-invade the Lower Creek towns. 
 Fortunately, many Upper Creek towns pledged to assist the Lower Creeks, 
demonstrating that Creeks continued to apply the Three Rivers Resolution towards the 
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Americans.  On October 18, Mad Dog messaged the Lower Creeks on behalf of the 
“Headmen of the Two Rivers,” meaning the Tallapoosa and Abeika provinces.  
Specifically, he represented at least ten Upper Creek towns, namely Tuckabatchee, 
Okfuskee, Kialijee, Tallassee, Hoithlewaulee, White Ground, Muccolossus, Tuskegee, 
Hickory Ground, and Coosada.  Mad Dog informed the Lower Creeks that he had 
prevented some warriors from committing depredations near Spanish settlements in 
Pensacola, and that White Lieutenant of Okfuskee promised to dissuade any Abeika 
warriors from raiding either the Americans or Spanish.  Moreover, he requested the 
Yuchis, Ouseechees, and Cowetas to round up any stolen U.S. property and bring it to 
Cussita, where he arrived by late October.  Returning the stolen property became the 
basis for holding “all white people by the Hand.”  As Mad Dog said, “I wish both 
Spaniards & Americans well.”
102
 
 As a result, the Creeks scored a major diplomatic victory.  The Creeks’ good 
intentions towards the Americans convinced Governor Mathews to defend the 
international border.  In late October of 1794, the Spanish-employed interpreter James 
Durouzeaux wrote to his superior that Mathews “has Removed the White people of this 
Syed the Ococney [Oconee] and Burnt thaer fort & houesess they had built.”  
Remarkably, Mathews authorized a military body to burn a Georgian settlement, 
including its fort, to the ground.  These facts gave the Creeks “Great profe of the White 
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people Wishing to be at paece With them.”
103
  The Cussitas were delighted.  In a message 
dated November 20, they informed the Spanish that the Georgians had been “removed” 
from “this [i.e., west] side of the river oconee,” so that “we shall have peace in our land[,] 
that our young people may hunt in peace and quietness in our land[, and] that we may be 
able to Cloath our weomen and Children and them likewise to stay at home in peace.”
104
 
 Peace was elusive in Upper Creek country, however, as the Creek-Chickasaw 
War escalated in the winter of 1794-1795.  Throughout January and February of 1795, 
the Chickasaws and Upper Creeks skirmished on the hunting grounds between the 
Tennessee and Tombigbee valleys.  Before January 22, the Chickasaws vanquished five 
Creeks near the Tennessee River and took their scalps as war booty.
105
  A Creek man 
who had “lived in the Chickasaws for many years” denounced that skirmish, whereupon 
the Chickasaws “knocked him on the head [i.e., killed him].”  Later, around February, 
three Chickasaw war parties searched for Creeks in the “Hunting Grounds.”  One such 
party killed nine, captured six, and “let one Boy make his Escape to carry [the] News” to 
the Creeks.
106
  According to another report, “four or five” Chickasaw war parties had 
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been sent out in February “to kill some parties of Creeks.”
107
  The ferocity of the 
Chickasaw campaign left the Upper Creeks confused and helpless.  One headman 
notified William Panton of Panton, Leslie that “I don’t know what to do now, I am setting 
inactive & perhaps the ennemy killing up my people in the woods.”
108
 
 During one skirmish that winter, the Chickasaws killed six Coosa men whose next 
of kin lived in both Coosa, on the Coosa River, and in Aubecooche, which lay just east of 
Coosa.
109
  Some of the slain Coosas had been “nephews” of Mackey’s Friend, 
Aubecooche’s mico, and Dog Warrior, another Aubecooche headman.  Dog Warrior told 
Panton that the Chickasaws had “killed three of my own relations. . . . [T]his is the way 
they have used us.”
110
  Although it is reasonable to assume that Dog Warrior and 
Mackey’s Friend desired retaliation against the Chickasaws, these Aubecooche leaders 
“stopped” the Coosas from planning “to take satisfaction” in late February.  Fearing that 
retaliation would escalate the war even further and thereby increase the death toll, the 
headmen counseled patience.  The grieving Coosas, however, were more dutiful than 
their Aubecooche kin.  Evidence confirms that the Coosas took revenge by killing “three 
Chickasaw women” in Coosa town, where the slain women had “had husbands.”
111
  
These intermarried women were innocent, of course, but the law of retaliation required 
the Coosas to mete out punishment on the first three Chickasaws they could find. 
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 Meanwhile, the Creek towns along the Tallapoosa River responded to the 
Chickasaw invasion by reaching out to the Spanish.  In February 1795, Mad Dog and 
White Lieutenant sponsored an Upper Creek visit to Pensacola Commandant Enrique 
White.  Leading that visit was Mad Dog who arrived in Pensacola on February 19 with 
eighty Tuckabatchees and fifty-seven other Creeks (for unknown reasons, White 
Lieutenant did not travel with the delegation).  Applying the same customs of kinship 
diplomacy as he had with the U.S. years earlier, Mad Dog opened the conference with 
Commandant White by giving him “a belt of seven strings of white Wampum with five 
purple rhumbs.”  The five “rhumbs” represented five peoples coming together in 
“perpetual friendship,” namely the Spanish Crown, Governor Baron de Carondelet, 
Enrique White, Tuckabatchee town, and Okfuskee town.  White accepted the belt, which 
transformed him into an adoptive Creek kinsperson.  During the Creeks’ brief embassy, 
Pensacola blacksmiths repaired the Indians’ guns, and White presented Mad Dog with a 
“small amount of food” as well as “ten guns, 150 pounds of powder, [and] 300 pounds of 
ball.”
112
 
 Despite the munitions Mad Dog procured for the Upper Creeks, the Chickasaws 
bested the Upper Creeks in battle throughout 1795.
113
  A Spaniard noted that between 
their winter campaign and April, the Chickasaws killed a total of twenty-two Upper 
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Creeks and sustained the loss of “only . . . two men.”
114
  Spanish Governor Carondelet 
believed that the Chickasaws had killed “some sixty [Upper] Creeks whom they found 
unarmed on the hunt” before May 1.
115
  A more reliable report suggests that the 
Chickasaws killed only twenty-six Upper Creeks in the same pre-May 1 battle.  
Regardless of the accuracy of either report, each corroborates the superiority of 
Chickasaw military power.
116
  This intertribal battle was one of the largest in the 
eighteenth-century Native South, for three hundred Chickasaw warriors faced a war party 
composed of eight-hundred Upper Creeks.  Despite being outnumbered, the Chickasaws 
defeated the Upper Creeks and suffered minimal casualties.
117
  Moreover, in the late 
summer or early fall of 1795, Mad Dog launched a raid against the Chickasaws.  
Shockingly, he lost thirty-six warriors.
118
  Although the size of Mad Dog’s war party is 
unknown, the death of thirty-six men under his charge dealt a blow to his legitimacy as a 
military leader. 
 The Creek-Chickasaw War came to a close in 1797 after a brief round of conflict.  
In June, a U.S. official remarked that the Upper Creeks had recently killed a “Chickasaw” 
and wounded another.  The Chickasaws retaliated by killing an unknown number of 
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Upper Creeks.
119
  Perhaps referring to a separate incident in late June, the new U.S. 
Agent to the Creeks, Benjamin Hawkins, penned that “Three more of the Creeks lately 
killed 2 Chickasaws, and the Chickasaws killed the 3 Creeks.”
120
  Yet, sometime between 
late June and late October, the Upper Creeks and Chickasaws reached, in Hawkins’ 
words, a “happy accommodation.”  Securing a permanent resolution to the Creek-
Chickasaw War was an extremely complex process that involved intertribal arbitration 
from the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Lower Creeks.  Hawkins, too, became an 
intermediary; on October 27, he transmitted a Chickasaw peace talk accompanied by 
“some beads and tobacco” to Creek headmen who assembled in the Lower Creek town of 
Coweta for that purpose.  Although he assisted the peace effort, Hawkins merely built on 
the diplomatic achievements of other Native leaders, such Lower Creek headmen 
Tussekiah Mico, Bird Tail King, and Hallowing King, all of whom had helped broker the 
Creek-Chickasaw peace weeks earlier.  During a meeting hosted by the Cherokees in 
September or early October, for example, Hallowing King of Coweta advised the 
attending Chickasaws and Upper Creeks to hunt “in peace” and “lie down at night and 
sleep in peace.”  Evidence shows that both sides heeded Hallowing King’s words of 
wisdom during the winter hunting season of 1797-1798.
121
 
 Tussekiah Mico, a trusted Cussita headman, powerfully shaped the arbitration 
process.  His efforts bring our story full circle.  Just as Bird Tail King and Cussita Mico 
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announced the Three Rivers Resolution to promote peace with the Americans and 
Chickasaws in 1793, so Tussekiah Mico helped persuade the Chickasaws and Upper 
Creeks to lay down their arms four years later.  Indeed, Cussita commanded influence in 
Creek society as a sacred peace town, so it makes sense that Cussita leaders served the 
Upper Creeks and Chickasaws as intermediaries.  In one face-to-face meeting with 
Chickasaw headmen, Tussekiah Mico instructed them to “mind their hunting and think 
nothing of peace.”  To bolster his peace talk, Tussekiah Mico leveraged the Cussitas’ 
ancient friendship with the Chickasaws.  He told the assembled headmen that “they and 
the Cussetuhs were one fire” and, therefore, “one people.”  Tussekiah Mico underscored 
the ties of kinship and bonds of alliance that yoked together the Cussitas and Chickasaws 
in service of peace.  Like Bird Tail King before him, Tussekiah Mico championed 
international peace and goodwill on a grand scale.
122
 
 Scholars have overlooked the ways in which the Creeks waged a war on two 
fronts in the 1790s.  In addition to dealing with ongoing conflict with American 
newcomers, Creeks and especially the Upper Creek towns faced a formidable enemy in 
the Chickasaws.  Nor have scholars considered how military conflict spurred Creek 
coalition-building, which birthed the peace-keeping initiative identified in this chapter as 
the Three Rivers Resolution.  This policy captured and codified the institution of 
community politics, which gave rise to a vicious cycle of diplomacy and warfare in the 
Native South.  Surely, the Resolution prompted Cussita to rein in Tame King, temporarily 
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suspended Creek-Chickasaw hostilities, and fostered an alliance led by Mad Dog and 
Cussita Mico that resulted in Georgia’s evacuation of the western bank of the Oconee in 
late 1794.  But because headmen constructed the Resolution from the town up, it lacked 
an enforcement mechanism to suppress retaliation, especially during the intertribal 
Creek-Chickasaw War.  As a result, that custom enflamed the Upper Creek towns in 
violence and prolonged a devastating war in which the Chickasaws slowly gained the 
upper hand.  It also periodically strained U.S.-Creek relations, although headmen worked 
tirelessly to maintain good relations with the Americans so as to preserve trade. 
 The Three Rivers Resolution sheds light on the relationship between elites and 
commoners in eastern Native North America.  Although Native Americanists argue that 
Euro-American expansion precipitated generational conflict between leaders and the led, 
this chapter suggests that the mechanics of consensus accounted for tensions between 
ordinary and elite Creeks.  Creek towns defied Alexander McGillivray’s market-oriented 
decision to consent to the Oconee Cession in order to adhere to town-based traditions.  
Thus, although he was a wealthy elite and created a wedge between rich and poor Creeks, 
Creeks rejected his authority because it claimed to surpass what mattered the most: 
political consensus.  At the same time, the generational thesis ignores the ways in which 
clan justice actually placed headmen and commoners on the same side of the aisle.  
Retaliation obligated both common warriors and town leaders to launch revenge raids on 
the Chickasaws.  In some cases, of course, Creeks withheld retaliation against the 
Americans so as to preserve U.S.-Creek trade ties.  Even so, headmen tirelessly 
convinced their relatives to foreswear vengeance against the Americans.  No matter the 
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issue affecting the relationship between leaders and led, consensual politics determined 
how that played out.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE HICKORY GROUND RESOLUTION 
 
 
 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. nation-state rose to 
power.  During the early national era, westward-bound American migrants searched for 
cheap land, economic opportunity, and social mobility.  American expansion brought 
with it the invasion of Indian Country from the Appalachians to the Mississippi.  In the 
Native South, American farmers and their slaves settled in larger numbers than in the 
colonial period across the Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky.  There, they 
established farms in rich alluvial lands along the region’s watercourses, where slaves 
planted and harvested cotton and other cash crops.  The King Cotton slave economy fed 
the global market, as Northeastern factories manufactured clothing made from cotton and 
other raw materials supplied by Southern farms.  Moreover, Americans migrating to the 
Mississippi Territory (chartered in 1798) and the Louisiana Purchase lands (1803) 
invaded Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw lands, creating friction between Natives and 
newcomers. 
 The growth of America’s presence in the Native South triggered a multipronged 
crisis among the Southern Indians.  American expansion exacerbated cross-cultural 
conflict and property theft, especially in the forests where Native and American hunters 
clashed.  After 1806, federal engineers constructed the “Federal Road,” a horse path that 
cut through Creek country.  American migrants traveled on this road by the thousands 
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and ignited conflict among Creeks, black slaves, and Euro-Americans.
1
  Additionally, 
Indians in this period more heavily relied on trade goods supplied by the U.S. and by 
Panton, Leslie, and Company (this firm became John Forbes and Company after 1805).  
As Indians accumulated enormous debts to U.S. trading houses or “factories,” federal 
treaty commissioners pressed the Indians to cede land in exchange for partial debt 
liquidation.  Previously, Britain employed this land-grabbing tactic, as in the New 
Purchase Cession of 1773.  Above all, the spread of American “liberty” across the South 
depended on the dispossession of Native people, whose lands (and debts) fed the growth 
of the nineteenth-century U.S. and global capitalism.
2
 
 To grapple with the sweeping changes of colonialism, the Creeks assembled more 
frequently in the late eighteenth century in the National Council.  How much power the 
Council actually possessed over clans and towns is a flashpoint of debate.  According to 
Claudio Saunt, American colonization exerted tremendous pressures on the Creeks and 
prompted several headmen, beginning with Alexander McGillivray in the 1780s, to 
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consolidate judicial and political control in the institution of the National Council.  Saunt 
contends that headmen suppressed the law of retaliation by establishing a coercive police 
force that punished criminals and weakened the power of clans.  The goal was to limit 
violence between Creeks and Americans, who mistook an isolated incident of clan 
retribution for a declaration of war by Creeks.  U.S. Agent from 1796 to 1816, Benjamin 
Hawkins was a vocal proponent of ending the law of retaliation in order to keep the peace 
between both sides.
3
  Duane Champagne and Robbie Ethridge suggest, however, that 
individual clans and towns dictated the extent of implementation of Council policies.  
Ethridge contends that except in a few cases, the Council largely failed to suppress clan 
retribution.
4
  In sum, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Council neither extinguished 
community traditions nor ruled coercively. 
                                                             
 
3
 For Saunt, the Council was a nucleus of “centralized power” (111), and a small number 
of market-oriented elites forged a “social compact” that empowered headmen to rule by 
“hierarchy and coercion” rather than by traditional town consensus.  For Saunt’s argument and 
the “social compact,” see Saunt, New Order, 90-110, 90 (“social”), 91 (“hierarchy”).  Although 
Saunt admits that most Creeks “objected” (90) to the new social order, he still argues that by the 
1780s and 1790s the “social compact forced Creeks to deviate from the white path [i.e., traditions 
of consensus], but few were pleased with the new direction” (110).  One wonders how that 
transformation actually occurred on the ground if, indeed, “few” (109) Creeks welcomed it.  For 
an examination of the transition from Creek society to Creek “nation,” see Kevin Kokomoor, 
“‘To be of one mind and one government:’ The Creation of the Creek Nation in the Early 
Republic” (PhD diss, 2014[?]), http://www.kevinkokomoor.com/#!research/c1pvz (accessed 28 
July 2015). 
 Tracing Creek history in the colonial period, Steven C. Hahn makes a similar argument 
about centralization, arguing that British requests for land forced the Creeks into creating a 
“nation” with clearly defined borders, which headmen defended in treaty councils.  Hahn also 
argues, however, that Creeks largely adhered to their town and kin loyalties, which precipitated 
factionalism that, nonetheless, enabled Creeks to remain relatively autonomous by engaging in 
triple-nation diplomacy with the European powers.  See Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the 
Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), especially 7-8, 110-120, 
228, 276-277. 
 
4
 Duane Champagne, Social Order and Political Change: Constitutional Governments 
among the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1992), 113-117.  Champagne contends that the Council’s attempts at 
 
274 
 
 More convincing is Saunt’s argument (and Gregory Waselkov’s and Angela 
Pulley Hudson’s support for that argument) that by 1800, some Council headmen 
amassed wealth that spawned class divisions in Creek society.  The origin of that 
development stemmed, as Saunt demonstrates, from Hawkins’ “plan of civilization” and 
the subsequent emergence of capitalism (or a profit-motive economy) among Creeks.  As 
the demand for deerskins in Europe dropped in the late 1700s, so did their value and 
subsequent purchasing power for Native consumers.  As a result, Creeks had to rely more 
heavily on credit to obtain basic necessities from U.S. and Spanish traders and 
consequently accumulated heavy debt to those traders.  To liquidate that debt and 
encourage self-sufficiency, Hawkins asked the Creeks to abandon hunting, become 
farmers and ranchers, and produce and sell their own clothing.  He conveniently ignored 
the fact that men and women had been experimenting with mixed-crop agriculture, 
ranching, and other economically viable practices since the colonial period.
5
  
Unfortunately, even those who adopted these innovations could not end their dependency 
on trade goods.  As well, several headmen took civilization policy to its logical 
conclusion by amassing wealth in the form of cash, livestock, and African slaves, who 
worked the chiefs’ lands. 
 As an ethos of acquisitive wealth took root among a minority of headmen, some 
leaders became corrupt.  As Saunt suggests, headmen began hoarding the annuity monies 
and distributing them to followers and clan relatives.  When famine struck, then, as it did 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
centralization “did not become institutionalized by a consensus” until the period following the 
War of 1812 (113).  See, too, Ethridge, Creek Country, 107-108. 
 
5
 A point argued in detail and with a focus on Creek women ranchers and traders by 
Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 13, 15, 142-143, 160-162. 
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several times in the first decade of the 1800s, ordinary Creeks starved because the 
wealthy headmen took care of their own families first.  As a result of these shifts in the 
Creek economy, sharp class divisions surfaced.  Several rich headmen (or those aspiring 
to be rich) made profit-motivated decisions that harmed the majority of Creeks.  For 
instance, only six market-inclined headmen ceded prime hunting grounds up to the 
Okmulgee River in the Treaty of Washington of 1805 (Figure 14).
6
 
 My research points up a cognitive dissonance in turn-of-the-century Creek 
society, however.  On one hand, class division separting rich from poor unmistakably 
arose.  Clearly, the accumulation of money by wealthy headmen who could afford to own 
slaves and livestock and who sold cash crops for profit helped generate much of these 
divisions.  Ordinary Creeks were responsible, too.  Ethridge reveals that “most” Creek 
                                                             
 
6
 For the influence of wealthy headmen and the annuity disbursement issue, see New 
Order, especially 213-229.  By arguing that mixed-heritage headmen or “mestizos” (89), such as 
Alexander McGillivray, bearing the capitalist ideologies of their Euro-American trader fathers 
introduced economic innovation into Creek society, Saunt conflates race with culture.  Although 
many market-oriented headmen were mixed (2), there are three problems with this argument.  
First, it ignores Native-centered perspectives on race, culture, and economy.  See, for instance, 
Theda Perdue, “Race and Culture: Writing the Ethnohistory of the Early South,” in Ethnohistory 
51:4 (Fall 2004): 701-723, here 715-716, 719-720.  Perdue writes that using the “language of 
blood denigrates the centrality of Native culture and the significance of individual choice,” 
thereby reinforcing Anglo-American racial ideology (719).  Secondly, Gregory A. Waselkov, A 
Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick War of 1813-1814 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of 
Alabama Press, 2006), 55, demonstrates that mixed-heritage peoples, such as many of the 
Redstick prophets, eschewed capitalism.  Waselkov, Angela Pulley Hudson (Creek Paths, 37-65), 
and I, however, accept Saunt’s point that class divisions emerged and exacerbated town-to-town 
relations.  Thirdly, Saunt’s contention fails to account for native-born headmen, such as Big 
Warrior of Tuckabatchee, who owned wealth but who vigorously promoted the majority’s interest 
by defending Creek lands.  See, for example, Big Warrior to “Path maker, Chief of the 
Cherokee,” 5/1[?]/1809, Tuckabatchee, in Letters received by the Office of the Secretary of War 
relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-1823 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Service, 
1959), Roll 1 (1800-1816), National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 271, 
frames620-621 (hereafter cited as LOSW).  See, too, “Journal of Occurrences,” Big Warrior to 
Benjamin Hawkins, 9/18/1815, Tuckabatchee, in Letters, Journals and Writings of Benjamin 
Hawkins, ed. C. L. Grant (Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1980), 2:754-756 (hereafter LBH). 
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men and women owned livestock, particularly hogs and cattle, and that they probably 
viewed livestock as a commodity to be bought and sold for a profit.  The extent of profit 
generated from that ownership varied, of course, but the point is that just about every 
Creek individual was complicit in the emergence of the Creeks’ acquisitive market 
economy, although those with the most wealth (usually the headmen) benefitted the 
most.
7
 
 On the other hand, as this chapter argues, plentiful indicates that headmen in the 
National Council respected community traditions and promoted the majority’s interests in 
the diplomatic sphere.  Far from Saunt’s coercive centralized body, the Council featured 
headmen who never missed an opportunity to elevate a town’s or province’s interests, at 
least diplomatically.
8
  Nor have scholars considered the international/pan-Indian 
dimensions of the Council.
9
  An adaptable institution of power, it absorbed a tension 
between localism and extra-localism in the Native South, a dynamic captured by what the 
Creeks called the “Hickory Ground Resolution.”  In late May of 1803, the Upper Creek 
town of Hickory Ground hosted the Southern Indians in a Council meeting.  On June 2, 
the Southern Indians announced that Resolution, which was a non-binding compact 
discouraging a member from agreeing to a land cession without first consulting all 
members.
10
  The Resolution captures the local, national, and international faces of the 
                                                             
 
7
 Ethridge, Creek Country, 160-162, 161 (“most”), 299n23, 300n29. 
 
8
 Saunt, New Order, 90-110. 
 
9
 For instance, Champagne, Social Order, 113-117 and Ethridge, Creek Country, 107-
108, tend to focus on the domestic shape of the Council. 
 
10
 A Creek headman called it a “resolution”; see “Opayamicko” (a Hickory Ground 
headman) to Pensacola Governor (Vicente) Folch, 8/31/1803, location (?), in The Papers of 
Panton, Leslie, and Company (Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, 1986), reel 15, frame136 
(hereafter cited as PLC). 
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National Council and, generally, of Creek politics in this period.  By spearheading the 
Resolution, Creeks partnered with other Indians to create an indigenous-centered 
international policy designed to contest U.S. expansion.  
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Table 6.  Coalitions in Turn-of-the-Century Creek Society. 
Coalitions Participating provinces, towns, talofas, 
and headmen 
 
Participating non-Creeks 
- Coalition that signed 
the Treaty of Coleraine, 
1796 
 
- 435 Creeks, among them: 
 
     Lower Creek: Sohonoketchee of 
Coweta and Bird Tail King of Cussita 
 
     Tallapoosa: Big Warrior of 
Tuckabatchee 
 
     Abeika (?): Chinabee of Nauchee 
 
 
- Hallowing King and 
Mad Dog coalition of 
1798 
 
- Lower Creek: Hallowing King of 
Coweta 
 
- Tallapoosa: Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee 
 
- Western Indian 
Confederacy (“northern 
nations”) and Southern 
Indians, including 
Seminoles 
 
- Coalition that signed 
the Treaty of Fort 
Wilkinson, 1802 
 
- 32 Creek towns and several headmen, 
including: 
     Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee 
 
     Long Lieutenant of Coweta 
 
     Hopoie Micco of Hickory Ground  
 
- Cherokee delegation 
- Coalition that gave 
rise to the Hickory 
Ground Resolution of 
1803 
 
- Undetermined number of Lower Creeks 
 
- Tallapoosa: Mad Dog and Big Warrior 
of Tuckabatchee 
 
- Alabama: Hickory Ground 
 
- “Four Mothers” 
(Cherokees, Choctaws, 
Chickasaws, and Creeks) 
 
- Choctaw headman 
named Mingo 
Homastabi 
  
- Post-Hickory Ground 
coalition 
 
- Lower Creek: Coweta, Cussita, 
Ouseechee, Apalachicola, Little Prince of 
Broken Arrow (talofa) 
 
- Tallapoosa: Tame King of Tallassee and 
Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee 
 
- Alabama: Hopoie Micco of Hickory 
Ground 
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 The international flavor of the Hickory Ground Resolution derived from the 
national flavor of the Three Rivers Resolution.  What united each resolution, of course, 
was Creek localism and the exigencies of communities on the ground.  Creeks continued 
to rely on the traditional machinery of town leadership and networks of kinship to build 
both national and international/pan-Indian coalitions.  Because of its sheer adaptability, 
the National Council was a fluid outlet through which the Creeks conducted diplomacy 
and framed policies.  Creek headmen, representing their towns in Council, deftly 
balanced the strictures of clan and town traditions with the necessity of forming larger 
extra-local coalitions.  Because the legitimacy of many (perhaps most) Council headmen 
continued to rest on the towns and families they represented, it makes sense that Council 
leaders thrust local issues into larger, extra-local contexts.  In short, for the most part 
headmen obeyed their communities, not the other way around. 
 How, then, do we explain the dichotomy between an individualist acquisitive 
economy that generated class division, corruption, and hunger and the persistence of 
Creek consensus by 1800?  The examples I offer indicate that wealthy and non-wealthy 
headmen more than paid lip service to the political majority and the entrenched practice 
of coalition-building; they sincerely believed in them.  Creeks relied on familiar political 
traditions to navigate through the bog of unfamiliar economic innovations, and most 
Creeks worried less about economic divisions than about blocking U.S. imperial goals to 
acquire land.  To be sure, the tensions raised by an acquisitive economy boiled over into 
civil war in 1813, but no Creek in 1800 could predict that that possibility loomed.  
Instead, Creeks applied political and diplomatic solutions to American expansion.  After 
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1805, as I show towards the end of the chapter, the cession of all Creek lands east of the 
Okmulgee River motivated Creeks to confront corrupt leaders head-on.  They did so by 
assassinating the Council Speaker, who was in part to blame, and then replaced him with 
headmen who voiced communal concerns to the U.S. and to other Indians.
11
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 For the assassination, see Hawkins to John Milledge, 6/9/1806, Creek Agency, LBH, 
2:505. 
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Figure 14.  Treaties in the Native South, to 1805.  The 1796 Treaty of Coleraine took its name 
from Coleraine Station, a U.S. fort located on the St. Marys River near Seminole country.  The 
Seminoles lived in numerous polities ranging from Pensacola to the St. Johns River.  The 1802 
Treaty of Fort Wilkinson was named after that fort, which doubled as a U.S. trading “factory” 
that supplied goods to the Creeks.  The fort lay on the middle Oconee River.  Source: Angela 
Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and the Making of 
the American South (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), p. 52 (Map 2).  
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 Treaty-making was a nation-to-nation business.  According to the U.S. 
Constitution, only federal commissioners and Native diplomats could make a legally 
binding treaty.  The Constitution gave to the Executive branch the power to negotiate 
treaties, while the Senate possessed the authority to ratify them.  Moreover, Indians 
accepted as binding those treaties that were negotiated and agreed to by a large majority 
of people in a particular Indian society.  As a result, federal Indian law denied treaty-
making power to state authorities and recognized Native sovereignty precisely because a 
treaty was a nation-to-nation compact.
12
  As class divisions emerged in the Native South, 
U.S. commissioners tempted a few headmen with economic rewards—bribes, really.  In a 
secret article of the Treaty of New York of 1790, recall, Little Tallassee’s Alexander 
McGillivray was made a brigadier general and promised an annual lifelong stipend of 
$1,200.  Other headmen received an annual stipend of $100 in perpetuity.
13
 
 While scholars are correct to argue that economic interests motivated some 
headmen to act against national interest, the attendance of numerous townspeople at a 
given treaty swayed leaders to make political decisions that adhered to town interests.  In 
June 1796, when the Creeks convened with U.S. commissioners, such as Agent Hawkins, 
at Coleraine Station on the St. Marys River, headmen obeyed the town majority’s 
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 Michael D. Green, “The Expansion of European Colonization to the Mississippi 
Valley, 1780-1880,” in The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, Volume I: 
North America, Part 1, ed. Bruce G. Trigger and Wilcomb E. Washburn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996): 461-538, here 462. 
 
13
 Saunt, New Order, 80 (general); Ethridge, Creek Country, 199 (stipends).  For 
changing patterns of chiefly leadership in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Choctaw 
society, see Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002); and O’Brien, “Trying to Look Like Men: Changing Notions 
of Masculinity Among Choctaw Elites in the Early Republic,” in Southern Manhood: 
Perspectives on Masculinity in the Old South, ed. Craig Friend and Lorri Glover (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2004): 49-70. 
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demands.  In what became the Treaty of Coleraine, headmen confirmed the Oconee 
cession of 1783 but, more importantly, flat-out refused to part with additional lands.  
Federal commissioners did permit three Georgia officials to attend the conference and to 
ask the Creeks for a land cession up to the Okmulgee River.  The Georgians were 
prepared to provide trade goods in exchange for the cession.  But after “ten days” of 
“debate,” Creek headmen “refused it vigorously,” and the matter was dropped.  
According to one Spanish report, “Georgia [officials] put their goods, that they had 
bought to make a purchase of the land, on board their Vessel, & returned back without 
any Success.”
14
  Aside from preserving the Creek domain, the Coleraine treaty resolved 
urgent international affairs.  It stipulated that boundary commissioners drawn from the 
Creeks and U.S. must demarcate both the U.S.-Creek boundary along the Oconee River 
and the U.S.-Spanish boundary in northern Seminole country.
15
 
 Creek headmen forced the land-hungry Georgians to pack up and return home 
precisely because the majority of Creek towns attended the conference.  The presence of 
Creek townspeople therefore prompted the headmen to defend their lands.  In other 
words, the Creeks rendered Georgia’s request for land an abysmal failure.  More than 
four hundred Creeks led by six “principal” headmen attended the Coleraine negotiations, 
which opened on June 16, 1796.  Twenty-two micos (“kings”) and seventy-five 
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 James Durouzeaux to William Panton, 7/23/1796, Cussita, in Corbitt, “Papers ... XVI,” 
GHQ, 265.  For the three Georgia commissioners (James Hendricks, James Jackson, and James 
Simms), see conference minutes, 6/17/1796, in American State Papers, Indian Affairs 
(Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 1:597 (hereafter cited as ASPIA). 
 
15
 Treaty of Coleraine, 6/29/1796, negotiated by Benjamin Hawkins, George Clymer, and 
Andrew Pickens, “Tustincke Hajo,” and “by a number of others [i.e., Creek headmen],” ASPIA, 
1:586-587.  Italics in original.  The U.S.-Spanish boundary—Ellicott’s Line—was run in 1798 
(Hudson, Creek Paths, 39). 
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“principal chiefs” presided, along with 152 warriors.  Roughly 186 women, children, and 
other men rounded out the delegation of 435 Creeks.  As Cussita’s Bird Tail King 
declared, “[H]ere we are, a representation of the whole nation.”
16
 
 In one of the largest treaty conferences between Creeks and a foreign power on 
record, Creeks advocated community interests by ensuring the participation of major 
Creek towns and provinces in treaty-making.  Leaders included “Coweta Leader 
[Mico?],” “Sohonoketchee” of Coweta and his “cousin,” John Galphin, and “A Coweta 
Chief Warrior”; “Abacoo Tustamitca” of “the Broken-arrow old field,” a Coweta talofa; 
Cussita “king”/Mico (or “Big king”) and “several of his relations”; Bird Tail King 
(Fusihatchee Mico) of Cussita, the Lower Creek speaker; “Chinabee, the great Natchez 
warrior” of the Natchez-affiliated Upper Creek town of Nauchee; and Tuckabatchee’s 
Big Warrior and Alexander Cornells, who served as the Upper Creek speaker.
17
 
 Perhaps because of the presence of hundreds of men, women, and children at 
Coleraine Station, Creek headmen infused their defense of sovereignty with bonds of 
kinship.  Before negotiations opened, for example, Tuckabatchee’s Big Warrior had a 
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 For total numbers, number of headmen, see minutes, 6/16, ASPIA, 1:597.  See also 
6/16 (“principal”), 1:596; 6/21 (“here we are”), 1:599 (see 1:597, too, for Fusihatchee Mico as 
speaker), all ASPIA.  Bird Tail King was also titled “Big king of the Cussetahs” (6/28, 1:608).  
For “the White-bird-tail king, or Big king of the Cussetahs,” see Constant Freeman to Knox, Fort 
Fidius, 5/11/1794, ASPIA 1:485. 
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 For the Cowetas, see the Coleraine minutes, 6/10, ASPIA, 1: 595; 6/22 (Coweta 
Leader), 1:600; 6/22 (Sohonoketchee and Galphin), 1:601; and 6/26 (Coweta Warrior), 1:606.  
And 6/22 (“Abacoo”), 1:600; 6/22 (“Cussetah king” and relatives), 1:601; 6/17 (“Fusatchee Mico, 
White-bird king”), 1:597; 6/11 (Chinabee), 1:595; 6/10 & 6/18 (Big Warrior), 1:595 & 1:598; and 
6/24 (Cornells), 1:604.  I removed the original italics from some names.  The only named Creek 
delegate provided at the end of the treaty is “Tustincke Hajo” (Mad Warrior?) (ASPIA, 1:587).  
Seagrove seems to indicate that Chinabee and Tuckabatchee headmen, such as Alexander 
Cornells, were friends (ASPIA, 1:403).  Apparently, White Lieutenant and Mad Dog abstained 
from the conference. 
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private conversation with U.S. commissioners.  He lamented that in 1793, American 
soldiers had killed his brother.  The victim had been delivering a Creek message, 
addressed to President Washington, to U.S. authorities at Coleraine.  In the aftermath, 
U.S. Agent James Seagrove had informed Big Warrior that the “bones of his brother [had 
been] buried.”  However, when Big Warrior arrived in Coleraine for the June 1796 
conference, he learned that Seagrove had lied to him, that “the bones were now 
unburied.”  Consequently, Big Warrior was “for some time . . . almost frantic; he could 
not speak to the commissioners without tears, and therefore, chose to be silent” until 
finally meeting them on the 10th.  The commissioners promised that they “would have 
the bones of his brother buried with the honors of war, if he would consent.”  But “he was 
silent, took us by the hand, and went out; then said his heart was too full to speak.”  Big 
Warrior remained at the conference, but channeled his grief into a defense of Creek lands.  
For instance, he denounced the U.S. for failing to punish settlers who continued to cross 
the Oconee River in violation of the international boundary.
18
 
 Coweta made kinship an issue of sovereignty, too.  On June 22, in the midst of 
negotiations, Sohonoketchee of Coweta told the commissioners that “I have a cousin 
here,” referring to the mixed-heritage John Galphin.  Galphin, recall, was the son of the 
Augusta-based trader, George Galphin, and Metawney, a Coweta woman.  
Sohonoketchee said that John, a kinship affiliate of the Cowetas, “wants to come in [to 
the Creeks’ encampment], and be about, as another Indian. We, the chiefs, solicit” the 
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 Minutes, 6/10, ASPIA, 1:595 (and 6/15, 1:596).  One “or two others” were killed, too.  
A white man accompanied the small delegation to Coleraine, ditched them just before reaching 
their destination, and went into the fort, whereupon the soldiers killed the Creeks.  To Big 
Warrior, this chain of events reasonably looked like a conspiracy to kill Indians. 
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U.S. commissioners “that he may be permitted to come in.”  “If you see proper,” 
Sohonoketchee continued, “I wish you would look upon him as another Indian.”  The 
commissioners thought Galphin was a “very bad man” because he once participated in a 
Creek raid on American settlements.  But the commissioners relented, saying that the 
“chiefs ... must be the judges” in the matter.
19
  Like Big Warrior, Coweta forced U.S. 
officials into recognizing that kinship was part and parcel of diplomacy. 
 The Cowetas’ request that John Galphin be recognized as a Native delegate 
revived a touchy issue in Creek politics.  In the winter of 1792-1793, Galphin and “a little 
band of thieves” plundered American and Spanish settlements near the St. Marys River.  
Milford reported to Carondelet months later that Galphin “robbed them of everything,” 
including “their blankets, sheets, mattresses, seven Negroes, their cows, and horses.”  
Galphin even scalped “a little boy.”  To keep peace with the U.S. and Spain, the “chief of 
the nation,” probably Mad Dog, encouraged “anybody” who wished to do so to execute 
Galphin and his men, and “No satisfaction will be asked for their death.”
20
  Naturally, the 
Cowetas defended Galphin, a fellow kinsman.  In late 1793, Hallowing King of Coweta 
sent a talk to Enrique White, commandant of Pensacola, informing him that “The 
Tuckabatchey haed Worrior [Mad Dog] & the Head worrior of the Cusseittaus had 
agreed to Kill” Galphin.  But Hallowing King “could not agree to any Sutch Doings,” 
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 Minutes, 6/22, ASPIA, 1:601.  For the Galphin family, see Michael P. Morris, George 
Galphin and the Transformation of the Georgia-South Carolina Backcountry (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington, 2015), 26. 
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 Milford to Carondelet, 5/26/1793, Tuckabatchee, in SMV, 4:161.  See, too, Olivier to 
Carondelet, 6/11/1793, Tuckabatchee, in SMV, 4:168. 
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perhaps because he shared clan affiliation with Galphin.
21
  In any case, Galphin was still 
alive by the 1796 Coleraine negotiations.  Possibly, Hallowing King convinced Cussita 
and Tuckabatchee to drop the matter and address more pressing issues, such as American 
requests for land. 
 The Coleraine conference and treaty promoted community.  As Creeks turned out 
in record numbers, leading Council chiefs like Big Warrior and Bird Tail King 
represented Creek men, women, and children who refused to cede any additional land.  
Aside from mounting a successful defense of Creek sovereignty, Creeks took the 
opportunity to address bonds of kinship in Creek society.  Although Big Warrior’s 
brother may have never been properly buried, the headman at least leveraged that anger 
against U.S. interests.  By underscoring kinship affairs within Creek society, Big Warrior 
and Sohonoketchee merged family with diplomacy.  The Creeks were sufficiently unified 
at the local and national level to defend their territory in 1796. 
 A year later, kinship became a flash point in U.S.-Creek relations.  Recall that the 
Coleraine treaty stipulated that Creek and American boundary commissioners co-survey 
the Spanish-American boundary.  During the running of the boundary in late December, 
violence erupted.  On the 22nd, a party of Georgians shot at five Creeks in southern 
Georgia near the proposed boundary line.  One Creek (“Holithlo Hopoie”) was killed, 
and two others (Nehah Tustunnuggee, a boundary commissioner; and “Samocuhaujo”) 
were injured.  The aggressors stole the Indians’ “skins, kettles and three horses.”  
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 Hallowing King to Enrique White, 1793, Tuckabatchee (?), in SMV, 4:234. 
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According to a headman named Ochese Tustunnuggee, Nehah Tustunnuggee and 
Samocuhaujo were “both nephews” of Hallowing King of Coweta.
22
 
 To compensate the aggrieved clan, Agent Benjamin Hawkins was requested by 
Creek leaders to officiate at an impromptu funeral ceremony for the slain man.  Nehah 
Tustunnuggee, one of the injured, said, “let the ceremony be postponed over our fire, and 
it will serve as a funeral ceremony for 2, if not more of us.”  Hawkins “agreed and 
requested Captain Webb to act in conformity; to bring the ceremony where we were and 
march around in front of the wounded camp and perform the ceremony. This he did,” 
observed Hawkins.  Days later, Bird Tail King of Cussita and Hawkins discussed the 
matter.  The headman told Hawkins that the deceased and injured were “near relations” 
of Hallowing King, adding that “the mother of the Commissioner, an old woman, would 
soon be at their camp.”  Bird Tail King and other leaders persuaded Hawkins to offer 
economic assistance to Holithlo Hopoie’s wife and children.  Obeying kinship protocol, 
Hawkins replied that he would “take care of the children” and “would be their father.”
23
 
 In the following months, Hallowing King hosted a Council meeting at his home 
town to patch up U.S.-Creek relations.  Coweta became a center not only of national 
discussion but also of confederation-building.  As the eighteenth century waned, the 
Creeks gradually united with the Western Confederacy to bolster the Native defense of 
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 Hawkins to Colonel Thomas Lamar, 12/23 and 12/24/1797, LBH 1:140-142.  The two 
injured men were nephews of “Youholau Micco” (142).  “Ochese Tustunnuggee” (140) was also 
known as “Tuskegee Tustunnuggee,” “Big Feared,” and “Feared” (146n5). 
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 Hawkins to Lamar, 12/24, 12/27, and 12/28/1797, LBH, 1:143, 145.  Additional quotes 
from text removed.  Bird Tail King is identified as “Fushatchee Micco” (144).  The three victims 
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at Tulapocca” (perhaps near the Apalachee River) (145). 
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land and safeguard the lives of Native families.  Through pan-Indian union, the Creeks 
hoped to convince American authorities that they desired to live and hunt peacefully on 
their lands, unmolested by American intruders, and to protect their people from unwanted 
attacks, such as the one in which Hallowing King’s relation perished.  To that end, the 
Creeks and Western Confederacy became close allies.  Although U.S. military forces 
under “Mad” Anthony Wayne had subdued the Confederacy in 1794, by 1797 and 1798 
Shawnees and other “Northern” Indians had adopted a diplomatic stance towards the U.S. 
and found a receptive audience among the Creeks. 
 In May 1798, Agent Hawkins met the Lower Creeks in Coweta to help smooth 
over the tensions raised by the American attack on Hallowing King’s relations.  The 
Cowetas showed Hawkins a “broad belt of peace” they had recently received from the 
“Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees and the northern nations.”
24
  On May 7 Hallowing 
King, belt in hand, addressed the “Chiefs” hailing from twelve Lower Creek towns; 
Hawkins, present, recorded the Council proceedings.  “I have a talk,” he began, “it is a 
short one; the northern tribes sent it to me.”  Hallowing King read (via a translator) a talk 
that accompanied the pan-tribal belt, saying: “they have tried our strength and are 
conquered. The most of our old and best warriors now rot in the earth, or whiten on its 
surface.”  Since Northern and Southern Indian warriors lay dead, the surviving 
communities favored diplomacy over war.  “We have made peace,” Hallowing King 
related on their behalf, and “we have buried deep under a great lake our sharp weapons, 
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 Hawkins to William Panton, 5/20/1798, Coweta Tallahassee, in The Collected Works of 
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and hope our young ones will grow up in peace and friendship with the children of our 
red and white brethren, and we hope you Creeks and Simanolees will follow our 
example, and that you will take the talk and inform us you have done so.”
25
 
 Community echoed in the Council meeting of May 1798, during which Coweta 
hosted twelve Lower Creek towns and possibly an emissary from the Western 
Confederacy.  By reading the contents of the peace talk and by ritually deploying the belt 
during the meeting, Hallowing King accepted the Northern Indians’ peace overtures on 
the Lower Creek towns’ behalf.  He understood that pan-Indian alliance was a means of 
achieving political stability within Creek society, between the Creeks and Seminoles, 
between the Southern Indians and the Western Confederacy, and, on the largest scale, 
between eastern Native America and the United States.  In Hallowing King’s address, 
Creek community and pan-tribal community were mutually reinforcing.  Having lost a 
kinsman and nearly the lives of two others to frontier conflict, the Coweta headman was 
probably delighted in hearing that the Northern and Southern Indians envisaged a future 
in which “the children of our red and white brethren” would live in harmony.  Hallowing 
King looked after the interests of his clan, his town, the Lower Creek province, and all 
Indians in the Coweta Council meeting of 1798.
26
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 For the belt and message and for “Yeauholau Mico [Hallowing King of Coweta]” 
relaying the talk to Hawkins, see Hawkins to Henry Gaither, 5/12/1798, Coweta Tallahassee, 
CWBH, 312.  For “Chiefs” and attendance of “The Chiefs of the 12 towns on this 
[Chattahoochee] River,” see Hawkins to James McHenry, 6/24/1798, Coweta, LBH, 1:208.  In 
this same letter (Hawkins to James McHenry, 6/24/1798, Coweta, LBH, 1:208), Hawkins wrote 
that “a Chief arrived [on the 7th] from the N. West, with a broad belt & talk of peace strongly 
expressive and [of] friendship towards all nations red and white.”  This particular quote implies 
either that Hallowing King relayed the talk from that chief, or that that chief spoke himself. 
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 Hawkins to Henry Gaither, 5/12/1798, Coweta Tallahassee, CWBH, 312. 
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 An additional Council meeting was required to determine whether the Seminoles 
and Upper Creeks accepted or rejected the peace belt and talk.  To that end, Seminole, 
Upper Creek, and Lower Creek headmen assembled in Tuckabatchee with Agent 
Hawkins on May 26.  One day later, national speaker Mad Dog deployed a six-strand 
wampum belt, interwoven with “two white ends, two rows of blue wampums on each 
edge, and two rows of white wampums thro’ the middle.”  White, recall, symbolized 
peace between two or more peoples.  Mad Dog explained to Hawkins that “The two rows 
of white are the path of perpetual peace, leading from one white end to the other, and the 
two white ends are the beloved man [Hawkins], one of them, and the other the Creeks 
and Seminoles.”  Like the Northern and Southern Indians, Mad Dog expressed his desire 
for international peace: “It is with a view to join the hands of the people of the United 
States and the people of my land that I offer this belt, that they may never again be 
separated or at enmity.”  Mad Dog’s peace belt communicated to Hawkins the Creeks’ 
and Seminoles’ desire to avoid any further violence in the Native South.  It also implicitly 
sanctioned Hallowing King’s acceptance of the Southern and Northern Indian peace belt 
and talk.
27
 
 Creek headmen promoted international peace on behalf of all Creeks.  Hallowing 
King’s and Mad Dog’s diplomacy reflected an attempt by Creeks, not by a centralized 
Council, to restore balance to Creek society and, more generally, the Native South.  
Although American expansion placed severe strains on Creek sovereignty in the late 
eighteenth century, headmen parried the blow in the Treaty of Coleraine and during 
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National Council meetings.  Headmen’s power continued to rest on clan, town, and 
province.  In turn, headmen leveraged that power to participate in the circuitry of pan-
Indianism, which fueled linkages across Creek towns, among Native societies, and 
between Native people and America (via Hawkins).  When Mad Dog coordinated with 
and responded to Hallowing King, he tapped into pan-Indian diplomatic initiatives to 
promote peace on a grand scale and at more local levels, such as among families and 
towns.  No matter how expansive, turn-of-the-century Creek diplomacy shaped and drew 
upon smaller scales of community. 
 Creek politics took shape from the ground up as well.  During a Council meeting 
held at Tuckabatchee on November 27, 1799, Upper Creek leaders agreed to a suggestion 
by Hawkins to “class all the towns, and to appoint a warrior over each class.”  That 
warrior would be called a “warrior of the nation.”  With headmen’s assistance, Hawkins 
generated a document listing nine classes that encompassed a cluster of Upper Creek 
towns.  Whether the Upper Creeks implemented or ignored the policy is unknown, but 
the report itself reveals the localist mindset of the National Council on the eve of the 
nineteenth century (Figure 15).  Despite (and probably because of) the chaos precipitated 
among the Upper towns by the Creek-Chickasaw War and Hawkins’s attempt to interfere 
in the affairs of the National Council, Upper Creek headmen classified their towns 
according to the logic of inter-community ties.  Each class resembles a kind of mini 
coalition within which member towns might turn to one another for assistance.  
Additionally, the report is a crucial snapshot of Upper Creek country outlining the deep 
continuities among Upper Creek towns just a decade before the Redstick War engulfed 
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the region in civil war.  In short, the classification of Upper Creek towns took shape 
along the localism of Creek society rather than pandering to Hawkins’ attempts to 
organize and centralize the Creeks.
28
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 For his report, see Benjamin Hawkins, “A sketch of the Creek Country in the years 
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Figure 15.  Classification of the Upper Creek Towns, 1799. Agreed upon during a National 
Council meeting hosted by Tuckabatchee on November 27, 1799, the nine classes are as follows: 
“1st. Hookchoie, Wewocau, Pucantallahassee, Opilthlucco and Thlotlogulgau [Fish Ponds]”; “2d. 
Kialijee and Eufaula”; “3d. Hillaubee, Woccocoie and Pochusehatche”; “4th. Aubecooche, 
Nauchee, Coosa and Eufaulahatche”; “5th. Hoithlewaule, Ecunhutke, Sauvanogee, Mucclassee 
and Tookaubatche”; “6th. Ocfuskee and its villages, Soocheah, Newyaucau, Immookfau, 
Tookaubatche Tallahassee, Tooktocaugee, Auchenauulgau, Ocfussooche and Epeesaugee”; “7th. 
Ocheubofau and Tuskeegee”; “8th. Tallassee, Autossee, Fushatchee and Cooloome”; “9th. 
Hookchoieooche, Coosada, Ecunchate, Toowossau, Pauwocte, and Attaugee” (306-307).  
Hawkins added that “6 and 8 are the white towns” (307).  (Boldfaced numerals are mine.)  
Source: Map photocopied from Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their 
World (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 29 (Figure 2).  Additional 
markings are mine.  For Hawkins’s report, see “A sketch of the Creek Country in the years 1798 
and 1799,” LBH, 1:306-307.  
 
295 
 
 Classes One, Three, Five, Eight, and Nine reflect towns’ shared provincial 
identities.  For instance, Class One enveloped five Abeika towns, including Wewocau, 
Okchai, Pucantallahassee, “Opilthlucco,” and Fish Ponds (“Thlotlogulgau”).  
“Simmomejee” of Wewocau was appointed “warrior of the nation” over that class.  In 
another example, Class Five elected “Opoie Emaultau” of Hoithlewaulee the “warrior of 
the nation” over five Tallapoosa towns, namely Hoithlewaulee, White Ground, Sawanogi, 
Muccolossus, and Tuckabatchee.  Additionally, in creating Class Eight, headmen grouped 
together four other Tallapoosa towns, including Tallassee and Autossee.  This recognized 
the Tallassee-Autossee partnership forged under Tallassee’s Tame King during the 
Revolution.  Aside from province-based classes, at least one class probably recognized 
the enduring bonds between a mother town (talwa) and its villages (talofas).  In that vein, 
Class Six pairs Okfuskee with eight of its villages, such as Corn House, Nuyaka, and 
Ocfuscooche (Little Okfuskee).
29
 
 When Upper Creek headmen grouped Okfuskee with its village offshoots, that 
decision possibly reflected the enduring kinship ties between a talwa and its talofas 
during a period of town fragmentation.  By the turn of the century, a greater number of 
Creeks supplemented traditional communal farming with animal husbandry.  Since cattle 
and hog ranching exhausted a town’s soil patterns, the townspeople migrated away from 
the town center in search of fresh land in rural floodplains, triggering a geographical 
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dispersion of Creek people and animals.
30
  Joshua Piker has argued that by the 1770s, 
Okfuskee experienced “a new settlement pattern” as its inhabitants moved to distant 
villages, which had been settled earlier in the century, to put cattle and hogs to pasture (as 
well as to farm new lands).
31
  By the 1790s geographical dispersal within Creek society 
had accelerated.  But Okfuskee and its out-settlements probably maintained contact, 
especially after Georgia militiamen invaded and torched Little Okfuskee (thereafter 
known as “Burnt Village”) on the Chattahoochee River in September 1793.  After the 
invasion, some Burnt Villagers returned to the Tallapoosa valley perhaps to reside near 
fellow kin in the Okfuskee orbit.
32
  By 1799, as the creation of Class Six suggests, the 
connections between town and talofa persisted, despite the enormous environmental 
shifts affecting Creek mother towns. 
 Moreover, the Upper Creek town classification of 1799 acknowledged the deep 
historical continuities among the four towns of Class Four: Aubecooche, Nauchee, 
Coosa, and Eufaulauhatchee.
33
  In the seventeenth century, members of the Coosa 
chiefdom in present-day north Georgia migrated to the upper Coosa River valley and 
established three settlements among local inhabitants there.  Around 1670, those 
settlements formed into the Abihka town of Coosa.  By the eighteenth century, 
Aubecooche (a name meaning “Abihka”) and, perhaps, Eufaulauhatchee affiliated with 
and may have sprung from Coosa.  After a failed uprising against the French in 1729, the 
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 A combination of economic, environmental, and political factors induced economic 
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Natchez Indians of the lower Mississippi valley fled to the Upper Creeks, where the 
Abihka towns incorporated them.  By the mid eighteenth century, all four towns had 
become a confederated unit and, as evidence demonstrates, maintained kinship ties into 
the nineteenth century.
34
 
 To be sure, the way in which the Upper Creeks classified their towns signaled a 
political shift in Upper Creek country.  Hawkins wrote that Classes One through Five 
“comprise the towns they call Kepauyau, or warriors of the nation.”  The Kepauyau were 
otherwise known as red or “war” towns.  In the Creek moiety system, at least in the early 
eighteenth century, both red and white towns existed within a province, such as among 
the Tallapoosas and Abeikas.  Whereas red towns commanded military affairs, white or 
“peace” towns promoted diplomacy with foreign peoples, although a white town might 
become engulfed in warfare periodically.  By organizing their towns along a dual system 
of leadership, Creeks maintained cosmic harmony by balancing the impulses of war with 
the cool-headedness of diplomacy.
35
  “But,” according to Hawkins, “on this occasion” in 
1799, “when their existence as a nation depends on their ability to carry the laws into 
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 For the Coosa chiefdom, see Gregory A. Waselkov and Marvin T. Smith, “Upper 
Creek Archaeology,” in Indians of the Greater Southeast: Historical Archaeology and 
Ethnohistory, ed. Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000), 242-
264, here 244, 246; and Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion 
and the Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2010), 113-114 (Coosa), 246 (incorporation of Natchez by Upper Creeks).  
For Aubecooche, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 88.  For the continuation of at least the Coosa-
Aubecooche-Nauchee alliance in the early 1800s, see Hawkins to William Eustis, 2/24/1811, 
Creek Agency, LBH, 2:583. 
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George E. Lankford, Looking for Lost Lore: Studies in Folklore, Ethnology, and Iconography 
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 73-96, here 82-83. 
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execution, [the Upper Creek Council] unanimously agreed that the Etallwau, the white 
towns, should be classed as warriors.”
36
 
 In other words, headmen reclassified Okfuskee, Tallassee, and other white towns 
as red towns, thereby at least theoretically requiring them to contribute warriors to the 
Council’s police force.  The Council police, known later as the Lighthorse, attempted 
(though largely failed) to suppress clan vengeance by punishing criminals outside the 
normal bounds of clan justice.
37
  Although it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
newfound red towns carried “the laws into execution,” the intent of reclassification raises 
the possibility that by 1799, persistent frontier conflict and the late Creek-Chickasaw War 
had thoroughly militarized Upper Creek society.  Possibly, as Claudio Saunt has 
suggested, Creek headmen attempted to centralize their towns (in this case, the Upper 
towns) under a stricter military structure to eliminate clan vengeance and unite against 
future requests by American authorities for land.
38
 
 Overall, however, the 1799 classification of Upper Creek towns and the 
reclassification of white towns did not constitute a radical departure from past traditions.  
First, Hawkins’s report exposes the entrenched political and kinship linkages forged 
among Upper Creek towns both recently and in the deep past.  Upper Creek headmen 
therefore remained committed to a town-based world.  Even if they sought to centralize 
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 Hawkins, “A sketch,” LBH, 1:307, wrote that Classes Six and Eight “are the white 
towns.”  These encompassed Okfuskee and the Okfuskee villages as well as the Tallapoosa towns 
of Tallassee, Autossee, Fusihatchee, and Cooloome (306). 
 
37
 For a discussion of centralized “judicial and political authority,” see Saunt, New Order, 
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the Council, the report digs up nine classes of intra-regional mini coalitions, rather than a 
regionally-unified Upper Creek unit.  Secondly, a Creek town’s red or white affiliation 
was not, according to one anthropologist, “permanently fixed.”  Creek towns frequently 
gained or lost their moiety status after suffering defeat in the famous two-goal ball game, 
also known as the “match game,” where only towns of the opposite moiety could 
challenge each other to a game.  The Creeks had a general principle that depending on a 
number of successive defeats, the losing town had to take the winning town’s moiety.  
For example, Autossee was probably a white town in the eighteenth century, but 
sometime afterwards it lost a series of games to Tuckabatchee, a red town, prompting 
Autossee to gain Tuckabatchee’s red moiety.
39
  In sum, Upper Creek headmen in 1799 
reflected and reinforced the machinery of inter-town connections. 
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 For the ball game, see Mary R. Haas, “Creek Inter-Town Relations” (1940), in A Creek 
Source Book, ed. William C. Sturtevant (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1987), 479-489, 
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Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 
argues that Choctaw war leaders could become diplomats as circumstances dictated (35).  The 
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Indians, 317-375. 
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 Lower Creek headmen, too, recognized that the National Council derived its 
authority from, and could not subvert the traditions of, towns.  The Maryland-born 
William Augustus Bowles shines light on Lower Creek attitudes towards political power.  
For personal motives, beginning in the early 1790s Bowles styled himself as “Director 
General” of the Creeks and lived among Creek and Seminole peoples.  His strategy was 
to unite the Southern Indians in a defensive pan-Indian pact that challenged American 
expansion.  Although many Creeks and Seminoles supported Bowles throughout the 
1790s, he tended to antagonize U.S.-Creek and Spanish-Creek relations by leading or 
inspiring Native attacks along the Southern frontier.
40
  For instance, sometime in 1799 a 
Creek-Seminole war party killed American settlers near Seminole country, allegedly on 
Bowles’s orders.  Whether Bowles actually moved these Indians to action is unknown, 
but Hawkins demanded that Creek headmen swiftly punish the marauders.  Little Prince 
of Broken Arrow and Cussita Mico responded to Hawkins by blaming the war party on 
Bowles’s Indians.  The headmen told him, “There are 38 great towns in this nation and 
[do] 20 rogues and mischiefmakers think that they can spoil their talks[?] Are these 20 to 
give Law to this land? NO. They must not, they shall not.”
41
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 On the surface, the headmen’s invocation of “38 great towns” endorsed, as they 
said, a Creek “nation.”  A Nation, the headmen implied, ought to punish the rogue band 
of twenty “mischiefmakers” who undermined the national interests of those thirty-eight 
towns.  As the headmen rhetorically asked, would twenty Indians dictate national policy 
or “Law”?  Of course, “NO.”  In order to punish the wrongdoers and prevent additional 
frontier violence, the headmen suggested substituting national law for local clan justice.  
“The mischiefmakers . . . must be sent to the Esaugetuh Emissee [i.e., to the Master of 
Breath (meaning killed)]. [And if] a man dies, it is the Law, that killed him. It is the 
nation who killed him. It is not one man or one family.”  Little Prince and Cussita Mico 
were saying that criminal punishment fell under the purview of national “Law,” thereby 
replacing the power of clans to punish a wayward kinsman with a Western-style national 
law-making body.
42
  At first glance, then, the Lower Creek headmen promoted national 
law over local custom to bring the troublemakers to justice. 
 Upon closer inspection, the headmen conveyed a localist understanding of 
Council law.  First, Hawkins was their immediate audience, and he was a vocal 
proponent of the suppression of clan justice and of the replacement of clan justice with 
coercive law.  Headmen told Hawkins what he wanted to hear, especially since Bowles’s 
activities plagued U.S.-Creek relations and caused the U.S. to threaten the Creeks with a 
temporary suspension of trade.  Moreover, by invoking “38 great towns,” Little Prince 
and Cussita Mico indicated that national law was consensual, driven by a majority of 
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“great” talwas and therefore representative of the political majority.  Law and policy 
derived from and could only be implemented by the thirty-eight towns, which formed the 
backbone of the National Council.  Headmen’s knowledge of the precise quantity of 
towns indicates that they understood that local interests filtered, rather than explicitly 
obeyed, Council authority.
43
 
 The Lower Creek headmen acknowledged that local traditions, too, guided 
Council law in the quest to apprehend and/or execute the twenty “mischiefmakers,” 
including Bowles.  By invoking the powers of the Master of Breath (“Esaugetuh 
Emissee”), a major deity in the Muskogean cosmos, headmen couched their message to 
Hawkins in traditional language.  In their view, the Master of Breath would ultimately 
claim the troublemakers.  The best evidence that Little Prince and Cussita Mico promoted 
a localist understanding of Council authority, however, was their advocacy of the Broken 
Days custom.  They suggested that the Council ought to debate and pass national laws by 
doing the following: “Let us try the Sticks. It is not the talk of one man. Let us try the 
Sticks, that is the law of the Creek people. If the Sticks will do, very well, we are safe, if 
they will not do, we must do more.”
44
  The “Sticks” or Broken Days custom was a pre-
contact political practice.  To render judgment on a pending decision, such as going to 
war, a group of towns exchanged a bundle of sticks.  As the bundle passed from town to 
town, each consented to the decision by taking out a stick.  If a town disagreed, it simply 
passed the bundle along to another town.  By promoting the Broken Days as a way of 
                                                             
 
43
 Hawkins to Alexander Cornells, 11/5/1799, Coweta Tallahassee, LBH, 1:267-268 
(additional quotes removed). 
 
44
 Hawkins to Alexander Cornells, 11/5/1799, Coweta Tallahassee, LBH, 1:267-268 
(additional quotes removed).  Emphasis mine. 
 
303 
 
debating and implementing Council law, the Lower Creek headmen respected Creek 
traditions and the principle of consensus undergirding those traditins.  The National 
Council therefore exercised authority so long as towns consented.
45
 
 The Council did, however, fuel national and international coalition-building, as 
the remainder of this chapter will show.  These extra-local coalitions arose from the 
concerns of the towns represented in those coalitions.  The expansion of America both 
stimulated and hindered the Council’s role in the shaping of national and international 
coalitions.  In the early nineteenth century, the Southern states embarked on a program to 
legally dispossess the Southern Indians of their lands, with Georgia leading the vanguard.  
In April 1802, Georgia ceded to the U.S. its colonial-era land claims, which extended 
from the Chattahoochee River to the Mississippi, in exchange for permitting federal 
commissioners to negotiate the “removal” of the Southern Indians from Georgia in the 
near future.  By agreeing to this “Georgia Compact,” the state relinquished treaty-making 
power to the U.S., which in turn recognized Georgia’s suzerainty over land between the 
Savannah and Chattahoochee Rivers.  Lower Creek, Seminole, and Cherokee towns lived 
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within this claim, which placed them in the line of fire.
46
  Federal commissioners wasted 
no time in securing a cession of Native lands within the new boundaries of Georgia.  
Using Creek debts to the U.S. trading house at Fort Wilkinson, Georgia, as leverage, 
federal commissioners pressed the Creeks for two land cessions.  On June 16, headmen 
touched pen to the Treaty of Fort Wilkinson, by which the Creeks ceded two moderately-
sized tracts of land: one between the Okmulgee and Oconee Rivers, where Lower Creeks 
and Cherokees hunted; and the second, just west of the St. Marys River, where Seminoles 
hunted.  In exchange, the U.S. promised the Creeks additional annuity monies to relieve 
trade debt.
47
 
 This treaty exhibits both Creek national unity and Southern Indian disunity.  
When Creek headmen consented to each land cession, they ignored the Seminoles, who 
stood to lose land.
48
  On the other hand, Creek headmen’s agreement to the cessions was 
apparently supported by their town communities, who attended the Fort Wilkinson 
conference in large numbers.  In late June, after the treaty’s signing, Mad Dog of 
Tuckabatchee addressed a message to the Seminoles informing them of the treaty.  He 
said that the “the two Upper and the Lower rivers”—the Three Rivers—were “now with 
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me,” meaning that they approved the treaty.  By couching his words in the language of 
provincial community, he exposed the community basis of treaty-making.  Moreover, he 
told the Seminoles that “thirty-two [Creek] towns” representing the “whole Creek nation” 
agreed to the treaty.  That figure is roughly supported by the commissioners, who later 
reported that twenty-seven towns and eight villages had been present during the 
negotiations.  In sum, the Treaty of Fort Wilkinson was made possible by the attendance 
of more than thirty Creek towns—and by ignoring Seminole input.
49
 
 The presence of numerous towns prompted headmen to air Creeks’ grievances.  
On June 9, in the midst of negotiations, leaders indicted American expansion.  Mad Dog 
excoriated the commissioners’ request for land when Georgia lacked the power (and will) 
to restrain American migrants from crossing the Oconee.  He implied that if the Creeks 
gave away more land, American settlers would simply defy an adjustment of the U.S.-
Creek boundary.  Additionally, Mad Dog complained of settlers crossing the Tombigbee 
River into Upper Creek country.  They “put over their cattle in the fork on the Alabama 
hunting grounds” and permit their cows to graze “a great way on our lands.”  Hopoie 
Micco of the Upper Creek town of Hickory Ground seconded Mad Dog, adding that 
“houses are built on our lands, and fields are cleared and cultivated [by settlers].”  
American expansion signaled the sustained invasion of Creek country.  The Lower 
Creeks lodged a complaint, too.  Long Lieutenant (“Tus-ke-ne-hau Chapco”) of Coweta 
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and Cussita Mico requested satisfaction for the death of three of their townspeople, whom 
settlers had recently killed.
50
 
 While Creek towns consented to the Treaty of Fort Wilkinson, the Seminoles 
probably did not.  Creek headmen arrogated to themselves the power to speak for the 
Seminoles, who, recall, were ethnic offshoots of the Lower Creek towns.  On June 30, 
two weeks after the treaty signing, Mad Dog and other headmen demanded that the 
Seminoles obey the St. Marys land cession and “listen to the voice of the chiefs of the 
[Creek] nation.”  He attempted to give his “talk” a measure of authority by remarking that 
the Aubocoes” supported it.  By calling attention to the Abeikas, Mad Dog invoked some 
of oldest and most influential towns in Creek society.
51
  No matter how Mad Dog framed 
his authority, however, news of the cession probably infuriated the Seminoles. 
 By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Seminole towns conducted 
their affairs autonomously, free from Creek authority.  By examining a Seminole talk 
dated November 1796, we can infer that at least twelve Seminole towns likely ignored 
the 1802 St. Marys cession.  That talk was authored by a Seminole headman named 
Thomas Perryman who spoke on behalf of “all the Chiefs of the Small Towns on the 
[Chattahoochee] River,” where “there is a good many about Down the river.”  Perryman 
sent the message to William Panton, a trader and part owner of Panton, Leslie, and 
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Company.  Speaking for a total of twelve towns on the lower Chattahoochee, Perryman 
said “that those lower towns has allways sat Still & have been to No [treaties], but the 
[Creek] Towns has been from one [treaty] to a Nother.”  He admitted that by meeting 
U.S. officials in treaty councils, the Creeks acquired trade goods.  The Seminoles, on the 
other hand, “have sat Still, & that is the reason they are . . . poore for things and 
ammunition.”  After appealing to Panton for a trade alliance, Perryman declared the 
twelve towns’ independence from the Creeks, even though “we have allways sat Still & 
lisined to Our friends the [Creeks].”  Specifically, Perryman and the twelve Seminole 
towns repudiated the Treaty of Coleraine, which established a boundary line between the 
Americans and Spanish and, in the process, impinged on Seminole lands.  “We Lower 
Towns,” he said of the Seminoles, “never can agree to [it] & the [Creeks] knows [sic] 
it.”
52
  Thus, if Perryman’s coalition of twelve Seminole towns repudiated the Coleraine 
treaty and its establishment of a U.S.-Spanish boundary, the St. Marys cession of 1802 
most likely upset those Seminoles as well.
53
 
 The Fort Wilkinson treaty is important for several reasons.  First, as Angela 
Pulley Hudson argues, during the treaty conference some Creek headmen defended Creek 
lands with a sharp understanding of borders, despite popular notions at the time that 
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Indians lacked a sense of territoriality.
54
  Additionally, it unearths the state of Creek 
politics at the turn of the century.  From the Coleraine conference of 1796 to the Fort 
Wilkinson conference of 1802, treaty-making rested on the participation of numerous 
towns.  From the moment they opened a conference to the moment they touched pen to a 
treaty, Creek headmen acknowledged their constituents.  When Mad Dog announced the 
presence of the “two Upper and the Lower rivers” at Fort Wilkinson, he revealed a 
political symbiosis among town/Council headmen, such as himself, and the communities 
they represented in foreign affairs.
55
 
 Unfortunately, Creek unity failed to translate into pan-Indian unity.  Put 
differently, American authorities’ unrelenting requests for Southern Indian land fostered 
pan-Indian disunity.  By ceding a parcel of Seminole land and demanding that the 
Seminoles recognize that cession, Creek headmen sought to protect national interests at 
the Seminoles’ expense.  Fort Wilkinson forced Creeks to define the intertribal borders of 
the Native South, causing Creek headmen to appoint themselves to be the arbiters in 
deciding where those borders began and ended.  The stakes were high, as American 
authorities used Creek trade debts as leverage to force headmen to cede land.
56
  Thus, 
Fort Wilkinson underscored the point that American expansion threw up barriers to pan-
Indianism and encouraged Indians to define themselves in opposition to other Indians.  
But there was a silver lining. 
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 Scholars have overlooked a rigorous attempt by the Creeks, in the immediate 
wake of Fort Wilkinson, to bar any future land cessions in the Native South.
57
  In the late 
spring of 1803, the Upper Creek town of Hickory Ground hosted a National Council 
meeting.  That meeting doubled as a pan-Indian assembly composed of the “four 
mothers” or “four nations”—namely the Creeks/Seminoles, Cherokees, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws.
58
  Euro-Americans attended the conference, too, including John Forbes, who 
was the younger brother of Thomas Forbes of Panton & Leslie; Estevan Folch, the son of 
Pensacola’s commandant; Agent Hawkins; a French official known only as Croisiers, 
employed by the Spanish as interpreter; and the self-appointed Creek chief, William 
Augustus Bowles.  On June 2, the Four Mothers announced what one Creek headman 
later called a “resolution” or, because it took shape in Hickory Ground, what I call the 
Hickory Ground Resolution.
59
  By it, the Southern Indians agreed to cede no additional 
land to the U.S. without the “consent of the whole confederacy.”
60
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 Although the Southern Indians soon ceded land without consulting one another, 
the Resolution showcases, first, the Southern Indians’ ability to promote Native 
sovereignty in a way that contested the Georgia Compact of 1802.  While American 
colonialism divided the Southern Indians, it also caused them to co-envision a future 
whereby Southern Indian lands, lifeways, and communities could be protected.  
Secondly, it marked a sharper engagement by the National Council with pan-Indian 
union, as Creeks parlayed their town-based national Three Rivers Resolution into the 
town-based international Hickory Ground Resolution.  By balancing the local, national, 
and international, the Creeks via the National Council synthesized Creek-centric goals 
with a quest for pan-Indian cohesion. 
 Creeks’ participation in confederation-building gradually accelerated in the 
eighteenth century.  In 1759 and 1760, Mortar of Okchai tried to unite the Creeks and 
Cherokees against British occupation, although most Creeks failed to support his effort at 
confederation-building.  Under the leadership of the Ottawa headman Pontiac and the 
Delaware prophet Neolin, in 1763 the incipient Western Indian Confederacy launched 
“Pontiac’s Rebellion.”  The uprising transcended ethnic difference in the Ohio and Great 
Lakes regions and, for a time, successfully challenged British imperialism.  The Creeks 
did not necessarily support the Confederacy, however.  Rather, they tapped into its 
diplomatic networks in the attempt to restore peace with the Choctaws. 
 In the Revolutionary era, Creek headmen more actively dialogued with other 
Southern Indians.  In the summer of 1776, Okchai hosted several Cherokee headmen who 
arrived with “Talks and belt [belts?] of wampum” from the Mohawks, Delawares, and 
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Shawnees.  A decision to ally with the British or rebels, it seems, necessitated pan-Indian 
discussion.
61
  In March 1786, Spanish Governor Estevan Miró reported that a “meeting 
[was] held by the Indian tribes, Talapoosa, Cherokee, and Chickasaw, who continue firm 
in their friendship” to the Spanish.  This pan-Indian compact may have deliberated on 
whether or not to raid the American frontier.
62
  Hallowing King’s reception of a wampum 
belt in 1798 by the Northern and Southern Indians was the most recent expression of pan-
Indian engagement by the Creeks.  By 1803, then, Creeks possessed real-world 
experience in Native North American confederation-building.
63
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 But while the international context of pan-Indian alliance and Southern 
geopolitics inspired the Hickory Ground Resolution,
64
 I argue that Creek politics, Creek 
community, and Creek political traditions, such as the Three Rivers Resolution, nurtured 
and breathed life into the Resolution.  After all, this was the Hickory Ground Resolution, 
an intertribal compact that nonetheless took shape within a Creek town, during a Creek 
National Council meeting, and from Creek headmen who conducted the negotiations that 
resulted in the announcement of the Resolution on June 2.  Precisely because the Council 
adhered to Creeks’ local ways of life, it shaped and enabled extra-localism in the Native 
South.  Moreover, Creeks took their rich coalition-building experiences within Creek 
society and applied them to an even richer international context.  But why did Creeks 
host the May-June 1803 Council Meeting in Hickory Ground as opposed to Tuckabatchee 
or Coweta, where the Council usually met?  Mad Dog explained why. 
 On June 30, 1802, two weeks after the Fort Wilkinson treaty conference 
concluded, Mad Dog announced to federal commissioners his retirement from the 
national speakership.
65
  He appointed to that capacity a Hickory Ground headman named 
Hopoie Micco, about whom little is known.  His town was located on the lower Coosa 
River near the Alabama towns and about twenty miles west of Mad Dog’s hometown.
66
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 For Hopoie Micco and his town affiliation, see Commissioners Wilkinson and Hawkins 
to Dearborn, 7/15/1802, near Fort Wilkinson, ASPIA, 1:670.  This document is slightly unclear, 
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The retired speaker also selected Hickory Ground as “the town for the meeting of the 
national council in the future.”  Mad Dog made this announcement so that “all the chiefs 
of the Upper and Lower towns may know where business is to be done, that they may 
attend to it.”
67
 
 Mad Dog chose Hickory Ground for future National Council meetings for two 
reasons.  First, since that town belonged to the white or “peace” division, Mad Dog 
promoted diplomacy and peace over war.  The popular Council seats of Tuckabatchee 
and Coweta, on the other hand, were both red towns.  For a short time after 1802, then, a 
white town committed to keeping good relations with Euro-Americans and other 
Southern Indians hosted the National Council.
68
  Secondly, Mad Dog may have attempted 
to modernize the Council.  In this attempt, he echoed the community rhythms of Upper 
Creek life.  By the early nineteenth century, a minority of Creeks practiced African 
American slavery, which was based on kinship rather than race because slaveholders 
tended to incorporate their slaves into the matrilineal networks of Creek society.  One 
scholar has called these slaves the “African Creeks.”
69
  Hickory Ground embodied the 
rich dynamic among slavery, culture, and town life.  After Alexander McGillivray passed 
away in 1793, his sister Sophia Durant, owner of eighty slaves, established Hickory 
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Ground just downstream from Little Tallassee with her family and slaves.
70
  A few years 
later, according to one report, Upper Creek “negros” made “their way to Mrs. Durand’s 
[i.e., Hickory Ground] to keep Christmas . . . [when] they made a gathering together at 
Mrs. Durand’s or her sister’s, where there lived more of the black people than in any 
other part of the nation.”  In Hickory Ground, the African Creeks “had a proper frolic of 
rum drinking and dancing.”
71
  By appointing that town as the Council meeting place, 
Mad Dog elevated racial inclusion over exclusion, diplomacy over war, and white over 
red. 
 Throughout May 1803, delegations from the Four Nations arrived at Hickory 
Ground.  On May 21, Creek headmen received the “Chactaws’ deputies,” as Spanish 
official Esteban Folch observed, “with much ceremony at the square.”  A Cherokee 
embassy arrived on or before the 23rd, and during that evening, the Creeks, Cherokees, 
and Choctaws held a “secret council all night.”  Folch noticed that “none” of the Indians 
“are armed, this being a white or peace town. Perhaps they may have left their guns in the 
woods or somewhere in the Indian hutts. It is certain that none approach the square with 
arms in their hands.”  In this way, the pan-Indian assembly relied upon symbols of peace 
to cultivate an aura of unity among the Southern Indians, similar to Hallowing King’s 
previous attempt in 1798 to align Southern and Northern Indian interests.  On the 25th, 
                                                             
 
70
 For a description of Ocheubofau and Sophia Durant’s migration to that town after the 
death of her brother, Alexander McGillivray, see Ethridge, Creek Country, 84. 
 
71
 Benjamin Hawkins, entry 12/25/1796, in “Journal,” LBH, 27-29.  African Creeks from 
the “towns” north of Autossee traveled to Hickory Ground for the Christmas festival.  Moreover, 
“the white people and Indians [Creeks] met generally at the same place with them and had the 
same amusement” (29).  Hawkins spent Christmas at trader Richard Bailey’s house along the 
Tallapoosa River about one mile west of Autossee (27).  For Durant and Ocheubofau, see 
Ethridge, Creek Country, 84-85.  Bailey had a ranch with his Creek wife (Ethridge, Creek 
Country, 69 (figure 10), 78). 
 
315 
 
Seminole, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Cherokee headmen convened in the Hickory 
Ground square, perhaps to discuss issues related to land cessions and trade debts.  In the 
evening, Native headmen strengthened bonds via dance.  Folch witnessed a “dance which 
is performed” in the “hot house,” a “large rotunda” with a “conical roof nearly fifty feet 
diameter.”  All members likely participated in the dance which resembled, Folch mused, 
the “actions and steps as the forest bear when he is taught.”
72
 
 The nuances of Creek politics shaped the intertribal forum.  Negotiations got 
underway only after Creeks from the “lower parts of the Nation” arrived.
73
  Moreover, 
the Council elected Tuckabatchee’s Mad Dog and Big Warrior as assembly leaders, who 
may have possessed more diplomatic experience than Hickory Ground’s Hopoie Micco.  
While Big Warrior was made the “executive officer,” Mad Dog served in the capacity of 
cultural ambassador of the Four Mothers.  According to Folch, Mad Dog “keeps the 
different belts of wampum and preserves the memory of the several embassies that 
brought them,” and on the 26th he narrated “their history before the young warriors, that 
they might preserve the records after his death.”
74
  A seasoned diplomat and ritual 
specialist, Mad Dog knew the ins and outs of Native custom.
75
  He therefore served with 
distinction as the intertribal record-keeper and storyteller. 
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 On the morning of May 28, the Four Mothers ceremoniously elected, according to 
Folch, “two new kings.”  Euro-Americans like Folch tended to employ “king” when 
referring to the indigenous terms for the head leader of a town.  Creeks called their 
“king” a mico; the Choctaws and Chickasaws, a mingo.  In some cases, though, Indians 
leveraged these terms in the service of diplomacy.  Evidence suggests that the interpreter, 
Croisiers, and the Choctaw headman “Mingo Homastabi” were each appointed as an 
intertribal “king.”  An elaborate ceremony was required for such an appointment.  
According to Folch, the “kings” were “seated side by side” in one of the structures of the 
square ground and placed “beneath” them was a “white deerskin,” a symbol of peace.  A 
sacred tea known among the Indians as the White Drink was prepared while two square 
ground officials, appointed for the following purpose, “advanced and one spoke with 
considerable force of gesture respecting the ceremony that was to be performed . . . and 
the virtues necessary to be possessed by a king.”  The speaker then “turned round and put 
into the Chactaw’s hand a white wing” as an additional emblem of peaceful relations, and 
Croisiers “followed him and ended with the same ceremony.”  At this point, all of the 
assembled Indians “got up and gave [the two kings] their hand. The [white drink] was put 
round and the ceremony ended.”
76
 
 As a result of this ceremony, the Southern Indians transformed Croisiers and 
Mingo Homastabi each into a Fanni Mico.  A Fanni Mico served as a cultural broker for 
his people and an outside group that fictively adopted him for that purpose.  Fanni Micos 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Indians, ed. Thomas J. Pluckhahn and Robbie Ethridge (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 2006): 57-93. 
 
76
 Folch, 5/28, “Journal,” PLC, reel 14, frames1563-1564. 
 
317 
 
could be Native or European.  We know that in the colonial period the Choctaws adopted 
several French governors as Fanni Micos, but that a Creek headman named Red Coat 
King served the British and Creeks as a Fanni Mico.  Typically, though, a Fanni Mico, 
whether Native or European, was supposed to cultivate ties between Europeans and 
Indians.  But by 1803, the Southern Indians appear to have adapted the institution of the 
Fanni Mico to promote the interests of all Southern Indians and the Southern Indians 
only.  Evidence indicates that Croisiers’ newfound status as a “king” was merely titular 
and harkened back to the Franco-Choctaw alliance in the colonial period.  There was a 
general sentiment among the Southern Indians that the French had always made fewer 
claims on their lands than the British.  In the early nineteenth century, when the Southern 
Indians faced rapid land loss, Croisiers embodied a hope that they could work together to 
reduce debt and stop the hemorrhage of land.
77
 
 After the Fanni Mico ceremony, the Four Mothers did two things.  First, to 
strengthen their friendship with Spain and America, they arrested the troublemaker 
Bowles, who attended the conference, and sent him “under guard” to Tuskegee just south 
of Hickory Ground.  Later that day, Folch and Hawkins traveled to Tuskegee to witness 
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Bowles’s exile from Creek country.  Bowles “was put on board a canoe and the crowd of 
[Indian] men, women, and children immediately pushed it off.”  He was bound for 
Pensacola.
78
  Just as the Fanni Mico ceremony unfolded within a rich town context, so 
Bowles’s arrest required the participation of Southern Indian men, women, and children.  
Secondly, after expelling Bowles from their midst, the Four Mothers announced the 
Hickory Ground Resolution on June 2.  Speaking on their behalf, the Chickamauga 
Cherokee Doublehead informed the small Euro-American audience that the Indians 
would now bar one another from ceding land without the “consent of the whole 
confederacy.”
79
 
 Although the Creeks agreed to the Resolution, they called a National Council 
meeting to confirm it.  Perhaps no other Southern Indians attended the meeting, which 
indicates that Creek towns preferred to discuss policy decisions on their own terms, allied 
though they were to their Native neighbors.  In this way, Creeks’ cross-town politics 
filtered and translated an international agreement.  In late August 1803, Hopoie Micco of 
Hickory Ground apprised Governor of Pensacola Vicente Folch of the Hickory Ground 
Resolution.  Hopoie Micco explained that at “our first meeting at the Hickory ground 
when the four mothers was together there in presence of your Son [Esteban Folch] & Mr 
[John] Forbes [w]e . . . concluded to [give?] no more Land away to the White people.”  
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Perhaps weeks later, however, all Creek towns (“the whole of us together”) attended a 
Creek National Council assembly whereby the Creeks “confirmed that resolution” and 
declared their refusal to part with “Land [requested] by the White people.”  Aside from 
protecting lands, the Resolution allowed the Creeks to speak with one voice.  After all, 
“what would other [Indian] nations think of us or the white people themselfs,” Hopoie 
Micco queried, if the Creeks ceded land after agreeing to the Resolution?  They “would 
say we were a wavering & inconstant” people.  By meeting as a national body, the Creeks 
ratified the Resolution and incorporated it into their world of towns.
80
 
 The Resolution compelled the formation of a multi-town coalition dedicated to 
working with the Cherokees.  In August 1803, Hopoie Micco informed Governor Folch 
that the Creeks planned to attend a “great Talk” scheduled among the Cherokees in 
September.  The Cherokees probably invited the Creeks to the conference to discuss the 
Fort Wilkinson treaty.  That treaty stipulated that commissioners drawn from the Creeks 
and Americans survey a new U.S.-Creek boundary line that lay between the Oconee and 
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Okmulgee Rivers.  Because Cherokee hunting lands existed near those rivers, Cherokee 
hunters feared that the Creeks might convince the U.S. to survey Cherokee lands in order 
to protect their own.  Perhaps to dissuade the Cherokees of that possibility, Hopoie Micco 
of Hickory Ground, Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee, Little Prince of Broken Arrow, and a 
Fish Ponds headman planned to confer with the Cherokees in September.  Whether the 
“great Talk” took place is unknown, but Hopoie Micco’s message suggests that the 
Hickory Ground Resolution generated a cross-town alliance among Creek society, and 
that the Creeks seemed willing to partner with other Native societies in the attempt to 
coordinate intertribal action via the recently-passed Resolution.
81
 
 Fortunately for the Cherokees, the Creeks defied running the proposed boundary 
line, doing so within the legal framework established by the Resolution.
82
  In January 
1804, only one Coweta and two Cussitas turned out to meet U.S. authorities, including 
Benjamin Hawkins and a U.S. surveyor named Mr. Freeman, in Georgia.  The 
commissioners’ journal reveals that the three Lower Creek commissioners were 
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intransigent to the decision to survey lands which, they claimed, belonged to Creeks.  As 
a result, the task was never completed.
83
  Generally, the Southern Indians recognized that 
treaty boundaries established artificial lines, and that U.S. surveyors, exploiting that fact, 
surveyed more Native land than headmen originally agreed to in a given treaty.
84
  For this 
reason James Durouzeaux, a freelance interpreter who worked for the U.S. and Spain, 
reported to Hawkins that “the talks we can hear all from Oasoochee Towns” (meaning the 
Lower Creeks) were “against running the line.”  For his part, Tame King of Halfway 
House “had a meeting at the apalacheekby[?],” which might refer to the Hitchiti town of 
Patachoche (old Apalachicola) on the Chattahoochee River.  Tame King told the 
Patachoche people that the “French are returning to their former places” with the result 
that the “lower [Hitchiti] towns has stoped all their people from gowing on the 
[boundary] line.”
85
  At least partially, the Hickory Ground Resolution underwrote Creek 
resistance to the boundary line and, more generally, constituted a legal challenge to U.S. 
colonialism. 
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 The Hickory Ground Resolution embodied the twinned dynamics of 
confederation and community politics.  In the Treaty of Fort Wilkinson, Creeks ceded 
land that abutted Cherokee hunting grounds and that encompassed Seminole hunting 
grounds.  This treaty generated friction among the Southern Indians by exposing the 
reality that indigenous boundaries were imprecise and by encouraging individual Native 
societies to privilege their interests over and above others’.  As a result, the Four Mothers 
sought to align Native interests and protect Native land by chartering the Hickory Ground 
Resolution.  The pan-Indian compact demonstrated an impressive, albeit brief, example 
of pan-tribal unity in the early national era.  At the same time, as Creeks adapted the 
Three Rivers Resolution to an international context, the Hickory Ground Resolution 
captured a more rigorous attempt by Creeks to confederate with other Indians.  Creek 
town traditions and cross-town ties in Creek society informed that transition.  By hosting 
the Four Mothers in the white town of Hickory Ground, by appointing Mad Dog and Big 
Warrior to positions of intertribal leadership, by ratifying the Resolution in a separate 
town-based Council meeting, and by partnering with fellow Creek towns to implement it, 
ordinary Creeks and Council headmen localized confederation.
86
 
 A November 1805 treaty conference between Creek headmen and federal 
commissioners in the City of Washington, however, upped the stakes.  In what became 
the Treaty of Washington, just six Creek headmen ceded the prime hunting grounds in 
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the fork of the Oconee and Okmulgee Rivers.  With the stroke of a pen, the Okmulgee 
River became the new U.S.-Creek boundary (Figure 14).  The headmen also permitted 
the U.S. to construct a road through Creek country, namely the Federal Post Path, 
otherwise known as the “Federal Road.”
87
  In exchange, William McIntosh of Coweta 
and the five other signatories were granted exclusive rights to establish and operate any 
ferries, stands, taverns, or other commercial enterprises along the Federal Road. 
 The decision by a small group of headmen to cede land captures the class 
divisions that had emerged in Creek society by the early 1800s.  Some market-oriented 
headmen had begun to make decisions without popular approval.
88
  According to Angela 
Hudson, the Treaty of Washington marked a rupture in “Creek national politics” because 
it essentially pitted six market-oriented headmen against the masses, the have-nots, who 
reeled from hunger and lack of access to new forms of wealth.
89
  I do not contest these 
interpretations, yet I argue that they gloss over the ways in which ordinary Creeks 
actively contested economic cleavage and replaced corrupt headmen with those 
respecting consensus.  The remainder of the chapter explores this dynamic. 
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 As news of the Okmulgee cession trickled into Creek society in the winter of 
1805-1806, the Creeks, armed with the power of consensus, executed Speaker Hopoie 
Micco of Hickory Ground.  Hawkins reported to a Georgia official that “Hopoie Micco . . 
. was murdered . . . by two men of Cussetuh.”
90
  Although Hopoie Micco never traveled 
to Washington for the treaty, he bore indirect responsibility for the Washington treaty 
because, as Speaker, he represented the face of the Council.  Also, common Creeks began 
to believe that the Council inadequately addressed the crises afflicting their world.  
Hawkins once wrote that Hopoie Micco “and the old [Council] Chiefs” had “expressed to 
me their apprehension, that the intruders on their rights would dispossess them of their 
lands, their hunting nearly done, their young people improvident and ungovernable, their 
[trade] expenses accumulating on them . . . and the land speculators eager to misrepresent 
. . . them” (my emphasis).
91
  Clearly, the Council could not solve all of these issues.  But 
perhaps the most immediate cause of the Speaker’s execution was his culpability in the 
Treaty of the Creek Agency.  In November 1804, fully a year before the Washington 
treaty, Hopoie Micco and “select [Creek] men” met Benjamin Hawkins at the U.S. 
Agency on the Flint River.  There the headmen consented to the Okmulgee cession, 
anticipating the Washington treaty by a year.
92
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 By executing the Speaker, the Cussitas excised from office those headmen they 
perceived as corrupt.  More generally, that act captured and buttressed the Creeks’ broad-
based view of consensual leadership traceable to the colonial period.  Only those leaders 
whose coalitions, policies, and diplomatic language toed the communal line maintained 
legitimacy, such as Wolf of Muccolossus, Mortar of Okchai, Emistisiguo of Little 
Tallassee, Fat King of Cussita, Tame King of Tallassee, Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee, and 
even the nation-builder, Alexander McGillivray.  Indeed, executing the Council speaker 
was a drastic move that probably required the consent of numerous Lower and Upper 
Creek towns.  Recall that a national coalition of headmen appointed the Cussitas to carry 
out the execution of Ochlulkee, an Okfuskee man, in 1774.
93
  A generation later, Creeks 
again called upon the Cussitas to execute Hopoie Micco, another political outcast.  
Unlike Ochlulkee’s execution, however, Hopoie Micco’s death sparked a brief moment 
of division between the Lower and Upper Creeks. 
 The execution of a prominent officeholder mounted a serious challenge to 
Council authority and, as Hawkins wrote from Tuckabatchee, “perplexed every thing 
here.”
94
  The “Chiefs are yet divided, proud and jealous, [and] full of intrigue,” he 
observed.  As a result, Creeks debated the speaker’s succession.    They “cannot unite in a 
speaker,” “the young men” refusing to accept “the sale of the Ocmulgee lands” ceded in 
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the Washington/Creek Agency treaties.  Nor did a candidate step forward.  Oche Haujo 
(Alexander Cornells), who signed the 1805 treaty, did not want the Speakership, for he 
had “been alarmed by . . . threats for his personal safety.”
95
  The vast majority of Creeks 
indicted Council leadership.  As Hawkins observed, the Creeks were “confused & 
suspicious,” and because game was scare, “their hunters were ungovernable” and 
“charged the Chiefs with giving away their lands” in 1802, 1804, and 1805.
96
 
 Although the Speakership remained vacant as late as July 1807, Upper and Lower 
Creek leaders repaired the breech between the Council and the towns by heeding their 
constituents’ demand for exorcising corrupt leaders from the Council.  For instance, in 
that month, Hawkins learned that Upper Creek headmen were “distrustful” of two 
Coweta leaders, namely William McIntosh and Long Lieutenant, who signed the 
Washington treaty.  Upper Creek headmen believed these men to be “too much attached 
to and in the interest of the white people,” meaning they were corrupt.
97
  The Lower 
Creeks agreed, and by October, Little Prince of Broken Arrow and Cussita Mico (also 
known as “Tuskegee Tustunnuggee”) had replaced McIntosh and Long Lieutenant, who 
were “dismissed from office.”
98
  By ousting McIntosh and Long Lieutenant, Upper and 
Lower Creek headmen bowed to the pressures of common Creeks who demanded 
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community leadership.  The Council reform of 1807 generated stability between the 
Lower and Upper towns.  In November 1808, for example, headmen from both the Lower 
and Upper towns convened with Hawkins in Okmulgee, an old Creek settlement area, to 
collect the annuity monies established by the Treaties of New York, Fort Wilkinson, and 
Washington.
99
 
 In April 1809, the National Council finally settled on a new speaker, Tame King 
of Halfway House.  Just months later, the National Council convened there.
100
  At first 
glance, Tame King’s appointment to the national speakership was provocative.  In the 
1780s, he signed the Creek-Georgia treaties that first established the Oconee River as the 
U.S.-Creek boundary and sparked controversy with the Upper Creeks.  In the 1790s, he 
defended that boundary by participating in raids on American settlements along the 
Oconee corridor, thereby poisoning U.S.-Creek relations.  In part to condemn his actions 
and promote diplomacy with U.S. officials, Creek headmen chartered the Three Rivers 
Resolution.  Although I am unable to locate evidence uncovering his activities in the late 
1790s and early 1800s, headmen may have marginalized him. 
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 Still, Tame King emerged as speaker because he voiced the interests of all Creeks 
and coolly mastered the language and symbols of diplomacy.  Unlike William McIntosh 
or Hopoie Micco, Tame King had his finger on the pulse of popular opinion.  Evidence 
bears this out.  In May 1811, he addressed a message to U.S. President James Madison 
from “Chatteeck, chu, fau, lee[?]” (Chattacchufaulee), otherwise known as Halfway 
House, Tame King’s town.  This town was positioned about “halfway” between the 
Lower and Upper towns, thereby striking a chord of unity and fairly representing all 
Creek towns.  Moreover, Tame King used kinship language that evoked Creeks’ desires 
for peace and sovereignty.  In the talk, he contested the Federal Road, reasoning with the 
logic of clan ties that “I have a large family of people in the Country and cannot 
govern[?] all so as to preserve a good understanding.”  He linked land and livelihood, 
emphasizing that U.S. roads “would bring trouble on our Country - I am an old man and 
speaker for our warriors[.] when we find a thing will not be good for us we must say it 
will not do. [T]he great god made us and the lands for us to walk on.”  Specifically, the 
Federal Road constituted an attack on Creek sovereignty, for “what land we have left 
is[?] but large enough to live and walk on.”  Also, Tame King sought to harmonize 
generational ties, for if the U.S. failed to restrain expansion, “our young people will say 
our old people are crazy and do not look into our rights.”  In short, Tame King marshaled 
his skill in diplomacy and rhetoric to defend his people—“a large family of people.”
 101
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 As speaker Tame King promoted Creek interests, Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee 
revived the spirit of the Hickory Ground Resolution.  Unlike the late Hopoie Micco, Big 
Warrior’s status as a wealthy slaveholder did not preclude him from representing his 
society’s concerns.  He ardently defended Southern Indian lands.  In May 1809, around 
the time the Creeks chose Tame King as speaker, the Tuckabatchee headman sent a letter 
to a Cherokee headman named Pathmaker.  Perhaps raising the gnawing issue of 
intertribal boundaries, Big Warrior scolded the Cherokees for permitting the Americans 
to settle in “our Country” and “disturbing our young people.”  Creeks, he said, “do not 
Like” being “mix’d with the white families” who coveted Creek lands and sowed 
dissension among the Indians.  Big Warrior thought he could address these problems by 
reminding Pathmaker of the 1803 Hickory Ground Resolution, saying 
 
You Know that it was agreed among The four nations, at this house [Hickory 
Ground] that we all should be of one mind, and one sentiment, and not to do, any 
thing contrary To that Talk; It has been repeated over and over at This house To 
the most of the head Chiefs, of the four nations; Cherokees[. The Americans are] 
a trying daily [to steal] the Chiefs mouth, you ought to be a sham;d of your 
conduct. [Creeks must keep their land] for our families, our Children, 
Childrens[?], And try to unite ourselves in peace and happiness.
102
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He therefore promoted pan-Indian unity to align Native interests, with the ultimate goal 
of protecting Creek land, families, and sovereignty.  Big Warrior was a square headman, 
a sincere voice for a Creek majority, which he thought would best be serviced by pan-
Indianism.  In fact, the Hickory Ground compact echoed among Creeks as late as April 
1810, when Hawkins wrote that Big Warrior and “his associates” as well as “some . . . 
Chiefs of the Upper Creeks” made “an other attempt . . . to unite the four nations under 
the Muscogee confederacy.”
103
 
 Big Warrior’s repeated attempts to achieve pan-Indian unity suggest that although 
American expansion divided the Four Mothers, headmen like himself kept the idea alive 
on behalf of Creek towns, clans, and families.  Like a good community leader, Big 
Warrior hoped that the Resolution might preserve Creek sovereignty and protect Creek 
“families” and “Children.”
104
  Tame King alerted President Madison to the exact same 
concerns.  Together, Tame King and Big Warrior exemplified the ways in which 
community shaped the Creek Council’s national and international goals in turn-of-the-
century Creek society.  Just as Tame King voiced the national interests of “a large family 
of people,” so Big Warrior encouraged pan-Indian unity to protect those same interests 
or, in his words, “our families [and] our Children.”
105
  Community, nation, and pan-
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Indianism: the National Council exuded and reflected all of these thrusts, despite the 
emerging class divisions in Creek society. 
 In the early national era, American migrants and slaves settled in unprecedented 
numbers in the Native South and exerted tremendous pressures on Indians to cede land 
and adopt Euro-American ways of living.  To survive change, the Creeks continued to 
privilege the locus of community and encourage town headmen, who served in the 
National Council, to enact policies that promoted the traditions and livelihood of Creek 
towns and families.  Although market-oriented headmen ceded land in the Treaty of the 
Creek Agency and of Washington, the day-to-day authority of the National Council 
hinged on consensual practices.  In the Treaty of Coleraine, the Treaty of Fort Wilkinson, 
Hallowing King’s diplomacy, the classification of Upper Creek towns, the invocation of 
the Broken Days tradition, the Hickory Ground Resolution, or in the emergence of Tame 
King and Big Warrior as prominent Council headmen in the early 1800s, the Creek 
Council personified the general interest—the many faces, whims, and attitudes of Creek 
clans, towns, and provinces. 
 The National Council was not a coercive body but a kind of institutional 
chameleon whose political shades changed according to circumstances in Creek 
country.
106
  In some cases, it worked on behalf of all Creeks by forging cross-town 
coalitions that in turn gave rise to international ones.
107
  The Hickory Ground Resolution 
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of June 2, 1803, for example, captures the local, national, and pan-Indian shades of Creek 
country most clearly.  A unique constellation of elements gave rise to the Resolution.  As 
Creeks more robustly participated in the project of confederation-building, they 
spearheaded a Council meeting that brought the Four Mothers together and encouraged 
unity among the Southern Indians.  By hosting the Council meeting in the multiracial 
peace town of Hickory Ground, Creeks signaled the modernity of Creek politics and re-
applied the Three Rivers Resolution of 1793 to an international coalition of Indians.  
Indeed, the Resolution was a culmination of Creek efforts in the late 1700s and early 
1800s to organize their world along the lines of clan, town, and nation.  This is not to 
deny the agency of the Cherokees, Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws at Hickory 
Ground but, rather, to highlight the unique diplomatic initiatives of Creeks and their 
National Council. 
 The Era of the Hickory Ground Resolution marked the simultaneous rise of class 
divisions and the enduring vitality of community politics.  Unmistakably, the Creeks’ 
biggest political achievement in this era was to rework the Three Rivers Resolution into 
the Hickory Ground Resolution.  While each respected and promoted community 
interests and consensual leadership, the Hickory Ground compact was more explicitly 
pan-Indian and recognized the crucial need for Indians to unite against colonization.  
Although the Southern Indians failed to do so, we should not fault them for that failure or 
expect them to have known that the Redstick War, much less Indian Removal, loomed 
ahead.  In many ways, the Hickory Ground Resolution served communal ends through 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
another and with events in distant places” (12).  “One thing is quite clear, however. The Creek 
Confederacy was never designed to have a central government” (12). 
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international means.  Big Warrior’s message to Pathmaker called for pan-Indian unity as 
a way to protect Creek “families [and] Children.”
108
  Big Warrior and his counterpart, 
Tame King, were doing what any good Council headman was appointed to do: recognize, 
empower, and speak for community.  Although the class divisions that surfaced by 1800 
impoverished the commoners and inspired the eruption of civil war in 1813, the late 
1790s and early 1800s feature numerous examples of headmen promoting community at 
local, national, and international levels.  When necessary, as in Hopoie Micco’s 
assassination, ordinary Creeks offered the proper correctives to the abuse of power.  
Unfortunately, as Chapter VII will show, political solutions would become a liability in 
maintaining order in the Creek universe.
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CHAPTER VII 
 
POLITICAL CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
 
 
 In 1812, the U.S. declared war on Great Britain.  For years, the Royal Navy had 
been “impressing” American sailors into His Majesty’s service and obstructing trade on 
the high seas.  Moreover, contrary to the Treaty of Paris of 1783, the British refused to 
evacuate key forts in the Great Lakes country, an act of defiance that the U.S. viewed as a 
threat to its sovereignty.  The War of 1812 pitted American “citizens” against British 
“subjects” in Canada, but it also divided each country.  One historian argues that in 
northeastern North America, where some of the heaviest fighting occurred, the War of 
1812 became a “civil war,” a battle within each country for “the hearts and minds” of 
soldiers, sailors, and civilians, all of whom possessed their own contested meanings of 
citizen and subject.  Despite a series of land and naval battles, neither the British nor the 
Americans gained the upper hand, and the war reached a stalemate in 1814.  In 
December, British and American diplomats signed the Treaty of Ghent, ending the war. 
 In the South, the War of 1812 pitted the Americans, British, Spanish, and Indians 
against one other for control of the land and resources there.  But just as the war divided 
the Shawnees in the Ohio valley and the Iroquois in New York, so too did the Southern 
Indians face internal strife.  From 1813 to 1814, Creek society devolved into a civil war 
known as the “Redstick War,” named after the red war clubs or “sticks” traditionally 
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carried by Creek warriors.
1
  Led by several prophets, thousands of Upper Creek 
Redsticks espoused two goals: 1) nullify U.S. civilization policy, and 2) alleviate the 
problems raised by growing economic disparities in Creek society.  America’s official 
policy towards all Indians in eastern North American was to encourage them to become 
yeoman farmers and ranchers.  This meant that men had to abandon hunting, and that 
women, many of whom fulfilled the role of farmer in their society, had to become 
housewives and attend domestic duties, such as spinning and weaving.  U.S.-Indian 
treaties provided the implements of husbandry and domestic work, including monies for 
livestock, fencing, plows, and carding units.  The Redsticks repudiated civilization 
because it mounted a threat to traditional Creek gender roles, spawned a class of wealthy 
headmen, and triggered inequality and hunger in towns.
2
 
                                                             
 
1
 For a compelling synthesis of the War of 1812, see Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: 
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Muskogees’ Struggle for a New World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991), 87-113; Robbie 
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North Carolina Press, 2003), 13, 15, 140-157; Gregory A. Waselkov, A Conquering Spirit: Fort 
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Press, 2010), 34.  For economic disparities that became increasingly stark among Creeks by the 
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 In a larger sense, the Redstick War originated in what anthropologists call a 
“revitalization movement.”  A society reeling from impoverishment and political 
powerlessness undergoes revitalization when a prophet steps forward, rejects the 
dominant ideology of a colonizer, envisions a return to old ways, and teaches his people 
how to regain control of their world.
3
  According to Joel Martin, the Creek Redstick 
prophets launched a revitalization movement in 1813 to end dependence on trade goods, 
reject the political and cultural influence of Hawkins’ civilization plan, and shore up 
Creek spiritual power.  To those ends, Redsticks encouraged their followers to execute 
Hawkins and the so-called accommodationist chiefs like Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee.  
Although Creek revitalization was a product of crises within Creek society, the Redsticks 
were also inspired by the Shawnee warrior Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa 
(known as “the Prophet”).  These two men had previously ignited a pan-Indian 
revitalization movement in the Ohio country.
4
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 The scholarship on indigenous revitalization is vast.  A foundational text is Anthony F. 
C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (1969; repr., New York, NY: Vintage Books, 
1972), especially 3-18, 239-337.  In this chapter, I rely on Michael E. Harkin, “Introduction: 
Revitalization as History and Theory,” in Reassessing Revitalization Movements: Perspectives 
from North America and the Pacific Islands, ed. Michael E. Harkin (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004), xv-xxxvi; and Alfred Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit: Native American 
Revitalization Movements in Eastern North America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
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 Similar to Martin, Gregory Evans Down contends that revitalization was 
intertribal.  He traces the shared concerns of Creeks, Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, 
and numerous other Native groups who resisted colonialism by harnessing “spiritual 
power.”  Dowd argues more forcefully than Martin that revitalization transcended ethnic, 
political, and regional boundaries and gave Indians a wide support network on which to 
draw.  Each scholar, however, tends to pigeonhole revitalizing Indians into two 
categories.  Native people were either “nativists,” who waged war against the U.S., or 
“accommodationists,” who preferred to maintain or cultivate ties with the U.S.
5
 
 To understand the finer points of revitalization, recent scholarship traces the 
Redstick War in a more complex framework.  For one, Robert Collins highlights the 
divisions within the Redstick camp, as there “is no reason to think that all Red Sticks 
believed to the same extent in a revival of Indian spiritual power, much less that all of 
them agreed on a single course of action.”  In turn, Gregory Waselkov demonstrates that 
kinship ties shaped relations among the Redstick prophets, which perhaps explains why 
the Redsticks failed to agree on a “single course of action.”  To tease out the connections 
among the Redsticks, he examines underused genealogical records.  Angela Pulley 
Hudson’s approach is innovative, too, for she directs our attention to space, place, and 
territoriality when thinking about resistance and societal change.  She contends that the 
passage of thousands of American migrants on the Federal Road in the early 1810s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Eastern Woodlands: Can a Middle-Aged Theory Stretch to Embrace the First Cherokee 
Converts?,” in Reassessing Revitalization Movements, ed. Harkin, 61-87. 
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 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for 
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obstructed the mobility of Creek towns and families.  Creeks attempted to limit the 
presence of American travelers by charging tolls and intimidating and, in some cases, 
assaulting the passers-by.
6
 
 For the most part, however, scholars overlook the impact of revitalization on 
Creek politics.
7
  If, as Chapters V and VI of this dissertation have argued, Creeks forged 
two political resolutions to partially address American expansion at the turn of the 
century, then how did revitalization reshape those coalitions and, more generally, 
coalition politics?  Moreover, since this dissertation has traced Creek coalition-building 
over time, the how did revitalization affect that deep-rooted political practice?  I argue 
that the Redstick civil war and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Creek country both 
restructured and exposed a deep continuity in Creek politics.  On one hand, coalition-
building became a means of dividing rather than uniting Creeks.  From the colonial 
period to the early nineteenth century, headmen attempted to unite Creek towns in 
coalitions designed to stymie Euro-American encroachment, preserve land, secure trade, 
and end intertribal violence.  During and after the Redstick War, however, Creeks 
gradually began to erect coalitions explicitly and vigorously to undermine each other.  
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Coalitions formerly promoted Creek stability, but they gradually (though not 
immediately) caused instability in the 1810s.  Despite a brief but important period of 
dialogue between the Redsticks and National Council, each side mobilized support 
through a town-based coalition that enhanced civil war and postwar division. 
 Political change was made possible only by the continuity of consensus.  In fact, 
the brief dialogue between the Redsticks and National Council in the initial months of 
civil war was caused by the same political principle that came to render coalition-
building a divisive institution: consensual leadership.  Both the National Council and 
Redstick leadership had different strategies, but each cultivated authority by mobilizing 
as many supporters as possible, for the most part, among towns and, in some cases, 
families.  Creeks navigated revitalization, civil war, and U.S. conquest the only way they 
knew how and the only way they could, as coalitions, but those same coalitions 
gradually—then permanently—divided Creeks by 1821.  In that year, the U.S. acquired 
Florida from Spain, but that date also represents the completion of the exodus of the 
“Florida Redstick Creeks,” who removed themselves from Creek country and from the 
old coalition system.  Another way of explaining the change and continuity in the 
Redstick era is as follows: the Creeks relied on traditional means (consensus) to achieve 
new ends (oppose one another through coalitions).  By examining Creek revitalization’s 
impact on Creek politics, I demonstrate that Creek political traditions, such as coalition-
building and consensus, fueled division.  While U.S. supremacy and the divisions it 
spawned among Creeks ignited the Redstick War, scholars have overlooked the ways in 
which Creek culture itself bore some responsibility for intra-societal disunity.  Since the 
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colonial era, of course, consensus caused all kinds of problems.  It encouraged town and 
clan autonomy, which thwarted coalitions, triggered international conflict, and 
undermined pan-Indianism.  Yet the persistence of Creek consensus in the Redstick era 
prompted Creek society to collapse from within.  
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Table 7.  Creek Coalitions in the Redstick War Era. 
 
Coalitions Participating provinces, towns, talofas, 
and headmen 
Participating non-Creeks 
- Sixteen-town 
Redstick coalition of 
August 1813 
 
- Tallapoosa: Hoithlewaulee, 
Fusihatchee, Cooloome, White Ground, 
Sawanogi, Muccolossus 
 
- Abeika: Wewocau, Pucantallahassee, 
Woccoccoie, Pochusehatchee 
 
- Alabama: Little Okchai, Hickory 
Ground, “Alabama” 
 
- Auxiliary towns: Okfuskee, Tallassee, 
Autossee 
 
- Occasional contact 
with Western Indian 
Confederacy and 
Spanish West Florida 
- Eleven-town peace 
coalition of September 
1813 
 
- Lower Creek: Coweta, Coweta 
Tallahassee, Cussita, Ouseechee, 
Aumucullee 
 
- Tallapoosa: Tuckabatchee 
 
- Abeika: Fish Ponds, Kialijee, Okchai, 
Wewocau 
 
- Upper Eufaula (an Abeika or 
Tallapoosa town) 
 
- U.S. Agent Benjamin 
Hawkins 
- Postwar (or National 
Council) coalition of 
1814-1815 
 
- Lower Creek: William McIntosh of 
Coweta, Little Prince of Broken Arrow 
(talofa), Cussita, Hitchiti 
 
- Tallapoosa: Big Warrior of 
Tuckabatchee 
 
- Several Abeika towns, including 
Kialijee and Wewocau 
 
- Alabama: “Talessee Fixico” of Hickory 
Ground, Captain Isaacs of Coosada 
 
- Major General Andrew 
Jackson and U.S. Agent 
Benjamin Hawkins 
- Possible coalition 
among Florida Redstick 
towns and Seminole 
towns by 1820 
 
- Tallapoosa: between six and eight 
towns 
 
     Key leader: Peter McQueen of 
Halfway House 
 
 
- Seminole towns, such 
as Miccosukee 
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 Several factors created the perfect storm that triggered civil war.  The major issue 
was that many Creeks began suffering from poverty and hunger in the early 1800s.  As 
the value of animal peltry plummeted in Europe, Creek hunters could no longer rely on 
the seasonal hunt to purchase weapons, clothing, iron and brass implements, and food for 
themselves and their families.  As a result, their trade debts to both the U.S. and Panton, 
Leslie (which became John Forbes and Company in 1805 after William Panton passed 
away) deepened.  Moreover, town headmen hoarded the federal annuity payments 
established by the New York, Fort Wilkinson, and Washington treaties.  Corrupt 
headmen failed to distribute those monies to their townspeople and, instead, kept them 
for themselves and their families.  As the global deerskin trade gave way to a global cash-
based economy rooted in the profit motive, headmen acquired new forms of wealth.  Big 
Warrior and William McIntosh owned livestock and slaves and by the standards of their 
society, were “rich.”  The new Creek economy privileged the wealthy and marginalized 
the majority of Creeks, who continued to farm and hunt and who formed the basis of the 
Creeks’ communal political world.
8
 
 Economic change demonstrates that the Three Rivers and Hickory Ground 
Resolutions, while each embodied a creative political response to colonization and inter-
Indian conflict, inadequately addressed the everyday needs of poor and hungry Creeks.  
By the 1810s, what the Creeks needed—and what the Redsticks essentially advocated—
was an economic resolution repudiating acquisitive wealth, U.S. meddling in Creek 
affairs, and market-oriented headmen.  To be sure, not all market-oriented headmen 
                                                             
 
8
 Saunt, New Order, 139-185, 213-229; Waselkov, Conquering Spirit, 72-74. 
 
343 
 
narrowly looked after their own interests.  A leading Tuckabatchee headman and Council 
member, Big Warrior genuinely cared about his town and, it seems, all Creeks.  He hoped 
to preserve Creek land against the American onslaught, lamenting the fact that Americans 
“mix’d” among the Creeks and “[disturbed] our young people.”
9
  Still, by 1812 and 1813, 
Redsticks decried the narrow self-interest of what probably only a minority of the 
National Council. 
 Hawkins’ “plan of civilization” gave rise to the Redsticks, too.  After arriving in 
Creek country in the winter of 1796-1797 as U.S. Agent to the Creeks, Hawkins 
promoted a vision of society that transformed Creek hunters into farmers and ranchers, 
and that took women out of the matrilineal crop fields and placed them into the home, 
where they would spin cloth and tend house.  To his credit Hawkins recognized that the 
value of deerskins dwindled in the late eighteenth century, narrowing Creek hunters’ 
ability to secure trade goods, even food, for their families.  He knew that Creeks bought 
more goods on credit that plunged them into debt.  To help make the Creeks solvent and 
economically competitive, Hawkins proposed a “plan of civilization.”  This program 
encouraged economic self-sufficiency among Creeks by asking them to participate in the 
global market economy in other ways.  If men abandoned hunting, they could find the 
time to practice more viable alternatives, such as mixed-crop farming and ranching.  
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Similarly, he encouraged women to participate in the economy by producing their own 
clothing and selling excess clothing products and other manufacturable goods.  In short, 
Hawkins’ “plan” urged Creeks to acknowledge that the changing economy required 
innovation to make ends meet.
10
 
 There were two problems with civilization policy, however.  First, it was an 
ethnocentric policy that ignored Creek-initiated economic innovation.  As Robbie 
Ethridge contends, men and women had been experimenting with ranching and mixed-
crop farming for decades.  Creek women especially adopted ranching into the traditional 
female agricultural cycle for decades.  Ethridge goes so far as to assert that late-
eighteenth-century women harbored a “commercial aggressiveness” to help feed and 
clothe their families, and women sold cattle at markets and to passers-by.  Women, in 
fact, were more flexible than men, who refused to abandon hunting.
11
  Secondly, the new 
market strategies embraced by women and some men failed to help Creeks access basic 
foods and goods.  Worsening matters were those wealthy headmen who unevenly 
distributed annuity monies and treaty presents when, for instance, crops failed and famine 
struck in 1803, 1807, and 1808.
12
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 Additional kindling that fueled the eruption of civil war was the promise of 
Native renewal offered by the Shawnee Indians, including Tecumseh and his brother, The 
Prophet.  In 1811, Tecumseh visited the Southern Indians to drum up support for the 
Western Indian Confederacy.  He invited the Choctaws and Chickasaws to join him in a 
pan-Indian union designed to roll back American expansion and recapture sacred 
powers.
13
  These powers would be used to rejuvenate Native society by ending 
dependence on trade goods, curbing alcoholism, and ameliorating other ills.  In 
September 1811, Tecumseh visited Tuckabatchee, where he essentially repeated that 
message and called on the Creeks to destroy the Americans and kill any and all 
accommodationist chiefs as a means towards revitalizing Creek society.
14
  Tecumseh may 
have encouraged them to await reinforcements from the British, with whom Tecumseh 
forged an alliance in 1811 and early 1812.
15
  In sum, Tecumseh envisioned for the Creeks 
a future in which poverty, dependence, and hunger vanished.
16
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 From September 1811 to the spring of 1812, Tecumseh’s war message divided 
Creeks into two camps.  In the first camp were those headmen who pursued diplomacy 
with Hawkins.  According to the Agent, the “Chiefs . . . unanimously refused to smoke 
the [war] pipe . . . [and] to join in [Tecumseh’s] war.”
17
  In late March 1812, “some 
Chiefs of every town of the Upper Creeks” gathered at Fort Hawkins on the Okmulgee 
River to collect the 1811 annuity.  Afterwards, Big Warrior and “three distinguished 
Chiefs” traveled with Hawkins to Augusta, the Georgia capital.  There, the headmen 
cultivated peace with Georgia Governor David Mitchell.
18
  Lower Creek headmen also 
promoted peace with Hawkins.  In May 1812, Hawkins attended “the Council of the 
Lower Creeks,” where the Cherokee headman Charles Hicks addressed the headmen.  
Referring to the outbreak of the War of 1812, Hicks urged the headmen to stand by the 
U.S. and reject any overtures from the British and Tecumseh.  Headmen pledged “not to 
interfere in the wars of the white people.”  However, the headmen “complained” to 
Hawkins of “intrusions on their rights.”  American settlers had illegally hunted on, driven 
livestock onto, and harvested lumber from Creek lands.  Settlers had also cultivated farms 
on the “Indian side” of the Okmulgee River, the U.S.-Creek boundary established in 
1805.  By requesting Hawkins to address their grievances, Lower Creek headmen 
demonstrated that they preferred U.S.-Creek diplomacy to a U.S.-Creek war.
19
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
revitalization resulted from the “positive experiences, visions, and hopes” of Creeks, aided by 
Tecumseh. 
 
17
 Hawkins to Eustis, 9/21/1811, Tuckabatchee, LBH, 2:591. 
 
18
 Hawkins to Eustis, 3/24/1812, Fort Hawkins, LBH, 2:603.  For the trip, see Hawkins to 
Eustis, 3/30/1812, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:604.  On March 30, the four headmen and the Agent 
returned to Creek country by way of the Creek Agency on the Flint River. 
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 Hawkins to Eustis, 5/11/1812, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:608. 
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 In the second camp were the “young ungovernable” Creek warriors who defied 
the headmen (and Hawkins).
20
  As the War of 1812 loomed and some Creeks accepted 
Tecumseh’s call to arms, especially given the promise that Britain would assist Tecumseh 
and his allies, Creek warriors began to assault the Americans.  In the spring of 1812, 
Creeks killed American settlers on the Federal Road, and in April a war leader named 
Hillabee Hadjo commanded a war party that killed two Tennessee families living near the 
Ohio River.  Despite Big Warrior’s claim in late March that the “Chiefs ... put a stop” to 
the bad “talks,” in June, when the War of 1812 erupted, Little Warrior of Wewocau 
headed a group of warriors who killed several Americans and captured one woman, a 
Mrs. Crawley, also near the Ohio River.
21
  In short, young Creek warriors, many of them 
probably disgruntled young men who could not supply their families with trade goods, 
embraced Tecumseh’s message of renewal.
22
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 For Creek attacks on Americans, see Waselkov, Conquering Spirit, 88-89; Hudson, 
Creek Paths, 97, 203n36, 203n40.  For Little Warrior’s town, see Big Warrior and Alexander 
Cornells to Hawkins, 4/26/1813, Tuckabatchee, in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, ed. 
Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 1:843 
(hereafter cited as ASPIA, volume 1, page number); and Cornells to Hawkins, 6/22/1813, Creek 
Agency, ASPIA, 1:846.  For Big Warrior’s message to Hawkins, see Hawkins to Eustis, 
3/30/1812, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:604 (“Chiefs” and “talks”). 
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 Scholars have identified other possible causes of the Redstick War.  Waselkov 
(Conquering Spirit, 79-80) traces the immediate origins of the war to two phenomena.  In late 
August 1811, a comet became visible in the twilight sky, coinciding with Tecumseh’s entrance 
into Creek country.  Secondly, between December 1811 and February 1812, earthquakes 
emanating from New Madrid, Missouri, rumbled across the Midwest and possibly reached Creek 
country.  Waselkov argues that the Alabama and Koasati towns interpreted these phenomena as a 
sign that Tecumseh and the Prophet possessed the spiritual powers of the Master of Breath, which 
would aid the Creeks in a struggle against American colonialism.  Martin, Sacred Revolt, 114-
115, traces the impact of the earthquakes on Shawnee-Creek relations.  While Gregory Evans 
Dowd, in “Thinking Outside the Circle: Tecumseh’s 1811 Mission,” in Tohopeka, ed. Braund, 
30-52, here 39, makes the point that Hawkins, an informed authority in Creek country, neglected 
to mention the New Madrid earthquakes in his writings, Martin, Sacred Revolt, 212n2, 212n3, 
locates evidence on the earthquakes from reliable authorities.  For more on rumors in the Redstick 
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 To prevent an all-out war between the Creeks and Americans, the National 
Council assumed tremendous power in 1812.  When Hawkins demanded that the Council 
execute the 1812 ringleaders, Big Warrior and other headmen agreed to do so.  Although 
the responsibility for punishing wayward kin lay with clans, the Council ignored clan 
justice by appointing a judicial police force that executed Hillabee Hadjo and another 
Creek warrior in the summer of 1812.
23
  In the spring of 1813 Little Warrior of Wewocau 
and his men resumed their attacks on American settlements in the Ohio.  Moreover, in 
late March or early April, two Okfuskee men killed two American travelers on the 
Federal Road.  In response to another demand by Hawkins that the Creeks execute the 
murderers, the Council reassembled its police force and executed the Okfuskee culprits as 
well as Little Warrior.  The police squad also executed a Creek woman, an “aunt,” 
because she had protected her “nephew” in previous months from being executed for his 
role in some of the murders of 1812.  By assuming the power to punish Creek criminals 
in 1812 and 1813, the Council deprived clans of that traditional prerogative and, as Evan 
Nooe demonstrates, undermined “clan and town autonomy.”
24
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
War and in early American history more generally, see Dowd, Groundless: Rumors, Legends, 
and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2015), especially 205-227. 
 
23
 Nooe, “Common Justice,” 252-253.  These two men had taken refuge inside the peace 
towns of Hickory Ground and Tallassee, where criminals were traditionally granted asylum.  By 
killing them in a peace town, the police force violated sacred town custom and bolstered the 
Redsticks’ argument that the Council pandered to Hawkins.  The police squad also denied 
Hillabee Hadjo’s family the custom of burial and last rites by dumping his corpse into the Coosa 
River (252-254).  See, too, Martin, Sacred Revolt, 125; Waselkov, Conquering Spirit, 88-89; 
Hudson, Creek Paths, 100-101. 
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 Hudson, Creek Paths, 100-101; Nooe, “Common Justice,” 252 (“clan”), 255.  For 
“aunt” and “nephew,” see Big Warrior, Alexander Cornells, and William McIntosh to Hawkins, 
4/26/1813, Tuckabatchee, ASPIA, 1:841.  The Okfuskee attackers may have been pursuing clan 
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 In the spring and summer of 1813, the Redstick War erupted.  In the following 
months, perhaps thousands of Upper Creeks flocked to a cadre of Upper Creek Redstick 
prophets.  Other Upper and Lower Creeks stood behind the Council or, simply, strove for 
neutrality.  The Redstick prophets included Peter McQueen of Halfway House, Josiah 
Francis of the Alabama town of Attaugee, and another Alabama, Paddy Walsh.  Although 
more of a political organizer than a prophet, Tame King of Halfway House earned the 
title, “head of the Prophet’s party.”
25
  The prophets vowed to execute anyone who had 
participated in or authorized the executions of 1812 and 1813.  These included Alexander 
Cornells, a métis headman from Tuckabatchee who served Hawkins as an interpreter; Big 
Warrior; Hawkins; and “the old chiefs who had taken” Hawkins’ “talks.”
26
  In fact, from 
late spring to early summer, the prophets “put to death” nine Creek warriors who had 
served in the Council police force.
27
  The prophets reserved particular animus for Captain 
Sam Isaacs, a former prophet who supported the Council and led a war party that resulted 
in the death of the Creek “aunt.”  Fortunately for him, Isaacs survived a Redstick attack 
on his home.
28
 
 Furthermore, the prophets instructed followers to assault, kill, or expel those town 
headmen who accepted the Council’s authority or who at least tolerated Hawkins.  In the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
vengeance as a response to American attacks on the Okfuskees at “‘Hog mountain’” in 1812; see 
Hawkins to Mitchell, 8/31/1812, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:616. 
 
25
 Hawkins to Armstrong, 7/20/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:849.  In this document, 
Tame King is named “Hoboheilthle Micco, the head of the Prophet’s party.” 
 
26
 Cornells to Hawkins, 6/22/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:846. 
 
27
 Hawkins “To Creek Chiefs who have taken the talks of the prophets,” 7/6/1813, 
enclosed in Hawkins to Armstrong, 7/13/1813, both at Creek Agency, LBH, 2:647. 
 
28
 Hawkins to Armstrong, 6/22/1813, near Fort Hawkins, LBH, 2:641.  In Cornells’ 
report to Hawkins, 6/22/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:846, Cornells never actually wrote that 
Isaacs was killed.  See, too, Nooe, “Common Justice,” 255. 
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summer of 1813, for instance, Okfuskee Redsticks “killed five [town] Chiefs.”  
Northwest of Okfuskee, Aubecooche Redsticks killed three of their town headmen and 
injured a fourth.
29
  Among the Tallapoosas, Autossee Redsticks had “driven off their 
Chiefs” by June.
30
  In addition to assailing headmen, young Redsticks attacked 
headmen’s wealth, which smacked of Euro-American cultural innovation.  After the 
Okfuskees killed their headmen, they “destroyed almost all the cattle in town.”
31
  In 
numerous other examples, Redstick men killed cattle, hogs, and other domesticated 
animals.
32
 
 As internal violence crescendoed in the summer of 1813, Creeks activated the old 
coalition network.  Non-aligned headmen addressed the civil strife by leveraging two 
inter-town coalitions forged in the late eighteenth century.  First was the Cussita-
Tallassee/Halfway House alliance.  In the midst of the American Revolution, Tame King 
cultivated ties with Fat King of Cussita.  These headmen coordinated numerous 
diplomatic overtures to the Americans and worked together to grow their coalition.
33
  The 
Redstick War, however, placed Cussita and Halfway House on opposing sides.  The 
Cussitas aligned with the Council, while Tame King, by now an old headman, with Peter 
McQueen embraced the Redstick cause.  Tame King harbored animosity towards the 
Council because in the spring of 1812, its police force had executed one of the 
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 For Okfuskee and Aubecooche, see Hawkins to John Armstrong, 7/28/1813, Creek 
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 Hawkins to Armstrong, 6/28/1813, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:643. 
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 Hawkins to Armstrong, 7/28/1813, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:652. 
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 Saunt, New Order, 257-258, 257n40. 
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 For a thorough discussion of the Cussita-Tallassee coalition in the 1770s and 1780s, 
please see Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
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ringleaders inside his old town of Tallassee, a sacred white town that granted asylum to 
fleeing criminals.
34
  The Council’s violation of sacred town traditions convinced Tame 
King and McQueen that neither the Council nor Big Warrior could be trusted.  Even so, 
lines of communication between Cussita and Halfway House remained open during the 
summer of 1813, demonstrating that the division separating Redsticks from non-aligned 
Creeks was impermanent, albeit temporarily.
35
 
 The second town partnership that came into play was that of Cussita and 
Tuckabatchee.  During the Revolutionary period, Fat King and Mad Dog rarely 
communicated.  Mad Dog’s primary allies were Emistisiguo, Alexander McGillivray, and 
Red Shoes of Coosada.  By the early 1790s, however, frontier conflict and the Creek-
Chickasaw War thrust Cussita and Tuckabatchee into the political spotlight.  Together, 
they framed the Three Rivers Resolution.  Like Cussita’s relationship with Tame King, 
Cussita’s ties with Tuckabatchee endured in the 1810s.  In fact, Big Warrior may have 
attempted to resolve the Redstick War and restore the Council’s credibility to boot by 
manipulating the connections between Cussita and Halfway House.  He and Cornells 
coordinated peace-keeping activities with Cussita and Coweta headmen in the attempt to 
persuade Tame King to ditch the Redsticks.
36
 
 Tame King activated the Cussita-Tallassee partnership in late May or early June 
1813.  At that time, he authored and “sent” a message to Cussita on behalf of the 
Alabama prophets.  In it, he downplayed the fact that the prophets and their followers had 
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 Cornells to Hawkins, 6/22/1813 and 6/23/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:846. 
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 “Talosee Fixico” to Hawkins (Cornells served as interpreter), 7/5/1813, Creek Agency, 
ASPIA, 1:847. 
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killed several members of the Council’s police squad.  He explained that otherworldly 
powers, not the prophets, caused those deaths.  When, for instance, the Council warriors 
had entered a magical “circle,” they had been “immediately seized with madness, and 
died.”  Although Tame King’s message reveals the ways in which prophets rely on magic 
to effect change during a revitalization movement, the point to emphasize here is that 
Tame King communicated this spiritual account to an old ally, Cussita.  Tame King was 
doing one of two things.  Either he attempted to persuade Cussita to join the Redsticks, or 
he encouraged the town to serve as an intermediary between the Redsticks and Council.  
It is hard to know either way, but one thing is clear: by contacting Cussita, he navigated 
his decades-old alliance with Cussita for larger purposes.  Clearly the boundary between 
Redstick and non-aligned Creek was porous, as there was always room for maneuver and 
shifts in popular opinion.
37
 
 The continuation of the Cussita-Halfway House alliance also makes it difficult to 
ascertain Cussita’s motives.  Alexander Cornells’ June 22 report to Hawkins suggests that 
Cussita at least sympathized with the Redstick cause.  Just days before the 22nd, for 
example, Cornells traveled to Cussita.  When he arrived there, he noticed that the 
townspeople were “consulting in the woods; and, instead of aiding to suppress the 
prophets, seemed willing to apologize for” the “conduct” of the prophets.  More revealing 
still is that not only did Cussita receive Tame King’s message that he explicitly sent to 
Cussita, but that Tame King “directed the Cussetah Micco to send it to all” the towns 
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 Cornells to Hawkins, 6/22/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:846.  One man whom the 
prophets executed was a “distinguished” Council messenger known as “Tustunnuggee Hopoie, of 
Tuckaubatchee.” 
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“below” Cussita, meaning probably the Lower Creek towns—Tame King’s allies during 
the American Revolution.  Cornells confirmed to Hawkins that Cussita Mico did transmit 
Tame King’s talk to the unidentified Lower towns.
38
  Cussita may have relayed that talk 
to the Chattahoochee towns in the attempt to explain (away) Redstick violence and, 
perhaps, to restore peace to the Creek universe.  On the other hand, Cussita Mico might 
have warmed to the Redstick cause and leveraged Tame King’s talk to recruit some of the 
Lower towns into the Redstick fold. 
 Regardless, Cussita’s exchange with Tame King indicates that political consensus 
endured during the Redstick War.  Towns and the ties linking them formed the epicenter 
of action during this conflict.  Whether Cussita Mico supported or rejected the Redsticks 
is unclear, but evidence does confirm that he refused to actively undermine them.  In 
June, for instance, the Tuckabatchees learned that the Redsticks planned to besiege their 
town and kill all the Council headmen there.  Sometime in mid-June, “Tuskeenohau” of 
Cussita left for Tuckabatchee “with his warriors” to assist the town against the Redstick 
assault.  Cussita Mico, however, refused to contribute warriors to Tuckabatchee “to help 
the [Council] chiefs” there.  Because of that decision, Tuskeenohau “reprimanded the 
[Cussita] Micco for his pusillanimous conduct.”
39
  Cussita Mico’s lukewarm commitment 
to the Council suggests that he strove to avoid an escalation in the violence between the 
non-aligned towns and the Redsticks, among whom he had several political allies. 
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 Cornells to Hawkins, 6/22/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:846.  Cornells was 
“ordered” by the “chiefs of Tuckaubatchee” to go to Cussita.  I haven’t pinpointed the date when 
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 Cussita Mico’s non-military stance may have inspired the Council and 
particularly Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee to open a dialogue with the Redsticks in late 
June and early July.  To that end, he leveraged the connection between Cussita and Tame 
King and that between Cussita and Tuckabatchee.  Probably at his urging, the Council 
appointed Tuskeenohau of Cussita and “Atchau Haujo” of Coweta to meet with Tame 
King in Halfway House sometime in early July.  There, the two emissaries tried “to 
induce” Tame King “to have the war sticks and projects thrown aside.”  Tame King was 
unrelenting, however, and “the old man [Tame King] rejected” the peace overtures.  He 
“declared his determination to persevere until he destroyed all who aided and assisted” in 
the Council police squad and “looked on [the squad] as people of the United States.”  
Moreover, Tame King and the Redsticks planned to evict settlers from Creek country and 
push them back to the “sea coast.”  Aided by the Shawnees, the British, and the “magic 
powers he possessed,” Tame King sought “to crush the Americans.”
40
  Big Warrior’s 
effort to rein in Tame King by navigating the complex corridors of town ties was 
therefore fruitless.  Still, that effort reveals that Big Warrior, like his sworn enemy, Tame 
King, relied on traditional political connections to pursue his goals. 
 Despite severe political divisions, Creeks on both sides of the aisle negotiated the 
town- and kin-based connections that knitted Creek society together.  When Tame King 
tried to enlist Cussita (for war or as a go-between) or when Big Warrior sought to 
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 “Talosee Fixico, a runner from Tuckaubatchee” to Hawkins (Cornells served as 
interpreter), 7/5/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:847.  Even Hawkins recognized that 
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manipulate Cussita’s alliance with Tame King, town partnership mediated each goal.  By 
overlooking the connections between the Redsticks and non-aligned Creeks and the 
attempt by the Council to restore order, scholars miss the ways in which the overlapping 
political webs of Creek society complicated loyalties during this civil war.  Although 
stability dwindled, partnerships endured the early stages of war.
41
 
 In turn, these complex webs of political relations may have encouraged conflict-
resolution.  Not only did Cussita Mico’s position of non-engagement shape the Council’s 
decision to meet with Tame King, it may have signaled a larger cultural attitude among 
Creeks that civil war was to be avoided at all costs.  Throughout the late spring and 
summer of 1813, Creeks ignored Hawkins’ repeated calls to fight the Redsticks.  A 
frustrated Hawkins wrote in early July that “I have advised the Council repeatedly to 
send out a party to attack and destroy the prophets without delay[,] but they seem not 
equal in their present state of alarm and confusion to such an enterprise” (my 
emphasis).
42
  Granted, as Hawkins penned his lament to the Georgia Governor, 
Tuckabatchee was under siege.  For one week, the Redsticks surrounded the town and 
gunned for Big Warrior and a “son” of the late Mad Dog.  Thirteen Redsticks perished, 
and only one Tuckabatchee was wounded.
43
  Still, even before the Tuckabatchee siege, 
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 See, for instance, Martin, Sacred Revolt, 150.  Martin tends to lump the “friendly” 
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 Hawkins to Mitchell, 7/7/1813, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:644. 
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 The Tuckabatchees had fortified their town, and hundreds of men, women, and 
children were holed up in the town fort.  As many as 320 Redsticks under the command of 
Autossee’s “Youholau Emaultau Haujo” besieged the town.  For details, see Hawkins to 
Armstrong, 7/28/1813, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:651; Hawkins to Mitchell, 7/7/1813, Creek 
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the non-aligned Creeks appeared uninterested in waging war on the Redsticks.
44
  When 
Cornells apprised Hawkins that “Seven of the [towns] nearest [to Tuckabatchee] refused 
to oppose the prophets,” he was saying that the Tallapoosa towns neither necessarily 
supported the Redsticks nor possessed any reason to fight them.
45
 
 Additionally, Cornells reported to the Agent that Creek towns that had “taken” the 
prophets’ “talks” exercised restraint and revealed no inclination to attack the Council or 
the Americans.  These particular Creek towns were more interested in dancing the Dance 
of the Indians of the Lakes, a ritual that originated among the Western Indian 
Confederacy.  In 1812 and 1813, Shawnees affiliated with the Prophet taught the Dance 
to the Creeks.  It promised to alleviate suffering in Creek society by enabling Creeks to 
capture new sources of sacred power.  Cornells explained to Hawkins that no Creek town 
that danced the new Dance during the summer of 1813 “has moved to assist them [the 
Redsticks].”  In short, some Creek towns welcomed the spiritual innovations furnished by 
Shawnee revitalizers but disregarded the more militant tone of the Redstick prophets.
46
 
 At least some Creeks’ reluctance to oppose, attack, or support the Redsticks 
suggests that the town- and kin- based political connections spanning Creek society 
encouraged neutrality and the deescalation of violence.  One of the best pieces of 
evidence bearing on this argument is Cornells’ statement that “Seven of the [towns] 
nearest [to Tuckabatchee] refused to oppose the prophets.”
47
  A refusal to “oppose” the 
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 Cornells to Hawkins, 6/22/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:846.  As Steven Hahn 
argues, at least in the colonial period the Creeks probably instituted measures to suppress 
 
357 
 
prophets did not necessarily mean that the seven towns supported the Redsticks.  In fact, 
these towns pursued their own interests, but by residing on the fence during a civil war, 
they adopted a dangerous stance, as Creek townspeople probably understood.  Neutrality 
invited a Redstick attack or possible disapproval from Agent Hawkins, who tended to 
group Creeks into an either-or category of “Redstick” or “friendly.”
48
 
 Meanwhile, the Redsticks planned an attack on Coweta after having failed to 
destroy Tuckabatchee.  Like Tuckabatchee, Coweta occasionally hosted the National 
Council, which remained enemy number one of the Redsticks.
49
  But they needed more 
weapons and ammunition to carry out the task.  To that end, in July 1813 Peter McQueen 
and other prophets traveled to Pensacola with about 300 Redsticks (Figure 16).  Governor 
González Manrique hosted the delegation.  McQueen invited Manrique to form an 
alliance with the Redsticks, requesting guns, shot, and powder from the Spanish.  On the 
23rd, Manrique gave the Redsticks powder and shot, but refused to provide them with 
guns, repair the guns they brought with them, or commit to a Redstick alliance.  
Manrique’s lukewarm response stemmed from the fact that McQueen had no leverage.  
Given his steep debt to Forbes and Company, the prophet was unable to convince 
Manrique that a Spanish-Redstick alliance was in Spain’s best interest.  McQueen’s 
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failure to secure adequate provisions caused most of his men to return home before the 
meeting closed.  Only about sixty of the original three hundred Redsticks who traveled to 
Pensacola remained.
50
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 For a trader’s report, see John Innerarity to James Innerarity, 7/27/1813, Pensacola, 
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Figure 16.  Battlefields and Forts of U.S.-Creek War, 1813-1814.  A mishmash of peoples and 
cultures inhabited the “Tensaw” district or delta of the Mississippi Territory.  Source: 
Photocopied from Tohopeka: Rethinking the Creek War and the War of 1812, edited by Kathryn 
E. Holland Braund, xiv.  
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 On July 27, as McQueen and the sixty-or-so Redsticks traveled home, they were 
attacked by a militia unit.  The unit was composed of 180 American and U.S.-allied 
Creek métis men from the nearby Tensaw district, which was part of the Mississippi 
Territory.  In what became known as the Battle of Burnt Corn Creek, named after a 
nearby watercourse, the Redsticks killed about 100 militiamen.
51
  At least six Redstick 
men perished and a “great many” were wounded in battle.
52
  Since clan law required the 
victims’ kin to seek revenge, the Redsticks persuaded their leaders to devise an attack on 
the Tensaw district and place the original plan to “destroy” Coweta on the backburner.
53
  
As Hawkins understood, Redstick leaders had “appointed . . . an attack on Coweta, but 
the families of the killed and wounded . . . forced the leaders to change the attack to” the 
Tensaw delta.
54
  Aside from clan retribution, a second factor motivated the Redstick plan 
to attack that region.  Many of the Tensaw métis were transplanted Alabama Creeks who 
had migrated to the lower Mississippi valley in the late eighteenth century and who 
adopted a slave-based market-oriented lifestyle there.  In a way, as Gregory Waselkov 
has argued, the Redstick prophets, many of whom lived in the original Alabama towns in 
Creek country, looked upon the Tensaw métis as wayward Alabama kin who needed to 
be punished for embracing the new economic order.
55
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 Throughout August, a sixteen-town coalition of Redsticks crystallized in Upper 
Creek country (Table 7, Figure 17).
56
  Thirteen towns supplied roughly 2,500 warriors to 
the Tensaw-bound war party.  Most of these warriors hailed from the Abeika and 
Tallapoosa towns.  Only three Alabama towns supplied warriors to the August coalition, 
suggesting, as Joel Martin points out, that although the Redstick movement initially 
formed among the Alabama towns, by August 1813 the Redsticks’ popularity had 
blossomed beyond its original base.
57
  However, I argue that in order to gain in 
popularity, the August coalition had to draw upon and realign the town partnerships 
established by Creeks in earlier decades.
58
 
 The Redstick coalition marked the restructuring of coalition-building from one 
that serviced Creek unity to one that precipitated Creek division.  Hickory Ground and 
Tuckabatchee, close allies during the Revolution and in the early nineteenth century, now 
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became enemies. Whereas Hickory Ground embraced the Redsticks, Tuckabatchee 
avoided them.  Moreover, the Cussita-Tallassee coalition of the Revolutionary era 
shifted, as Okfuskee, Tallassee, and Autossee broke with Cussita and aligned with the 
Redsticks.  Hawkins wrote that those three towns “formed a front of observation towards 
Coweta, to conceal the movement” of the August 1813 Redstick warrior force.  Cussita 
did not thrown in with its old coalition partners in 1813.  Unlike Okfuskee, Tallassee, and 
Autossee, the Cussitas neither teamed up with Tame King nor any other Redstick town in 
the formation of the Redstick coalition.  Thus, the Redstick coalition began to steel the 
political line separating Cussita from Tame King, old coalitions from new ones.
59
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Figure 17.  Upper Creek Towns in 1813.  Note: Turkey’s Town, also known as Esenaca, was a 
Cherokee town.  Source: Photocopied from Craig T. Sheldon, Jr., “Archaeology, Geography, and 
the Creek War in Alabama,” in Tohopeka, ed. Braund, 200-231, here 202 (figure 11.1).  
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 The shift in inter-town connections that characterized the Redstick coalition was 
balanced by the endurance of consensual leadership.  To cultivate solidarity, Redstick 
headmen obeyed the rituals of war.  Generally, before war, Southern Indian warriors 
isolated themselves from their townspeople, prepared war medicine, and danced to 
capture spiritual powers.  These powers were thought to protect warriors from harm in 
the upcoming battle.  During the Redstick War and perhaps as part of their efforts to 
revive Native custom under the umbrella of revitalization, Redsticks followed these 
martial traditions.  Just before the march on the Tensaw, according to one source, 
“leaders” summoned “their warriors at every town separately and held a war dance” (my 
emphasis).  At the conclusion of each town’s dance, warriors rendezvoused at a creek, 
where a “great war dance” was held by some 726 warriors of the thirteen confederated 
towns.
60
  Coalition-building continued to rest on those leaders who respected local 
traditions. 
 Following the war dances, the Redsticks set off for the Tensaw where settlers had 
built a series of forts to defend themselves from a possible Redstick reprisal.  En route, 
Redstick leaders learned that about 440 American settlers, militiamen, and U.S.-allied 
métis Creeks were holed up in Fort Mims.  There, on August 30, the Redsticks launched 
an attack, which was led by Redstick tactician William Weatherford and prophet Paddy 
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Walsh.  After hours of fighting, the Redsticks defeated the Tensaw inhabitants and killed 
some 247 people inside the fort.  Although technically a victory for the Redsticks, almost 
half (about 300) of the original force of 726 warriors perished.
61
 
 The casualties sustained by the Redsticks at the Battle of Fort Mims temporarily 
undermined prophetic power.  That evening, the surviving warriors “rose in fury” against 
Walsh “for their loseing so many men by death and wounds.”  His ability to conjure 
sacred power to protect the men was discredited.
62
  Moreover, the Abeika town of 
Wewocau may have bolted from the Redsticks.  Perhaps as many as fifteen Wewocaus 
perished at Fort Mims, quite a large figure considering that Wewocau was a small town 
with a population of 170 people.
63
  As a result, by mid-September, Wewocau as well as 
three other Upper towns denounced the prophets as “liars.”  In a message to the National 
Council, Wewocau and other towns said that they had “1,100 warriors” but were no 
longer “going to fight against the Americans.”
64
 
 Wewocau’s political shift took place in September, when the United States was 
preparing to avenge Fort Mims by invading Creek country.  When Creeks learned this 
frightening news, they scrambled to forge a peace coalition that pledged its loyalty to the 
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Americans and the National Council.  The coalition fused together about eleven towns: 
Coweta, Coweta Tallahassee, Cussita, Ouseechee, Aumucullee, Tuckabatchee, Fish 
Ponds, Kialijee, Upper Eufaula, Okchai, and of course, Wewocau.
65
  These towns served 
the interests of peace and diplomacy in various ways.  Some delivered messages between 
the Council and Hawkins, who lived at the Creek Agency on the Flint River.  He reported 
in late September, for instance, that three Upper Eufaula men and three Kialijee men 
delivered to him a message from the national Speakers, Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee and 
Little Prince of Broken Arrow.
66
 
 For his part, “Hoboheilthle Haujo” of Fish Ponds strove to keep his townspeople 
out of harm’s way.  He sent a message to the Redsticks, explaining that while some of his 
“towns people” were “foolish,” “they have not killed me, and other old Chiefs as many of 
you have done, and we are determined not to kill red or white people.”  He also indicted 
the prophets for their ineffectual mastery of spiritual power: “Your prophets said that in 
battle [i.e., Fort Mims] you would not [lose] more than two men if a severe battle, three at 
most [but] you have lost much blood by listening to them.”  To demonstrate to the 
Americans that his people preferred stability to conflict, Hoboheilthle Haujo forward that 
message to Hawkins.
67
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 The Lower Creek wing of the peace coalition expressed its loyalty to the U.S. in 
several ways.  In September, for instance, the Lower Creek town of Ouseechee hosted a 
meeting of the “Chiefs on Chattahochee and Flint river” who declared “themselves 
unanimously friendly to the white people.”
68
  Although identifying the exact towns that 
attended the Ouseechee meeting is impossible, some were probably drawn from the 
Hitchiti towns on the Chattahoochee and Flint watersheds.  For one, the headmen of the 
Chehaw village of Aumucullee at one point pledged peace with Hawkins.
69
  At another 
point, Aumucullee Mico reported to a U.S. official that he and his people “have large 
familyes” who wished to avoid any confrontation with the U.S.
70
  Additionally, Hitchiti 
Town’s Wolf Warrior strove to preserve neutrality between his townspeople and the U.S.  
He also worried about the fate of his fellow kin in Seminole country.
71
 
 Although the roots of the peace coalition lay in the immediate aftershock of Fort 
Mims, two pieces of evidence suggest that Creek women established the groundwork of 
that coalition in early August, just weeks before the Redsticks attacked Fort Mims.  For 
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instance, on August 4, Big Warrior messaged Hawkins to inform him that the Council 
received information from “a red woman of Hoithlewaulee.”  She came “straight from 
that town” to report on Redstick military strength, including some Redsticks who had 
recently arrived in her town with “two white men’s scalps.”
72
  Her reasons for spying on 
the Redsticks stemmed from the unstable situation in her town.  Hoithlewaulee had 
become a refugee center, where starving Redsticks, cut off from U.S. trade, settled in 
various “camps” around the town.
73
  The Hoithlewaulee woman probably grew tired of 
eking out a tenuous existence in that town, prompting her to ally with Big Warrior to 
improve her future.  A Creek woman from the nearby Tallapoosa town of Muccolossus 
acted as a Council informant, too.  On August 14, a Creek husband named 
“Hoithleponiyau” informed Hawkins that “My wife at [Muccolossus] informed me she 
got a part of the [Redstick] plans from a near female relative of a leader of the prophets 
(Molton),” an Alabama headman.
74
  Each example reveals the ways in which women 
sought to reduce civil strife on behalf of their families and towns.
75
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 Like the women, several men in the peace coalition served Hawkins and the 
Council as spies, runners, scouts, and other informants.  In late 1813, a “runner” from 
Coweta disclosed Redstick movements to Hawkins, as did the Hitchiti headman Wolf 
Warrior and Lower Eufaula headman “Fullaupau Haujo.”
76
  Later, in February 1814, 
forty to fifty warriors from Upatoi, Cussita’s satellite village, may have tracked the 
movements of some Redstick-allied Lower Creeks.
77
  Likewise, some runners earned 
cash for their services, such as “Cussetuh John,” “Adam Uchee,” “Tomoho Holohtau,” 
“Two Indians,” Coweta’s “public runner,” and an unnamed “runner.”  At least one 
messenger, Cussita John, may have had kin ties to Aumucullee, a town allied to the 
Council and to whom he passed along sensitive information.
78
 
 The Redstick and peace coalitions illuminate the ways in which coalition-building 
practices had amplified the fragmentation of Creek society by late 1813.  The Redsticks 
attacked the Americans and objected to Council leadership by uniting Upper Creek towns 
in the Tensaw expeditionary force.  When the U.S. planned to invade Creek country a 
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month after Fort Mims, the non-aligned Creeks responded by forging a peace coalition 
that disputed the Redsticks and favored peace with the U.S. 
 Unfortunately, the U.S. military and state militias ignored the peace coalition.  
Seeking to avenge the Anglo-American deaths at Fort Mims and to implement larger 
imperialistic goals, the U.S. declared war on the Creeks in September 1813.  Although 
only a small portion of Creeks fought in the Battle of Fort Mims, Southern planters and 
politicians used that battle to justify invading Creek society, expelling the Creeks from 
their lands, and transforming the South into a slave-based economy, free of indigenous 
people.  “Remember Fort Mims” became America’s rallying cry.  It served as a 
propaganda piece that blamed all Creeks for the Redsticks’ actions, and inflated the 
number of people killed inside the fort from the accurate figure (about 147) to 400 or 
more.  Americans prepared for war throughout the fall of 1813, when Tennessee, 
Georgia, and Mississippi Territory readied their troops.  For his part, Major General 
Andrew Jackson, commander of U.S. forces, led the Tennessee regiment.
79
 
 Federal and state military forces invaded Upper Creek country with unimaginable 
ferocity.  There, from September 1813 to May 3, 1814, they destroyed forty-three towns 
and villages as well as more than 1,000 houses.  Twelve additional towns and talofas 
were abandoned between August 1813 and July 1814.  Hundreds perished in a “total 
war” that looked more like absolute conquest than mere punishment for Fort Mims.  
Creeks perished in several lopsided battles that resulted in the massacre of Creek towns.  
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Death, famine, poverty, and dislocation became staples of Creek society.
80
  The first 
“major battle and victory” for the U.S. took place in Tullushatchee on November 3, 1813.  
There, U.S. forces under General John Coffee killed all of the town’s Redsticks.  Days 
later the Hillabees, who were in the midst of arbitrating a peace with Jackson, were 
inexplicably mowed down in the Hillabee Massacre.
81
  Months later, on March 27, 1814, 
Jackson led a force of fifteen hundred Americans, five hundred Cherokees, and about one 
hundred U.S.-allied Creeks against a Redstick fortification on the upper Tallapoosa River 
known as Tohopeka (“Horseshoe Bend”).  Some eight hundred Redstick men lost their 
lives at the Battle of Tohopeka.  Despite the Redstick defeat, American forces obliterated 
twenty-one additional towns and talofas in several clean-up operations between April 11 
and May 3.
82
  For the next several months, some 8,200 Creek refugees requested rations 
at the Creek Agency and at U.S. forts posted around Creek country.
83
  American military 
power, coupled with an imperialistic ideology, left Upper Creek country in ruins. 
 Basking in the glow of victory, Jackson wrestled from the Creeks one of the 
largest land cessions in American history.  On August 9, 1814, Jackson and other military 
authorities cajoled Creek headmen, many of whom had been his allies during the war, 
into signing/touching pen to the Treaty of Fort Jackson.  The treaty began: “WHEREAS 
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an unprovoked, inhuman, and sanguinary war, waged by the hostile Creeks against the 
United States, hath been repelled ... successfully [by] the said States, in conformity with 
principles of national justice and honorable warfare....”  Essentially, the treaty blamed all 
Creeks for the Battle of Fort Mims, justified America’s disproportionate military 
response, and coolly ignored the destruction of Upper Creek country.  Admitting that the 
Creeks’ defeat amounted to a “conquest,” the treaty required the Indians to relinquish 
about twenty-three million acres of Creek (and Cherokee) hunting lands to the U.S.  
These lands comprised about half of modern Alabama and sections of southern Georgia 
and north Florida.  This treaty unequivocally established America’s suzerainty over the 
Creeks.
84
 
 Jackson and other officials misled the Creeks about the exact size of the land 
cession.  Days before the signing, Hawkins did not clearly explain the “line of conquest,” 
which encompassed Lower and Upper Creek hunting grounds.
85
  Months later, when the 
Creeks realized that two-thirds of the Creek domain had been ceded, they contested the 
cession.  In a Council meeting, Big Warrior complained to Hawkins that Jackson had 
pressed the Creeks for a land cession during the war and ignored Big Warrior’s counsel 
to allow the Creeks to discuss the issue “in our own minds.”  Moreover, he alleged that 
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the “whole nation did not meet together to hear the treaty”; nor was the treaty conducted 
in the proper space of “a town house” but, rather, “in the woods.”
86
 
 The Treaty of Fort Jackson expanded freedom for Anglo-Americans, deepened 
the South’s commitment to African American slavery, and diminished the rights and 
livelihood of Indian people.  By forcing the Creeks to cede a gargantuan tract of land, the 
treaty spurred the expansion of King Cotton and chattel slavery across the South.  It also 
fostered a chorus of Southern politicians, editors, thinkers, and settlers whose demands 
for Southern Indian removal became more vociferous by the 1820s, leading eventually to 
Indian Removal in the mid-1830s.  By transferring millions of acres of Creek and 
Cherokee lands to the federal government, Fort Jackson limited Southern Indian 
sovereignty to a smaller portion of lands.
87
 
 In the postwar period, Council headmen and Redstick leaders continued to rely on 
the practice of coalition-building.
88
  Nevertheless, the two competing coalitions that took 
shape in this era magnified Creek division.  While Big Warrior, William McIntosh, and 
several Council headmen leveraged their relationship with Agent Hawkins, thousands of 
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Redsticks fled Creek country as a multi-town unit.  They took refuge in Spanish Florida, 
where they established towns near one another and perhaps confederated with the 
Seminoles.  As a result, the creation of two independent postwar coalitions, much like the 
Redstick and peace coalitions of mid-1813, accelerated the fissioning of Creek society.  
Both at “home” and in “diaspora,” the Creeks lived in a widely dispersed and politically 
divided world.
89
 
 At Fort Jackson, the first coalition formed around the National Council and its 
allied towns.  There, thirty-two headmen representing twenty-eight major towns and 
talofas put their mark to the treaty on August 9.  Surely they were coerced, and, as one 
scholar suggests, Jackson probably handpicked the headmen, many of whom assisted the 
General’s campaign at Tohopeka.
90
  Despite these fraught circumstances, Fort Jackson 
presented headmen with the opportunity to represent their communities in an official 
capacity.  Moreover, many signers hailed from towns and talofas that had been destroyed 
or abandoned during the U.S.-phase of the war, including: “Uchee Mico” of Yuchi Town, 
“Choocchau Haujo” of Woccoccoie, “Esholoctee” of Nauchee, “Yoholo Micco” of Upper 
Eufaula, “Stinthellis Haujo” of Aubecooche, métis John O’Kelly of Coosa, “Eneah 
Thlucco” of Imookfau, “Espokokoke Haujo” of Wewocau, “Eneah Thlucco Hopoiee” of 
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 Sheri Marie Shuck-Hall’s exploration of a Native-centered concept of diaspora has 
inspired my thinking about postwar Creek society.  See Journey to the West: The Alabamas and 
Coushatta Indians (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 6-8.  She writes, for 
instance, “Diasporic communities often maintain a collective memory or myth of their ancestral 
place and seek to rebuild former spaces elsewhere. Groups may participate in a return movement 
to the homeland and reconnect with those who may have stayed behind.”  Bonds are created both 
among the migrants and between the migrants and “‘stayers’” (6).  Such a dynamic applies to the 
postwar Creeks. 
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 In a telephone conversation with the author on August 13, 2015, anthropologist Robbie 
Ethridge raised this possibility. 
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Tallassee, “Talessee Fixico” of Hickory Ground, Captain Isaacs of Coosada, métis 
“Tuskegee Emautla, or John Carr” of Tuskegee, and métis Alexander Grayson of 
Hillabee.
91
  By attending the treaty even under circumstances not of their own choosing, 
these headmen showcased the endurance of the connections among Creek towns and 
provinces. 
 Additionally, the order in which the headmen signed the treaty (with an “x” mark) 
provides further clues as to the survival of towns and provinces as well as the growth of a 
postwar coalition.  The primary Council headmen signed first, including speaker for the 
Upper Creeks, Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee, and speaker for the Lower Creeks, Little 
Prince of Broken Arrow.  After that, Lower Creek headmen signed together, forming a 
sort of Lower Creek bloc.  Their towns are listed thusly: Coweta, Cussita, Hitchiti, 
Sauwoogelo, Lower Eufaula, Apalachicola, Padjeeligau, and Yuchi Town.  Next, 
headmen signed for the Abeika towns in the following order: Kialijee, Woccoccoie, 
Nauchee, Upper Eufaula (“Tallapoosa Eufaulau”), Aubecooche, Corn House, Coosa, 
Imookfau, Wewocau, and Pucantallahassee.  That these towns are listed together suggests 
that despite the U.S. destruction of Upper Creek society, the Abeikas had reestablished 
their province.
92
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 I compare the signatories’ town of origin against the towns destroyed during the war as 
listed in Waselkov and Wood, “Creek War,” 12-14 (Table 1.); Treaty with the Creeks, 1814, in 
Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, ed. Kappler, 2:109-110.  Headmen of two (of four) towns 
attacked in July 1813 by the Redsticks also signed: “Socoskee Emautla” of Kialijee; and Big 
Warrior, Alexander Cornells, and “Micco Aupoegau” of Tuckabatchee (2:109-110).  For 
O’Kelly, see Hawkins, Journal, 12/13/1796, LBH, 1:17.  Alexander Grayson was probably a son 
of “Sinnugee,” likely a Hillabee, and Scotch trader Robert Grayson (“Grierson”); see Hawkins, 
Journal, 12/11/1796, LBH, 1:15 and Hawkins’ “sketch,” LBH, 1:301. 
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 Tallassee, a Tallapoosa town, appears just before Pucantallahassee.  See Treaty with 
the Creeks, 1814, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, ed. Kappler, 2:109-110.  Chisca was an 
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 While coalition-building united one group of Creek towns, it did so at the expense 
of the legitimacy of another group of Creek towns.  Scholars have missed the point that 
by precisely relying on coalition-building to grow and consolidate its power, the National 
Council created an unbridgeable gap between Redstick and non-Redstick, undermining 
the unity necessary to blunt American expansion.  Although Jackson’s supremacy in 
Creek affairs helped reinforce Creek schisms, we must recognize that Creek coalition-
building had become a dangerous liability.  For example, the Tallapoosa towns of 
Hoithlewaulee and Autossee as well as several Alabama towns, the nerve centers of 
Redstick power, sent no delegates to Fort Jackson.  Although one headman from the 
former Redstick towns of Tallassee/Halfway House, Coosada, Tuskegee, and Hickory 
Ground each attended, they were probably not Redsticks.  Not surprisingly, Tame King, 
the “head of the Prophet’s party,” did not attend.
93
  In any case, the Redsticks would have 
scoffed at an invitation to the treaty.  They hated Jackson, the Creeks who assisted him 
during the war, and any Creeks who favored diplomacy with the Americans.  Plus, 
thousands of Redsticks fled to Spanish Florida in the years following Tohopeka.
94
 
 The postwar coalition consolidated its power around métis Creek leadership; 
however, the term “métis” must be approached with caution.  A métis Indian had a Native 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
old name for Yuchi (Swanton, Early History, 119).  I assume métis Timpoochee Barnard 
represented Padjeeligau, located on the Flint River, because his father, Timothy, had intermarried 
with Yuchis there.  Additionally, a headman signed for a Yuchi polity (“Chuskee Tallafau”).  
“Chuskee” might be a corruption of Chisca, an old name for Yuchi.  For the Chiscas, see 
Swanton, Early History, 119. 
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 For “head,” see Hawkins to Armstrong, 7/20/1813, Creek Agency, ASPIA, 1:849.  
 
94
 While the former prophet, Captain Sam Isaacs, attended for Coosada, he does not count 
as a Redstick, for the Redsticks had censured him early in the war for assisting the Council’s 
execution squad.  See Treaty with the Creeks, 1814, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, ed. 
Kappler, 2:109-110. 
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mother and Euro-American father, who instructed his son in the ways of the market 
economy and wealth acquisition.  But blood did not determine culture, meaning a métis 
was not automatically pro-capitalist or pro-American.  Waselkov’s genealogical research 
reveals that many Redsticks prophets who espoused the revival of Creek traditions were, 
perhaps unexpectedly, métis.  Yet they detested economic innovation and a market-
oriented society, which smacked of American influence.
95
  Nor did those métis Indians 
who preferred a market-oriented lifestyle have a monopoly on capitalism in their society.  
The wealthy, pro-Creek, and native-heritage Big Warrior of Tuckabatchee exemplifies 
this complexity.  An owner of slave and livestock property, he advocated Creek interests 
(as can be glimpsed in a talk to Cherokee headman Pathmaker
96
).  Moreover, Big Warrior 
later contested the Fort Jackson treaty when the Creek signers learned in late 1815 that 
they had been misled about the exact size of the cession.
97
  Nor did rich Creeks see eye-
to-eye.  In fact, Big Warrior’s greatest rival in the National Council was another wealthy 
Creek, William McIntosh, a métis headman of Coweta.
98
 
 Market-oriented métis headmen favorable to American interests staked their 
power in the Fort Jackson treaty.  McIntosh signed for Coweta as “major of Cowetau,” 
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 Waselkov, Conquering Spirit, 55.  Whereas Martin and Saunt argue that métis 
headmen tended to be market-oriented and accounted for growing divisions in Creek society, 
Waselkov’s genealogical work shows that the prophets were métis, not market-oriented, and pro-
traditional culture.  Waselkov has successfully moved the scholarship beyond the idea that race 
determined culture in the Native South, an idea that Theda Perdue argued for in “Race and 
Culture: Writing the Ethnohistory of the Early South,” in Ethnohistory 51:4 (Fall 2004): 701-723, 
here 715-716, 719-720. 
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 See Big Warrior to Pathmaker, 5/1[?]/1809, Tuckabatchee, LOSW, roll 1, frames620-
621. 
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 “Journal of Occurrences,” Big Warrior to Hawkins, 9/18/1815, Tuckabatchee, LBH, 
2:754-756. 
 98 Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in 
Crisis (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 63, 65. 
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demonstrating his martial connections to Jackson and the U.S. military.  Moreover, the 
headman possessed significant authority over the Lower Creek towns; he signed not only 
for Coweta but also “for” “Hopoiee Haujo” of Ouseechee, “Chehahaw Tustunnuggee” of 
Chehaw, and “Spokokee Tustunnuggee” of Hurricane Town, a talofa of Chehaw.  These 
towns may have empowered him to voice their interests or, perhaps, he took that liberty 
upon himself.  Although the Coweta Mico (“Micco Achulee”) signed for his town, his 
one “x mark” pales in influence to McIntosh’s four marks.  McIntosh’s ties to America 
were endless and complex.  He shared a cozy relationship with Jackson; served for the 
Americans in the First Seminole War (1817-1818); and was a cousin of Georgia 
Governor George M. Troup.
99
  Other métis signers established themselves as leaders in 
the postwar period, including John O’Kelly of Coosa, Alexander Grayson of Hillabee, 
Timpoochee Barnard (“Captain of Uchees [i.e., Padjeeligau]”), and perhaps John Carr of 
Tuskegee.
100
  The white fathers of these young headmen had traded, lived, and 
intermarried with the Creeks since the eighteenth century. 
 In late 1814 and early 1815, the stabilization of the postwar coalition buttressed 
the chasm between Redstick and non-Redstick.  Despite the Big Warrior-McIntosh 
rivalry, the coalition projected a largely unified face towards the Americans and 
especially Hawkins.  To shore up his own relationship with these headmen, Hawkins 
attempted to alleviate hunger and suffering in war-torn Creek society.  In exchange for 
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 He was related to several other white Georgia officials, too.  See Green, Politics, 54.  
For his service in the First Seminole War, see William McIntosh to David B. Mitchell, 4/13/1818, 
camp near Miccosukee, pp. 1-2, Telamon Cuyler Collection, TCC921, SNAD. 
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 Treaty with the Creeks, 1814, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, ed. Kappler, 
2:109-110. 
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supplying the Creeks with some food and clothing, Hawkins invited the coalition to form 
a “Creek Regiment” in early 1815.  Some 1,405 Creek warriors enrolled in the Regiment, 
drawn from twenty-three towns and talofas (Table 8).  Hawkins commanded the 
Regiment through the head warrior of Coweta, William McIntosh, who was made second 
in command.  A “Maj. Tinsley” served as its quartermaster.  In tandem with Jackson’s 
clean-up operation against the Redsticks in Spanish Florida, the Regiment was formed to 
punish the Redsticks who had fled to the “Negro Fort” in West Florida (Figure 19).  
There, Creeks, Seminoles, and runaway slaves mounted a last-ditch effort to resist 
American expansion and slavery with the help of Britain, which supplied the Fort with 
goods and weapons.  American forces eventually destroyed the Fort in 1816, but no 
thanks to the Creek Regiment.
101
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 Hawkins to Monroe, 1/23/1815, “Camp near Coweta,” LBH, 2:716, and 677 (for C. L. 
Grant’s context).  For quartermaster, see Hawkins to Early, 2/20/1815, “Camp 115 Mile,” LBH, 
2:718.  For the multiracial history of the Negro Fort, see Saunt, New Order, 273-290. 
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Table 8. William Triplett, “The Warriors Enrolled in the Service of the U. States under the 
Command of Col. Hawkins.”  (Note: This table has been rearranged to highlight the number of 
warriors contributed by each town.) 
 
Towns/talofas Enrolled Reserved Marched Officers Non-coms 
1. Coweta 216 44 172 8 0 
2. Upatoi 158 33 125 6 0 
3. Broken Arrow 154 34 120 6 0 
4. Cussita 111 24 87 4 0 
5. Padjeeligau (“Flint 
river”) 
108 48 60 3 0 
6. Ouseechee 99 21 77 4 0 
7. Imookfau (an 
Okfuskee talofa) 
82 18 65 3 0 
8. Sauwoogelo 73 15 58 3 0 
9. Tuckabatchee 60 13 47 2 0 
10. “Aupaulauchooche” 
(Little Eufaula?) 
52 11 41 2 0 
11. Ooktauhauzausee (a 
Hillabee talofa) 
41 9 32 1 0 
12. Yuchi Town (“old 
town”) 
38 8 30 1 0 
13. Lower Eufaula 38 8 30 1 0 
14. Kialijee 36 8 28 1 0 
15. Upper Eufaula  22 5 17 1 0 
16. Hickory Ground 20 5 15 0 1 
17. Hatchechubbau (a 
Kialijee talofa) 
18 4 14 0 1 
18. Coosada 17 4 13 0 1 
19. Tallassee 16 4 12 0 1 
20. Little Okchai 12 3 9 0 1 
21. Tuskegee 12 3 9 0 1 
22. Corn House (an 
Okfuskee talofa) 
12 3 9 0 1 
23. Okfuskee 10 2 8 0 1 
TOTAL (23) 1405 327 1078 46 8 
 
Source: Compiled by William Triplett, “Adj.,” enclosed in Hawkins to James Monroe, 1/23/1815, 
“Camp near Coweta,” LBH, 2:716-717.  For Hatchechubbau, Ooktauhauzausee, Imookfau, Corn 
House (“Toottocaugee”), and Broken Arrow (“Thlacotchcau”), see Hawkins, “Sketch,” LBH, 
1:301-305.  (The orthography of “Aupaulauchooche” suggests a translation of Little Eufaula.)  
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 The Regiment saw little to no military action, although probably most of the 
1,078 Creek warriors listed as “marched” did march on the Negro Fort.  On January 23, 
Hawkins wrote that “Three divisions of warriors have marched [there] and the remainder 
march today.”
102
  By late February, the Regiment was encamped near the Negro Fort, 
poised to attack.  But on February 25 Hawkins received word that British and American 
diplomats had signed the Treaty of Ghent in Ghent, Belgium, on Christmas Eve 1814, 
which ended the War of 1812.  Because the Creek Regiment had been partially charged 
with fighting the British, America’s wartime enemy, it disbanded immediately.
103
  
Despite its brief tenure the Creek Regiment is important with regard to postwar Creek 
politics. 
 To be sure, the Regiment served practical purposes.  Military service enabled 
warriors and their “families,” according to Hawkins, to obtain “aid,” including food and 
clothing.  Although the Fort Jackson treaty guaranteed $40,000 dollars to non-Redstick 
Creeks, Hawkins complained in January 1815 that provisions were “very scarce” in 
Lower Creek country, where the Regiment was based.
104
  To alleviate the suffering, 
Hawkins allowed families to purchase clothing on credit, which amounted to $10,370.50.  
By mid-1815, however, the warriors had not received payment for service, and it is 
unclear if they ever did.  Obtaining basic necessities came at a high price and perhaps 
served to increase Creeks’ debts to the U.S. factories.
105
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 Hawkins to Monroe, 1/23/1815, “Camp near Coweta,” LBH, 2:716. 
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 Hawkins to Jackson, 2/27/1815, “Camp near” the forks, LBH, 2:721. 
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 Hawkins to Monroe, 1/23/1815, “Camp near Coweta,” LBH, 2:716. 
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 Hawkins to Jackson, 5/5/1815, Creek Agency, LBH, 2:725.  For a Creek regiment that 
served in the First Seminole War, see “Pay Roll of Company of Creek Indian Warriors 
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 The Regiment served coalition politics.  At least fifteen of the towns that 
committed warriors to the Regiment also sent headmen to the Fort Jackson treaty 
conference.
106
  This meant that, plausibly, the same headmen who signed the treaty 
encouraged their town’s warriors to join the Regiment, and that in turn, the warriors 
supported the headmen by enrolling in the Regiment.  The mutually reinforcing dynamic 
between headmen and warriors suggests that ordinary Creeks sanctioned the postwar 
coalition leadership.  Whereas the Redstick War poisoned relations between town 
authorities and young warriors, Creeks in the postwar era tried to put the horrors of the 
past behind them.  Thus, in addition to securing food, Creeks perhaps served in the Creek 
Regiment to cultivate generational unity within towns. 
 Though bolstering the postwar coalition, the Creek Regiment enhanced the 
division between the coalition and the dislocated Redsticks.  Table 8 depicts the 
correlation between a town’s enrollment of warriors and its affiliation with Redsticks.  
For instance, the five towns that enrolled the most warriors (747 or one-half) eschewed 
the Redsticks.  Conversely, the fewer the number of warriors offered up for service 
increases the likelihood that their town was a former ally of the Redsticks.  For instance, 
warriors hailing from the ex-Redstick towns 18-22 in Table 8 barely participated in the 
Regiment.  Who these warriors were is uncertain; perhaps they had supported the Council 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Commanded by Capt. ‘Nehalockopoye’ lately in the service of the United States,” 11/28/1818, 
Fort Hawkins, pp.1-2, Keith Read Collection, KRC013, SNAD.  Unfortunately, I am unable to 
determine the warriors’ and Nehalockopoye’s town affiliation.  Nehalockopoye cannot be 
William McIntosh of Coweta whose war title was Tustunnuggee Hutkee (“White Warrior”). 
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 Fifteen towns: Coweta, Cussita, Padjeeligau, Ouseechee, Imookfau, Sauwoogelo, 
Tuckabatchee, Yuchi Town, Kialijee, Upper Eufaula, Hickory Ground, Coosada, Tallassee, 
Tuskegee, and Corn House. 
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or remained neutral during the conflict.  In short, by serving in the Regiment, Creek 
warriors accessed some trade goods and demonstrated its loyalty to Hawkins and, more 
generally, the United States.  But their service, designed to fight the Redstick holdouts in 
Spanish Florida, simultaneously widened the chasm between Redsticks and Council-
allied towns. 
 In August, months after the Regiment’s dissolution, more than two hundred 
“Distressed” Creeks descended on Coweta seeking money and provisions from Hawkins 
and Assistant Agent Christian Limbaugh.  These “Distressed” Creeks were largely 
affiliated with the National Council and, therefore, the postwar coalition.  Hawkins 
invited them to Coweta so that they could lodge individual claims against the Redsticks.  
Too, he probably hoped to fulfill his obligations to those who served in the Creek 
Regiment.  The “claim against the Hostile Indians,” as this document is called, was 
compiled by Limbaugh.  He catalogued the names and/or titles of micos, other officials, 
women, warriors, and slaves (see example in Figure 18).  Altogether 260 Creeks and nine 
American traders tendered claims for $100,569.37½. 
 The claim “against the Hostile Indians” represents an additional example by 
which coalition-building divided Creeks.  As affiliates of the postwar coalition lodged 
their claim with Limbaugh, they consolidated that coalition’s power and marginalized the 
Redsticks.  Admittedly, the claim’s ledgers obscure as much as they reveal.  Whether the 
“Distressed” Creeks expected to receive money or provisions (or both) is unknown.  
Whether individuals lodged a claim to recoup the loss of property, to provide for one’s 
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family or town, or for more selfish motives are also difficult to ascertain.
107
  Still, the 
document allows us to tease out the specific relationships between towns and between 
individuals in the postwar coalition. 
 Class divisions permeated the coalition.  The average amount claimed by ordinary 
lesser-status Indians was $125.  On the other hand, both native-born and métis headmen 
(and some women) individually claimed eight times as much as ordinary individuals, or 
about $1,000.  This suggests that Creeks made claims based on their political position in 
society and not, as Claudio Saunt has suggested, based on their race.  To reiterate a point 
I made earlier, métis Creeks did not have a monopoly on wealth.
108
  For instance, the 
native-born property-owning headman of Tuckabatchee, Big Warrior, requested the 
largest claim, a mindboggling $26,048—or one-quarter of the sum of all claims!  
Moreover, the native-born and recently widowed “Sen,nec,chee” of Hillabee claimed part 
of her late Euro-American husband’s property ($2,138).  Her husband had been 
Hillabee’s trader.  Following their mother, two of her métis children claimed their 
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 Limbaugh to Hawkins, 8/9/1815, Coweta, with claims enclosure, both unpaginated.  I 
paginate according to folder page; here p. 1, 2 (for sum), 4 (traders), 5-18 (Creeks).  For 
document, see Secretary Of War, Letters Received, 1815, Letters Sent/Received by the Secretary 
of War Relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-1824 (U.S. National Archives, Archives Unbound), 
http://go.galegroup.com/gdsc/i.do?&id=GALE%7CSC5102563217&v=2.1&u=gree35277&it=r&
p=GDSC&sw=w&viewtype=fullcitation (accessed May 22, 2015). 
 Limbaugh organized his ledger by town: 27 Cussitas requested $2,083.37½; 61 Broken 
Arrows, $10,881.75; 72 Cowetas, $8,117.75; 80 Tuckabatchees, $65,908.75; 20 other Creeks 
(among them three Hillabees, a Tallassee, a Tuskegee, and two Lower Eufaulas), $9,262.  
Accounting for the traders’ claims ($4,315.75), the grand total is $100,569.37½—$10 more than 
Limbaugh’s miscalculated figure, “$100,559: 37½” (p. 2).   William McIntosh’s claim of 
“upwards of $4,000” (p. 1) does not appear in the ledger. 
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 Big Warrior’s claim alone challenges Claudio Saunt’s argument that mixed-heritage 
elites favored a market-oriented economy that spawned class divisions in Creek society.  Native-
born elites, too, spawned class divisions. 
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father’s remaining property ($3,940.25).
109
  Some métis headmen like Tuckabatchee 
interpreter Alexander Cornells requested an indemnity ($6,835) for property destruction.  
Other métis leaders, such as William McIntosh, hoped to recoup money ($4,000) for the 
loss of slaves.
110
  The postwar coalition exuded class. 
 Despite the coalition’s stark class divisions, though, Creeks lodged a claim for the 
same reason they joined the Creek Regiment: to secure basic necessities, such as food, 
building materials, clothing, and other provisions.  After the American military had 
burned cornfields and hundreds of domestic structures in the U.S.-Creek War, food 
shortages and homelessness rose to a fever pitch.
111
  Hillabee, for instance, likely 
recovered from the November 1813 Hillabee Massacre only gradually.  While market-
oriented Creeks surely hoped to recover money and goods for themselves and their 
families, the coalition as a whole expressed its wish to reestablish the support network of 
clans and towns, lessen privation, and restore a sense of normalcy to society by lodging 
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 The claims of Sen-nec-chee and her children reveal an innovation in inheritance 
patterns, at least among a Hillabee family.  That they claimed their husband’s/father’s wealth 
pushed against matrilineal customs, under which a wife inherited her deceased uncle’s, not 
husband’s, property.  At the same time, Sen-nec-chee and her children’s claim showcases the 
staying power of Creek women in town politics among postwar Creeks.  For changes and 
continuities of Creek inheritance patterns in the 1700s and early 1800s, see Kathryn E. Holland 
Braund, “Guardians of Tradition and Handmaidens to Change: Women’s Roles in Creek 
Economic and Social Life during the Eighteenth Century,” American Indian Quarterly 14:3 
(Summer 1990): 239-258, here 241, 245, 246, 253.  Braund points out, however, that Creek 
“social organization” tended to endure, even after Removal: “Matrilineal kinship patterns, 
matrilocal residence, town organization, [and] the ceremonial year . . . continued as central 
features of Creek life well after Removal” (253). 
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 Limbaugh to Hawkins, 8/9/1815, claims, pp. 15 (Cornells), 1 (McIntosh), 7 (three 
Hillabees), 15 (Big Warrior), and 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15 (métis claims). 
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 Hawkins to Early, 11/5/1814, Fort Hawkins, LBH, 2:702 (“Corn is scarce in the upper 
towns of the Lower Creeks”), and Hawkins to Early, 4/21/1815, Fort Hawkins, LBH, 2:724 (for 
“Indians” eating alligators).  For postwar demographic conditions, see Waselkov and Wood, 
“Creek War,” 10, 15. 
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claims.  Given Big Warrior’s pro-Creek interests, he must have submitted his large claim 
($26,048) on behalf of his townspeople and to provide for other Creeks who took refuge 
in his town in 1815.
112
  Other headmen may have requested money for their people, 
including: a headman of Corn House ($3,232); the mico of Ouseechee ($3,588); perhaps 
a headman of Broken Arrow ($1,645); and two Hitchiti headmen ($807.50).  Wives of 
Native headmen, too, supported their husbands and probably their towns when they 
lodged a claim.  Take, for example, Big Warrior’s “wife” ($432) and Patty ($147), who 
was the “wife” of a Broken Arrow warrior.  “Ce,ho,lus,kee[,] a woman” of Broken 
Arrow, requested $274.
113
 
 Aside from the possible attempt to secure money for their families and towns, all 
of the individuals who lodged a claim against the Redsticks demonstrated that the 
cultivation of unity within their own coalition depended on marginalizing the Redsticks.  
Coalition headmen helped drive that disunity.  Those who signed the Fort Jackson treaty 
one year earlier and who lodged a claim included: Big Warrior; William McIntosh and 
Coweta Mico; Okfuskee Yoholo of Corn House; Tuckabatchee Tustunnuggee and Noble 
Kinnard of Hitchiti Town; the Grayson family of Hillabee; and, perhaps, Tallassee Fixico 
of Hickory Ground.
114
  The 260 “Distressed” Creeks, led by these headmen, eventually 
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 Tuckabatchee became a refugee center of sorts.  Limbaugh’s document shows that 
Okfuskee Yoholo of Corn House is listed under “Tookaubatchee,” as is the mico of Ouseechee, a 
Lower Creek town, far from Tuckabatchee.  See Limbaugh to Hawkins, 8/9/1815, claims, pp. 16 
(Corn House), 17 (Ouseechee Mico). 
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 Limbaugh to Hawkins, 8/9/1815, claims, pp. 15 (Big Warrior, “wife,” and Andrew), 
16 (“Ocfuskee Youholough” of Corn House), 17 (“Oose,oo,chee Micco”), 8 (“Eufau,lau 
Tus,tun,nug,gee” and “Ce,ho,lus,kee,” both listed under Broken Arrow), 12 (Hitchiti headmen), 9 
(Patty, “wife”), 5-6 (Carr’s slaves), and 10 (Moses and Tom). 
 
114
 The “Ta,le,see Fix,i,co” listed under Tuckabatchee’s claims in Limbaugh to Hawkins, 
8/9/1815, claims, p. 17, might be the same as the “Talessee Fixico, of Ocheobofau” listed in the 
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swayed Congress to act.  In early 1817, the Congressional Committee of Ways and 
Means reported that “their claims to indemnity should not be disregarded.”  The 
Committee reasoned that the Fort Jackson treaty granted such claims.  According to the 
report, “it will be best to appropriate a definite sum,” perhaps as much as “$60,000.”
115
  
Whether or not the U.S. remitted the claim as part of the Creek annuity is uncertain.  
Moreover, the Committee stipulated that to receive the money, the Creeks must accept 
the Fort Jackson land cession.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Treaty with the Creeks, 1814, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, ed. Kappler, 2:110.  For 
Coweta Mico, see Limbaugh to Hawkins, 8/9/1815, claims, p. 11 (“Mic[?] Au,chul,la”) and 
Treaty with the Creeks, 1814, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, ed. Kappler 2:109 (“Micco 
Achulee”). 
 
115
 Claim of the Creeks, 1/29/1817, in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, ed. Walter 
Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 2:126 (hereafter cited 
as ASPIA, volume 2, page number).  
 
388 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  “Tookaubatchee Indians their Claims against the Red Sticks.”  Excerpt from 
Limbaugh, August 8 (?), 1815.  Source:  Limbaugh to Hawkins, 8/9/1815, Coweta, with claims 
enclosure, in Secretary Of War, Letters Received, 1815, Letters Sent/Received by the Secretary of 
War Relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-1824 (U.S. National Archives, Archives Unbound).  
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 In the wake of the destruction wrought by the U.S.-Creek War, a coalition of 
Creeks formed around key National Council headmen, such as McIntosh and Big 
Warrior.  These headmen leveraged their relationship with the U.S. in the attempt to 
restore order to society.  By joining the Creek Regiment or submitting an indemnity 
claim, the Lower Creeks, the Abeika towns, and a few other Upper Creek towns forged 
an impressive alliance.  By consolidating its power through the Creek tradition of 
coalition-building, however, the Council enlarged the gap between the Redsticks and 
Council-allied Creeks, arresting any chance of reconciliation between two bitterly 
opposed peoples.  Coalitions no longer served Creek unity; rather, they permanently 
divided Creeks.  But if coalition-building in Creek country edged out the Redsticks, how 
did they adapt to the postwar era? 
 A combination of crisis, migration, and coalition-restructuring characterized 
Redsticks’ experiences from 1814 to 1821.  Their defeat at Tohopeka followed by the 
Fort Jackson land cession, which included most Upper Creek hunting grounds, triggered 
a Redstick exodus to Spanish Florida.  So, too, did the food shortages occasioned by the 
destruction of towns and crop fields by U.S. and Southern military forces.  Big Warrior 
succinctly captured their plight: they had “lost their lands, their towns and many of their 
relations” (although this just as easily applied to Creeks in the postwar coalition).
116
  
Some Redsticks continued to resist American expansion by joining the British, 
Seminoles, and runaway slaves at the Negro Fort.  Most, however, settled in a broad arc 
spanning from Pensacola to the Florida peninsula.  They lived with, near, or apart from 
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Seminole and black villages and towns in the region.  Tampa Bay became a popular area 
of the Redstick settlements (Figure 19).
117
  Altogether, more than 3,000 Redstick men, 
women, and children lived in Florida by the early 1820s.
118
  In a new environment, the 
Redsticks established towns and forged ties among one together and with the Seminoles.  
In the process, they gradually cut themselves off from Creek country.  This fissure 
marked the historic removal of thousands of Creeks from the rich coalition complex that 
had provided Creeks with the breathing room to adjust to colonialism since the Creek-
Cherokee War. 
 The Redstick migration echoed that of the Hitchiti towns, such as Oconee, which 
established Alachua and other settlements in north Florida in the mid eighteenth century.  
The Hitchiti Seminoles adopted a mixed agricultural and ranching lifestyle, which they 
learned from Spanish herders, and probably acquired bits and pieces of Spanish.  Like the 
Creeks, the Hitchiti-derived Seminoles grew corn, settled in towns, constructed square 
grounds, and practiced the Green Corn Ceremony.  By 1793, according to one Spanish 
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report, two Hitchiti-descended Seminole towns (“Cascavela” and “Anattylaica”) 
inhabited the area.  Some “eighty families” lived in Anattylaica.  Each town grew “corn, 
rice, potatoes, pumpkins,” vegetables, and “some green stuff.”  They also traded 
deerskins for numerous trade goods at St. Augustine, Pensacola, and Apalache.
119
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Figure 19. Early Nineteenth-Century Native South.  In and after 1814, the Redsticks settled in a 
broad arc between Pensacola, West Florida, and Tampa Bay in west-central Florida.  Near 
Tampa, the U.S. constructed Camp Izard adjacent to the Withlacoochee River.  The Suwanee 
River, near Tallahassee, was just north of there.  The “Negro Fort” was built atop Prospect Bluff 
near the mouth of the Apalachicola River.  Source: J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Creeks and Seminoles: 
The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986), 220.  
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 Settling in a new environment posed stiff challenges.  In July 1814, Agent 
Hawkins wrote that the “remains of the eight towns on the Tallapoosa” that fled to 
Pensacola were “greatly distressed there for provisions, and have greatly distressed the 
Spaniards themselves.”
120
  Years later, U.S. official Joseph White reported that Redsticks 
in Pensacola and perhaps in north Florida’s Alachua settlement had “no locality, or 
permanency of habitation.”  They were “frequently found infesting our towns and 
settlements,” and were “reduced to great extremities for the want of the ordinary articles 
of subsistence.”  White’s report indicates that Redstick migrants may have settled on poor 
lands unable to support corn or other crops, but they did obtain basic necessities from 
local trade networks.  Moreover, animal meat was hard to come by.  Given the “scarcity” 
of game in the region, hunters had “almost entirely abandoned the chase,” according to 
White.
121
  In the 1810s and early 1820s, the Redsticks eked out a livelihood on the Gulf 
Coast. 
 Despite these harships, by 1818 at least six out of the eight Tallapoosa towns that 
fled to the panhandle four years earlier had established towns, cultivated farmlands, 
herded cattle, and confederated for mutual protection.
122
  According to William 
McIntosh, who was currently campaigning against the Seminoles in the First Seminole 
war, about 200 men and at least 98 women and children lived in six Tallapoosa towns.  
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Among them lived Peter McQueen, the prophet of Halfway House, who served the 
displaced Tallapoosas as leader.  These Creeks kept about 700 “head of Cattle,” including 
hogs, owned horses, and harvested corn.
123
  The stabilization of the Tallapoosa economy 
and power structure along the Gulf Coast further ruptured the Redsticks’ ties to Creek 
country.
124
 
 By 1821, when Spain formally ceded Florida to the U.S., at least a few of the 
Tallapoosa Redstick towns referenced by McIntosh and perhaps other Redsticks had 
migrated to the vicinity of Tampa Bay and the Withlacoochee River valley.
125
  According 
to a well-informed Seminole headman, Redsticks settled in four towns in the Tampa Bay 
area: “Red Town” (“at” Tampa), “Ac-lock-o-na-yake” (“above” Tampa), “O-pony’s 
Town” (“back” of Tampa), and “Watermelon Town” (“on the seaboard”).  Other 
Redstick refugees settled near them, including the Tallapoosa settlement of “Peter 
McQueen’s village” (on “the other side of Tampa Bay”) and, perhaps, a town named 
“Sowwalla village” (location unknown) whose villagers “fled from [the Coosa River], 
and followed McQueen and [Josiah] Francis, their prophets” to Tampa.  Other Redsticks 
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possibly left the Coosa or Tallapoosa River for the Florida panhandle, where they 
established “Santa-fee-ta-lo-fa” and “Waw-ka-saw-sa” along the Suwanee River 
watershed, just up the coast from Tampa.
126
  Peter McQueen’s Village, Santa Fe Talofa, 
and Wawkasawsa might be among those Tallapoosa towns identified by McIntosh in 
1818.
127
  In sum, as Tallapoosa Redsticks migrated east from Pensacola, they continued 
to stick together and offer each other protection and support. 
 Other Florida Redsticks possibly cultivated ties with the Seminoles.  In July 1821, 
Florida Territory Indian Affairs official Jean A. Pénières wrote to Andrew Jackson that 
3,000 people inhabited “Mickasuky, Suhane, Moskoky, Sante Fé, Red Sticks, and 
Echitos” (my emphasis).  Except for Red Sticks, which presumably was a settlement of 
diasporic Redsticks, all were Seminole towns.  That Pénières listed the town of Red 
Sticks among five Seminole towns raises the possibility that these particular Redsticks 
had forged ties with the Seminoles, helping to ease the migrants’ transition into Floridian 
geopolitics.
128
  Additional evidence reveals possible confederation between the Redsticks 
and Seminoles.  Sante Fé had a talofa named Santa Fe Talofa (“Santa-fee-ta-lo-fa”), 
which had been settled by Redsticks fleeing from the Coosa or Tallapoosa River 
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sometime after the war.
129
  Thus, while some Florida Redstick towns partnered together, 
others preferred fastening ties with the Seminoles.  It is likely, too, that all of the Florida 
Redsticks found ways of visiting or communicating with one another. 
 The Redstick migration originated in the changing economic and political 
conditions of early-nineteenth century Creek society.  The combination of economic 
want, class division, the National Council’s assumption of power over clans, and 
Tecumseh’s message of world renewal gave rise to a cadre of Creek Redstick prophets in 
the summer of 1813.
130
  They called on disgruntled Creeks to purify society by killing 
town chiefs who accepted Hawkins’ “plan” and by destroying the accouterments of 
American wealth, such as cattle, hogs, and fences.  Almost instantly, the Redstick 
revitalization movement divided the Creeks.  Thousands flocked to the Redsticks, while 
many others rallied behind the Council.  Some tried to remain neutral by refusing to 
embroil themselves in the conflict. 
 Revitalization restructured the old coalition network by splitting it into two 
geographically and politically distinct networks over time: the Florida Redstick Creeks 
and Alabama Creeks.  Initially, in the summer of 1813, the political networks that knit 
Creeks together complicated town loyalties and offered a brief moment of conflict 
resolution.  The stakes were raised, however, when the Redsticks realigned the 
Revolutionary-era coalitions.  When a peace coalition arose from the ashes of Fort Mims 
in early September, Redsticks and non-Redsticks lay on two irreconcilable sides.  The 
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devastation of Upper Creek country and the 23-million-acre land cession enlarged the gap 
between the non-aligned and Redstick Creeks.  The Big Warrior-McIntosh postwar 
coalition searched for stability in the Creek Regiment and claims commission by 
consolidating its power at the exclusion of the Redsticks.  At the same time, thousands of 
Redsticks fled for refuge in Spanish Florida and established new villages and towns there 
hundreds of miles from their natal talwas along the Tallapoosa and Coosa Rivers.  By 
forging political ties among one another and with the Seminoles, the Redsticks like the 
National Council relied on coalition-building.  As the Redsticks entrenched themselves in 
Florida, the coalition complex that had given rise to, for instance, the Revolutionary-era 
coalitions, the Three Rivers Resolution, and the Hickory Ground Resolution, crumbled.  
Upper Creeks who had once formed an integral part of the coalitions in Creek society 
now inhabited new lands far removed from the “Three Rivers.” 
 Many scholars have traced the origins, duration, and aftershocks of Creek 
revitalization.  Some like Martin and Dowd examine the concepts of world renewal 
ceremonialism and sacred power, while others like Waselkov and Hudson refocus the 
scholarship on local issues of kinship and place in the Redstick era.  Few, however, have 
interrogated the ways in which revitalization reshaped Creek politics and coalition-
building, which had in many cases serviced Creek autonomy, stability, unity, and peace 
since the colonial era.  Instead of equipping the Creeks with the sacred powers to 
overcome colonization, the Creek revitalization movement shook coalition-building to its 
foundations.  The Redstick attack on Fort Mims in August 1813 derived from the 
formation of a cross-town coalition that while uniting the Revolutionary-era coalitions, 
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cleaved society.  Exacerbating political fissures, the non-aligned Creeks constructed a 
peace coalition with the Americans weeks later, assisted Jackson’s army in the defeat of 
the Redsticks in March 1814, and erected a postwar coalition around the exclusion of the 
Redsticks, who fled to Spanish Florida.  Although scholars have inspected the ways in 
which U.S. colonization split the Creeks into Redstick and non-Redstick, Creeks 
themselves hastened division by obeying a consensual form of politics that fostered two 
competing hardline coalitions.  By 1821, when the Redstick exodus to Florida was 
complete, coalition-building had engendered permanent division.
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This dissertation has traced how Creek Indian families, clans, towns, and 
provinces inspired, shaped, and thwarted Creek headmen’s ability to lead during the 
colonization of the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth century Native South.  Part and 
parcel to that process, it has also tracked how headmen’s community allegiances 
determined and frustrated Creek rulership.  By examining British, American, and Spanish 
records as well as Creek Indian “talks,” it argues that Creek politics was community-
based, and that the impact of community membership on political practices and political 
culture was double-edged.  From the conclusion of the Creek-Cherokee War to the 
aftermath of the Redstick War, the Creek “community politics” witnessed a dialectical 
relationship between unity and disunity, peace and warfare, and innovation and tradition. 
 The Three Rivers Resolution of 1793 acknowledged that multilayered tension.  
When Bird Tail King and Cussita Mico announced to U.S. authorities in April 1793 that 
“The three rivers have talked, and wished for peace,” they were not being rhetorical.  
Rather, they envisioned Creek unity with the language of Creek locality and captured a 
general sentiment among Creeks that they should tackle the problem of U.S. colonization 
head-on.  Many town headmen from the Chattahoochee, Tallapoosa, and Coosa Rivers 
united around a policy towards the Americans and Chickasaws.  Yet the towns and the 
resident clans of those towns supported that policy if it did not conflict with local courses
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 of action.  A key framer of the Resolution, Mad Dog sensed that mutuality between unity 
and custom when clan vengeance moved him to assault and kill Chickasaws during the 
Creek-Chickasaw War.  Trapped in the clutches of retaliation, he was unable to service a 
larger diplomatic agenda.
1
 
 To rule with legitimate authority, headmen forged impressive multi-town 
coalitions on behalf of their towns and provinces.  Those political support networks were 
designed to defend hunting grounds, secure goods from Euro-American traders, and 
promote peace with Euro-American colonies and other indigenous populations.  In fact, 
Creeks preferred to adjust to colonization in the form of coalitions.  Bonds of clan and 
kinship stabilized those coalitions after headmen adopted outsiders as fictive kin or when 
headmen dissuaded families from launching revenge raids, especially on Euro-American 
settlements, in the pursuit of Anglo-Creek and U.S.-Creek diplomacy.  By relying on 
their clans and towns to shape colonial change, however, the Creeks set themselves up for 
disaster.  Creek leaders’ allegiances to their immediate communities, particularly their 
clans and towns, occasionally clashed with their affiliation with a province, a cross-town 
coalition, or an international alliance.  Since headmen needed to represent a broad array 
of peoples and interests in order to maintain their authority, their participation in 
coalitions foundered especially on ties to their clan.  The international principle of clan 
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retaliation (lex talionis) obligated an aggrieved family to mete out punishment on the 
offending party, such as on the Choctaws and Chickasaws.  Clan justice destabilized 
society by smashing town-based coalitions, and it uprooted diplomatic settlements by 
embroiling towns in regional conflicts and war, which lasted for many years.  By the 
Redstick War, the whole coalition building system became shaky and unstable, as towns, 
like clans, became unreliable community institutions for the building of coalitions.  Town 
headmen, for instance, mustered support and organized coalitions to harm one another, 
exacerbating a preexisting climate of severe social, economic, and geopolitical change. 
 From the cessation of the Creek-Cherokee War in 1753 to the completion of the 
Redstick exodus to Spanish Florida in 1821, the power and authority of headmen rested 
on representing a majority opinion in their clan, town, or province or on persuading a 
majority of people within a clan, town, or province to accept a course of action.  The long 
career of headmen like Tame King, Mad Dog, and Big Warrior suggests that they ruled 
by consensus, primarily doing so by forging and participating in cross-town coalitions.  
There were exceptions of course, as when the New York treaty signers consented to the 
Oconee Cession or when the national Speaker, Hopoie Micco of Hickory Ground, ceded 
the Okmulgee lands to the U.S.  But those exceptions reinforced the consensual rule, as 
when the Cussitas executed Hopoie Micco so as to affirm the participation of a broad 
cross-section of towns in political affairs. 
 Town headmen continued to fasten bonds with one another in the era of Indian 
Removal.  The expansion of the Southern states compelled towns to defend their lands as 
a coalition.  After a minority of corrupt headmen illegally ceded Creek lands east of the 
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Chattahoochee to Georgia in 1825, Southern settlers, politicians, and intellectuals 
launched a program of dispossession.  Euro-American Southerners sought to “remove” 
all Southern Indians from the South and to force them to resettle in Indian Territory 
(Oklahoma after 1907).  In 1830, the ardent Indian-hater President Andrew Jackson 
rallied support behind the Indian Removal Bill, which the House of Representatives 
approved by a slim margin (102 to 97) on May 26.  Two days later, Jackson signed the 
bill into law.  Although the Creeks signed the Treaty of Cusseta with federal 
commissioners in 1832, granting them to right to stay in what was now Alabama, they 
nontheless faced pressures from Georgia and Alabama settlers to remove once the 
Removal Bill became law.
2
 
 In response, Creeks adapted to removal as allied communities.  For instance, a 
five-town coalition of twelve Upper Creek headmen informed Jackson that they “as a 
Nation and a people” once lived by their own “laws [customs] and privileges.”  But their 
best chance to survive, they said, was to remove “to the new home provided for us in the 
west by our father The President.”  As a “Nation,” they stressed the unity of the Creek 
Indians, but as a “people,” they elevated the community roots of Creek society.
3
  Even 
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under duress the Creeks conceptualized change with the language of politics, local 
custom, and coalition-building.  Unfortunately, a combination of factors induced the vast 
majority of Creeks to undertake removal in 1836 and 1837.  How Creek communities 
rebuilt their political structures in a new environment is, however, a story for another 
day.
4
 
 The future of Creek Indian history and, more generally, Native South studies 
should continue along a localist/community trajectory.  In order to understand how 
colonization reshaped the history of the Native South, scholars must continue to focus on 
the community categories that structured the experienes of indigenous Southerners, 
including clans, the law of retaliation, town leadership, coalition leadership, the symbols 
of political power, and the political language deployed by coalition leaders in the service 
of coalition-building.
5
  The colonization of the early modern Atlantic basin comes into 
sharp focus when cross-community ties are privileged over and above European-Indian 
ties.
6
  The Southern Indians accommodated and resisted colonization by relying on 
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coalition-building practices, which were both aided and stalled by the community forces 
giving rise to them.
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Ethnohistory, Las Vegas, NV, November 6, 2015).  Rindfleisch’s concept of “intimate” power 
explores the ways in which Lower Creek headmen leveraged kinship and power to forge ties with 
Scots-Irish traders linked into the wider Atlantic world. 
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